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ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses the integration of' colonial Ghana into the world
trading network between 1886 and 1939.

It attempts to explain the underde-

velopment of Ghana's economy as a result of her subjection to a system of
economic and political imperialism.

Ghana's contact with Britain resulted in a

situation in which, although her trade economy "developed, 11 her economic
potential, as well as the potential :for development of her trading and
entrepreneurial classes, was thwarted.

While three groups, namely the expatri-

ate businessmen, the expatriate Government, and the African elite, interacted
in the setting of economic policies, genera.J.ly speaking the policies were set
by Government for the benefit of the expatriate oligopolists.
what they perceived as

exploitation~

In response to

Ghanaians organized protests and

boy~otts

both against the Government and against the European firms with whom they dealt
as producers end consumers.
The thesis, then, is organized around various aspects of Ghana's e·::!onomic situation between 1886 and 1939 which help to explain her
within the world economy.
system prior to 1886.

underdevelop~ent

Chapter I summarizes her role in the world economic

Chapter III elaborates on the development of Ghana's

role as a producer of prima:ry products and a consumer of manufactured goods; in
short, her

11

peripheralization. 11

Chapter IV deals with the progressive oligopo-

lization of the Ghanaian economy; the takeover of trade, shipping and

ban~ing

by European firms, the various agreements in restraint of trade which were in
force in the colony, and their effects on indigenous businessmen.

Chapters 'l

and VI deal with th<::: co-operation betv.·een the British economic and political
elites in Ghana and the effects which this co-operation had on economic policy;
specifically on transport policy, the intro(:uction of modern currency, inYestment policies, a..>1d Govemment 1 s feeble attercpts at crop diversification a..1d
.,
..i.

2

quality control.

Chapters II and VII discuss two movements of African resist-

ance to foreign economic control which

roU&~ly

coincide with the beginning and

the end of the period, and Which indicate the extent of African opposition:
Chapter II is concerned with the attempted institution of a Crown Lands Bill
which would have removed ownership of land from African hands, and Chapter VII
is concerned with the two large boycotts of European cocoa-buying firms which
took place in 1930-31 and 1937-38.

The

con~luding

chapter considers the under-

development of Ghana and the thwarting of her possibilities for indigenous
capitalist growth in the light of the research presented in the preceding
chapters.
The purpose of the thesis is to describe the underdevelopment of colonial Ghana in such a way as to have meaning fJr scholars unfamiliar with Ghana,
or indeed, Africa, and to situate Ghana wit::1in the "world systems" school of
analysis of underdevelopment.

ABREGE
Le sujet de cette these est 1 1 entree du Ghana colonial dans le reseau

mondial d'echanges commerciaux entre 1886 et 1939.

Le sous-developpement de

l'economie ghaneenne y est interprete comme etant le resultat de son
assujettition

a un

systeme politiquement et economiquement imperialiste.

Le

contact entre le Ghana et la Grande-Bretagne, bien qu'ayant permis le
"developpement" des ressources d 1 echanges commerciau:x du Ghana, ettouffa le
potentiel economique aussi bien que le potentiel de developpement des classes
marchandes du pays.

Alors que trois groupes principaux se partageaient

l'organisation de la politique economique,

a savoir

les hommes d'affaires

expatries, le gouvernement expatrie, et 1 1 elite africaine, le gouvernement
etablissait generalement sa politique en fonction des interets d 1 oligopoles
expatries.

En reponse

a ce

qu'ils consideraient leur exploitation, les

Ghaneens organiserent protestations et boycottages contre le gouvernement et
les firmes europeennes avec lesquelles ceux-ci entretenaient des relations de
producteurs/consommateurs.
Cette these est done organisee autour des differents aspects de la
situation economique ghaneenne, entre 1886 et 1939, qui expliquent son sousdeveloppement a l'interieur de l'economie mondiale.
son

~le

dans le

syst~me

Le chapitre premier resume

economique mondial avant 1886.

Le chapitre III etudie

les details du developpement du Ghana en tant que producteur de matieres
premi~res

et de consommateur de produits manufactures; en bref sa

"peripheralise.tion. "*

Le chapi tre IV examine la transformation progressive de

l'economie ghaneenne en economie oligopole, la monopolisation du commerce, des
expeditions et des banques par des firmes europeennes, les differents accords

*Terme de l'auteur.

N. du T.

3

4
imposes aux colonies et restraignant les echanges commerciaux, et leurs effets
sur les hommes d'affaires

indig~nes.

Les chapitres V et VI traitent des effets

de la cooperation entre les elites britanniques economiques et politiques du
Ghana et l'influence de cette cooperation sur la politique economique;
principalement sur les transports, l'introduction d'une monnaie moderne, la
politique d'investissements, et les faibles efforts du gouvernement vers la
diversification et le contr$le de qualite des recoltes.
Les chapitres II et VII examinent deux mouvements de resistance
africaine au controle economique etranger qui coincident presque avec le debut
et la fin de la periode, et qui donnent une indication de la mesure de
l'opposition africaine.

Le chapitre II examine la tentative d'imposer la

"Crown Lands Bill"* par laquelle la terre aurait ete enlevee aux africains, et
le chapitre VII s'interesse aux deux grands boycottages des firmes europeennes
acheteuses de cacao, qui se

deroul~rent

en 1930-31 et 1937-38.

Le chapitre de

conclusion decrit le sous-developpement du Ghana et l'entravement de ses
possibilites de croissance capitaliste

a la

lumiere de la recherche presentee

dans les chapitres precedents.
Le but de cette these est de decrire le sous-developpement du Ghana
sous une forme comprehensible aux erudits peu familiarises avec l'histoire
ghaneenne, et m@me africaine, et de situer le Ghana dans l'ecole d'analyse du
sous-developpement des "systemes mondiaux."

•

*Projet de loi sur les Terres de la Couronne.
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PREFACE
This thesis is a discussion of the integration of the economy of Ghana
into the world trading network during the period of colonial rule, from about
188.6 to 1939.

The dates chosen are meant to coincide with both the institution

of formal politica.l control in Ghana, and the use of that control to promote
Ghana.' s economic development as a peripheral nation in the world economic system; that is as a supplier of primary agricultural and mineral products and a
buyer of manufactured consumer goods.

The assumption of formal political

control in Ghana was a process extending from 1874 to 1901; however, by 1886
the colonial Government had been relatively firmly established in the Gold
Coast Colony area of Ghana and part of its function was to help to promote the
import-export trade.

During the 1880s the beginnings of the processes whereby

Europeans took over a monopoly of trade became evident, 1939 is taken as the
cut-off date for the thesis as the economic system changed during World War II,
especially with the institution of the Government-run Cocoa Marketing Board,
and it continued to change in the decolonization period up to 1957.
The fundamental objective of this thesis is to present evidence for the
point of view that the present

underdevelop~ent

of the Ghanaian economy is in

part a result of the economic imperialism which it underwent during the colonial period.
her contact

Ghana's contact with the developed capitalist West, especially
~ith

Britain, resulted in a situation in which she was not able to

realize her own economic potential.

The formation of economic policy in Ghana

during the colonial period was a result of conflict and accommodation among
three groups; the external economic elite

~hich

controlled the import-export

trade, the Government which usually sided with this elite but sometimes tried

c

to modify its policies or to protect African traders and peasant producers, and
the African eli.te which was i tseli' interested in participating in trade and
X

xi

c

obtaining some of' the profits '\ihich seemed to be monopolized by its European
competitors.
The view taken here is that the primary cause of' Ghana 1 s underdevelopment was her interaction with a foreign, capitalist nation.

Ghana herself', it

is argued, did not become capitalist, as the possibilities f'or development of'
a bourgeois class were constantly thwarted by economic and political means.
The underdevelopment of the Ghanaian trading class (the class which might have
had the possibility to evolve into an actual bourgeois class) is considered in
tandem with the underdevelopment of' the economy as a whole.
question of'

11

The theoretical

entrepreneurship" is, however, not considered; it seems clear f'rom

the evidence presented in this thesis that Ghanaians were possessed of entrepreneurial skills but that they were denied outlets for these skills by the
international trading system in which they were obliged to operate.

Moreover,

the ability of' Ghanaians to organize protest movements and boycotts deliberately aimed at European businesses can be taken as evidence of their
organizational skills and their determination to take every possible means to
try to break into the world market as independent businessmen.
Because the purpose of' this thesis is primarily to consider the economic
roots of' Ghana's underdevelopment, the body of the work concentrates for the
most part on her external economic ties, not the internal Ghanaian economy.
Developments in social differentiation among Ghanaian peasants are considered,
as also are the Government's policies towards the idea of diversifying the
economy and possibly even introducing some industrial production.

But the

economy of Ghana was oriented towards export growth; railways and roads flowed
south to the harbours, cash-crop production was geared towards the European

c

market.

The internal economy did not develop apace with the import-export

trade; indeed, its lack of' development was precisely a function of' the

xii

c

overdevelopment of the latter sector.
Similarly, this thesis is biased in consideration towards the two areas
of Ghana most closely connected with the world economic system, the Gold Coast
Colony and Ashanti.

Togoland did not become part of Ghana until 1918 after the

League of Nations Mandate was created over the former German territories of
Africa; the Northern Territories, while part of the colonial administration
after 1901, remained peripheral to the export-import sector.
Thus the thesis is organized around various aspects of Ghana's economic
situation between the years 1886 and 1939 which can help explain her basic
underdevelopment within the world economy.

It is not strictly chronological.

Chapter I is a summary of Ghana's role in the world economic system prior to
the period under discussion in this work.

Chapter III elaborates on Ghana's

peripheralization during the colonial period, and on the development of her
role as a producer of primary products and a consumer of manufactured goods.
Chapter IV deals with the progressive oligopolization of the Ghanaian eccnomy
throughout the period; the takeover of trading, shipping, and banking by
British-dominated oligopolies, the various agreements in restraint of trade
which operated in Ghana, and their effects on indigenous businessmen.

Chapters

V and VI deal with the co-operation between the British economic and political
elites in Ghana and the effects which this co-operation had on economic policy;
specifically with the issues of transport policy, the introduction of modern
currency, investment policies, and Government's feeble attempts at crop diversification and quality control.

Chapters II and VII deal with two movements

of African resistance to foreign economic control which roughly coincide with
the beginning and the end of this period, and which indicate the extent of

c

African opposition; Chapter II is concerned with the attempted institution of
a Crown Lands Bill which would have removed ownership of land from African

xiii
hands, and Chapter VII is concerned with the tvo large boycotts of European
cocoa-buying firms which took place in 1930-31 and 1937-38.

Chapter VIII, the

conclusion, considers the underdevelopment of Ghana and the thwarting of her
possibilities for indigenous capitalist growth in the light of the research
presented in the preceding chapters.
The thesis is a contribution to original knowledge insofar as it is an
original approach to analysis of colonial Ghana, adopting as it does the theoretical stance that Ghana's underdevelopment can be explained in terms of her
relationship to the world economic system and, within that system, to the expatriate businessmen who dominated her economy.

While the history of Ghana has

been well documented, very little research has been done within this framework.l

The thesis is an attempt to situate Ghana within the "world system"

school of analysis of underdevelopment which is currently gaining strength
among many social scientists concerned with the "Third World," and to describe
the underdevelopment of colonial Ghana in such a way as to have meaning for
scholars unfamiliar with Ghana or, indeed, with Africa.

Insofar as the thesis

research is based on primary Government and commercial archives, it is also
original; some of these documents had not previously been available to scholars.

No part of the thesis has been published, although the author has

presented two conference papers based on materials from Chapters IV, V, and VII. 2
1 0ne thesis adopting a somewhat similar framework has been written. See
Roger Southall, "Cadbury on the Gold Coast, 1907-38: The Dilemma of a. Mcdel
Firm in a Colonial Economy." (University of Birmingham: unpublished Ph.D.
Thesis, 1975.)

c

2Rhoda Howard, "Development and Underdevelopment in the Gold Coast:
Foreign Business and the African Response, 1886-1939" (presented to the
Canadian Association of African Studies, Toronto, February 1975), and Rhoda
Howard, "Differential Class Participation in an African Protest Movement: The
Ghana Cocoa Boycott of 1937-38." (Presented to the Canadian Association of
African Studies, Victoria, February 1976.)

xiv
The reader will note that throughout this thesis the term Ghana is used
interchangeably with the term Gold Coast,

d~spite

the fact that the colonial

name for the country was uGold Coast" and that the name "Ghana" was instituted
only with independence in 1957.

In adopting this practice the author is fol-

lowing Kwabina Dickson in his Histonaat Geography of Ghana. 3 The reasons for
this practice are threefold.

First, the terms are used interchangeably for

stylistic reasons, especially to avoid the use of the term "Gold Coasters"
when referring to the colony's inhabitants.

Second, the intent is to emphasize

the continuity between colonial and postcolonial economies even at the risk of
using anachronistic terms.

Finally, neither Ghana nor Gold Coast is the cor-

rect name for the colony during the period under discussion; Gold Coast
referred only to the Gold Coast Colony, which was administered separatelJ· from
Ashanti and the Northern Territories until 1936.

Given that neither ten1 is

precisely accurate, it seems that there would be no serious objection to using
both.

c

3Kwamina B. Dickson, A Historical Geography of Ghana (Cambridge:
University Press, 1971).

at the

CHAPTF..R I
GHANA IN THE WORLD ECONO~IT:

1450-1885

From the time of her earliest contacts with European explorers, Ghana
entered the emerging world economy of which Europe, and especially Britain,
was the core.

Her contact with Europe resulted in her becoming a trade econ-

omy in which imports and exports soon came to dominate indigenous economic and
political structures.

The basic economic framework of the Ghana which this

work studies, and the basic relationships between Europeans and Africans which
persisted into the twentieth century, were established in this period of early
capitalist expansion from Europe to Africa.
1.

The Early Gold and Slave Trades in Ghana
The first Europeans to arrive on the West African coast were the

Portuguese. 1

They first set foot on what soon became known as the Gold Coast

in 1471, and established the fort of Elmina there in 1482. 2

The Portuguese

were searching for African sources of gold, which was especially needed in the
fifteenth century to pay for the goods which Europe imported from East Asia
and the Levant.

It was also needed as currency within the rising state

of Western Europe.

syst~~

"Larger and larger supplies of this precious metal were

required by the European states in the sixteenth century for currency and for

1There

had however been some contact between Europe and the West
African coast in pre-Christian times. The records of Herodotu3 suggest that
the ancient Phoenicians rounded West Africa and reached the Gold Coast around
the sixth century B.C. W. Walton Claridge, A History of the GoZd Coast and
Ashanti (London: Frank Cass~ 1964), p. 14.
2After having been granted permission to build a fort by the African
king at Elmina, the Portuguese immediately committed the error of attempting
to obtain their building materials from some sacred rocks. The enraged
Africans at once attacked the European wor~~en and the Portuguese were compelled to give compensatory gifts to the king before the work could be resumed.
Basil Davidson, The African Past (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1966}, pp. 187-88.
1

2

financing courts and governments, and above all to pay for increasingly costly
wars."3

West Africa had long been one of the major sources of Europe's gold,

but the European states had hitherto been dependent for their supply on Arab
traders who obtained their gold through overland savannah routes.

The Spanish

and Portuguese had tried to conquer the Maghreb area, partly to obtain control
of this gold trade, but without success.

Hence it was a major breakthrough

for the Europeans when the Portuguese reached the Gold Coast by sea.
The gold which the Europeans received was obtained primarily as dust
from alluvial washings and small pits.

According to J. D. Fage, by 1500

£100,000 worth of gold was travelling every year to Portugal from Ghana; this

constituted about one-tenth of the world's supply. 4 Sylvia Harrop gives the
figure as £350,000 per annum.5
There was little European demand for slaves in the fifteenth century.
By the sixteenth century, however, the Portuguese had begun to trade in slaves
to work in their Brazilian colony.

With the discovery of huge deposits of

precious metals in America, the demand for African gold had declined while the
demand for African slaves to work the American mines had grown.

This need for

slaves multiplied rapidly after the establishment of plantation agriculture,
producing coffee, cotton, sugar, and tobacco, in the West Indies and North
America.

From the mid-seventeenth century,

11

. [t]he demand for slaves

tended always to exceed the supply . • • ,"6

3sylvia Harrop, 11 The Economy of the West African Coast in the Sixteenth
Century," The Economio Bulletin of rJhana, nos. 3 and 4, Vol. 8 (1964). No. 4,
p. 23.
4 J.

D. Fage, A History of West Africa (Callibridge:
Press, 1969), p. 59.

'-

5Harrop,

op. oit., no. 4, p. 23.

6Fage, op. cit., p. 68.
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The slave trade emerged as a very important aspect of the commercial
integration of the Gold Coast into the world economy from the early seventeenth
to the early nineteenth century, both in terms of volume and in terms of the
effect which it had on indigenous African society.

Nevertheless the gold trade

also continued.
That the m1n1ng of gold continued to be the major concern on the Gold
· Coast well into the era when Europeans elsewhere in West Africa were
dealing with scarcely anything but slaves attests to the fact that gold
was considered more valuable within the capitalist economy especially
since the attachment to gold was increased by influential bullionist
theories. Conversely, the shift away from gold on the Gold Coast meant
that within the overall process of capitalist accumulation, slaves had
become Africa's most valuable contribution to Europe and the Americas. 7
Unfortunately for the European traders, it was difficult for Africans to provide both gold and slaves simultaneously.

European traders frequently

bemoaned the fact that while wars between the African states stimulated the
supply of slaves, they cut off the supply of gold, while times of peace had
the opposite effect.
The Gold Coast, in times of war between the inland nations, and those
nearest the sea, will furnish great numbers of slaves of all sexes and
ages • . . • At other times slaves are so scarce there, that in 1682 I
could get but eight from one end of the coast to the other, not only
because we were a great number of trading ships on the coast at the same
time, but by reason the natives were everywhere at peace. 8
Walter Rodney provides a succinct analysis of the contradictions involved in
trying to produce both gold and slaves.

The slave trade meant war, kidnap-

pings, and violation of peaceful trade in a situation in which one's very home,
not simply the public footpaths and transportation routes, was unsafe from
attack.

One Dutch record reported:

" . . • [A]s one fortunate marauding makes

7Walter Rodney, "Gold and Slaves on the Gold Coast," Transactions of the
HistoricaZ Society of Ghana, vol. 10 (1969), pp. 18-19.

c

8John Barbot, A Description of the Coasts of North «ad South Guinea, p.
420, quoted in Davidson, op. cit., pp. 213-14.

4
a native rich in a day, they therefore exert themselves rather in war, robbery
and plunder than in the old business of digging and collecting gold." 9 The
loss of able-bodied workers on the Gold Coast had tremendous repercussions.
There were fewer people to engage in the very labour intensive process of
digging and sifting for gold.

There were also fewer people to act as porters

to transport the goods with which Europeans paid for gold, inland from the
coast.

And finally, there were fewer people to engage in indigenous domestic

agriculture and production.
With the introduction of the slave trade came the beginnings of British
preponderance in Ghana.

It must be noted, however, that it was not a foregone

conclusion that the British would become the predominant European power on the
Gold Coast.

Indeed, until the point arrived in the seventeenth century when

England's naval power enabled her to outstrip her rivals, this was far from
clear.

On the entire West African coast, the Gold Coast was the area most

densely settled with European forts and factories.

At one period or another

there were forts from Portugal, Britain, the United Provinces, France, Sweden,
and Denmark, indeed even from Brandenburg and Prussia.10

The development of

power relationships in the Gold Coast closely paralleled developments in
Western Europe.
century.

Portugal was the dominant nation until the early seventeenth

After this point, however, it began to be pushed out by the British

and especially by the United Provinces, who captured Elmina in 1637.
While attempts at accommodation among the different trading nations were
often made, in fact there were constant battles to get control of the forts.

9Quoted in R~dney, op. cit., p. 19.

c

10 Sir Matthew Nathan, "The Gold Coast at the End of the Seventeenth Century under the Danes and Dutch," J aurnaZ of the African Society, no. 13, vol.
4 (1904-05). Many of the "forts," of course, were actually simply tiny
trading stations with perhaps two or three men.
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The forts of Cape Coast and Accra were the only two which the British held
consistently for any length of time.

While by the mid-eighteenth century

Britain had gained the upper hand on the Gold Coast, in fact neither Denmark
nor Holland ceded all of its possessions there until well into the nineteenth
century.

The Danish forts were purchased for £10,000 in 1850 and the Dutch

possessions were ceded for £3,790 compensation {for stores) in 1872. 11
The first documented English slave trading venture was that of Sir John
Hawkins in 1562, under the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. 12

However, although

profitable, this slaving venture was unusual, inasmuch as Britain was not at
this point encouraging the slave traffic and very few of her
to West Africa.
to India.

were going

Rather, the English were concentrating on their explorations

But by 1618 the first English West Africa Company, "The Company of

Adventurers of London Trading to Gynney and Bynney 11 was incorporated.
company however traded in produce, not slaves.

This

It was not until the period of

the Restoration that the slave trade was seriously organized in Britain, as a
response to the development of sugar plantations in the Caribbean.

In 1660,

the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to Africa was established.

Lasting

only a short time, it was superseded in 1672 by the Royal African Company,
which technically was given a thousand-year monopoly, to be renewed, however,
at twenty-year intervals. 13
The Royal African Company was a potent force only until the Revolution

11 Sir Matthew Nathan, "Historical Chart of the Gold Coast and Ashanti,"
Joumal of the African Society, no. 13, vol. 4 (1904-05), pp. 40, 42.
12Alice M. Kleist, "The English African Trade under the Tudors," Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, vol. 3, part 2 (1957), p. 143.
13K. G. Davies,

The Royal African Company (London:

Company, 1957), pp. 39ff.

Longmans, Green and
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of 1688, after which it steadily declined.
twofold.

The reasons for the decline were

First, as Davies points out, the Royal African Company was largely a

creation of the monarchy; in fact, its greatest investor was James II.

Royal

Prerogative had been responsible for the creation of the Company, but after

1688 the Royal Prerogative was no longer an accepted form of regulation of
trade in the British Isles.

11

. [I]n no instance was the identification

between the royal family and a trading monopoly so close as in the African
companies."l 4

Secondly, the Royal African Company was a monopoly of certain

traders in London, who controlled both the export to the Gold Coast of goods
produced in England and the export of slaves from the Gold Coast to the West
Indies.

There was considerable opposition to the London monopoly from three

sources.
One such source was the planters in the West Indies.
tion in the West Indies

h~d

to be constantly replenished.

The slave popula"Since the life of

the average negro on a plantation was but seven years and negro slaves, for
whatever reason, did not multiply, incessant reinforcements were necessary."l 5
The monopoly of the Royal African Company meant both that the number of slaves
being landed in the West Indies was too low, and that their prices were too
high.

At all times during the legal and government-backed monopoly of the

Royal African Company there were also English privateers engaged in the slave
trade, and the West Indian planters found the privateers to be the better
suppliers.

They could afford to sell slaves at lower prices since they did

not have to pay for the upkeep of the forts and factories on the West African
coast; they were in fact benefitting from external economies supplied by the
Royal African Company.
I4n a~es,
·
op.

o~'t

., p. 10 3 •

15Walter L. Dorn, Competition foP EmpiPe~ J740-1?65 (New York:

and Row, 1963), p. 261.

Harper
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The privateers, or "separate traders" constituted the second party of
opposition to the Royal African Company.

These separate traders tended to

represent the less privileged regions within England, first Bristol and later
Liverpool, as opposed to London.

They argued that the Royal African Company

impeded their trade and that as the Spanish and Portuguese managed to make
profits without the use of forts, the English should do likewise.

Until 1688,

the Royal African Company was supported by the navy and was permitted to confiscate ships and cargoes of private traders.

After 1688, however, many of

the separate traders sued for compensation for the seizure of their ships and
were awarded it.16
A third opposition party consisted of the manufacturers of England, especially the Lancashire cloth manufacturers who argued that monopoly was
limiting the amount of exports to West Africa.

The Charter of the Royal

African Company did in fact include a commitment to "export yearly woollen and
other English manufactures to Ithe] value of £70,000," 17 a commitment which it
found increasingly difficult to keep.

The manufacturers felt that private

traders could increase exports and they had a powerful argument inasmuch as
under mercantilism "the level of exports was still regarded as the most convenient and revealing indicator of the health of the national economy."l8
The actual monopoly, then, of the Royal African Company, existed only
from about 1672 to 1688.

After that time, Parliament became increasingly re-

luctant to support the Company's monopoly privileges, and began to grant the

1 6navies, op. ait., pp. 104ff.
17Nathan, "Historical Chart
1 8navies, op. ait., p. 127.

,

11

op. ai t . ,

p•
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legal right to trade to separate traders.

By 1712, Parliament had decided to

throw the trade open to all, so that the Company's monopoly became a myth, although it still held it in name until 1750.

In fact, the Company was in a

vulnerable position inasmuch as it was still responsible for the upkeep of
forts and factories on the Gold Coast and other parts of West Africa from its
own funds.

Separate traders were supposed to, but often did not, pay a ten

per cent duty on articles which they exported out of England in order to help
with this upkeep.l9
Not until 1750 did the trade become once again regulated with the formation of the Company of Merchants Trading to Africa.

This company levied duties

on all those trading in order to provide for the upkeep of forts and factories.
It was in this company that the Liverpool merchants, who were feeling the bite
of the London and Bristol control of the trade, became powerful slavers and
indeed came to dominate the trade until its termination in 1807.
The merchants of Liverpool owned and outfitted ships that carried
manufactures to Africa and. slaves to the West Indies . . . . The London
Commission agent . . . operated in the esoteric world of high finance.
He handled the sugar and the nicely engraved pieces of paper that were
remitted in payment of slaves. His function was undoubtedly as important
as that of his confederate at Liverpoo1.20
London remained the centre of finance of the slave trade, but Liverpool, aided
by its proximity to the industrial heartland of England, the northwest,

w~s

responsible by the early nineteenth century for some seventy-five per cent of
all the imports of African slaves into the West Indies; in 1802, for example,
it imported 31,371 of the 41,086 slaves who landed.21
1 9Ibid. ' p • 46.
20 R. B. Sheridan, 11 The Commercial and Financial Organization of the
British Slave Trade, 1750-1807, 11 Economic History Review, 2nd. Series, no. 2,
vol. 11 (December 1958), p. 263.
21 Averil Mackenzie-Grieve, The Last Years of the English Slave Trade
3
Liverpool 1750-1807 (London: Frank Cass, 1968), p. 273.
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Eric Williams' book, Capitalism and Slavery, 22 provides an excellent
introductory exposition of the role which the slave trade played in the world
economy.

The slave trade in West Africa vTas part of the Triangular Trade be-

tween England, West Africa, and the West Indies and Americas.

The heart of the

Triangular Trade was the West Indies; it was the function of West Africa to
act as a labour reserve for this productive core of the trade.

The sugar, cot-

ton, coffee, tobacco and other goods produced in the West Indies were
transported to Britain to be processed and manufactured •
. • • [T]he 'triangular trade' • • . depended first mainly upon sugar
and tobacco and later on cotton. The processing of these materials turned
England into a manufacturing country, and the focussing of the attention
of technicians upon methods of manufacture brought an astonishing series
of inventions in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The Negroes
were purchased with British manufactures and transported to the plantations. There they produced sugar, cotton, indigo, tobacco, and other
products. The processing of these created new industries in England;
while the needs of the Negroes and their owners provided a wider market
for British industry, New England agriculture, and Newfoundland fisheries.
By 1750 there was hardly a manufacturing town in England which was not
connected with the colonial trade. The profits provided one of the main
streams of that capital which financed the Industrial Revolution.23
The Europeans used West Africa as an area of free plunder; they ransacked it
for gold and slaves and were not concerned with the effects of their plunder on
the people or the economy of the area itself. 24

West Africa, in other words,

was a secondary adjunct to the West Indian and American trades during the slavetrading era.

22 Eric Williams,

Capitalism and Slavery (New York:

Capricorn Books,

1966).
23 w. E. B. Du Bois, The World and Africa (New York:
lishers, 1965), p. 58.

International Pub-

24For a description of the concept of "plunder, 11 see Immanuel Wallerstein,

c

The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the
European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press,
1974), pp. 335-36.
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However, by the eighteenth century West Africa had also become a market
for the textiles and light. consumer goods produced in the British Isles.

The

supply of slaves had always been dependent on the ability of the Europeans to
supply African traders with consumer goods.

Formerly, however, these goods

had not been produced in Europe.
It is particularly striking that in the early centuries of trade,
Europeans relied heavily on Indian cloths for resale in Africa, and
they also purchased cloths on several parts of the West African coast
for resale everywhere. Morocco, Mauritania, Senegambia, Ivory Coast,
Benin, Yorubaland, and Loango were all exporters to other parts of
Africa--through European middlemen.25
But by the late eighteenth century
The 'African Trade' had come to form an essential part of the economy
of the maritime states of Europe, and i t was expanding fast--British
exports to Africa, valued at £130,000 in 1720, had risen to £866,000 in
1775. The ramifications of the trade were very great; not only slave
dealers in Liverpool . • . or planters in Jamaica or Virginia had a
stake in it, but also merchants in London . • . industrialists in
Manchester . • . . 2 6
As Britain changed from a mercantile to an industrial capitalist nation, so
also West Africa changed from being simply a supplier of goods for the merchant
traders to being a market for the industrialists.
The slave trade was officially abolished by the British in 1807, and
abolition by other European nations quickly followed.

Popular mythology has

often had it that the British abolished the slave trade from merely humanitarian motives, and that it was humanitarian idealism which obliged them to
assume more control in West Africa in order to stamp out the infamous commerce.
Humanitarian aims, diplomatic rivalry, commercial interests--all three
contributed to the partition of West Africa by Britain, France, and

25 Wa1ter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar es Salaam:
Tanzania-Pub1ishing House, 1972}, p. 113.
26 Robin Ha1lett, "The European Approach to the Interior of Africa in the
Eighteenth Century," Journal of African History, no. 2, vol. 4 (1963), p. 196.
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Germany. But as far as Britain was concerned, it was the anti-slavery
movement, the humanitarian factor, which led to the involvement from
which all else followed.27
There were of course many sincere Christian missionaries and abolitionists who believed that the introduction of "Christianity, commerce, and
civilization" into the West African coast would eliminate the slave trade.
Humanitarianism, however, was often a cover for baser motives.

Eric Williams

carefully documents the fact that many of the most powerful abolitionists were
those whose primary concern was to abolish slavery in the West Indies to safeguard their own investments in the East Indies, where slavery did not exist
and where in consequence labour costs were higher, so that East Indian sugar
could not compete with the West Indian variety. 2 8
'2,

The Effects of the Early European Intrusion
in West Africa and Ghana
In analyzing the effects of the European intrusion on West Africa in

general, and on Ghana in particular, during the mercantilist era, an important
question to be considered is, what was the effect of the slave trade on the
indigenous African society?

The effects seem to have included depopulation,

the diversion of traditional trading routes to the new slave trade, and disruptions of local African polities occasioned by slaVe-raiding wars.
On the

whole~

the African population declined, or at least stayed stag-

nant, as a result of the slave trade.

Rene Dumont argues that".

the

African continent, which in the eighteenth century had about the same population as Europe, or a fifth of the world population, today only has about a
twelfth." 29

c

The trade deprived Africa of its most vigourous citizens; it was

27 Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern University Press, 1959), p. 10.
2 8Williams, op. ait., eh. 11.
2

p. 36.

~Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa (London:

P~dre Deutsch, 1966),
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the healthy young men and women who were taken, not the old and the sick.

c·

Hence, simply, the strongest, the most efficient, and the most fertile, were
taken from the West African coast.
It should be noted that the intrusion of the Europeans into the Gold
Coast was not a matter which met with no resistance on the part of the
Africans.

The early records of the slave traders recount incident after inci-

dent of rebellions by Africans around forts, of kidnappings, and of murders of
individual European Governors or factors.

This occurred especially when the

Europeans had committed a "diplomatic error" such as kidnapping royal personages as slaves.

A random selection of such accounts in Ghana includes the

destruction of the Portuguese fort at Accra by Africans in 1578, the takeover
of the Danish f0rt at Accra in 1693, a Fanti attack on the English fort at
Anomabu in 1701, and the murder of the Dutch Governor at Elmina in 1808.30
Nevertheless what the Africans were resisting was not the slave trade per se,
but rather the acts of individual Europeans.
At any time the native population by sheer weight of numbers could
have taken all but the strongest of the forts. That they seldom did
so is an indication less of white strength, more of negro disunion, and
more still of the advantages which the Africans themselves (or some of
them) thought they derived from the presence of European traders. 3l
Slavery not only depopulated West Africa but it also diverted the old
established trade routes, which had gone north through the savannah to the
Mediterranean, south to the Guinea coast.

However it is not certain whether

this diversion of trade was, in the long run, detrimental or beneficial to
West Africa.

It may simply have meant more trade, going now through the coast

instead of across

the savannah.

According to Fernand Braudel, the Africans

30Nathan, "Historical Chart • • • ," op. ait., pp. 34-40.

c

31 Davies

'

'+ , p. 6 .
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had long been used to receiving European goods via the North African routes,
but the prices of these goods were very high.3 2

The arrival of the Europeans

on the southern coast might have been welcomed as an alternate source of
supply for European goods, even though the articles offered for sale were inferior to those which the Arabs had imported.
Fage argues that the articles received in return for slaves made up for
the losses of the savannah trade.

He estimates that the contemporary value of

goods received by West Africa in the eighteenth century in return for slaves
exported to America was about sixty-six million pounds sterling.

"There can be

no doubt that in the eighteenth century West Africa's involvement in the slave
trade was big business, contributing substantially to the growth of her
trade." 33

Rodney argues, however, that Fage 1 s view on the question is overly

optimistic, for it was not only the trade routes, but the economy as a whole,
which was disrupted by the coming of the Europeans.

Not only were the young

men and women removed from the continent, but "The most dynamic groups over a
great area of Africa became associated with Foreign trade • . • 11 34 to the
detriment of indigenous production.

Cheaply-made English manufactures swamped

the African markets from the seventeenth century onwards, pushing out of production the cloth and iron goods which had been made within the continent by
less advanced production techniques.

When the Africans tried to compensate for

their technological backwardness, the Europeans refused them aid.

The

Asantehene Opoku Ware (1720-1750), for instance, asked the Europeans to set up
factories and distilleries in Ashanti but was refused.

The Europeans were

32 Fernand Braudel, La Mediterranee et le Monde Mediterraneen
de Phi Uppe IT (Paris : Armand Colin, 1966) , p. 426.

c

33Fage, op. cit., p. 91.
34 Rodney, How Europe

• , op. ci t

. , p • 115 •
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willing to provide only poor quality consumption goods which could not be used
for development.

Furthermore, not only did the European conquerors disrupt

the tendency of African states to consolidate into larger units, but they also
tried to take over and control existing trade among different African communities, especially along the coast.

In sum, the coming of the Europeans meant

the disruption of any tendencies to growth and development of African polities
and the maintenance of these polities in a state of technological regression.3 5
Diverted from their natural trading routes and from the development of
indigenous production, African states turned to the traffic in human beings as
a way to enrich themselves.
Les forces productives n'evoluaient pas et la marche historique
des peuples africains s 1 est vue meme retrograder par les guerres tribales
que la traite d 1 esclaves et les intrigues des puissances europeennes
interessees dans ce commerce etendaient sur le continent.36
For example, Ashanti diverted much effort into the slave trade.

By obtaining

arms from the Europeans, especially from the ports which Ashanti controlled
(i.e., for the use of which Europeans paid tribute to Ashanti) as of the early
eighteenth century, it was able to overcome the resistance of many small
political groupings and sell its captives to the Europeans.37
The question of Ashanti suggests that the embr-oilment of Europeans in
the political affairs of local African states had an effect on African development.

As already mentioned, the European presence hindered the evolution of

large and integrated African states,

In fact, as one Governor of the Gold

35The argument in this paragraph is taken from ibid., pp. 112-23.
36Joao Mendes, La RevoZution en Afrique (Paris:
Recherches Marxiste3, 1970}, pp. 47-48.

Centre d'Etudes et de

37J. C. Anene, "Slavery and the Slave Trade," p. 107 in J. C. Anene and
Godfrey N. Brown ( eds. ) , Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
(London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1966).
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Coast, Sir Hugh Clifford, argued:
There can be no doubt that, if the British had not interfered, the
Ashanti would have extended their empire over all the nations of the
Gold Coast; but our disapproval of their invasions was due, in the
beginning, not so much to any feeling of pity for their victims, as to
resentment at the disturbance to trade which they occasioned.3 8
European involvement in African political and military affairs stemmed from
two causes.

First, the Europeans often incited the Africans to act on their

behalf against other European states, who of course also had African allies, as
for instance when the English promoted a Komenda rebellion against the Dutch
in 1694 by giving a "loan" of £240 to the Komenda.3 9

Secondly, they inter-

fered in African affairs to avoid the stopping of trade routes.

While wars

per se were useful to the Europeans inasmuch as they supplied slaves, wars for
the control of trade routes (especially, after about 1750, between the inland
Ashanti and the coastal Fanti) might stop supplies altogether.

The Europeans

were also preoccupied with undermining the independence of the coastal states,
especially insofar as these states had a firm grip on the middleman trade with
the inland states or still controlled coastal trade.
The diversion of African states' resources to the slave trade was exacerbated by the corruption of chiefs which followed upon it; they falsely
convicted their subjects of crimes in order to be able to sell them as slaves,
or found fault with their domestic slaves in order to be able to turn them
over to the Europeans.

"Principal men of enterprise at all levels of society

became increasingly aware of the economic value of their servants, pawns,
serfs and subjects, and became increasingly keen to add to their numbers

38 Sir Hugh Clifford, introduction to Claridge, op. cit., p. x.
39 K. Y. Daaku, "The European Traders and the Coastal States, 1630-1720,"
Transactions of the Historical Society of mzana, vol. 8 (1965), p. 19.
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to the greatest possible extent. n40
This corruption of chiefs who had formerly acted to protect their citizens was symptomatic of the changes taking place in Ghana throughout the
period of the slave trade; from a territory which had previously had little or
no connection with the emerging capitalist system of the West, it was changing
into a territory in which large numbers of people were being affected by the
gold and slave trades, and in which increasing numbers of people were attempting to enter trade with Europeans in order to make profits.

At the same time,

Europeans were making demands on Ghana which resulted in internal wars and
disorganization.

As the slave trade declined after abolition, disorganization

became a serious hindrance to the development of new types of exports to replace the lost commerce in human beings.

Eventually, the need for organized

commerce was to facilitate the outright takeover of Ghana by the British, but
this process of takeover was to last almost a hundred years.

3.

The Period of Informal Empire
The period from 1807 to the 1880s can be described as one of

empire 11 in Ghana, to use a term coined by Gallagher and Robinson. 41

11

informal
That is

to say, that the control of Britain, which by this time was the dominant power
on the Coast (although it did not gain complete formal control until 1872 when
the Dutch ceded the port of Elmina) was tightening, but it was still based on
informal, not formal, means.

British administrators were sent out to the Gold

Coast forts but the territory itself did not yet have formal status as a
colony.

The British Government wavered throughout this period in the degree

of control which it wished to maintain.

40Fage, op. oit., p.

In 1821 the Colonial Office took over

94.

41 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 11 The Imperialism of Free Trade,"
Eoonomio History Review, 2nd. Series, no. 1, vol. 6 (December 1953), p. 1.
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the Gold Coast forts, but by 1828 it had put the forts under the control of a
Committee of Merchants.

In 1843 the

Goverr~ent

again took over responsibility,

and the Gold Coast forts were ruled jointly with the colony of Sierre Leone
from 1844 to 1850.

The period from 1850 to 1865 was the only period during

which the Gold Coast had its own separate, resident governor until the assumption of formal control of the Colony in 1874.

In 1865 a Parliamentary

Committee of Investigation recommended complete withdrawal from Ghana; rather
than implementing this, however, the area was simply put under the jurisdiction
of the Sierra Leone Governor once again.
The decision to assume tighter control of the Gold Coast was not made
on purely political grounds; it was a result of structural economic factors.
Most weighty of these factors was the decision, in 1807, to abolish the slave
trade.

As a result of this abolition, the economy of the Gold Coast declined.

One little-mentioned aspect of this decline was the abolition in 1833 of
domestic slavery in the regions controlled by the British; that is, in the
areas around the British forts.

This change vas a part of the general aboli-

tion of the institution of slavery, as opposed to the

~ade

in slavery, in all

parts of the British Empire; after 1874 the abolition of domestic slavery was
extended to the entire Gold Coast Colony, and after 1900 to Ashanti and the
Northern Territories.

There were many complaints from the African slave-

owners to the British when domestic slavery was abolished.

In a "Petition of

the Principal Mulatto Females of the Gold Coast to the Right Honourable I.ord
John Russell" in 1841 several prominent ladies complained that they had not
been paid compensation for the loss of their slaves as West Indian slaveholders had been. 42

The implication was that agricultural production was

42 Petition

dated Cape Coast Castle, 29 March, 1843; in G. E. Metcalfe,
Documents of Ghana History 1807-1957 (London:
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1964), p. 161.
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falling without the labour of domestic slaven.

Several chiefs also presented

a statement to the British:
First that they are as it were deprived of the power of holding
domestic slavery, which has greatly reduced their power and dignity
as kings and chiefs . . . . They agree to follow agricultural pursuits
if they will be permitted to hold domestic slavery for reasons
assigned by them. . . . They observed also that the country in sixty
or seventy years past was in a thriving condition when domestic slavery
was prevalent, but now since the great alteration that has taken place
with reference to the slave holding, the country is totally deprived
of its wealth.43
Formerly, according to Edward Reynolds, the Fanti had used slaves to produce
foodstuffs which were then sold to passing European ships.

The abolition of

domestic slavery had the effect of cutting back on this particular type of
enterprise. 44

Reports from various British settlements shortly after the

abolition of the trade indicated economic decline.
Komenda, reported that:

One observer, stationed at

"The progress of agriculture has decreased since the

aboliton of the slave trade, there not being that vent for their commodities
which there was when shipping had frequent recourse here." 45
Nevertheless if the economy of the settlements around the British forts
was declining, the economy of the Africans in the hinterland area of the Gold
Coast continued strong.

The nineteenth century witnessed the expansion of the

Ashanti kingdom as the only block to the incursion of the British into the
hinterland.

" . . . Ashanti in this period can best be regarded as a separate

economy, having important relations not only with the Gold Coast but also with
other parts [of Africa], such as the territories to the north and the Ivory

43"Grievances of the Gold Coast Chiefs," 9 August 1864, in ibid., pp.

300-01.
44 Edward Reynolds, "Trade and Economic Change on the Gold Coast, 18071874" (University of London: unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1971), p. 125.
4 5"0bservations on the State of 'l'rade at the Several British Forts on the
Gold Coast, 1814-1815," quoted in Metcalfe, op. cit., p. 30.
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Coast."46

The Ashanti were still very much involved in the now technically

"illegitimate" slave trade.
centre.

Ashanti ilas, moreover, a thriving commercial

In the early half of the century, the savannah trade was still flour-

ishing, and Ashanti was an important focus of trade.

In 1812 Kumasi, its

capital, was " • • • not only the meeting point for the routes from Timbuktu
and Hausaland, but was also the nerve centre for four important routes to the
coast. "4 7

It was not until the middle of the century, when steam transport up

the rivers from the coast became cheaper than the camel trade, that the
Europeans put a complete stop to this 2,000-year-old commerce. 48
Several Ashanti-Fanti wars took place during the nineteenth century.
The principal reason for the Ashanti expansionary movement to the south was to
eliminate the Fanti middlemen from the coastal trade; the Ashanti wanted direct
access to the coast.

The British, wavering between involvement and noninvolve-

ment in these "internal" matters, finally decided to take the Fanti side.

The

slave trade could not be completely eliminated until the powerful and wellorganized Ashanti were prevented from trading with other European nations, and
it was difficult to establish trade routes when such a large proportion of the
territory through which such routes went was controlled by Ashanti.

"European

merchants were naturally reluctant to venture their capital, and Africans were
discouraged from developing new lines of trade to replace the traffic in
slaves, in a country in which there were no settled relations between the
coast and the hinterland." 4 9 The final subjugation of the Ashanti did not
4 6H.

J. Bevin, 11 The Gold Coast Economy about 1880," Transaations of the
GoZd Coast and TogoZand HistoriaaZ Soaiety, vol. 2, pt. 2 (1956), p. 73.
47 J. B. Webster and A. A. Boahen, The RevoZutionary Years: West Afriaa
Sinae 1800 (London: Longmans, 1967), p. 61.
48 Ib'd
t. • ' P· 71 '
49 J. D. Fage, Ghana~ A HistoriaaZ Interpretation (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1961), p. 61.
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occur until 1896, when the British entered Kumasi.

The last breath of the

Ashanti nation was spent on a 1900 uprising in futile protest against a demand
by the British Governor that the Golden Stool, the religious symbol of Ashanti
nationhood, be turned over to him.
Several adverse economic conditions, then, arose in Ghana as the result
of the abolition of the slave trade and the beginnings of the system of "informal" empire.

But just as a need for slaves had arisen simultaneously with the

decline in the European demand for gold from West Africa, so a demand for primary agricultural products superseded the demand for slaves.

The European

economy had changed from one of mercantile capitalism to one of industrial
capitalism, and the Gold Coast was now a full-fledged peripheral area.

No

longer could the Europeans simply raid for slaves, disregarding the effect on
the Gold Coast of such raids.
Capitalism in the centre • . • took on its complete form; the function
of mercantilism--the primitive accumulation of wealth--lost its
importance. , •• The old periphery--America of the plantations--and
its periphery--Africa of the slave trade--had to give way to a new
periphery. The function of the new periphery was to provide produats
• • • raw materials and agricultural produce.so
The function of Ghana at this time, then, was to act as a supplier of
raw materials and agricultural produce.

However, such production as existed

was still of an extraative nature; organized production and cultivation
capitali.st world market did not as yet exist,

"

f~r

the

• IoJne cannot call the

primitive process of oil extraction from palm nuts, the extraction of kernels
and washing and crushing of auriferous ores, technical transformations." 51

50 Samir .Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa:

Historical Origin," JoUPnat of Peaae Researah, no. 2 (1972), p. 113, italics in
original.
51 R. Szereszewski, Struaturat Changes in the Eaonomy of Ghana 1891-1911
(London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1965}, p. 5.
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Until the introduction of cocoa in the 1890s the level and character of the
economy, according to Szereszewski, remained static for centuries.
for export changed, but the mode of production did not.

Products

The raiding of human

communities for slaves was replaced by the simple extraction of the natural
resources of the Gold Coast.
While gold remained an important product in the nineteenth century, the
economy of Ghana during the period of informal empire was based upon the export of palm oil and palm kernels.

In the period 1881-1885, for instance,

seventy-three per cent of the total exports were palm products, oil accounting
for forty-seven per cent and kernels for twenty-six per cent. 52
years, gold accounted for ten per cent of exports.53

In the same

Apart from these two

products, there was a brief boom in rubber in the latter part of the century.
Gold, rubber, and palm products, however, were not enough to inject the Gold
Coast into the modern world economy.

It was fortunate indeed that, so soon

after Britain assumed formal political control, cocoa, which was to find a
large international market at high prices, became Ghana's economic mainstay.
The massive new cocoa export economy, however, was to facilitate the introduction of new controls on trade which would help to push out the remainder of
the old African trading class which, up to the period of the formal British
takeover, had been competing on relatively equal terms with the European
traders.

4.

Competition between African and European
Merchants in the Nineteenth Century
There is considerable evidence to suggest that competition between

African and European merchants was conducted on a fairly balanced basis until

52B ev1n,
·

op. cit.,

53Jh'-'d •' P• 74.

P•

73.
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about the mid-nineteenth century.

On an economic level, and moreover on a

political and social level, Africans and Europeans were

e~uals.

The Europeans

did not at first consider themselves as a superior race dealing with an inferior race; in fact, as Margaret Priestley shows in her book, West Afrioan

Trade and Coast Sooiety, 54 a number of intermarriages took place between the
early European traders in Ghana and aristocratic African families.

11

fT ]here

were few resident traders, lacking white female company, who did not enter into
a more settled relationship with a local woman."5 5
Well into the nineteenth century, until with better health facilities
it was possible for more Europeans to live in Ghana, and especially for white
women to accompany their husbands, European traders were only too willing to
socialize with their African counterparts; the gulf was not between white and
black but between educated and uneducated in the coastal towns. 56

Africans and

Europeans belonged to the same trade organizations and the same Chambers of
Commerce until the 1870s.5 7

Together, the two groups of educated traders ran

the forts and administered justice in the areas under British control,

It was

not unusual for Africans to hold high administrative positions, although the
highest ever held was by James Bannerman as Lieutenant-Governor in 1850.58
In its egalitarian quality, the system of trade reflected the social and
political systems of Ghana in the early nineteenth century.

Trade was still

54 Margaret Priestley, West Afrioan Trade and Coast Sooiety (London:
Oxford University Press, 1969).
55 Ibid.,

p. 106.

56susan Beth Kaplow, "African Merchants of the Nineteenth Century Gold
Coast" (Columbia University: unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1971), p. 170.

57Ibid., p. 184.
58 David Kimble, A PoZitioaZ History of Ghana 1850-1928 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 65.
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small-scale and high risk.

"Trust," the willingness to trust one's trading

partners, was one of its most important aspects, and as Edward Reynolds points
out, the willingness of Africans to trust Europeans was as important as the
Europeans' willingness to trust Africans.
The granting of credit had been a feature of Gold Coast trade from
at least the seventeenth century with both Africans and Europeans offering
credit terms. Africans frequently offered the European trader staple
exports on credit when the goods he wanted were not immediately on hand.
The European trader likewise offered the African trader goods on credit
to be paid for with the produce of the country when it was available. 59
Many Africans traded independently, many others worked as commission agents
for European houses.

Although, Reynolds argues, there was not enough room in

the trade to accommodate all the Africans who wished to enter it, on the other
hand it was possible for some Ghanaian traders to import as much as £20,000 to
£30,000 worth of goods each year on credit. 60

Especially after 1853, when

steamship lines were introduced in the West African trade and regular crossing
enabled small independent entrepreneurs to ship small consignments with a
security of arrival dates which had been

mL~own

to them before, many oppor-

tunities arose for African competition with the large European firms, such as
Forster and Smith and F. and A. Swanzy, who had hitherto dominated the trade.
"Forster and Smith as well as F. and A. Swanzy became alarmed at the increased
direct trade with indigenous merchants and tried to interfere with the opera-

tions of the steamships which hit at the trade that had once been their
monopoly."6 1

59 Edward

Reynolds, "The Rise and Fall of an African Merchant Class on
the Gold Coast, 1830-1874," paper submitted to the International Congress of
Africanists, 3rd Session (Addis Ababa, December 9-19, 1973), pp. 8-9.
60Reynolds, "Trade . . . , " op. ait. , pp. 226 and 257.
61Reynolds, "The Rise • • • ," op. ait., p. 7·
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But by the end of the nineteenth century the tenuous system of equal
trading relations had collapsed.

No longer was it true that "The run of

Europeans who came out to the Gold Coast were quite a superior class of men,
[who] • • • mixed freely with the intelligent sons of the soil, and helped to
lay the foundations of a new civilization."62

Rather, the European firms were

reorganizing in such a way as to minimize the need to use African traders.
Direct shipments to European employees on the coast were being substituted for
shipments consigned on credit to African trading partners.63

The change to

direct shipping was in part a deliberate attempt to remove African competition;
Andrew Swanzy, a partner in F. and A. Swanzy, argued that indigenous merchants
"drove the European merchants from the trade by ruinous competition."6 4

But by

this time the European merchants were also arguing that too much credit was
being extended to Africans, and that in the absence, especially, of adequate
bankruptcy laws, it was unsafe to entrust them with imports.65
At least part of the reason, however, for the inability of African
merchants to repay their debts was the fact that Africans were consistently
charged more than Europeans for the same trade goods.

Reynolds points out that

"As early as 1826 it had been reported that trade goods were sold to Europeans
on the coast at cost price, to mulattoes at a higher price and to blacks at a
still higher price." 66

In 1856 an African trader by the name of Joseph Smith,

62 J. E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions (London:
Cass, 1970), p. 95.

Frank

6 3 c. W. Newbury, "Credit in Nineteenth Century West African Trade,"
Journal of African History, no. 1, vol. 13 {1972), p. 91.
64 "Select Committee of the House of Commons to Consider the State of the
British Settlements on the Western Coast of Africa," 1865 (412) V, l. Minutes
of Evidence, testimony of A. Swanzy, Q. 4673.
'6 5Reynolds , "Trade

66Ib'd
-z. • ' P·

• , " op. ait., pp. 380ff.
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in debt to the firm of Forster and Smith for £18,000, discovered that Forster
and Smith had consistently, over a period of fifteen years, been charging him
between twenty and fifty per cent more than it charged white traders for the
He therefore claimed that Forster and Smith had made £27,000

same goods.

extra profits in its dealings with him, and far from his owing them £18,000
they owed him £9,000.

Smith's claim was not acknowledged, however, and he

died a bankrupt.67
Indeed, of the fifteen large Ghanaian businessmen of the nineteenth
century whom Kaplow investigated in detail, only five escaped bankruptcy or
serious financial difficulty.68

Africans could simply no longer compete with

Europeans who held numerous advantages along with increasingly monopolistic
contro1. 69

Whereas Africans had to transport their goods down the inland

waterways to the coast by canoe, Europeans possessed steam launches.70
Africans found it difficult to obtain enough
dues, whereas British traders had enough

British specie to pay customs
not only to pay dues but also

to pay cash for agricultural produce; thus pushing African traders, who were
obliged to pay barter for such products, out of the market. 71

Europeans

consistently engaged in practices of undercutting Africans in sales, and overpricing them in purchases. 72

One African trader complained in 1889:

67 Kaplow, op. cit., pp. 69-71. The incident is also recounted in
Reynolds, "Trade • • • 11 op. cit., pp. 387-88.
68Kaplow, op. ait., p. 62.
69Qn monopoly control, see below, Ch~IV.
7 °Kaplow, op. ait., p. 114.

c

71Jbid., p. 120.
see below, Ch.V.
72

Ib'd
-z, •

'

p. 121 .
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But now our African markets are failed and the only business we can
transact is commission business, because lot of European firms has been
established here who sell their goods invoicely and also give 10%
commission to all buyers who buy from one pound upwards, so there is no
profit at all in our works here when ive order [sic]. 7 3
As a result of the unequal terms of competition and of technological
developments whose costs to Africans were prohibitive, many scions of indigenous trading families began, in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, to move
out of trade and into professional life.

Many mulatto Africans, formerly able

to compete successfully in trade because of the advantage of their partial
European ancestry, began to move into professions such as trading agents,
teaching, evangelism, and the ministry. 74

Law was also a favorite recourse

for the son of a trader who had lost his fortune.

Professional Africans, with

degrees from British universities, began to replace traders in positions of
power in the European administrative structure.

After 1904, of all the

Africans who sat as unofficial representatives on the Gold Coast Legislative
Council, only one was a trader.75

Of the twenty-six men who were included in

the biographical work, Gold Coast Men of Affairs, 7 6 only one or two engaged in
any sort of trade.
The decline of African traders as a significant economic force was
accompanied by their decline in other spheres as well.

Not only did the Gold

Coast Chambers of Commerce systematically exclude Africans by the turn of the

7 3I. H. Caesar to Edward Challinor and Company, quoted in ibid., p. 117.
74 Reynolds,

"The Rise • • • ," op. ait., pp. 14-15.

75 Kaplow, op. ait., p. 232.
76 M. J. Sampson, Gold Coast Men of Affairs (London:
Mall, 1969) .
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century, 77 but they were also excluded from government, as the administration
initiated a policy of putting power into the hands of the "traditional" elites
who seemed more likely to support British rule; and from social intercourse
with the whites, who had now a large enough community of trade and government
personnel, including wives, to enable them to be socially exclusive.

The

introduction of direct colonial rule, with its consequent steering of educated
Africans into the professions and away from competitive trading, facilitated
the eventually complete economic takeover of the import-export sector by
foreign, predominantly

5.

~ritish,

firms.

The Assumption of Formal Political
Control in Ghana
The period of informal empire in Ghana came to an end in 1874, when the

territory along the coast on which British forts and trading factories were
established became the Gold Coast Colony.

Ashanti, however, remained indepen-

dent until a British expeditionary force of 1896 finally conquered it
completely .. The Northern Territories were added as a protectorate in 1901.
While the assumption of formal political control by Europeans in Africa
is often attributed to the Berlin Conference and the "scramble for Africa" of
1884, it is clear that the scramble cannot explain the takeover of the Gold
Coast which occurred ten years prior to the Conference.

Rather, it would seem

that a confluence of forces resulted in an almost desultory takeover of the
Colony.

Not least of these was the debate, stretching back to a Select Com-

mittee Report in 1842, on what to do with the Gold Coast forts; whether to
leave them under government-regulated merchant control or to take them under
direct colonial contro1. 78

In 1865, the Select Committee on the Western Coast

77 Kaplow, op. ait., pp. 183ff.
78"Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the West
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of Africa recommended that, while it was not possible to withdraw from current
settlements, a policy of extension of territory would be

11

inexpedient." 79

Yet

in 1874 the Colony was taken over.
While it seems as if the decision to take over the Colony in 1874 was
almost incidental, based as it apparently was on administrative efficiencies,
the Proclamation announcing the takeover clearly indicated that law and order
and the protection of trade were important considerations.

The Proclamation

listed, among other purposes:
• • . the protection and encouragement of trade and traders, including
the construction, maintenance and improvement of roads, paths, bridges,
harbour works, water ways, telegraphs, and other public works which
benefit trade and promote civilization . • • [and] the maintenance of an
armed police force for the preservation of internal order and the
prevention of foreign aggression.so
The takeovers of Ashanti and the Northern Territories were more direct
results of political and economic pressures.

The scramble for Africa was

inciting a fear in certain British circles that if she did not obtain tighter
control on all her spheres of influence, she might lose them altogether to her
French and German rivals.

At the same time, because they needed better trans-

portation and better systems of protection for their trade inland from the
Colony, British commercial houses were pressuring the Colonial Office for
military takeovers of Ash anti and the Northern Territories.
An important theoretical issue surrounding the question of the change

in British policy to direct colonial rule in the late nineteenth century is
the debate as to whether this transition constituted a qualitative change in

African Settlements," 1842 (551) XI.l and XII.l.
79ap •

't

01.- •'

...
P· 111.

80 Quoted in Casely Hayford, op. ait., p.

366.
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British policy.

Gallagher and Robinson, in their article "The Imperialism of

Free Trade,"8 1 criticize the notion that any such change in policy took place.
They carefully document their case, proving that there was a consistent expansion by the British all over the world during the nineteenth century, and
that direct political dependencies were established in parts of the world
other than Africa during the mid-Victorian period.
Those who accept the concept of 'economic imperialism' would have us
believe that the annexations at the end of the century represented a
sharp break in policy, due to the decline in free trade, the need to
protect foreign investment, and the conversion of statesmen to the n.eed
for unlimited land-grabbing . . . • [But] the tariff policy of Great
Britain did not change. • . . British foreign investment was no new
thing and most of it was still flowing into regions outside the formal
empire • . . • [T]he statesmen's conversion to the policy of extended
annexation was partial . • • ,82
Gallagher and Robinson are indeed correct in stating that there was no autonomous change in political policy.

But in denying the theoretical relevance of

the concept of economic imperialism they miss their own point.

There was

indeed a certain continuity in British expansionism during the nineteenth
century.

But as they so rightly state:

Whether imperialist phenomena [that is, political control] show
themselves or not, is determined not only by the factors of economic
expansion, but equally by the political and social organization of
the regions brought into the orbit of the expansive society • . • . 83
In Ghana, the situation was ripe for direct political takeover precisely
because the social and political organizations of indigenous Ghanaian society
were not conducive to the type of trade in which Europeans were beginning to
engage.

Intertribal wars had facilitated the export of slaves; they did not,

however, facilitate the free export of palm oil, rubber, and later cocoa.

81ap.

eit.

82 Ibid., p. 12.
83 Ibid., p.
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did intertribal boundaries and tolls facilitate the free import of cheap
European goods for the African consumer.

The foremost need of the European

traders in the colony was for fast, efficient, cheap, and orderly transport
both of exports and imports.
later motor roads.

Hence, the first priority was railroads, and

In order to be able to build these roads, the Europeans

needed peace and good government.

Later, they

for the abolition of

tolls into Ashanti and the North, so that their goods could have free access.
Gallagher and Robinson argue that there was " • • • no strong political
or commercial movement in Britain in favour of African acquisitions." 84

How-

ever, while such a statement may have been applicable for Africa as a whole,
it does not seem to have been applicable for Ghana.

Rather, from the 1870s on,

the powerful Chambers of Commerce of London, Liverpool, and Manchester were
actively pressing the Colonial Office for additional takeovers.
\

A letter, for

example, from the predominantly European Cape Coast Chamber of Commerce to the
Manchester Chamber, urging immediate occupation of Ashanti, received the support of both the Manchester and London Chambers in 1894.
Istagnation of the Gold Coast trade was a result of] • • • constant
interruptions of the roads and trade routes, and {of] • • • the fact that
traders from the surrounding districts were restricted in their peaceful
operations by a general lack of security • • • • This insecurity was due
to the unsettled state of the interior in consequence not only of intertribal animosities, but also of interferences and aggressions between
these tribes and their European neighbours. The petitioners prayed that
the kingdom of Ashantee might be
brought within the sphere of
British influence, and that the Government should place its administration
upon a footing which should embrace some form of permanent residence under
an experienced officer of a diplomatic and military training. • • • That
the British resident •
should be charged with the duty of protecting
all traders passing to and from the sea coast.85

84Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London:
Macmillan, 1961}, p. 462.

c

85 Letters from the Cape Coast Chamber of Commerce to the Manchester
Chamber of Commerce, reported in ManCC, 6 February 1895.
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The purpose of the above petition, then, was clearly to urge the takeover of
Ashanti for the purpose of protection of trade.

From 1894 until the final

complete "pacification" (to use contemporary terminology) of Ashanti in 1900,
petitions and letters from British Chrunbers of Commerce interested in Africa
made a stready stream to the Colonial Office, all urging
. . . that the British sphere behind the Gold Coast should be extended
over the basins of the rivers which discharge themselves into the sea
within the limits of the Colony, and that Ashanti and other countries
adjacent to the Colony, which come under more active British influence
than the distant parts of the interior, may be taken under British
protection, and a Commissioner be appointed to reside at Coomassie. 86
Nor was the pressure only to take over Ashanti.

In 1894 the Manchester and

Glasgow Chambers of Commerce urged the Government also to take over the Northern Territories.
Read letter from Messrs. Alex. Miller Bro. and Co., Messrs. Taylor,
Loughland and Co., and Messrs. W. B. Mciver and Co., all merchants of
the city of Glasgow, on the subject of the disturbances on
:-:c:rthern
boundary of the Gold Coast Colony and their injurious eff'-~r:·c;s upon the
Colony in recommending Her Majesty's Government to assume a Protectorate
over the Frontier as well as the Ashanti tribes. 87
Much of this pressure, aside from demanding simple law and order to
facilitate trade inland, was also geared towards the takeover of the gold mines
of Ashanti.

Europeans were no longer content simply to buy gold from Africans

as they had done in the past; they were now anxious to construct their own
mines.

As one contemporary commented about the 1896 campaign against Ashanti,

One of the main motives for the expedition • . . not admitted till
after its conclusion, was, of course, command of the mineral wealth in
which the interior of the Gold Coast is supposed to abound. Before the
troops had returned from Kumasi, in fact, several speculators had begun
arrangements with local chiefs and others, with the object of obtaining
valuable concessions [of land] at low prices.8 8

86LivCC, 44th Annual Report, 1894, p. 68.
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87ManCC, 10

January 1894.

88 H. R. Fox Bourne, Blacks and Whites in West Africa (London:
and Son, 1901), p. 41.
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As soon as Ashanti and the Northern Territories were taken over, the
British commercial interests began to press for the abolition of all tolls on
products entering the two areas, arguing that such tolls were a restraint on
trade and that furthermore they constituted unfair competition, inasmuch as
tolls were levied on goods entering by road but not by the new railroads, 8 9
which only the wealthier (usually European) traders could afford to use.

The

system of tolls was a relic of the days when all trade into the independent
Ashanti nation was regulated by the Ashanti government.

Although the British

fought Ashanti in order to make Ashanti trade as "free" as possible, the actual
tolls into the area were not abolished until 1906. 9 0 Tolls on roads to the
Northern Territories (which constituted the only source of revenue for the
area) were abolished in 1907, because of fear of competition for routes with
the surrounding French and German colonies. 91

The governor in 1908 stated

that, since all tolls had by then been abolished, "There is every reason to
anticipate that the removal of all transport restrictions will result in a
marked increase of traffic in the interior."92
Thus i t can be seen that a primary aim of the British in taking over
Ashanti and the Northern Territories was precisely to attain the economic
objectives which Gallagher and Robinson deny were crucial to British policy in
the late nineteenth century.

How important the scramble for Africa was in

comparison to these economic aims cannot be decided here, 9 3 but the economic

89 GCLegCo, answer to question posed by John Sarbah, 30 April 1906.
90acLegCo, 30 September 1907.
91 F. M. Bourret, Ghana, the Road to Independence, 1919-1957 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 84.
92GCLegCo, statement by the Governor, 26 October 1908.
9 3For a discussion of the scramble for Africa, the reader is referred to
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motive has been established.

Nevertheless, the motive was not specifically to

protect foreign investment or to engage in land-grabbing.

While trade with

Ghana was extensive and profitable, and was expected to grow as Ghana became
a major exporter of agricultural and arboricultural produce, actual foreign
investment in the country was miniscule. 94

While there were many who would

have liked to take over the land, to facilitate both the establishment of gold
mines and the potential setting up of plantations, they failed to do so.
Chapter II discusses the attempts by the British government to take over
possession of the land of Ghana once the takeover of the Colony and the conquest of Ashanti had been completed, and the reasons why this attempted
takeover failed.

Raymond F. Betts (ed.), The
D. C. Heath, 1966).

ScPamble 11 for Africa (Lexington, Massachusetts:
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94 For a discussion of foreign investment in Ghana, see below, Ch.VI.
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AFRICAN RESISTANCE TO EXPATRIATE ENTREPRENEURS:
THE LMID ISSUE
To understand the position which the Gold Coast was to occupy after
1885 in the world economic system, it is essential to keep in mind that the
actual land of the colony never fell completely into the hands of the Colonial
Government.

Attempts were made during the 1890s to declare all "unoccupied 11

land in the colony Crown Land and to vest it in the Government, which would
supervise the land's disposal and its revenues.

For a variety of reasons, not

least of which was organized resistance on the part of educated Africans and
chiefs to the blatant takeover of their ancestral possessions, the move to vest
the land in the Crown failed.

Land did, however, become subject to regulation

by the Crown, and could not be alienated to non-Africans except in accordance
with a set of rules laid down by the Government as the Concessions Ordinance
in 1900.

In 1911, the Government tried again to take over control of lana, by

fostering a new policy of setting up "forest reserves," ostensibly designed to
safeguard African resources.

As a result of local opposition) however, the

Forest Bill had to be postponed until 1927, when it was finally enacted in a
much watered-down version.
It will be clear from the following that African opposition alone was
not enough to prevent enactment of laws contrary to the interests of Ghanaian
landowners.

But organized African opposition, combined with appositional

elements abroad, ensured that, unlike in most other colonies, the natural resources of Ghana would stay under some measure o? Ghana:l.an control; further,

c

that crops such as cocoa and palm oil would be produced by Ghanaian enterprise
and initiative.

Rather than being confined to reserves to live in
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anachronistic "communal" societies, Ghanaians became independent farmers,
quickly dividing into rich and poor) landowner and landless, and forming the
beginnings of classes in the countryside.
1.

The Crown Lands Bills:

1894 and 1897

A simplistic model of land tenure in the Gold Coast would distinguish
it from modern European land tenure systems by the fact that there was,
throughout the colonial period, no private property in land, and that only
usufruct

was granted to the individual cultivator.

Land in Ghana

was owned by the tribe, as a communal entity, and was not alienable.

It was

divided, in general, into stool land (land for the chief's use, to be used by
him for his own purposes but also to earn revenue to fulfil the ceremonial
needs of the tribe) and tribal land, for the use of the whole tribe) portions
of which were allotted to individual families and to which the families held
rights (for use only) in perpetuity.l
A system of shifting cultivation was the norm in the Gold Coast.

This

system, while seeming irrational to outsiders, was in fact a rational adaptation to soil conditions and the level of technical development.

The system

seemed crazily patchwork to the Europeans who took over the colony, used as
they were to clearly-defined, permanent fields.

But, in fact, boundaries were

relatively well-marked as far as the Africans were concerned, as indeed,were
property rights.

Strangers to particular tribes held certain obligations of

payment to the chief which a member of the tribe did not hold; usually, in
Ashanti and the Gold Coast Colony, under what was known collectively as the
"abusa" system, they were obliged to present one--third of their produce (or in

1G.

Benneh, "The Impact of Cocoa Cultivation on the Traditional Land
Tenure System of the Akan of Ghana," Ghana Journal of Soaiology, no. 1, vol. 6
{February, 1970), pp. 45-46.
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the case of cash-crop production, of the revenue of their produce} to the
chief.
This brief sketch does little justice to the complexity of land tenure
in the Gold Coast, a complexity which increased throughout the period as more
and more Ghanaians were drawn into the system of cash-crop production.

It is,

in fact, more a description of what European administrators perceived to be the
system of property than the actual system, which was not only more diverse but
which also was undergoing some change, even before the twentieth century, in
the direction of private ownership of land.

For example, reports compiled by

various District Commissioners in 1895 indicated a wide variety of property
systems, especially near the coast where, because of contact with the Europeans
and the consequent desire to earn money by cultivating permanent cash crops,
private property in land was developing.

From Pram Pram, east of Accra, the

District Commissioner reported, no doubt rather simplistically, that

11

Excepting

leasehold properties, all lands sold either to strangers or natives become the
absolute property of the purchasers.u 2 The District Commissioner for Cape
Coast reported that" . • . land along the coast is conveyed in nearly all cases
by deed. 11 3

In Accra, the Attorney-General reported that

• it has become a common custom to transfer land absolutely for
a consideration by conveyance forms. These conveyances are made at
least as frequently to natives as to Europeans . . • • They are generally
held by the Courts to be valid instruments of title between natives,
even if imperfect according to English law·. 4
The report above quoted was specifically commissioned in order to ascertain African customs as to land rights at a time when the Colonial Government

2"Report upon the Customs Relating to the Tenure of Land on the Gold
Coast" (London: 1895), p. 5.
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Ibid. ' P· 10.

4

Ibid. ' P• 16.
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was considering taking over all

11

unoccupied" or "waste" land as Crown Land.

vlliat the report indicated was that the ownership and tenure of land was wellorganized, that in fact such waste land as the Crown wished to take over hardly
existed, and that moreover, without any prompting from Government, Africans
were evolving forms of ownership consistent with their new role as producers
for the world market.
Given that such forms of ownership were being evolved, permitting
Africans to participate more effectively in the world economic system, for what
reason did the Government wish to try to take over the land in its own name?
With hindsight, it is now a truism that Africans were capable of producing for
the world market on their own initiative, without any stimuli (other than the
cash paid for products purchased) from the Europeans.

At the time, however,

many Europeans doubted that enough could be produced without complete European
takeover of the land.

There was talk of establishing plantations using im-

parted Chinese labour to produce cocoa and palm products.s

Moreover, the

Europeans regarded Africans as unreliable and they hesitated to do business
with a race which they considered inferior.

Controlled production, as one

contemporary Ghanaian observed, was more to their taste.
Is it lthe land question] • . . that the land shall belong to the
indigenes and not to foreign capitalists; or that, in the last analysis,
neither the foreign capitalist nor the indigenes, but Government shall
own it? To state the problem in another way, is it that the people
shall be free to till the soil in their own right and sell produce thereof
to the merchants abroad, the Supreme Court protecting the rights of
contractor and contractee in common; or that Government shall step in
and control private rights on the assumption that parties are incapable
of managing their own business?6

c

50lufemi Omosini, 11 The Gold Coast Land Question 1894-1900: Some Issues
Raised on West Africa 1 s Economic Development, 11 International Journal of African
Historical Studies, vol. 5 (1972), p. 457.
6J. E. Casely Hayford, The Trv~.th about the West African Land Question
(London: Frank Cass, 1971), p. 2.
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Gold Coast land, in any case, was valuable for more purposes than simply as a
producer of cocoa and other agricultural and arboricultural products.

The

1890s was the period of the first Ghanaian "gold rush"; a period when hundreds
of small speculators were trying to take out concessions to prospect land in
the hopes that gold might be found.

Before the Concessions Ordinance was

passed in 1900, limiting the permissible size of concessions, huge claims on
land were being granted to Europeans by African chiefs who often had no idea
of the extent of the land that they were bargaining away.

During this period

Ashanti Goldfields, for example, obtained a concession of one hundred square
miles, over which it obtained complete monopoly rights, in some of the best
gold land of Ashanti.7
In the face of such abuses of gold concessions, and in the light of a
land tenure system which, although it was evolving capitalist forms, was as
yet, from the European point of view, disorganized, it was easy for the Government to argue that it ought to vest all waste lands in the Crown in order to
protect the interests of the Africans against those of European entrepreneurs
who were "flooding" the colony. 8
was introduced in 1894.

The first lands bill, the Crown Lands Bill,

It was publicized as a laudable project, meant to

protect chiefs from being cheated by European concessionaires.

This protection

was to be effected by the vesting of all "waste lands, forest lands, and
minerals" in the Crown. 9

But, in fact, it would seem that protection of the

African was a minor consideration compared to the desire to protect the rights
of both Government and business concerns.

In the Gold Coast Legislative

7For a discussion of this concession, see below, Ch. Ill.
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8 In 1895, there were only eight gold mining companies with interests in

Ghana listed in the Stock Exchange Yearbook. But by 1905, there were 153.
Stock Exchange Yearbook (London), 1895 and 1905.
9 GCLegCo,

14 November 1894.
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Council, the Governor stated freely that" . • . for the past three years his
attention had been directed to the establishment of a means of acquiring the
waste land in the Colony for the use of the Government."lO
In the 1890s the Government was more concerned with the mineral than
the agricultural wealth of the country; and it was recognized that whereas
Africans could produce cocoa, they could not mine gold.

For that, Europeans

were needed.
Governor Maxwell's Public Lands Bill . . • was framed less for
' the purpose of protecting African cultivators from the squandering of
chiefs, as he professed, than to prepare the way for allotment of valuable
mineral and forest lands to selected European developers. Whether African
cultivators concurred in the chiefs' conveyancing of stool land or
received a fair share of the proceeds troubled some Gold Coast officials,
but Maxwell was more concerned that ill-defined boundaries, overlapping
titles and disputed claims would discourage responsible European entrepreneurs from investing in the area. Far beyond clarifying and improving
the land law, Maxwell desired to endmr the Colonial Governor with overriding power of intervention in all concessions agreements. 11
In fact, the Governor's insistence on having powers to regulate concession
agreements backfired; European merchants and miners feared too much control by
officialdom and made representations to the Colonial Office to that effect.
These fears, combined with protests registered by Africans who sent memorials
to the Governor asking that the Bill be withdrawn, resulted in the substitution
of a new Bill, called simply the Lands Bill, in 1897.

The vesting of all lands

in the Crown was dropped from the 1897 Bill, the aim being stated simply as a
desire to regulate and control the use of land in the colony.

However, under

the new Bill the Government intended not only to regulate the land's occupation
and use by expatriates, but also its occupation and use by Africans, thus

10Ibid.

11 R. E. Dumett, "British Official Attitudes l.n Relation to Economic
Development in the Gold Coast, 1874-1905" (University of London: unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis, 1966), p. 211.
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abrogating, as thoroughly as the earlier Bill would have done, the Africans'
right to control of their own resources.
African rights of ownership would no longer be automatically recognized. Occupiers of land would not be disturbed; but they would be
entitled only to a 'settler's right', a permanent heritable right of
occupancy, which could be transformed into an absolute right, on application to the Governor, by the gra~t of a land certificate. The
Government could also declare that any piece of land had no owner, and
then authorize its occupation.12
In the face of this promised onslaught upon their land rights, Ghanaians
were quick to organize.

Many petitions were laid on the table in the Legis-

lative Council against the Lands Bill, but with little effect. 13

The

Aborigines Rights Protection Society, a society formed ostensibly to protect
the rights of the chiefs and peoples of the Gold Coast but consisting primarily
of educated Africans, went so far as to send a delegation to England to present
a petition to the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain.

The petition argued

that the British had no paramount title to land in the Gold Coast Colony, especially since the land had been obtained not by conquest but by cession;1 4
that in any case lands needed for Government use could be obtained under the
Public Lands Ordinance of 1876; that no compensation would be issued to persons
whose land was granted to some other person by a Government Land Certificate;
that the Bill removed all rights for Africans to buy, sell, or make profit from
land and retained for their benefit only the minimal customary rights; and that
if Africans tried to obtain a Government Certificate to their own land they
would by doing so be putting themselves under English law, and removing

12Kimble, op. oit., p. 340. For a detailed exposition of African opposition to the Lands Bill the reader is referred to Kimble's Ch. IX, "The
A.R.P.S. and the Lands, 1889-1900."
13GCLegCo, May-June 1897.
14Kimble, op. oit., p. 338.
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themselves from "native customary" law. 15

All of these were detrimental

measures, which, the A.R.F.S. argued, would undermine traditional rule and
custom, and prevent the natural evolution of proprietary relations.
The petition to Joseph Chamberlain had its desired effect, and under
his orders the Lands Bill was removed from the books, to be replaced three
years later by a Concessions Ordinance which regulated the granting of African
lands to Europeans, but left dealings in land among Africans in the hands of
the traditional authorities.

There is no doubt that had the A.R.F.S. not or-

ganized and presented its petition in such an articulate manner, the Bill
might well have gone through.

However, it would be facile to attribute the

demise of the Bill solely to such African opposition; both prior to and after
this Bill many issues arose in Ghana on which African opposition had no effect
whatsoever. 1 6 David Kimble suggests that the A.R.P.S.' protests
. • . were not the only objections that weighed with Chamberlain, who
also had commercial interests very much in mind. Although no hint of
weakening had been apparent in the Gold Coast, there had been heart
searching in the Colonial Office for a long time over this Bill. . • •
George Fadmore argues that Chamberlain acted as he did partly because he
was already under attack for his alleged complicity in the Jameson Raid,
and mainly be.cause he realized that West Africa was not suitable for
permanent white settlement: 'The mosquitoes saved the West Africans,
not the eloquence of the intellectuals.'l7
It would indeed seem that a confluence of forces combined to suggest to
Chamberlain that it would be wise to rescind the Bill.

First, it was obvious

to him that even with a system of peasant proprietorship, Ghana was producing

15"Report of the Proceedings of the Deputation from the Kings and Chiefs
of the Western Province of the Gold Coast" (London, 1898).
16 For instance, the issue of the Sedition and Water Works Ordinances of
1934. See Francis Agbodeka, Ghana in the TWentieth Century (Accra: Ghana
Universities Press, 1972), p. 115.
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17 Kimble, op. cit., p. 354. The quotation is from George Padmore, The
Gold Coast Revolution (London: Dennis Dobson, 1953), p. 38.

the goods needed for the world market; it 'vas not necessary to establish plantations and introduce forced labour in order for British merchants to obtain
the goods they needed.

Moreover, the political situation in Africa was un-

stable enough as it vTas; a war was brewing in South Africa and Sierra Leone had
just had a hut tax rebellion; the Gold Coast petitioners hinted that a similar
rebellion might take place there were their needs not met.l8
had just been conquered and was still in a state of unrest.

Moreover, Ashanti
A strong body of

opinion within England, led by such personages as Mary Kingsley and E. D.
Morel, was also of opinion that land should be left in African hands.
Moreover, the Bill was opposed by certain commercial elements in the
colony, since among its provisions was that of a five per cent royalty to be
paid on the gross value of mineral products of the colony; a royalty to be paid
not to the owners of the land but to the government.l9

"One of the express

purposes of the Bill was to restrict the freedom of concess; 'Daires to drive a
one-sided bargain; another was to enhance colonial revenues by exacting royalties from concessions." 20

Opposition from expatriate commercial concerns,

literate and articulate Africans, and libera.l opinion within England, combined
with the pressure of political events elsewhere in Africa, was sufficient for
Chamberlain to decide to withdraw the Lands Bill.21
What must be noted from this extremely cursory outline of the history of
the Lands Bills in the 1890s, is first, that African opposition did, at least

18 Letter from lawyers of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society to the
Under-Secretary of State, the Colonial Office, 18 August 1898. Included in
"Report of the .
IA. R. P. S. J Delegation," op. cit. , p. 16.
190mosini, op. cit., p. 462.
20numett, op. cit., p. 213.
21 For a discussion of Colonial Office relations w·ith British firms with
interests in Ghana, see below, Ch. V.

43
in this one case, have some independent effect on the outcome of the policy,
and second, that by asserting their opposition in terms of the defence of their
traditional rights, those same Africans were bargaining away their right to
change their forms of land tenure in the future. 22

The A.R.P.S. consistently

argued that the traditional form of land holding was communal; that all land
was held for common use by the tribe, and that it was inalienable.

In its es-

sential forms this vras correct but, as described above, the system was already
changing by the 1890s (if not, indeed, earlier) to accommodate itself more
fully to the development of cash-crop agricultural production for the world
market.

But after the rescission of the Lands Bill, the Government adopted a

policy of retaining traditional forms even >lhen the internal dynamic of the
indigenous society demanded change; even when, for example, certain tribes were
willing to sell land outright to members of certain other tribes, or when
chiefs were willing to grant freehold to their subjects because it was recognized that freehold and security of tenurewerenecessary for the cultivation of
cash crops, a cultivation which would eventually benefit the whole society
through the introduction of a greater amount of cash with which to buy new
goods and education.

Because the Africans' only method of defense had been to

counterpoise the traditional against the new society, the actual development of
Ghana was thwarted.
Once a land policy had been established for the Gold Coast Colony, a
similar policy was established for Ashanti.

After the conquest of Ashanti in

1900, many British firms argued that they should be allowed freehold rights to
land in this new possession, since Ashanti could not plead, as could the Gold
Coast Colony, that oy right of voluntary cession she was entitled to keep her

22This point was suggested to the author by Dr. E. R. Brett in discussion, London, November 1974.
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traditional laws.

The firms urged that land be granted to them freehold, or
On 9 December 1907 the Liverpool

with a minimal rent, for a 999-year lease.

Africa Committee sent a letter to the Colonial Office urging that all possible
speed was necessary in order to obtain grants of land from chiefs before the
chiefs became aware of the land's value.

"If these arrangements be completed

before the land has acquired value, owing to the trade brought by the railway,
the necessary dealings with the Chiefs should not be very difficult." 23

The

Colonial Government, in this situation, emerged as the guardian of the African
people against the absolute rapaciousness of its commercial compatriots, inasmuch as it refused to accede to these demands for freehold rights for trading
firms.
In the Northern Territories, however, the Government did eventually
take over the land, although not until 1927.

Under the Land and Native Rights

Ordinance, all land in the Northern Territories (with some exceptions) was
"placed under the control and made subject to the disposition of the Governor
for the common use and benefit of the natives," and the Government was responsible for the granting of rights of occupancy to both "Natives" and
"Non-natives," 24

As Northern Territories affairs were not debated in the

Legislative Council, 25 opposition to this usurpation of northern land rights
was difficult to organize.

In addition, African lawyers were not permitted to

practice in the courts of the Northern Territories.

Hence they could not

organize opposition to this Bill.
The last of the flames caused by direct attempts to take over control of

c

2 3LivCC, 9 December 1907.
24Gold Coast, Colonial Report, 1927-28, p. 44.
25 The powers of the Legislative Council are explained below, Ch. V.
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land died, then, by 1897.

After that time land was still a political issue,

but the basic policy of leaving control of land in African hands had been
established; with the exception of the Northern Territories, it was universally
implemented.
1911.

Nevertheless, a second issue, that of Forest Reserves, arose in

The reaction of the African chiefs and educated men was similar to the

reaction they had experienced fourteen years earlier, and as ir.i the earlier so
in the later case the Bill was watered down and eventually reformed.
2.

The Forest Bill:

1911

The Forest Bill, introduced into the Gold Coast Legislative Council in
1911, was the only serious challenge presented by the British after the turn
of the twentieth centurJ to the policy which had been laid down by Chamberlain,
that land in Ghana was to remain in Ghanaian hands.

Explicitly, its purpose

was to protect forest lands in order to preserve the humidity necessary for
cocoa production.

Implicitly, however, i t seemed--at least to the African

opposition--that its purpose was to try, on-:::e more, to create new opportunities
for European capitalists at the expense of Africans.
In 1910 a Forestry Bill had been introduced into the Gold Coast Legislative Council which" . • . enabled the Colonial Secretary of the Colony to
grant concessions, leases or licenses on behalf of the owners of the land, and
to regulate the gathering of forest produce in a forest reserve, and the sale,
or export, of such produce." 26

The intent of this bill was to preserve forests

and forest products, and also the humidity necessary for the cocoa industry, as
well as both to safeguard chiefs against "dirty deals" with European concessionaires and to safeguard the rights of the African people as a whole to use
their forests.

c

There was no argument as to the fact that forests were indeed

2 6A. McPhee,

1ne Economic Revolution in British West Africa (London:

Frank Cass, 1971), p. 148.
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necessary for the ecologJ of the country, and that without their protective
roots soil would erode and water would disappear.

What was at issue was the

means by which forests should be protected.
The 1910 Bill imposed such stringent "protective" measures on forests
that opposition was intense, and the Government was soon compelled to withdraw
the Bill.

One of its opponents, E. J. P. Brown, an African, accused the Gov-

ernment of drafting the bill in order to acquire the privileges of compulsory
acquisition of land which had been denied it in 1897. 27

Certainly the Bill was

drafted in such a way as to imply this, as it provided for measures to compel
chiefs to alienate, against their will and absolutely, land deemed by the
Government to be necessary for forest reserves.

In the face of opposition, a

milder Bill, the Forest Ordinance, which included provisions for chiefs and
their people to protest takeovers of their land for reserves, was introduced
and unanimously passed (with the consent not only of European unofficial members but also of African unofficial members) 28 on November 9, 1911.

This Bill

provided that when it deemed it necessary, the Government could set up forest
reserves, administering them as best it saw fit, and making a profit from the
forests by leasing them, or allowing concessions on them, as long as the principles of conservation were adhered to.

Two-fifths of any profits the

Government made was to go to the owners, the other three-fifths to be retained
by the Government for administrative purposes. 2 9
Although the Bill was passed unanimously, there was a great deal of
2711 Report on the Legislation Governing the Alienation of Native Lands in
the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti, 1911 11 (hereafter referred to as the Belfield
Report} {London: 1912), p. 99.
2 8"Report of the West African Lands Committee 11 (hereafter referred to as
the Digby Report) (London: 1917}, p. 284.
29GCLegCo, 9 November 1911.

opposition to it, even within the Legislative Council.

It was generally felt

that whatever the ostensible reasons for the Bill, the Government had an ulterior motive not beneficial to the African.
It is quite evident that from the principles laid down by this Bill,
it is wholly and purely a foreign element which is being imposed into
Native Customary Laws and for its 'objects and reasons' it is stated
that, it is to establish 'Forest Reserves' and to enable the Government
to grant licenses and leases, • • • but for its 'objects and reasons'
where does the Native come in?30
One of the chief issues of debate between Africans and Europeans was
whether deforestation, which in the cocoa areas would have the ultilll!3,te effect
of decreasing humidity, was actually the responsibility of Africans.

Africans

argued that the European mines were as responsible for deforestation in the
Colony as was the constantly criticized shifting cultivation which the Africans
practised.

Yet it seemed that the mines ,,;ere to get off scot-fr·

tribes took all the financial burden of reforestation.

The assumption behind

the Forest Bill was that unless the Government declared certain land as preserved land, and planted trees on it, the forests would all disappear because
of the devastations of the ignorant Africans.

But it was also known that a

great deal of deforestation occurred, not because of devastations caused by
peasants, but rather because of the ravagings of the 'mines.
There was much debate as to whether or not a mining concession brought
with it the right to timber products of the land on which the mine was situated.

In general, in fact, the rights of mines over the surface products of

the land they mined were in dispute.

The investigator of land policy in the

Colony in 1911, Conway Belfield, noted that mining companies often planted
cocoa and rubber trees in cleared areas, a right which their actual

c

30 Nene Mate Kale of Krobo, in GCLegCo, 13 September 1911.
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concessions did not grant them. 31

By appropriating this right the companies

denied access on mining land to Africans, either for shifting cultivation or
for the more permanent and profitable cultivation of cash crops.
In general, it was assumed that the mining companies' concessions
granted, at the minimum, the right to use such lumber and timber as was necessary for the mine.

But this was often quite an extensive need.

Each company leased from the native owners, at the very outset,
certain blocks of forest for timber and fuel, in addition to the
areas actually required for erection of plants, buildings, etc.
These areas have been and are being added to by further leases, as it
is most essential that the supply of timber and fuel should not be
exhausted, and thus bring the mining industry to a standstill. 32
In 1917 it was estimated that the mines consumed 1,070 acres of forest
per year, and it was recommended that 134 square miles of land should be set
aside to assure an adequate supply of timber in the future. 33

Nevertheless,

the idea that the miners, not the Africans, should therefore be responsible for
the cost of reforestation was never entertained .
• • • [T]here is no obligation on the Mines authorities to replant.
They have leased Forests for the specific purpose of using all the
timber they can get out of them, without any proviso that they shall
re-stock the denuded areas . . . . If the owners of forests are previously
warned that they will be held responsible for re-afforesting, • . • and,
this obligation is enforced by legislation, the future of the forests
will be safeguarded. • • • [I] f these are unable to defray the expenses
then re-afforestation should be done by Government, and the future crop
regarded as Government property . • . . [W]ith reference to the Reserves
aggregating 134 square miles which will be required for the future
requirements of the Mines, it is hardly necessary to point out no
cultivation of crops in these Reserves can be allowed.3 4

31Belfield Report, op. ait., p. 35.
32 "Papers Relating to Re-Afforestation of Areas which have been denuded
of Forest by the Requirements of the 1'-ITNES and of the RAIL\.J'AY" (Gold Coast:
Government Press, Accra, 1918). Report by N. c. McLeod, Conservator of Forests,
25 March, 1917, p. 4.
33Ibid.
34Ibid.' p.
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In.other words, chiefs were to be responsible for the reforestation of areas
which mines had denuded, even though the timber rights of those mines were none
too clear in the first place.

Further, the chiefs were to create reserves for

the mines which were to be completely unproductive, in the economic sense, from
the chiefs' point of view, for not only were no rents to be paid on the reserved lands, but also no crops were to be grown on them.

The cost of such

reforestation to be paid by Africans was estimated in 1917 at about £6,400 per
square mile. 35
The question of whether mines or shifting cultivators were responsible
for deforestation was one of the most severe issues surrounding the Forest
Bill.

Several other issues arose, at the core of all of them the fear that the

Government was actually trying once again to give opportuni Ucs to Europeans at
the expense of Africans.

Because of the immense hostility to the Bill, a

Committee was set up to investigate land tenure and the forest situation in the
Gold Coast in 1912.
investigators. 36

The Committee was supposed to be an impartial body of

Neither the European business community nor the African

community was given representation on it, despite many protests.

The Joint

West Africa Committee, representative of the Manches.ter, London, and Liverpool
Chambers of Commerce, asked for representation but was told that

11

if they

once included representatives of the various interests on the Committee it
would require the addition, not only of educated, but

were the people most concerned. 1137

Bush natives, as they

Nevertheless, Conway Belfield, the leader

of the investigatory committee, was unusual in West African history inasmuch as

35Ib.1-u..
:J
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36 Cited

above as the Belfield Report, fn. 27.

37JWAC,
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he did make a serious effort to encourage testimony to the Committee not only
from educated Africans, but also from chiefs.

The picture they built up of the

proposed administration of the forest reserve system was one of mistrust and
abuse.
The educated Africans criticized the Government, first of all, for trying to set up reserves when an adequate system of forest protection was already
extant in the Timber Protection Ordinance.
There is a Timber Protection Ordinance in force in this Colony, but
I do not think the mining companies take any notice of it nor do the
Government see that it is enforced in the mining districts to guard
against deforestation. The object of that Ordinance is to prevent the
cutting of immature trees except trees of a certain girth and width. 38
If the Government had to have timber protection, the Africans argued, the
chiefs themselves could take care of the forests.

Instead of enacting ordi-

nances, the Government could sponsor the education of young African men in
forest conservation.

Indeed, the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, on its

own initiative, had already sponsored such young men in the cocoa industry, but
their efforts had been thw·arted by the Government.
The [Aborigines Rights Protection] Society formulated a scheme for
training young men at the Botanical Gardens in the Colony in the proper
cultivation of cocoa. These young men were to be distributed among the
cocoa districts to diffuse among the cocoa planters a technical knowledge
of the method of cultivating, pruning, and fermenting cocoa • • . • All
the initial expenses such as clothing, board, and other incidental
expenses, were borne by the Society, and it was f1rrther proposed that the
Society should employ the young men for five years . • . • All that the
Government had to do ••• was to give the young men free tuition and
lodging at the Gardens • • • • [But] the Government wrote back to the
effect that inasmuch as the young men had not passed the Seventh Standard
(although all had passed the Sixth Standard) they were not eligible within
the existing regulations. The efforts of the Society were thus thwarted

. . .39

Speaking for his own class of educated, "modernized" Africans who used

c

38Belfield Report, testimony of E. J. P. Brown, p. 111.
39Ibid.' p. 109.
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land not only for subsistence cultivation but also for cash-crop production,
E. J. P. Brown further argued, as did many others, that if the Government took
over forest land, paying only two-fifths of the profit to the original African
owners, it would in effect be depriving those Africans of the right to make
profits on their own.
p~ent

"I do not consider the reservation of my land and the

to me of two-fifths of the profits arising therefrom a matter of public

interest to which must be subordinated my private interest, right, and ardent
desire to work and improve my own land myself. n40

Three-fifths of the profit

would be going to a Government which was free, if it saw fit, to rent out the
land, technically only "reserved" from the Africans, to European entrepreneurs.
• • • [F]oreign speculators • •
in the process of time will absorb
our lands and thereby reduce us to a landless proletariat fit to work at
a wage for the benefit of outsiders • • • . [U]nder the Forest Ordinance
we have neither voice nor choice in the matter--for by a stroke of the
pen the Governor has the power to reserve and afterwards lease our lru1ds,
and this, in effect, is compulsory acquisition of our lands for the
benefit of outsiderso 41
In essence, there was no difference between the 1911 Bill and the 1897 Bill.
"[T]he Forest Bill of 1911 o •• introduces the same encroachments on the
people's proprietary rights which were objected to in 1894 and again in

1897." 42
Beside the highly articulate and extremely angry protests of the educated elite of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, the arguments of the
chiefs against the bill sounded weak.

Nevertheless, chief after chief com-

plained to the Belfield Commission, always asking the same question, why they
could not be allowed to take care of the forests themselves, with the help of
their educated young men.

40

Ibid. ' p

41

0

The question was especially important to them

111.

Ibid.' p. 109.

421bid.,

testimony of Jo E. Casely Hayford, p. 102.
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because of the existence of sacred groves, which they feared would be expropriated by the Europeans.

It was even argued, if feebly, that the very existence

of these groves constituted sufficient reserved forest space for the Governrr!ent
to abrogate its programme.
We should be glad if the Government '.YOuld send us instructors to teach
us how to improve our forests, but we wish to manage them ourselves. I
admit that we have never taken steps to improve our forests, in fact at
present we do not understand the management of forest lands • • • . [But]
I should not be satisfied with any arrangements which do not give to the
people the sole control of the forests. 4 3
The masses of testimony presented against the 1911 Forest Bill convinced
Conway Belfield that it must be revised.

He did feel that the

AL~,

,c, . . .

were

ignoring the issue of forest conservation, and that they were not facing the
very real need to protect the cocoa industry against disease and an overly dry
climate. 44

In addition, he felt that if administration of forest l~~d were

left solely in the hands of chiefs and elders, they would administer it for
their own profits. 45

Nevertheless, he agreed that it was unfair for the Gov-

ernment to remedy the situation by simply taking over lands and running them
for its own profit.

Rather he recommended that the Government not

to lease land, but only to employ the reserved land for its own

b~'

u~e.

~rmi tted

Further,

the Government should not be allowed to retain three-fifths of the prof'i ts, but
only as much of the profit as was absolutely necessary to cover the costs of
administration.

Finally, he recommended that a maximum be set on the percent-

age of stool land which could be reserved so that no tribe would find itself
without a sufficient supply of common land.46

43Ibid.,

testimony of Amanhin Mensah of EliP..ina, p. 117.

44Ibid., report by Belfield, p.

c

45Ibid.' p.
46 Ibid.,

7.

pp. 39-41.
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Because of the many protests against the Forest Bill, which were backed
up by Belfield's

recow~endations,

the Bill itself was never implemented despite

the fact that it had been legally passed.

The 1910s were taken up by pre-

occupation with the European war, and the issue of forest conservation was left
in abeyance until Governor Guggisberg took over the Colony in 1919.

Guggisberg

was a strong believer in forest conservation and he decided to implement a
system of reserves.

His policy with regard to reserves was originally

11
•

•

•

to trust the Chiefs entirely with the, formation and administration of those
reserves which are considered necessary by the Forestry Officers and which are
set aside after mutual agreement between them and the Chiefs. " 4 7 The chiefs
were to set aside reserves under the powers granted to them under the Native
Jurisdiction Ordinance.

However, it soon became apparent that not enough re-

serves were being set up by the chiefs on their own initiative, and after a
great many threats, Guggisberg had a Forestry Ordinance passed on 3 l-1arch,
1927.

It maintained the rights of O'lmers and did not override by-laws made

under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance as long as such laws were satisfactorily administered.

Provision was made

11

•

•

•

for buying out any rights (but not

the land} if the exercise of established claims would make successful forest
management impossible. " 48

The Government was to supervise and maintain re-

serves constituted either under the Forest Ordinance or under by-laws, and onethird of the revenue was to be used for improvement.

The owners could grant

concessions to work minerals or timber in a reserve, but
• • • in the event of such a concession being granted the taking of
firewood for other than domestic purposes, or of trees for conversion
into timber, will be carried out under the direction of the Forestry

47 GCLegCo,

6 March 1924.

48GCLegCo, 3 March 1927.

Department, and the owner will get a fair price for his timber, which is
not always the case at present. 4 9
The Government also pledged to give an annual bounty of one pound per
year per square mile to owners of land as acknowledgement that they had set
aside land for the good of the country, but the bounty did not imply that the
Government had taken over ownership. SO

By 1932, however, payment of this

paltry sum had been discontinued, apparently on the grounds that the African
Provincial Councils were no longer paying bounties, and therefore the British
had no need to pay bounties either.51

Chiefs were expected to contribute land

and preserve forests entirely on their own financial responsibility.

By 1938, 5,659 square miles of some 30,000 square miles of forest land
in the Gold Coast had been constituted or approved as reserved land. 52

Some

Africans, despite the fact that the land was clearly, in law, now guaranteed
as the possession of the stools, feared this gradual expropriation, and their
representatives often cautioned the government to "make haste slowly" in order
not to upset the people.

One chief, for example, recommended t .. d.C the Govern-

ment should state its purpose when it acquired land and refer the acquisition
Iw]ith a view to allay the present ~~rest

to the Legislative Council ".

amongst the natives brought about by the wide areas of land acquired by the
Government.

I!
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But the Government, far more concerned about cocoa dis-

ease and the need at all costs to protect the cocoa crop, referred land
issues to the Concessions Ordinance, the vehicle enacted in 1900 after the

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.

51 GCLegCo, 2 February

c

1932.

52 Bourret, op. eit., p. 126.
53 Nana M. A. Awah II of Adangme, in GCLegCo, 24 September 1931.
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1897 Bill failed.

This Ordinance, as will be shown below, regulated land

dealings between Africans and Europeans to the satisfaction of the latter> but
not of the former.
3.

The Regulation of Dealine;s in Land
between Africans and Euro~
Once it was determined that Europeans would not be able to take over

Gold Coast lands in their own name, and that property would remain in African
hands, the question became:

how much access to land would Europeans have, and

how would their dealings with Africans be regulated?

By 1900, after the polit-

ical ferment surrounding the 1897 Lands Bill, it was obvious to Europeans that
Africans could produce enough of the export crops which traders desired, and
that for a variety of reasons, not least of which was climate, plantations were
not a desirable option for Europeans in any case.

But Ghana was still a major

source of gold, and the political power of the gold-mining investors at the
Colonial Office in London was strong.

Hence a way had to be found to guarantee

rights to gold-mining companies in Ghana while simultaneously protecting
African land rights.

The solution to this dilemma was promulgated in the Con-

cessions Ordinance in 1900,
During the latter half of the 1890s, a minor "gold rush" had taken place
in Ghana, a rush which tapered off after the Boer War when investors turned
their attention back to South African gold fields.

Europeans entered the Gold

Coast and began negotiations with Africans for mining rights.
was no legislation

regarding such negotiations, enormous areas of land were

negotiated away, often for paltry sums.

In 1897, Ashanti Goldfields obtained

concession rights to one hundred square miles of territory. 54

c

Because there

The success of

54 The Ashanti Goldfields concession will be described in detail J.n Ch.

III.
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Ashanti Goldfields in obtaining such monopolistic rights prompted others interested in mining to pressure the Colonial Office to institute regulations which
would guarantee other prospectors and investors a reasonable chance to exploit
Ghana 1 s resources in competition with Ashanti Goldfields.
The upshot of this pressure was the Concessions Ordinance of 1900, an
Ordinance which limited the size of concessions to five square miles for
mineral lands, and twenty square miles for timber, rubber, or other products of
the soil, with a maximum length in time of ninety-nine years.

(Ashanti Gold-

fields, however, having already obtained its lease, was exempt from these
provisions.)SS

The 1900 law applied only to the Gold Coast Colony, but a

similar law was enacted in Ashanti in 1903.

Leases were to be negotiated be-

tween the European and the African chief responsible for the area concerned,
but they were to be ratified in the Gold Coast courts in the Colony, or by the
District Commissioner in Ashanti (where African lawyers were forbidden to practice in order to "protect" the chiefs from the "exorbitant" costs of lawyers 1
fees).

In the Northern Territories, no Concession Ordinance was enacted; the

Government simply had the right to grant concessions as it saw fit; however,
by 1910 the total area leased in the North was less than one acre. 56
It was clearly stated in the Ordinance of 1900 that no concession should
"derogate from the customary rights of natives"; 57 that is, that the rights of
Africans to practice shifting cultivation, collect firewood, and snare and hunt
game, should be guaranteed in all mining concessions, and that the surface
rights to the land should remain in African hands even when mining was carried

55Dumett

c

56McPhee

'
'

op. cit., p. 229.
op. cit., p. 188.

57 Digby Report, op. cit., p. 123.
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on.

They were to retain the right to collect products of' the soil other than

those specif'ically claimed by the lessee.
loosely guaranteed and guarded.

Nevertheless such rights were

on~y

For instB.nce, the text of' a lease to Messrs.

Brunner, Mond and Company 58 in 1913 gave the company complete liberty to sell,
dispose of', or underlease its rights, provided only
[t]hat the Lessors, their people and servants, shall at all times have
liberty to hunt and snare game to gather f'ire-v10od snails and building
materials f'or their dwelling houses and to till and cultivate their f'arms
and plantations so far as the same can be done without causin~ interrup-

tion to any operation carried on under the pOl.Jers and prim: ·
granted• • . . 59

· Y'eby

Such a qualification in a lease could ef'fectively abrogate the rights of the
original owners of' the land, since it would be unclear to them what their
rights were in the first place.
The limitation of lease rights to ninety-nine years was regarded by some
Europeans as a drag upon their enterprise; they f'elt that they should be al·lowed to work their lands in perpetuity.

'l'o many Africans, however, ninety-

nine years was more time than they could fathom; in essence it meant that land
was being signed away not only f'or the original owners' lifetimes, but also
f'or the lifetimes of their children and grandchildren.
Af'ricans was that usufruct

The f'eeling among these

should be returned to a man's family; that

he should not be able to or required to sign away its rights as well as his
own.

In 1912 the Bel:field Commission, investigating the operations of the

Concessions Ordinance as well as the problems connected with the Forest Bill,
heard chief after chief complain that ninety-nine years was too long.
example, Kobina Foli, the Omanhene of' Adansi, stated:

"I •

58Later a division of Imperial Chemical Industries.

c

F'or

consider the

Stock Exchange

Yearbook (1939).
59"Correspondance relating to Oil-Palm Lands," Cd. 6673, 1913, p. 5,
italics the author's.
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term of ninety-nine years too long because the land will not come back to the
people now living.

If the rents were larger I should not mind . . . . "60

field, however, rejected this argument by the chiefs.

Bel-

"I hold that the wish of

the chiefs is mainly prompted by the desire to get back into their own hands
properties which have been proved to be valuable in order that they or their
successors may reap the advantage of disposing of them a second time." 61
The limitations of land holdings to twenty square miles for agriculture
and five square miles for mining were subject to considerable abuse.

By law

no one concessionaire, either an individual or a company, could hold more than
two concessions, but the practice of setting up dummy corporations to acquire
options on land to be held for future use soon became prevalent in Ghana.

Even

without the setting up of such dummy corporations, however, the chiefs soon
began to feel that too much land was being alienated.

Few had any accurate

idea of what exactly a square mile was, and while European administrators were
willing to explain, conceptually, what the term meant, they did not visit the
Africans' lands to point out to them in detail just how much land they were
alienating.

In testimony to the Belfield Commission, many chiefs stated that

had they known the extent of a square mile, they would never have alienated
their land.

Chief Esselkojo of Appinto, in the Tarkwa area, for instance, said

"I do not know what a square mile is.

Sometimes I have given more land than I

intended, and if I had known the true extent I would have given less.
be an advantage to have advice in the preliminary stages."6 2
of Adansi agreed.

61Jb'd
~ . , p. 20.
62 1bid., p.

Chief Kobina Foli

"Before signing the agreement I appear before the

60Belfield Report, op. ait., p.

76.

97.

It would

59
Commissioner to have the document explained to me.

0

square miles, so we are not much wiser then.
land.

He describes the area in

The Commissioner never visits the

I should like a local officer to visit i t and explain the boundaries to

me." 6 3 Belfield was more sympathetic to the confusion which the chiefs expressed over the concept of square miles than he was to their desire to have leases
shortened, arguing that
[t]he chiefs and their advisors . . • always imagine that what they
are granting is a mere fraction of the area which they actually dispose
of . • • • I have been told by almost every chief who granted a concession, that if he had known the extent of the country which was being
sought from him, he would have refused to concede all that was asked
for. 64
Nevertheless, as he recommended no changes in length of concessions, so Belfield recommended no changes in area of concessions, simply expressing the
pious hope that Africans would be better informed than prior to his investigations of the magnitude of land which they were alienating.
In 1911, land alienation appeared to be a very serious business indeed
since in some parts of the Colony, there was more land under option (that is,
to which a concessionaire had first rights if he so desired them) than there
was actual land in existence.

In toto, only about 880 square miles of land (or

one in twenty-sevenl in the Gold Coast Colony had been alienated but another
3,000 square miles were "under notice. " 65

ifuile some chiefs seemed deliberately

to be granting options two or three times over on the same land, others simply
had no idea of the extent of the land they w·ere alienating or indeed whether
the land was theirs to alienate in the first place.

Boundary disputes were

arising with alarming frequency as neighbouring chiefs discovered that they

6 3Ibid.' p.

0

97.

64 Ibid. '
P· 965

Ibid. ' P• 11.

6o
were alienating the same land, and each wanted to retain the land as his own so
that he could have payment for it.

Lawyers from the coast were making small

fortunes arguing the claims of rival chiefs to the same plots of land.

For-

tune hunters from Europe were, of course, the originators of this practice of
overalienation, or double alienation of land.

Ghana was known to have large

deposits of gold, although at the time, in the late 1890s and early 1900s, such
land was often unworkable because of the difficulties of transport and of obtaining labour.

In order that potential gold land be not lost to them,

therefore, Europeans would travel to the Gold Coast and arrange to have options
for leasing land, thus tying it up at minimal option rents of perhaps five
pounds or ten pounds a square mile, until they saw fit to actuall;;' lease and
hopefully work it.

There was no legal regulation as to how long an option

could exist before it lapsed, nor was there any way a chief could compel a
European either to take up the option or to forgo the land.
Land so tied up was often used for speculative purposes in Europe;
gullible Europeans bought options thinking that the options ensured them actual
ownership of Gold Coast land, unaware that by law they could never do more than
rent the land in question for ninety-nine years.

In 1904 the Legislative

Council passed some regulations to counteract this practice, since in that year
alone there were some 3,000 "enquiries .. on the Court lists, that is, concessions for which the claimants had merely filed claims and gone no further.

The

Government feared both a sudden rush for validation and, more important, fraud.

-c

All concessions are not bona fide. In some cases, it is believed that
the land has no existence; in other cases, the same land has been leased
again and again; in many cases, the moneys agreed upon have not been
paid; in many cases the claimant knows that his concession cannot be
supported, and, in the great majority of cases, the claimants have no
intention of proceeding with their claims. It is this class of case
which has led to fraud. A claimant could truthfully allege that his
claim was pending in Court, and the pendency of a claim would be sufficient to induce an unwary purchaser to pay for a valueless concession.
In fact the filing of a claim gave it the imprimatur of the Court which
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could be used for fraud.66
Concessions granted by chiefs were definitely being used in Europe to induce
investors to finance companies when there ivas no proof either that the Government would validate the concession or that the land contained what it was
purported to contain by way of exploitable resources.
[D]uring the present year [1910], as in the so-called 'boom' of
1901, many investors in the United Kingdom have been victimized by company
promoters . . . . An instance has been brought to my notice where a syndicate acquired a concession from a Native Chief for an area of land
considerably in excess of that allowed by the Concessions Ordinance, and,
on the strength of that 'concession' • . • floated a company on the unwarranted supposition that the concession in question would be certified
as valid in the Courts of the Colony. The public should be careful to
ascertain before investing in any Gold Coast Company purporting to have
rights in land, that the concessions granting such rights have received
legal sanction, or . . • that a certificate of validity has been i8sued
in respect of such concessions . • . • [I]n connection with the company
referred to above which was floated primarily to exploit a trace of
country purported to have some ten rubber vines or trees to the acre,
• • . an official of the Agricultural Department reports that he passed
along one of the boundaries of this concession but that he saw no
Funtumia [rubber] trees and that the Chief and natives informed him that
there were no such trees in the forest in question. 67
Even on land where legitimate concessions had been granted, very little
profit was made by the Africans after the concessions had been validated by the
courts and after the boundaries had been clearly defined.

Concessions rents

were always very low, in order to encourage European·investment and speculation.

The few mines, such as Ashanti Goldfields, which made large profits did

not therefore have to pay more in rent to the African owners of the land.

They

were simply obliged to pay five per cent of their profits in royalties to the
British Government(and such royalties were not necessarily retained in the
Colony for the Colony's use).

"Considerations money" (that is, money paid in

order to have the right to negotiate a concession) usually amounted to about

c

66 GCLegCo, speech by the Chief Justice, 25 July 1904.
67 GCLegCo, speech by the Governor, 28 October 1910.
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fifty pol.Ulds for five square miles with a ten pol.mds per annum occupation fee
until the concession was actually worked. 68

After the concession was worked,

rents varied around one hundred to three hundred pounds per annum. 69

'l'he

difficulty was, however, that there was no time limit on occupation before
working the concession, and the concessions often lay dormant
lessees decided whether or not to work them.

whil~'

the European

In times of boom, especially

during the "gold rushes" of the late 1890s and the 1930s (when the price of
gold was allowed to float on the open market) the amount of cor : 0eration
money was raised and chiefs often received bribes, occasionally as high as
£5000. 70
The problem with these concessions was that they were

'"'1<>ntly worked

without the consent of the Government, and without Government validation rents
were lower than they otherwise would have been. 71

Africans, who either did not

go to the courts for protection, or were unaware that by hiring one of the much
abused "half-educated" lawyers from the coast they could prov;<:·G themselves,
often had their rights to the land curtailed.

A1 though African access to land

granted for mineral concessions was supposed to have been guaranteed in the
original 1900 Concessions Bill, in fact the Bill had to be amended in 1912 to
include this provision.

11

[T]o prevent Concessions being certifled as

valid if the conditions therein provided exclude natives from their rights of
collecting natural produce, or give powers to the concessionaires to remove
natives from their habitations within the area of the Concessions." 72
68Belfield Report,

op. oit., testimony of Francis T. Dove, p. 49.

69 Ibid.,

testimony of Giles Hunt, p. 65.
70 Interview with a former British barrister, Accra, May 1974.

71Digby Report, op. oit., p. 141.
72GCLegCo, 24 August 1912.

As well,
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the concessionaires frequently abused the provisions of the concessions by
renting out parts of their concessions to other
trading posts.

~uropeans,

for instance for

Such extra rents vrere su.pposed to be paid not to the Europeans,

but to the original African owners.

Chief Esselkojo of Appinto complained to

the Belfield Commissions about this practice.
I wish to complain that in the case of the Tarquah concessio"' the
concessionaires have allowed white people to build houses and s:wps on
land forming part of the concession, and, inasmuch as their surface
rights are restricted to such as are appurtenant to mining, I think the
rent should come to me instead of being appropriated by them . . . • I
do not know whether the Government made any arrangement with the mining
company respecting the Government buildings erected on the concession
land, but they did not do so with me. 73
In general, concessions were viewed not as means for i\.[".<i.cans to make
profits which could then be invested in money-making ventures or selfimprovement schemes of their own, but as a means to further the development of
the Gold Coast through European investment.

Even Conway Belfield, whose com-

mission of investigation into land law in the Gold Coast certainly took
seriously Africans' complaints of abuse and who tried to remedy these abuses as
best he could, saw the object of the Commission as primarily to "expedite the
process of alienation and reduce the expense of acquisition.

1174

While it

could be argued that the rents charged for concessions were too small, the
European companies themselves seemed to feel that the expenses of obtaining
concessions were too great.

In the Minutes of the London Chamber of Commerce

in March 1906, for example, "Mr. J. H. Cordner James referred to correspondence
which had passed between his firm and the Colonial Office giving particulars of
an instance where it had cost a Syndicate £6000 and taken ~~years to render
valid a concession five miles square." 75
73 Belfield Report, op. ait., p.
74Ibid., p.

25.

75LonCC, 29 March 1906.
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There were continual disputes between

64

c

Government and prospecting firms as t.o who should be responsible for surveying
concession land; the firms aretied that by putting the onus of such work on them
the Government was getting a free survey of the land76 while the Govermnent
argued that the opposite was true.

The general belief of the firms was that no

obstacle should be put in their way, since only through European investment
would the Colony develop (even though by the mid-1910s it was obvious that the
Colony was rapidly developing through African investment in cocoa, rubber, and
palm oil production).

The Government was concerned to protect its own inter-

ests, to make sure that royalties on minerals were paid and that it did not
itself have to pay the costs of granting concessions.
The business community was not willing to pay much for the concessions
it held, either to the landowners themselves or to the Government.

The five

per cent royalty on profits of concessions which was fixed by the Government in
1900 became law only after extreme protests in England from businessn><;;:·; -who
felt that a one per cent royalty was ample.

In 1897, for instance, the Liver-

pool Africa Committee sent a letter to Joseph Chamberlain· objecting strongly to
the Government policy of charging five per cent on profits of mining, timber,
rubber, and other concessions.

The Committee preferred "Small rents, or

a royalty not exceeding one per cent, on the gross value of produce." 77
• • • [I]n view (1) of the very large capital invested in the various
undertakings, and of the fact that only one Company has been able to pay
one small dividend upon its capital; and further, in view (2) of the
large contributions of the Companies to the revenues of the Colony paid
in duties on imports, including storage, the Committee think it unreasonable that either the Mining Companies, or other concessionaires,
should be expected to pay a royalty of more than one per oent, until at
least such time as the districts have been properly opened up by roads
and railways. 7 8

0

76 GCLegCo, speech by Mr. Osborne, a European unofficial member, 17
December 1901.
77LivCC, 48th Annual Report, 1898, p. 155.
78Ibid., p.

167.
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That the Government stood firm in its dispute with the European business
community, and passed a law requiring a five per cent royalty despite their
objections, is a sign not of its concerD with African rights so much as with
its own revenues.

In fact the Government did little to protect African land-

owners short of insisting that concessions be validated and that minimum rents
be paid (to the Gove1~ment Treasurer, who then passed them on to the landowners
concerned).

The major purpose of the Concessions Ordinance and subsequent

amendments to it was to render efficient the alienation of

+o organ-

la-,~-

ize means of regulating boundaries and ensuring security of tenure to

1ropeans

so that they could carry out their commercial ventures in peace.
In the firms' view, however, the Government seemed singularly unconcerned with the real problems they faced in validating concessions and making
sure that land was surveyed and boundaries defined.

Even with the legislation

which was extant, boundary disputes were common, even endemic, it seemed, to
Gold Coast society.

Until well into the 1920s African lawyers

w~;;...e

forbidden

to practice in the courts of Ashanti and the Northern Territories, 79 ostensibly
to protect the innocent "natives" of those areas from shyster advocates but no
doubt also to protect Europeans from the legal costs which would be entailed
were their claims to land to be challenged in the courts.

The British firms

were very much opposed to juridical control of concessions; they preferred to
see them controlled by the executive, and they were against the African lawyers' practicing in court and helping chiefs in their battles with
concessionaires.

In the Colony proper concessions went through the courts and

the African lawyers were allowed to defend their clients.

These "modernized"

AfricaDs were much mocked for their supposed inconsistency in protecting their

c

79 McPhee,

op. ait., p. 188. The act prohibiting lawyers from practicing
in Ashanti and the northern Territories was in existence from 1906 to 1923.
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"traditional" rights to the ls..nd; and indeed, no doubt they were motivated by
other than purely ideological concerns as they waged war in the courts over
which chief was to be entitled to which land rents.

Nevertheless, they were

the only guardians of traditional land rights as they were the only Africans
who could understand and

inte1~ret

British laws of property to their own ad-

vantage.
One reason why the Government was not overly concerned with the dangers
of allowing African lawyers to challenge European claims to land was that it
was itself entitled to take over land, as it saw fit, and without
under the Public Lands Act of 1876.

p~-ing

rent,

This Ordinance permitted the Government to

take over land for public purposes, such as roads, railways, hospital or administrative buildings,

wi~hout

compensation to the owners.

In Kumasi, for

example, the Government took over for its own use all land within one square
mile of Kumasi fort. 80 In the Northern Territories, it was able .. 1.:a.ke over
as much land as it wished, as, according to the Digby Report, the chiefs and
peoples seemed to feel that all land belonged to the British by right of conquest.

11

There has been no difficulty in getting land without payment for the

establishment of Government stations or for other public purposes [in the
North). 1181
While both Europeans and Africans agreed to the need to allow the Government the right to expropriate land for public purposes, there were
complaints throughout the colonial period about abuses connected with this
right.

In 1897 the Government was obliged to pay compensation when i.t expro-

priated the land of an independent European mining company, the Ahanta Company,

80 Belfield Report, op. ait., p. 13.
81Digby Report, op. ait., p. 169.
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without going through even the formalities of the 1876 Act.

Until the Company

pressed its claims for compensation this practice had apparently bee::1 quite
common~

as a confidential circular from the Acting Colonial Secretary indicated.

Several recent instances [have] been brought to the Governor's notice
of private land being occupied, and even built on, by some Government
Department, without any proper steps being taken to acquire the land
beforehand, either by arrangement with the owner or under the provisions
of the 'Public Lands Ordinance, 1878' . . ,82
Until 1919, when the practice was changed, the Government not only took over
land for public use without compensation but also took the liberty of disposing
of it, as it saw fit, for the use of other Europeans, often charging them rent
11

for the use of these

public 11 lands.

In fact, most of the land on which the

European firms erected their bungalows and trading houses was owned by the
Government and they paid rents for it to the Government.

The firms disliked

this system and continually pressed for the right to hold freehold land for
commercial buildings.

The Joint West Africa Comnrlttee suggested in 1907, for

example, that
• • . merchants should be allowed to purchase land for their premises
and to become absolute owners. The present system of leases for
fourteen to twenty-one years was unsatisfactory: there was no security of
tenure and no inducement to tenants to erect substru1tial buildings. 83
Such privileges were never, of course, granted by the Government since they
would infringe on the principle of African ownership of land.

Only the Govern-

ment was allowed to take over ownership.
But to Africans, Government use of land often meant abuse, especially
when they could see that Europeans were profiting from their right to
expropriated land.

oc~upy

Although as late as 1932 the Governor could argue that in

toto, Government owned only fifty-two square miles of land in the Colony,
82 GNA, file Adm. 11/1461.
December 1906.
83J1ilAC, 27 November 1907.

Confidential Circular no. 52-1906/6327-00, 12
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including all the land needed for the railweys, 8'+ some of this fifty-two square
miles was prime urban land.

Had

the

Africa~s

had the right to rent out that

land to the Europeans themselves, instead of watching the Government expropriate it for "public" purposes and then rent it out on its own terms to its
European compatriots, considerable fortunes might have been made.

An issue which especially aroused African public opinion as regards the
Public Lands Ordinance was the government takeover of lands in Sekondi to facilitate the establishment of that town as a commercial and railway

centre.

This takeover was protested vigorously by the Aborigines Righ. ·· 'Protection
Society.
We have cause to be apprehensive of confiscatory tendencies in regard
to land legislation in this country, when we come to think of the many
uses to which the Pub1ic Lands Ordinance, 1876, has been put • . . •
When the railway was being constructed at Seccondee the Government • • •
acquil·ed absolutely the site at Seccondee at an inadequate valuable
consideration and asked the people to remove to Essikadu. •
[T]he
people moved to Essikadu, and the Government parcelled o·
· c;y of
lease, the site to tenants at substantial rents instead of
it
outright in the same way as they had acquired it. The people have now
their homes at Essikadu. . . • Now the Government have applied the same
Public Lands Ordinance to oust them from this place also at an inadequate
consideration by an out-and-out sale. 85
The opposition to the Government policy of taking land over and then renting it
to commercial firms, as exemplified by the Sekondi case, was intense, as it
directly affected the interests of the wealthy, educated community of coastal
Africans.

The policy was therefore eventually changed by Governor Guggisberg

in 1919.
We have done away once and for all with the old policy of the Government
taking up land and sub-letting it afterwards and holding on to the rent
themselves. The natives are going to have the benefit of the land rented
to merchants, for that is a fair return to them for having given the land
to Government for Government purposes.8 6
84GCLegCo, 1 March 1932.
85Belfield Report, op. ait., testimony of E. J. P. Brown, p. 113.
86 GCLegCo, 17 November 1919.
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But although the decision to grant land rents to the original owners improved
upon the situation, as late as 1927 Africans 'tvere still complaining that they
had lost control over urban land, hence had lost control of the right to exploit it for profit as they saw fit.

Kojo Thompson complained in the

Legislative Council against the government policy of declaring "free zones,"
land set aside for possible Government use which had to be left unused by
Africans in anticipation of future public needs •
• • • [A]lthough this Government recognizes that the land belongs to
the people of this country, yet Government does not allow the people to
exercise their rights of ownership in particular cases . • • • I refer
. • • to some of the dispossessed people in Accra and to the land on
Asylum Road--the land that is known by Government as 'free zone'. Some
of these lands are the properties of private owners and whenever they
have endeavoured to sell these lands intending purchasers are warned
that they will not be allowed to build because Government has declared
that portion 'free zone' . • . I say that whilst the Government fully
recognizes that the land belongs to the people, they should be paid
for their lands if Government wants them, whether they use them or not. 87
In this particular case, the Government agreed to take action to remedy the
situation of which Kojo Thompson complained. sa

Nevertheless, the principle

remained that the Government could, if it wished, expropriate land for its own
use.

While only fifty-two square miles had been appropriated by 1932, this -vras

fifty-two square miles of prime land.

Had Africans been able to bargain

directly with the European entrepreneurs who used that land, instead of, after

1919, indirectly through the Government, they might have been able to make tidy
fortunes in urban real estate which could then have been invested in other
enterprises.

Similarly, had they been compensated for the use of land for

roads and railways, small fortunes could have been made in the countryside,
The development of an indigenous bourgeoisie was inhibited, in this

c

8 7GCLegCo, 3 March 1927.
88Ibid.

inst~~ce,
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by Government restrictions on the operation of free market forces.
And indeed, the whole situation with regard to land in Ghana was anomalous.

In order to prevent their complete expropriation, from 1897 on Africans

were obliged to argue for the preservation of traditional rights in land.
They successfully argued their case in both 1897 and 1911, and pressured the
Government enough for it to institute a Concessions Ordinance which, while subject to considerable abuse, could at least be used by educated Africans to
protect their rights.

But in arguing for the preservation of their traditional

rights against the encroachment of the Europeans, educated Africans used an
argument which was already, to some extent, outmoded.

The preservation of

traditional property rights was at the expense of the possible development of
new forms of ownership which would have been more conducive to individual
private profit for Africans participating in the world economic system.
internal economic development of the country was therefore inhibited.

The
A

choice had to be made between allowing private property relations to develop
freely, with the concomitant risk that the Europeans, with their greater resources, would then take over all property, and protecting traditional property
relations into which the Europeans could not intrude, at the expense of
possible internal capitalist development.
chose the latter option.

c

The African political community

CHAPTER III

0

PERIPHERALIZATION OF GHANA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

Despite the fact that land in Ghana was retained in Ghanaian hands and
that therefore no plantation system arose, or indeed any massive proletarianization of the indigenous inhabitants of the colony, Ghana very early began to
exhibit the classic signs of a peripheral nation; peripheral, that is, to the
world capitalist system as a whole.
weak.
system.

Ghana was economically and politically

Politically, she was under the direct control of the British imperial
Economically, she was soon to come under the control of expatriate

firms which were nearly always British in origin.
Ghana's weak economic position was a result of her inability to control
her own resources, and of the non-my role which those same resources played in
the economic system of the world.
monocultural country.

Moreover, she rapidly became a

prima~i!y

With her heavy reli&tce on cocoa exports she was depend-

ent on economic swings of the world market in general and the cocoa market in
particular.

Even had political power been in African instead of European hands

between 1886 and 1939, the room for improvenent of Ghana's economic position
would have been limited by the nature of the crops which she produced and sold.
This chapter will describe Ghana's economy, as it was in its basic
features, between 1886 and 1939.

There was no structural change to speak of in

the Ghanaian economy during this time period; it started and ended the colonial
era as a peripheral economy heavily

~eliant

on imports and exports.

Y~no

culturalism became dominant by 1915 when farmers and traders began to neglect
other products in favour of cocoa.
from complete financial

reli~~ce

While mi.neral exports provided some r•.;lief

on cocoa, they too were subject to world

market fluctuations and in any case were entirely controlled by Europeans.
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Much of' the economy was based on simple extraction, a carry-over of' the earlier
plundering of' slaves and gold-reserves by the Europeans.

A certain amount of

actual cultivation for profit was evident even before 1900, and the twentieth
century was a time of' institution of an organized cash-crop economy.

But many

people still engaged only in subsistence cultivation, and many more were able
to retreat, at least partially, into subsistence cultivation when the marketplace could not supply them with sufficient remuneration f'or their products.
On the whole, however, their ability to extricate themselves at will f'rom the
world economy decreased over time.

Although Ghana's importance to the world

economic system was small, the world economic system's effects on her were very
large.
This chapter will describe the bases of' Ghana's econo:rcy, concentra.ting
on her import-export trade.

The concluding section of the chapter will analyze

the regional differentiations within Ghana which resulted f'rom her external
orientation, and demonstrate how her position in the world system resulted in
her economic powerlessness.
l.

Ghana as a Producer of' Primary
Products: Mining
The colonial name f'or Ghana was the "Gold Coast," and the name reflects

the economic history of' the area.

The Portuguese first came to Ghana in search

of' gold; gold remained an important export commodity throughout the period of
the slave trade and when the British took over formal political control of' the
Gold Coast Colony in 1874, and of Ashanti in 1896, gold was one of' their chief'
reasons f'or doing so.
chief' exports.

Throughout the colonial period, gold was one of' Ghana's

Table 1 indicates the importance of' gold as a percentage of

Ghana's total exports by value f'rom 1886 to 1939.
importance was always obvious.

Its value fluctuated, but its

For twenty-seven of the f'ifty-four years covered

in this study, it constituted over twenty per cent, by value, of Ghana's
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Table 1.

Total
Exports
Year ( £000s)
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919

Gold, Diamonds, and ~anganese as Percentages
of Total Ghans Exports, 1886-1939 1
Diamonds

Gold

Manganese

Total Mineral

Value %Total Value % Total Value %Total Value %Total
(£000s) Exports (£000s) Exports ( £000s) Exports ( £000s) Exports

407
372
382
416

75
81
87
103

18
22
23
25

75
81
87
103

18
22
23
25

601
684
665
722
850
878
792
858
993
1112

92
88
99
79
77
91
86
85
64
51
38
22
97
255
346
596
822
1131
1122
982

15
13
15
11
9
10
11
10

92
88
99
79
77
91
86
85
64
51
38
22
97
255
346
596
822
1131
1122
982

15
13
15
11
9
10
11
10

885
560
774
980
1340
1646
1996
2641
2525
2655
2697
3792
4307
5427
4942
5943
5816
6364
4472
10814

1

790
1058
1439
1626
1659
1755
1201
1718
1365
1404

6
5
4
4
13
26
26
36
41
43
44
37
29
28
33
30
34
30
21
27
31
13

6
50
56
72

0
1
1

,

.....

790
1058
1439
1626
1659
1755
1207
1768
1421
1476

6
5

4
4
13
0?:,

'--

26
36
41
43
44
37
29
28
33
30
34
30
21
28
32
14

Sources: 1886-1899; Gold Coast, Blue Books. 1900-1939: Geoffrey Kay:
The PolitiaaZ Eaonomy of Colonialism in Ghana (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1972), Table 18, p. 325, "Imports,exports, and the balance of visi"ole
trade, 1900-1960," and Table 2la, pp. 334-335, "Value of major exports, 19001960." N.B. -- = no exports, 0 = some exports but less than 0. 5 per cent.
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Table 1 (cont'd.)
Total
Year Exports
( £000s)
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

12352
6942
8335
8959
9914
10890
12104
14350
13824
12677
11287
9300
8348
8048
8117
9971
12636
16218
15425
16235

Total Mineral
Diamonds
Manganese
Gold
Value % Total Value %Total Value % Total Value % Total
(£000s) Exports {£000s) Exports (£000s) Exports (£000s) Exports
889
855
889
851
875
840
850
727
685
690
1056
1069
1692
1842
2421
2635
3047
3911
4842
6178

7
12
11
10
9
8
7
5
5
5
9
11
20
23
30
26
24
24
31
38

85
99
363
512
584
585
659
441
537
518
757
546
585
648
548
464

1
1
3
4
4
5

6
5

6
6
9

5
5
lt

4
3

68
12
106
327
526
681
685
683
610
748
823
389
124
357
481
612
613
1025
908
790

1
0
1
4
5
6
6
5
4
6
7
4
1
4
6
6
5
6
6
5

957
867
995
1178
1486
1620
1898
1922
1879
2023
2538
1899
2353
2717
3659
3793
4245
5584
6298
7432

8
12
12
14
15
15
16
14
13
16
22
20
27
33
45
37
34
34
41
46
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exports.

For the fifteen years between 1903 and 1918, it constituted about

one-third, by value, of the country's exports, as it did again in the late
1930s, the Depression era, when a rise in the price of gold was accompanied by
a decline in demand for Ghana's nonruineral exports.
Table 1 also indicates that gold was not the only mineral export of
Ghana; in 1916 Ghana began to export manganese, and from 1924 diamonds were
also exported.

Both these minerals soon became significant, if not major,

contributors to Ghana's foreign exchange earnings, although they, like gold,
were controlled almost entirely by Europeans in both production and distribution so that little benefit accrued to Africans from their sale. 2
The history of the gold mining industry of Ghana is partially the history
of the takeover of an indigenous industry by a group of expatriates who, because they possessed superior technology, were easily able to displace the
original producers.

Gold was mined on an active basis in Gha.."'la. long before the

first European explorers appeared and negotiated concessions for mines with
chiefs in the early 1870s.

In factt the result of such concession-granting in

the late nineteenth century was the stoppage of indigenous mining enterprises.
Sir Richard Burton's account of his voyages, To the Gold Coast fo~ Gotd, 3 shows
that many prospecting licences granted to Europeans were simply licences to
take over mining in areas in which it was already known that African mining
activity existed.

Even shaft mining was conducted by Africans, contrary to the

generally held belief that their level of technical skill had not reached
beyond the level of "women 1 s washings," or panning.

Burton, for instance, saw

2The exception is the diamond indust1y.

In the early years of the industry, some diamonds were found and exported by African "diamond-winners."
See below.
Richa.rd F. Burton and Verney Lovett. Cameron, To the GOZ.d Coast fo~ Gold
Cha.tto and Windus, 1883).

3

(London:
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a "native" shaft in the centre of a concession at the Apatim valley.

This con-

cession, known as the "Izrah" concession, was 2,000 by 1,000 yards square, and
as many as 2, 000 Africans had been known to work there at one time, with
shafts twelve feet square and fifty-five feet deep over an area of 150 by 120
yards. 4

The generally held belief was that the Appolonia tribe worked these

shafts, having learned the elements of shaft mining from the Portuguese centuries before. 5
In his article, "The Ashanti Goldfields Corporation," G. W. E. Turner
quotes an oral account of African methods of gold mining, obtained, he states,
from "a very old man. "
••• before the White Man came to Obuasi the Appolonians used to sink
pit until they found the hard rock, when they pile firewood in the pits
and set fire to this. When the fire is wasted, then they carry water in
big pots and pour down into the pits until the fire goes out. They wait
for a day or two until the pit gets cool before they go down again and
with hammer or something of the kind they break the walls, then having
become quite loose and very easily broken up ~#ing to the fire they
burned. Then they bring all the stone up and divide them into three
parts, one of which is given to the Chief of that land. 6
All over Ashanti, Africans mined gold either by the panning method, chiefly
confined to women, or by shafts.

Their methods, however, were hardly as so-

phisticated as the European, although they quickly picked up European
techniques.

Burton reported that as soon as Africans learned how to "bore and

blast" from him, "thefts of powder, drills, and fuses became every day more
common," 7 as his African employees stole off at night to use his techniques on
their own shafts.

4Ibid., p.

159.

5 G. W. Eaten Turner, "The Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, n

c

Magazine, no. 6, vol. 46 (June, 1932), p. 329.
6Ibid.,

P• 329.

7Burton, op. cit., p. 246.

The Mining
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The Europeans who first made concessions for gold mining did so in areas
where mining already was taking

place~

and they reached these areas not through

their own intrepid exploring, but rather with the help of hired African guides~
The chiefs who negotiated concessions were accustomed to receiving tribute from
the indigenous miners, but they realized that the rents which the Europeans
were willing to pay were more than their indigenous miners, with their less
sophisticated methods of mining, could pay.

The chief of the Izrah concession

preferred a fixed rental of £100 per month to the dues to which he was entitled
from his own tribespeople. 9 The early gold concessions, ostensibly made for
prospecting purposes, were simply means by which the chiefs exchanged insecure
customary tribute for more secure concession rents.

Referring ·to the Apatim

concession, Burton wrote the following:
Its lessor had forbidden his fraudulent people to prospect or to
mine, because, as usual, they systematically robbed him of his royalty.
This universal practice has made the kings and chiefs throughout the
country ready and even anxious to sell mining lands for small sums which
will be paid honestly and regularly.lO
Although European mining methods in the early 1870s, when gold concessions were first staked out, were still relatively primitive (especially since
it was not yet possible to transport large pieces of machinery inland), African
methods were even more so.

Africans had not yet learned how to prop up large

tunnels underground, nor had they learned how to pump out their pits.

When,

however, they saw the European inventions, they were eager to use them.

The

Frenchman Bonnat, renowned in all histories as the negotiator of the large

8For

instance, Mr. Sam of Cape Coast, mentioned in ibid., p. 113.

9Ibid.,

p. 159.

1 0Ibid. ' p • 122 •
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Tarkwa mining concession, 11 deliberately refused to make pumps available to
Africans when they asked for them.

Bonnat, referring to the Africans working

the Tarkwa mines, wrote in his journal in 1879
This has been a very profitable year for them; but their galleries
· are getting very deep; and when the wet season sets in, not being able
to drain them, they -vrill have to abandon them. This will be all the
better for us; for a time will come when we shall reach those galleries
from our tunnel and easily drain them; all will then be in our possession • • • 12
Another European explorer wrote of the African miners "One man assured us that
he estimated his daily out-run, with two others, at £40.

He was most importun-

ate in begging us to sell him a pump at any price, as of late his operations
had been entirely suspended by the entry of water into his shaft. " 13
Despite the handicaps they faced, several early ventures were made by
educated Africans to become gold miners themselves, rather than allow the
industry to :fall straight into the hands of the Europeans.

The Tarkwa gold

area, later to house several European :firms, was originally taken as a concession by Dr. J. Africa.nus Horton, an African physician in the employ of the West
African Medical Service, in conjunction with one Mr. Fitzgerald, British publisher of the African. Times
African enterprise. 1 ~

and an enthusiastic supporter of indigenous

These two entrepreneurs formed the Gold Coast Mining

Company in 1880, after Horton had already spent over two years going "rotmd the
country inland from Axim persuading rulers to grant him mining concessions.nlS

11 For a biography of Bonnat, see H. Bevin "M. J. Bonnat; Trader and
tl.ining Promoter," The Economic Bulletin of Ghana, no. 7, vol. 4 (1960).
12 Quoted in W. F. Holmes, "Notes on the Early History of Tarkwa as a Gold
Mining District," Gold Coast Review, no. 1, vol. 2 (1926), p. 81
13Ibid., p.

c

84.

14The story of Horton' s gold mining venture is found in Christopher
Fy:fe' s Africanua Horton: West African. Scientist and Patriot (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1972), pp. 129-132.
I sib1.-·a · , p. 131.
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But the Company failed for want of technology.

At a meeting of the Society of

Arts in London in 1882, Horton pleaded for technical aid to save the African
Gold Coast Company and the Effentua Company, both his own concerns.

The first

company, he said ". • • did its work well, but unfortunately they had not the
machinery which would bring good dividends to the shareholders. " 16

At Effentua

"They had four different places, and shafts in another place, and it was only
the want of proper machinery to raise the water from the valley up to where the
stamping machinery was, which prevented their paying large dividends. • •• " 17
Because of his inability to obtain machinery and financial backing, Horton,
like other African entrepreneurs, was obliged to stand aside and watch as
Europeans quickly made concessions over all the gold land of Ashanti and the
Gold Coast.
The European takeover of mining in the late nineteenth century was to
have a serious effect not only on African entrepreneurs, but also on African
goldsmiths.

The function of gold, in European eyes, was to act as currency,

not inside Ghana which could function well enough on silver and cowrie shells,
but outside Ghana, in the world market where gold was the ultimate means of
exchange.

The African custom of using gold for ornament;:; and jewelry was

downgraded and considered irrelevant by the Europeans.

In 1908 a law was pas-

sed permitting the free dealing by Africans in gold won by "native methods" 1 8;
the Government, however, consistently refused to publicize this Bill or to adviae Africans as to this right as it wished to buy as much gold as it could for
itself.

"

• [T]he interests of the Colony would best be served by issuing

16 Reported in Joumat of the Society of Arts, vol. 30 (June 2, 1882),
p. 782.

0

17Ib*d
'1.- • , ~t-OO. 0'1.-•t •

18GCLegCo.,

4 August 1908.
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no official notification to native landowners that they are allowed to offer
for sale Gold Dust collected on their own lands." l9
ensure that as much gold as possible was exported.

The Government wished to
No gold produced in the

mines could be sold in Ghana and anyone found with mined gold was presumed to
have obtained it illegally.

Goldsmith's shops were often searched for illegal-

1y obtained gold.

African members of the Legislative Council often spoke up on the subject
of the rights of goldsmiths, but they received little redress until 1926 when
goldsmiths were at last given the right to bu;y a certain amount of gold from
the banks so that they could continue their trade. 20 But in 1932, to curb the
African

indus~ry,

Government passed a regulation that all goldsmiths must pay

licence fees; 21 and in 1938 another bill was passed shifting the onus of
proving that gold had been legally obtained onto the possessor. 22

All of these

acts served to guarantee that the maximum amount of gold was available for
Empire use and the minimum for traditional African uses.

The craft of gold-

smithing declined as a result.
The law of concession which eventually emerged out of the Government's
attempts Ito regulate gold mining in Ghana stipulated that no concession could
exceed five square miles in
square miles in toto.

area~

while no company could have more than twenty

The maximum period of validity was ninety-nine years,

while the maximum period during which an option to acquire a concession could
be held was three years.

A five per cent duty was to be paid on all mining

19 Letter from the Colonial Secretary, Accra, to LivCC, 6 June 1906, reported in LivCC, 2 July 1906.

c

2 0GCLegCo., 23 February 1926.
21GCLegCo., 2 March 1932.
22 GCLegCo., 17 March 1938.
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profits. 2 3 The law of concession, however, did not apply to concessions obtained before 1895, hence Ashanti Goldfields, which was rapidly to become the
largest, most successful gold mine in the colony, was permitted to retain the
lOO-square-mile concession it had obtained in 1897, on the grounds that the
original negotiations for its concession had begun in 1895.
A two-tiered system of gold mining quickly grew up in Ghana and remained
the pattern until the Second World War.

A plethora of small companies emerged

about the turn of the century when a false report on the gold-mining prospects
of Ghana combined with the South African war to divert much mining capital to
investment in the former colony.

In the Annual Report of the Gold Coast for

1898 the Government stated that there was enough gold in the Western Province
for £40,000,000 of gold to be extracted in ten years, at an annual profit of

These statements touched off a burst of speculation, 1-rhich became
known as the 'Jungle Boom' and by the end of 1901 about 400 companies
with a total nominal capital of nearly £40,000,000 had been formed to
operate concessions in West Africa. The boom collapsed in the following
year • • • • [O]ut of those 400 companies not one • • . has survived in
. . 1 f orm. • • . 24
1•ts or1g1na
Although the 400 companies registered in 1900 represented a high point
in gold speculation in Ghana, they were typical of the many small firms which
were to emerge and re-emerge throughout the colonial period, often dissolving
themselves and then re-forming under slightly different names.

Their subscribed

capital rarely approximated their declared capital, and investors frequently
lost their entire investment.

An investigation of the Stock Exchange Yearbook

at ten-year intervals reveals that while there were only eight public gold

c

23 N. R. Junner, 11 Gold in the Gold Coast" (Accra:
1935), "Appendix," by?.. P. Wild, p. 72.

Government Printer,

24 GCCMines, "Gold in the Gold Coastn (December 1950), p. 7.
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mines listed for 1885 and only three for 1895, in 1905 there were 153, in 1915
sixty-seven, in 1925 forty-three, and in 1939 forty-nine companies registered
as having interests in mining gold in Ghana.

Aside from these companies there

were many others which were never listed as public concerns.
Many of these mines failed because they were no more than prospecting
ventures, which never actually struck gold.

For example, the Gold Coast Selec-

tion Trust Limited spent a total of some £108,000 on prospeating its concession;
but no gold was ever found. 25

Other mines failed because they simply did not

have the capital necessary for their investments; operating often on shoestring
budgets, one major loss could break them.

The important Abontiakoon Mine, for

example, was liquidated in 1927 after the mine flooded because the crank shaft
on the main engine broke and there was no money for repairs. 2 6 Another frequent complaint of the mines was that they could not find enough underground
labourers to operate successfully; Africans could make more on cocoa farms than
the mining venturers were willing to pay them.
Only Ashanti Goldfields and the mines which had very large

holdings in

the Tarkwa area of Ghana were able to make any substantial profits in the industry.

Over the nineteen-year period from 1912 to 1931,, only four mines

produced over £3m. worth of gold.
The first mining boom, around 1900, was followed by a second "boom,"
somewhat more subdued in style, in the 1930s when the fixed price of gold was
removed and the price therefore rose dramatically.

During the 1930s, with the

251bid., pp. 12-13.
2 6Interview

with an English metallurgist involved in mining in Ghana
from 1919 to 1968, Liverpool, November 1974.
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Table 2.

Output of Chief Producing Mines in Ghana
for the Nineteen Years Ending March 193127

Mine

Fine Ounces

Value (£)

731,634
,941
985,809
119,149
30,952
29,982
10,588
89,652
3,662
8,639
8,347

3,107,942
4,961,378
4,188,030
506,190
122,994
127,458
45,128
380,841
15,556
36,585
35,457

19,944
1,929,042
30,947
4,521

84,716
8,194,959
131,448
19,207

Gold Coast Colony
Abontiakoon
Tarkwa and Abosso
Prestea
Broomassie
Akoko
Bibiani
Ankobra Dredging
Cinnamon Bippo
Koyiankor
Akim and Atta
Wassaw (G.C.)

1,16~(

Ashanti
Obuasi Mines
Ashanti Goldfields
Offin River Estates and Dredge
Lyndhur st Deep

high price, many formerly unremunerative mines re-entered production. 28

Also

during the 1930s the gold-mining industry as a whole became somewhat more organized.

A group

kno~~

as the Finsbury Pavement House Group bought up many of

the Tarkwa mines, including Aristo, Prestea, Gold Coast Main Reef, Amalgamated
Banket Areas (which itself owned several mines), Gold Coast Banket Areas, South
Banket Areas, and the Brimang Gold Dredging Company. 29
Finsbury Pavement House Group owned some 400 companies.

At one point the
Its chairman, H. G.

La.tilla, was also a director of mines in Nigeria, South Africa, and Rhodesia.30
2 7GCCMines,

28 GCCMines,

Fourth Annual Report (1931), p. 13.
Seventh Annual Report (1934) speech by the President, p. 16.

29 Interview with a former Chairman, Gold Coast Chamber of Mines, Accra,

May 1974.

30Direatory of Direa·tors (1935).
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More order was introduced into the mining industry with the formation of
the "London Advisory Committee" in 1936, which, according to one former cl1airman of the Gold Coast Chamber of Mines, was formed of all the chairmen of the
major mining interests and made all of the important decisions for the industry.31

Its first chairman was J. H. Batty, the chairman of Ashanti Goldfields

as well as of several other mines, and former chairman of the African and
Eastern Trade Corporation.32
Ashanti Goldfields was the foremost goldfield of Ghana, the only mine
with a

consisten~

record of profits throughout the colonial period.

Much of

its success it owed to the fact that it was a far more productive mine ths.n
others; whereas the Tarkwa group of mines was located in the low-producing
banket areas, Ashanti was a high-producing quartz mine.

In the nineteen-year

period from 1912 to 1931 Ashanti produced some two million fine ounces of gold
at a total value of eight million

po~~ds

sterling.

Table 3 indicates the

dividend rates paid by Ashanti Goldfields up to 1939.

The consistently high

dividends (which do not include bonuses such as the issue of two shares for
one) indicate the high level of profitability as compared with the hundreds of
other mines which either failed completely or eked out

o~ly

the smallest of

production and profits.
Some of Ashanti's success might, however, be attributed to its lOOsquare-mile concession over some of the richest gold land of Ashanti.33
31 Interview. The author was unable to obtain access to any records of
the London Advisory Committee, nor to locate any records of its assumed predecessor, the West African Chamber of Mines, which is mentioned frequently in the
Minutes of the British Chambers of Commerce.
32Directory

c

of Directors (1935 and 1925).
33 Stock Exchange Yearbook (1939} lists Ashanti as follows:
"Registered
25 May 1897. Owns (inter aUa) the lease (until 31 Dec. 1986, subject to a

Government royalty of 5% on gold and other metals) of 100 square miles in the
district of Bekwai and Adansi, Ashanti, West Africa."
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Table 3.

Dividend

Year

(%)

1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911

75
nil
nil
nil
20
nil
25
75
87-1/2

Year
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920

Ashanti Goldfields: Dividend Rates
(Ordinary Shares) 1903-1939 3 ~
Dividend

Dividend

(%)

Year

87-1/2
75
68-3/4
68-3/4
70
75
70
62-l/2
45

1921
1922
1923-4
1924-5
1925-6
1926-7
1927-8
1928-9
1929-30

Dividend

Year

(%)

(%)

1930-1
1931-2
1932-3
1933-4
1934-5
1935-6
1936-7

25
nil
25
37-1/2
45
50

55

1937~8

65
100

90
75
70
75
85
95
95
95

Although Ashanti Goldfields did not use all of this land for gold mining,
nevertheless its concession prevented competitors from moving in.

Further, the

concession gave the mine exclusive rights tQ the use of timber in the 100square-mile area, thus effecting considerable savings in the costs of fuel and
construction.

With such a large concession, it was able to exert a consider-

able amount of influence over the Colonial Government; specifically, to make a
deal with the Government to extend the

railw~

to its minehead at Obuasi in

1903. 35
A further privilege which accrued to Ashanti Goldfields under the terms
of its lease was a complete monopoly of trading rights within the lOO-squaremile area.

The mine ran a company called the Ashanti-Obuasi Trading Company,

in conjunction with the three companies of

~illers,

Swanzy and the African

Association (which were later to become the mainstays of the

Afric~~

Trading Corporation and then of the United Africa Company).36

3 4 stoak E~ahange

Yearbook (1939, 1910).

35For details of this deal, see Chapter V.
36see Chapter IV for details of these companies.

and Eastern

This trading
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company was on the whole very successful and "There were years when the dividend on the paid up capital exceeded forty per cent." 37

Because the

concession's trade monopoly had been granted by the Government, there were some
constraints on the Ashanti-Obuasi Trading Company's activities.

Specifically,

the company could not charge Europeans more than ten per cent above cost on
imported goods.
Africans.

However, no such constraint was placed upon dealings with

A report by the Ashanti-Obua.si 'l'rading Company to its headquarters

in London in 1928 shows how jealously its monopoly of trade was guarded.
This business has the sole monopoly to trade on the lOO square miles
of the Concession belonging to the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation. • • •
The Trading Rights have been the subject of litigation • • • • [I]n 1917
we on the Gold Coast brought a Case in the Ashanti Courts for infringement of our rights against an African trader, and as a result this man
was turned off our property. The question of these Rights turns up from
time to time and the Government know they have to support us as if they
did not they would probably have to compensate us to do away with the
Rights. We undertake to supply Europeans working on the Mines at an
agreed 10% upon cost, but we are free to do the African trade without any
such arrangement. We purchase annually about 2,500 tons of Cocoa. Here
again Africans have infringed our Rights by attempting to buy Cocoa en
the Lands, and the Government usually remove them without action being
taken . • • as we claim to have the Sole Right here also. •
38
Those African traders who were permitted to trade on concession property had
to pay ground rents to the company.

Although the Government could have re-

moved the monopoly rights on the grounds that Ashanti Goldfields did not
actually have th.e right to transfer the monopoly to the Ashanti-Obuasi Trading
Company, a se·parate concern, it did not choose to do so.

The injunction against

and expulsion of the "native trader Nelson" in 1917 was one of several incidents in which the company destroyed the businesses of Africans trading on
'
37 J. J. Rankin, The History of the United Africa Company Limited to 1938
(London: United Africa Company, 1938) p. 87.
38 UAC.Rankin file:

Report 55.

(Italics in original.)
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its

concession land; in general it only permitted Africans to trade if they

originally bought their goods from Ashanti-Obuasi. 39
Ashanti Goldfields ·was rivalled in its profit-making capacity by only
two other Ghana mines, the African Manganese Company40 and Consolidated African
Selection Trust.

The former was the first to exploit the huge manganese de-

posits discovered by a Government geologist during the First Weld War, 41 the
latter was to become the owner of Ghana's diamonds.

As shown in Table 1 above,

the discoveries of manganese and diamonds helped to diversify Ghana's export
economy.

The reason for their discovery, however, was not the Government's

concern with monocultural dependence, but rather its increased need for mineral
supplies in wartime.

Manganese, especially, was a strategic material and as

soon as it was discovered in 1914 the Government made plans to exploit it. 42
Bauxite was also discovered during World War I and was immediately pre-empted
by the Government, over the protests of certain African members of the Legislative Council, 4 3 for the use of the Empire.

"It has been considered advisable

to secure this mineral deposit for the Colony, and through the Colony for the
exclusive use of the Empire, as aluminium is likely to be in great demand after
the war.

n44

But the bauxite was not actually exploited until after World

War II.
Government policy with regard to the new mineral resources, combined

39UAC: document 393, Ashanti-Obuasi Trading Co. Ltd.
40A wholly-owned subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation.
41Its discovery was announced in GCLegCo, 25 October 1917.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.

0

44 Ibid.

88
with the

tec~~ological

inability of Afric&lS to exploit these resources,

quickly pushed both manganese and diamonds into British hands.

As early as

1860, Africanus Horton had speculated that there were diamonds in Keta, in the
eastern province of the Colony. '+ 5 When the diamonds were eventually found by
Europeans in Akim Abua.kwa, however,
large scale.

Africar~s

could not exploit them on any

Consolidated African Selection Trust, registered in 1924, quickly

acquired "alluvial diamond mining concessions over about fifty-four square
miles in the Akim district, "'+ 6 and immediately began to pay high dividends.
Table 4.

Year

Dividend

1925-6
1926-7
1927-8
1928-9

45
70
70
70

(%)

Consolidated African Selection Trust: Dividend Rates
(Ordinary Shares) 1925-26 to 1938-39 47
Year

Dividend

1929-30
1930-1
1931-2

Al~hough

Year

Dividend

(%)

60
35
20

1932-3
1933-4
1934-5

4o
60
65

(%)

Year

Dividend

(%)

1935-6
1936-7
1937-8

70
90
15

most of the diamonds exported from Ghana went to the Consoli-

dated African Selection Trust, some diamonds were found loose in the soil.
Africans who wished to sell these diamonds were obliged, even if the diamonds
were found on their own soil, to purchase licences to act as "diamond winners."
Such licences were granted at the discretion of the District Commissioner who
was, however, obliged after 1926 to grant the licence if he was satisfied that
the landowner was the true owner of the diamond. '+8

The capacity of individual

45Fyfe, op. ait., p. 128

c

46stook

Exohange Yearbook (1939).

41Ibid.

48 This licence system was discussed in GCLegCo, 22 February 1926.
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Africans to export found diamonds was seriously hampered, however, by the fact
that they had to enter into a bond to ensure that they could
duty.

p~

the export

Few Africans could afford to pay the fifteen per cent of the value of

the diamond required as a bond, 49 hence they sold their found diamonds to
Europeans inside the country.

In areas covered by diamond concessions,

African diamond winners were not permitted to operate and "the holder of the
mining concession possesse[d] certain rights of search and power to prohibit
unauthorized persons from entering therein. n50
This brief exposition of the development of diamond, manganese, and
gold industries in Ghana highlights the dependence of the Africans on European
technology to exploit these resources, a dependence which resulted in the
almost total takeover of the industry by Europeans.

Fortunately for Ghana,

however, it was only in mining that pPoduation, as well as distribution, was
taken out of indigenous hands.

Chapter IV will describe in detail how

Africans were driven out of the commercial network while large British trading
houses, banks, and shippers took over the international distribution of
Ghanaian produce.

But, partly because of African agitation to keep the land

in their own hands, and partly because of other political factors, as well as
because plantation agriculture did not suit the climate,and products of Ghana,
export production remained in the control of African farmers.

While the

country became more and more monocultural as the initially diversified agricultural exports gave way to cocoa, nevertheless the fact that cocoa
production was so uniquely suited to peasant agriculture guaranteed a certain
leeway to the Ghanaian producer.

49GCLegCo, 16 August 1920.
SOJunner, op.

~'t

., p. 73.
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2.

Ghana as a Producer of Primary
Products: Agriculture
Table 5 presents the percentage figures for the major agricultural ex-

ports of Ghana from 1886 to 1939.

From this table it can be seen that the

major exports, aside from minerals, were cocoa, palm oil, palm kernels, rubber,
and timber.

Graph 1 presents visually the percentages of Ghana's total exports

which all of these major crops constituted.

It can clearly be seen that palm

oil, rubber, palm kernels, and timber, while constituting significant percentages of Ghana's exports in the early colonial period, dropped sharply after
1905 and had virtually disappeared by 1915, leaving cocoa as the only agricultural export of any significance whatever.
The gradual elimination of all other export crops in favour of cocoa
production reflected the external conditions which Ghanaian producers faced.
They produced, and sold, the product for which they could receive the best
price.

Attempts,such as they were, by Government, business, or chiefs to

diversify the economy, always fell back against the economic fact that cocoa
was simply the most profitable product for the Ghanaian farmer.
profitable, however, also reflected market realities.

That cocoa was

Poor quality rubber or

palm oil from Ghana could not compete with good quality rubber and palm oil, or
oil substitutes, from other countries; but poor quality cocoa could always find
a market. 51
The last two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a concentration
on palm oil, palm kernel, and rubber production to the detriment of all other
Ghanaian exports.

Certain products which had formerly been minor sources of

revenue lost their importance; these included ivory, monkey skins, gum copal,
and kola nuts.

Animal exports such as ivory and monkey skins declined as the

51 The question of cocoa quality is discussed below, Chapter VI.
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Table 5.

0
Total
Exports
( £000s)

Year

c

Major Agricultural Products as Percentages of
Total Ghana Exports, 1886-1939 52
Cocoa Palm Oil

{%)

(%)

Palm
Kernels

Rubber

(%)

(%)

1886
1887
1888
1889

407
372
382
416

38
38
39
33

12
11
18
15

17
17
10
13

1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899

601
684
665
722
850
878
792
858
993
1112

24
28
27
25
28
26
16
13
11
16

13
13
15
11
13
11
11
8
7
10

38
29
25
30
27
37
40
49
56
50

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

885
560
774
980
1340
1646
1996
2641
2525
2655

3
8
12
9
15

11
16
17

37
19

17
20
21
28

27
32
30
15
10
5
6
5
5
5

1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919

2697
3792
4307
5427
4942
5943
5816
6364
4472
10814

32
43

6
3

7
5

38

3

46
44
62
66
49
40
77

5

l

3
2
1
1
1
3
2

0
0
0
0
0
1
1

ll

1
0
1
0
2
0

ll

6
5
4
4
3
4

12

20
27
20
17
13
7
10
13
6
4
2
0
0
1
2
1
0

Timber

.(%)

Total
Agricultural
Exports {%)
67
66
67
61

3
5
7
8
3
7
11
11
8

75
73
72
73
76
77
74
81
86
85

8
10
3
5
4
5
4
6
6
3

86
85
74
60
62
46
48
48
42
50

5
4

63
61
55
59
52
65
71
53
49
80

5

7
5
2
2
1
3
1

52

sources: 1886-1899: Gold Coast, Blue Books. 1900-1939: Kay, op.
cit., Table 19, "Imports, exports, and the balance of visible trade, 19001960," pp. 325-326, and Table 2la, ''Value of major exports, 1900-1960," pp.
334-335. N.B. -- =no exports, 0 = some exports but less than 0.5 per cent,
n. d. = no data.
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Table 5 (cont'd.)

Year

Total
Exports
( £000s)

Palm
Cocoa Palm Oil Kernels
(%)
(%)

(%)

Total
Agricultural
Exports (%)

3
3
3
2
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n. d.
1
1

87
72
74
76
74
77
77
83
83
79
64
60
67
62
51
53
63
64
29
31

Rubber Timber

(%)

(%)

2
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

12352
6942
8335
8959
9914
10890
12104
14350
13824
12677

81
69
70
73
73
76
76
82
81
77

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

11287
9300
8348
8048
8117
99'71
12636
16218
15425
16235

62
59
66
62
50
52
61
62
29
31

0
0

1
0

0
0

1
1

0
0
0
0

1

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0
0
0
0

1
1

0

1
1
1
1

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

0

Years
1886

1890

1895

1900

1905

1910

1915

1920

1925

1930

1935

19 39
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supply was depleted, while other exports such as kola, which was used by
Africans in other parts of West Africa, especially Nigeria, and cotton, from
which cloth was made, suffered as the direction of trade reversed from the
north to the south.
Various British Government efforts were made to diversify and intensify
Ghana's export capacity after the political takeover in 1874.

Among crops

which the British Government (and traders) tried to introduce were cotton,
coffee, and tobacco. 5 ~

None of these crops could succeed, however, without the

active cooperation of the Africans who were to cultivate them.

And the African

cultivators were aware that, while cotton, coffee, and tobacco were of speculative value only, a ready market could be found for both palm products and
rubber.
Palm oil and kernels had been important Ghanaian crops since the abolition of the slave trade had compelled entrepreneurs to search for something new
to sell.

After 1850, a large market for palm products arose in Western

~~rope.

The new machine-based factories in Europe used palm oil for lubrication; and
the rising prosperity of the middle classes and skilled workers provided a
market for palm-based soap and candles. 55
margarine was extracted.

From the palm kernels, oil for

Palm oil was an inportant product because it was also

used locally; hence its production did not impose on traditional ways of life
or cause major reallocations of farming priorities.

Palm kernels, however,

were produced primarily for export.56

54 "Report of the Commission on Econcmic Agriculture in the Gold Coast
1889" (manuscript) GNA Adm. 5/3/7, pp. 99-123.

c

55John E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and. the Making of Nigeria (London:
Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 10.
56Bevin, "The Gold Coast .•

"op. ait., p. 73.
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Until about 1902, the combined production of palm oil and palm kernels
constituted about forty per cent of Ghana's exports.

It is interesting to note

that the production of palm products seemed to vary inversely with that of
rubber, suggesting that these were probably alternative lines "between which
traders could switch their interest according to where their best advantage lay
for the time being. n57

The decline in palm oil exports after 1902 seems to

have been caused by a combination of poor production conditions and falling
prices on the world market.

Transportation costs were high in Ghana, and palm

oil and kernels were high-weight, low-priced goods which gave little return per
mile compared to more expensive goods such as gold, or even rubber. 58

More

important, however, the methods of purification of oil in Ghana were primitive,
and the oil produced often could not compete with oil from other areas such as
Lagos, let alone with substitutable products such as tallow, petroleum, or
whale oils.

The process of fermentation employed in Ghana produced low-quality

"hard" oil, whereas "soft" oil connnanded a better price. 59

The problem was

exacerbated, moreover, by persistent adulteration of the product; palm oil was
mixed with adulterants as various as red
kenke.6°

e~·th,

overripe plantain, and sour

The idea of quality control for palm products was entertained by the

Government as early as the 1890s, but no efforts at legislation to that effect
were made until the 1930s.
The combination of poor quality and lack of competitiveness with aubstitutable products resulted in lower prices for palm products between 1885 and

57 H. J. Bevin, "Some Notes on Gold Coast Exports 1886-1913,"

Bulletin of Ghana, no. 1, vol. 4 (January 1960), p. 16.
58 11 Report ••• 1889,n

c

The Economic

op. oit., p. 57.

59 Ibid., PP• 46-56.
60 10id., p. 51.

(maize).

Kenke is a staple food of Ghana made from fermented corn
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1905.61

Since, simultaneously, the price offered for cocoa rose, it was

natural for farmers to switch their efforts from palm trees to cocoa trees,
despite the fact that palm trees grew "naturally" whereas cocoa trees had to be
planted and tended for a good five years before they could bear fruit.

In

later years, it became a constant concern of the Government that African
farmers· refused to cultivate palm products because they were too concerned
with cocoa, and it was often charged that fine supplies of palm trees were
brutally cut down to make way for cocoa farms. 62

Such charges, it would seem,

were exaggerated, especially as palm trees ·were used by farmers to provide the
necessary shade for the growth of young cocoa plants.
were also exploited locally for oil and palm wine.

In any case, palm trees

The Government's sporadic

attempts through the 1910s and '20s to encourage Africans to cultivate and export more palm products failed to recognize the realities of the international
market.
The cultivation of rubber began for reasons similar to palm oil and
failed for much the same reasons.

Between 1890 and 1905 the Gold Coast was

the largest rubber producer in the British Empire, and fourth of the world's
five leading rubber producers.6 3 According toR. E. Dumett, the rise of rubber
exports was due to African responsiveness to international market conditions,
at a time when the Government was trying to encourage nonprofitable crops such
as coffee and tobacco.

He argues that

rubb~r

production in Ghana began in 1883

61Bevin, "Some Notes •.•• -1913," op. cit., p. 15.
62 For example, a report by W. S. Tudhope, Director of Agriculture, 23
September 1910. "The destruction of the oil palm trees in making clearings for
cocoa and other agricultural crops is quite unnecessary and should be discontinued. 11 In GNA S.N .A. Case no. 87/1911.

c

63R. E. Dumett, "The Rubber Trade of the Gold Coast and Asante in the
Nineteenth Century: African Innovation and Market Responsiveness," Journal of
AfPican History, no. 1, vol. 12 (1971), p. 79.
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as a response to an attempt by an international ring of speculators to corner
all existing supplies of Para rubber, mainly from Brazil.

Gold Coast Africans

quickly joined the attempts to break this monopoly.6~
But, like palm oil, rubber also suffered from inferior methods of processing and preparation, which resulted in a product which was wet, heavy, and
difficult to transport.

The rubber trees were also overexploited, as their

trunks were often cut down in order to obtain rubber, rather than simply being
tapped. 65

As soon as alternative sources of supply were found, Gold Coast

rubber lost much of its market.

Gold Coast rubber was wild, not cultivated; as

such it could not compete with rubber from the organized plantations whicb
arose early in the twentieth century in Southeast Asia, where the rubber was
also of the Hevea variety, a variety which had a higher caoutchouc content and
yielded

more rubber because of the "wound response" flow which its trees

evinced during the first five years of tapping.66

Given the competition from

Asian rubber, and the obvious opportunities for investment in cocoa, the iemand
for which rose rapidly in the 1900s and 1910s, it was rational for rubber producers (and oil palm producers) to use the money they had earned to invest in
new cocoa plantations.67
Before going on to discuss the cocoa industry, a look should be taken at
the timber trade in Ghana which, although it did not provide a very large percentage of Ghana's exports, nevertheless is unique in that production and much
of distribution were in African hands.

6

The timber industry was never as large,

~Ibid.' p. 81.

6 5"Report •
66Dumett,

11

1889 , 11 op. ci t . , p • 90 •

The Rubber • • • Responsiveness, 11 op. cit., p. lOO.

67Ibid
. . ' p. 95.
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during the colonial period, as one might have supposed it could have been from
the amount of timber, especially mahogany, available.

In fact, during the

1880s and 1890s Ghana was importing timber from the United States because of
the difficulty of obtainin

it in the colony.68

Transportation difficulties

were the main reason for the slowness of the development of the industry.

The

heavy logs were cut as near to rivers as possible, and then floated down; hence
the Ankobra river and the port of Axim were the centres of the earliest timber
export trade.

As logs near the rivers were depleted, it became necessary to

move further inland; logs were cut near railway lines as these were built, and
later near roads.
logs.

After World War I, lorries were introduced to carry the

Until 1939, all logging was conducted by this method of manual extrac-

tion and dragging of logs to transport facilities, although a very few tractors
were introduced to replace hauling gangs in the 1930s. 69
The logs which were exported were usually owned by Africans.

No

Europeans, exeept for one American Company from Louisville, 7 0 had timber concessions in Ghana prior to World War II.

Many mines, of course, possessed

timber rights on their concessions, but they did not avail themselves of these
rights for exporting purposes although they complained bitterly about Africans
who trespassed on their land to obtain logs. 7 l

African entrepreneurs could

obtain "concessions" for logs from chiefs; to the chagrin of certain Europeans,
these concessions were not subject to the 1900 Concessions Law as they were the
68The Gold Coast Legislative Council decided in 1892 to spend £2,650 on
timber from the U.S., GCLegCo, 24 June 1892.
69 Tbe above description is taken from "Gold Coast Timber Industry-Report

of a Fact-finding Committee Appointed by the Minister of Commerce, Industry and
Mines" (Accra, 1952.), p. 29.

c

7 0 Interview

with a former European Barrister, Accra, May 197 4.

71 See statement by Mr. Hunt, European Unofficial Member, in GCLegCo, 29

April 1907.
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object of dealings between "natives."

"Pa" Grant, a legendary figure in

Ghanaian history and probably the first African timber merchant to open up an
office in Britain, obtained his logs from concessions, at one time having as
much as 700 square miles of concession land. 72

other entrepreneurs obtained

logs simply by buying them, one at a time, from the owners of the trees, and
shipping them to the coast in whatever manner they could.
For many years, even after logs had arrived at the coast for shipment,
facilities at the surf ports were unable to handle them.

'l'he older ships,

moreover, were not able to lift the logs and their hatches were unsuitable for
their transport. 7 3 Many of the regular shipping lines refused to handle logs
at all, although the German shipping line, Woermann, was willing to take logs.
Prior to World War I much Ghanaian timber went to Germany while British brokers
complained that it was unobtainable. 74
shippers for his logs.

"Pa" Grant was often unable to obtain

After World War I he bought and converted two German

minesweepers for carriage of his exports, but in the face of this competition
the large shipping companies agreed, at last, to ship his logs. 7 5
The timber industry as a whole, however, never reached large propcrtions
until after World War II.

The transportation infrastructure had to be com-

pleted before it was worth the while of Europeans to invest in the trade.
Africans, with the exception of such persons as Grant, generally did not have
enough capital to exploit the industry; they certainly did not have the contacts

72 Interview

with George Grant Jr., son of "Pa" Grant, Takoradi, July

1974.
73 Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, Cd.4668 (1909).

Testimony of Sir

Ralph Moor, Q.7055.

c

74 Charlotte

Leubuscher, The West African Shipping Trade (Leyden:
Sythoff, 1963), p. 22.
7 5rnterview with George Grant Jr.

A. W.

lOO
in Europe and America which would enable them to get credit for exporting.

0

Moreover, there were difficulties in proving ownership of trees. 7 6 Nevertheless, it would seem that such problems would have been surmountable had there
been a real desire to export Ghanaian timber in large quantities; as it was,
timber exports, like palm kernels, palm oil, and rubber exports, declined to
almost nothing after 1915.

The cocoa market provided so many opportunities

for European entrepreneurs that timber was not even considered as an opportunity for investment.
The export of cocoa from Ghana began in minute quantities in the 1890s,
rising considerably after the turn of the twentieth century to become the foremost export of the colony, vastly overshadowing all others, by 1910. 77

The

origin of the cocoa industry in Ghana was for many years a matter for debate,
centring around the question of whether Africans or Europeans were responsible
for its introduction.

The Basel Mission experimented with cocoa in Ghana as

early as 1858, 78 but as there was no market for the product at that time its
cultivation did not spread.

In 1876, however, a Ghanaian by the name of Tetteh

Quarshie, who had gone to Fernando Po to work on the Portuguese cocoa ple.ntations, stole some pods and brought them home to his native Mampong, where he
sold them to his fellow farmers. 7 9

It seemed that there was a market for the

cocoa, especially after 1900 when the firm of Cadbury decided to buy its cocoa

76 "Timber Supply, Consumption, and Marketing in Gold Coast," undated,
report included in GNA, Cape Coast, Adm.23/l/801.
77 The rise, organization, and effects of the marketing of cocoa will be
discussed only partially in this chapter. Chapters IV and VII deal with cocoa
marketing inside Ghana and the international cocoa market.

c

78"The Story of the Basel Trading Company Limited, 1859-1935," supplement
to the West African Review (November 1935), p. 14.
79The story of Tetteh Quarshie can be found in Sampson, op. cit.
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from Ghana rather than from the slave plantations of Sao Thome and Fernando Po.
The Government agriculture department, unaware of the market for cocoa, did not
begin to promote its cultivation until well after the industry was established
through the enterprise of the African farmers.

Nor, indeed, did its transpor-

tation policy encourage the development of cocoa.

Transportation in the 1890s

and early 1900s was geared towards opening up gold-mining territory; cocoa
farmers were compelled to build their own roads or carry their cocoa crops on
their heads if they wished to sell them to the European buyers.

"[I]improved

internal transport facilities ••• followed, but did not precede the

dev~lop-

ment of cocoa growing. n80
The type of cocoa grown in Ghana was in high demand on the international
market as a base for chocolate production.

Cocoa production on a world scale

was divided into "fine" cocoa, known as Trinitarios or Criollo and cultivated
chiefly in the West Indies, certain Latin American countries, Ceylon, and Java,
and "basic" cocoa, known as Forastero and grown chiefly in West Africa and
Brazil. 81

The price offered for basic cocoa was, of course, never as high as

that offered for fine, but on the other hand the demand for basic cocoa was far
greater.

The export of fine cocoa shrank from seventy-eight per cent of the

world's total cocoa exports in 1895 to thirteen per cent in 1933.8 2 The two
types were in fact not competitive, although higher quality Forastero than
Ghana produced was often in demand {that is, Forastero free of defects and

8 0Polly Hill, The Migrant Coaoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 170.
Blunited Africa Company, "What Cocoa Means to the Economy of the Gold
Coast," Statistiaa"l and Eaonomia Review, no. 2 (September 1948), p. 2.

0

82c. Y. Shephard, "Report on the Economics of Peasant Agriculture in the
Gold Coast" (Accra: Government Printing Office, 1936), p. 10.
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properly cured),83
The beginnings of cocoa cultivation in Ghana represented a dramatic
change in the organization of trade inasmuch as, for the first time {except for
some palm tree "plantations" in Krobo), exports were the result of organized,
planned, cash-crop cultivation, not simply of the extraction of naturally
growing produce from the land.

Cocoa "plantations," or farms, were established

over most of Ghana except the Northern Territories, starting first in the Eastern Province of the Colony, spreading into Ashanti, and moving later into the
Western and parts of the Central Provinces of the Colony.

Most cocoa farms

were very small; in 1938 the Nowell Commission on cocoa estimated the average
Ashanti farm at two-and-a-half acres, although multiple farm ownership was
common. 84

Often Ghanaians who had already saved capital through trade or pro-

fessional work bought cocoa farms; in such cases the size of their farms was
considerably larger, in some cases reaching as high as twenty-eight or fortyfive acres. 8 5

Investments in cocoa involved a considerable amount of waiting

time, as cocoa trees did not bear fruit until they were five years of age.

An

acre of cocoa land produced on average, in 1938, about nine "head-loads" (of
sixty pounds each) of cocoa; it was estimated that in 1938 a million acres of
land in Ghana were under cocoa, using approximately one-sixth of the total
potential labour force of the country.86
The cultivation of cocoa as the major export crop, while it interfered

83For a discussion of cocoa quality, see Chapter VI.
84 "Report of the Commission on the Marketing of West African Cocoa" (hereafter referred to as the Nowell Commission) Cmd.5845 (1938), p. 17.

0

8 ~. Hunter "Cost of Establishing Cacao by Ashanti Farmers," Gold Coast,
Department of Agriculture YeaP Book (1930) included in Cad:289/24.
8 6s. Herbert Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa (New York:
Fertig, 1969), p. 323.
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with

~ubsistence

farming, nevertheless was of considerable advantage to Ghana

as a whole because it did not preclude the growing of other crops on the same
land.

Cocoa trees needed shade, which palm trees could provide, and underneath

the cocoa trees, during their first few years of existence, "nursing" plants
such as yams and cassava could be cultivated,

A traveller in Ghana in 1912

described the typical cocoa farms as follows:
• the bulk of cocoa appeared to be grown on small patches of
forest land, sharing the intervening spaces with several other products
--near at hand, a group of broad-leaved yams; then a square of cassava,
between the plants of which were inserted young cocoa trees of a few
months' growth taken from the nursery; then half an acre of full-grovm
trees.
Interspersed between all this luxuriant growth the tall oil
palms reared themselves • . • ,87
The other crops grown on cocoa farms could be eaten by the farmers and their
families, or they could be sold to provide income while waiting for the cocoa
trees to yield. 88
The introduction of cocoa as the most

import~~t

cash crop of the economy

led to significant changes in the system of land tenure in Ghana.
gani~ed

As the or-

production of agricultural goods specifically for the world market

became a significant means of acquiring a higher income, the communal system of

land ownership, or the system by which the chief was not permitted to sell or
alienate land without the consent of his communal group, gave way to the beginnings of a system of private ownership.

In her book, The Migrant Cocoa-

Farmers of Southern Ghana, Polly Hill points out that the system of private
ownership of land usufruct was not altogether unfamiliar to the migrant farmers,
even before the introduction of cocoa.

c

They had already been familiar with a

87John H. Harris, Cocoa Production in West Africa:
(London: Denison House, 1911), p. 4.

The Labour Problem

8 8Hunter, op. cit. The farmers studied in Hunter's article sold corn,
coco-yams, yams, and plantain from their farms while waiting for their cocoa
trees to yield.
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cash economy through their participation in the palm trade, as well as in
rubber or coffee production. 89

They were already used to buying and selling

usufruct, especially for oil-palm plantations.90

Customary law in Ghana had

long recognised the outright sale of usufruct by chiefs, acting on behalf of
the group, 9l and the early cocoa farmers, who were migrants into the area of
Akim, took advantage of this law.

Later farmers, especially in Ashanti, grew

cocoa on their own family land, and thus were not compelled to pay any rent,
although they owed a customary tribute of one-third of their produce (later
reduced to one-tenth by the Government) 92 to the chiefs.

Outright private

ownership, however, continued to be prohibited.
Hill's description of the migration of cocoa farmers illustrates the
changing relationships between land and its owners characteristic of Ghana at
the turn of the twentieth century.

Starting in 1882, producers migrated from

Akim and Akwapim to southern Ashanti.

They bought land in groups, either in

"companies" of friends, or as groups of relatives.

But there was strictly in-

dividual ownership within these groups; each individual received his own plot
of land, which was usually very carefully measured out.

He was not obliged to

consult with other members of the group should he wish to sell his usufruct.
It was common for a farmer to invest profits from one farm into buying usufruct
for another farm, hence "large" landowners in the cocoa-producing areas were
not rare.

"The need to secure the future was involved in the idea, so reason-

able in Africa, that there is no resting place between stagnation and growth;

890p.

a1.-'t •, PP•

90Ib'd
. 1, •

'

91 1bid., p.

c
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109.

92Digby Report, op. ait., p. 299. The one-third rent was considered exorbitant and was therefore reduced by the British in 1910.
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a business cannot be healthy unless it is expanding."93
Eventually the cocoa industry developed into a system in which there was
much absentee ownership of usufruct.

Wealthy cocoa farmers did not farm their

own land, preferring to engage in other activities such as cocoa brokerage or
money-lending.

Much migrant labour, especially from the Northern Territories,

was used on the cocoa farms, paid either by time rate, by salary, or by some
system of share-cropping (generally one-third).
11

Often the landowner had a

care-taker," sometimes a relative, on the land, to manage the overall super-

vision of the farm.

Samir Amin refers to this type of development, which he

considers typical of the "trade economies" which developed on the Gulf of
Guinea, as "Kulakization."

He describes it as " ••• the constitution of a

class of indigenous planters of rural origin, the virtually exclusive appropriation of the land by these planters, and the employment of paid labour • . • • '~
In other words, an incipient class system was forming.
producers emerged.

Three groups of

These groups can be loosely identified as the "Kulaks" who

employed labour on their farms, peasant farmers who used only their own and
family labour on their farms, and migrant labourers.
Some of the earliest individuals to avail themselves of the new opportunities for cash-crop farming (that is, f&rming specifically for the external
market) were the chiefs.

Already wealthier than the average tribal member

because of their control of stool lands and their receipt of dues, fines, and
tributes, some chiefs found it easy to become wealthier still through the sale
of concessions to Europeans.

Chiefs who negotiated concessions on behalf of

their tribes were occasionally tempted to misappropriate the funds received,
or to grant special rates to the Europeans in

9 3Hill, op. cit., p. 179.
94Amin, op. ait., p. 116.

re~urn

for secret bribes.

The
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Belfield Report of 1912 described some such practices.
Their [the chiefs'] sense of obligation to the tribe in respect of
their trusteeship was frequen~ly obscured by their greed for money, and
some cases have certainly occurred where the proceeds of concessions
granted have been misappropriated to their own personal use. Such
fraudulent action has, however, been invariably resented by the tribe,
and has resulted in the removal of the offender from the stool.
As a general rule, therefore, and particularly in later years, the
chiefs who have granted concessions have been careful to effect distribution of the proceeds in a manner conformable to the rules of the
tribe, but the fact nevertheless remains that in consequence of their
own ignorance, and the reluctance of the tribe to press their elders
unduly, concessions have been granted upon terms which are unfavourable
to the people ••• ,95
It was common for Europeans to overcome chiefs' scruples as regards concessions
by the distribution of what was charitably known as "consideration money."
Consideration money was granted over and above the public "gifts" which a
European might give to a chief and his elders.

With such additions to the

already considerable advantages they had over ordinary farmers in terms of
wealth, chiefs could easily invest in cocoa farms.

They were also

pe1~itted,

by customary law, to commandeer labour to work on their farms, although, as
their subjects became more tied themselves to the external market, they became
less and less willing to devote their labour to the chief's farm.
It was not, however, necessary for an individual to be a chief or to
have some initial advantage in order to rise to be a wealthy farmer.

Each

individual member of a tribe was entitled to a section of the tribal land to
cultivate as he wished, and the products of this land, after payment of tribute, were his own.

Cocoa trees or palm trees grown on tribal land were the

property not of the tribe but of the individual who cultivated the land.

Those

who wanted more land for cultivation could, upon application to the chief, be

c

granted more.

950p •

Land was a "free good," not an object of property, at least

en•t
... , p. 9.
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within each tribe.

0

Those Ghanaians who came originally from areas in which the

land was not suitable for cash crops, especially cocoa, migrated to other areas
where they could buy or rent usufruct of land from the indigenous tribe.

Their

payments to the chief were of course greater than the payments made by the
indigenous people; but the principle of

11

instalment payment 11 was well recog-

nized and land could be paid off gradually from the profits from selling
cocoa. 96
Polly Hill lays great stress on the notion that African capitalist
farmers were entrepreneurs; innovative and risk-taking and at the same time
capable of rational investment and planning.

She argues that cash-crop farmers

were characterized not only by their willingness to invest but also·by their
willingness to expand, to increase their areas of production and delegate
responsibility to relatives or hired labourers.

A farmer might barely oversee

his land, leaving responsibility for day-to-day cultivation and decisions in
the hands of his employees.

As he accumulated wealth, he might try to expand

into different activities; trade being often blocked beyond the middleman's
role by the European distribution system, a favourite new role to adopt was
that of a money-lender.97
For while some farmers were able to become rich through cash-crop production, others, perhaps through a lack of initial advantage, a lack of
entrepreneurship, ·or simply bad luck, found themselves going under.

If they

had a bad crop or if the international price for cocoa was low, they might not
recover their investment in their farms.· Noreover, they were often tied into

c

96Polly Hill, "Some Characteristics of Indigenous West African Economic
Enterprise, 11 Nigerian Institute of Soaial and Eaonomia Researah: Conferenae
Proaeedings (1962), p. 116.
97 Ibid.
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the consumer network sufficiently that they did not wish to, or were unable to,
wait for the sale of their crop in February or March in order to buy the goods
they needed; hence they took out loans on the security of their fUture crops
in September.

School fees, especially, were a heavy expense for farmers who

wished to further the opportunities of their children, and as the school year
started in September, at the beginning of the cocoa season, farmers were
obliged to take out temporary loans to cover the fees.
The need for loans to cover their costs was, according to one observer,
the direct result of the introduction of cash-crop cocoa farming into Ghana.
Prior to the arrival of cocoa, loans could not be made as farmers could not
offer security; now the cocoa crop was taken as security. 98

The opportunity

for farmers to borrow and to indebt themselves on a large scale was introduced
with production for the external market.
Three different types of people engaged in money-lending in the countryside.

Rich farmers practiced money-lending as a means of investment;

de~ts

were often paid off in cocoa crops or in usufruct of the debtor's land, enabling the rich farmer to increase his own salable product.

The rich farmer

was' often a farmer-cum-chief, or even a farmer-aum-chief-aum-broker.

His

object might be to control as much cocoa as possible in order to sell to the
Europeans.

Cocoa brokers pure and simple also engaged in money-lending; it was

their objective to "corner" as much of the cocoa supply as possible at the beginning of the season, at the lowest possible prices, hoping to reap substantial
gains on the cocoa on its sale to European firms at the end of the season.
There was much resentment among farmers at the high rates of interest
which borrowers had to pay for loans.

c

98shephard, op. ait., p. 39.

One Africun borrower complained in 1912
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that
Ricbmen are very barbarous cruel and inhumanity [sia] in loan;
charging unreasonable interest ten shillings (10/-) on a pound
sterling (£1.0.0.) charge sheeps before loan. Sale of money for
double interest weekly. Pledge of cacao farms for a period of five
years in hands of debtors; who neither has nothing to do to pay the
debt nor against his daily bread.99
By his last accusation, that the debtor had "nothing to do" the author of this

sad letter was complaining against the prevalent practice of creditors' completely taking over farms.

Aside from the other abuses of this system, the

creditor was unlikely to invest in the farm or even to keep it in good order;
his only interest was the crop.

Conversely, when they were allowed to stay on

their farms, peasants who had pledged the entire crop, regardless of its size,
were unlikely to work to increase the crop; any increase would simply go to the
creditor.
for a loan.

Entire crops were often pledged simply as interest, not as principle,
In 1936, C. Y. Shephard wrote of this system, which was then at

its most prevalent because of the world economic Depression,
In most cases, the lender takes possession of the farm, and reaps the
crops, until the debt is liquidated. The crop is usually regarded as
interest. The crop of a low-yielding farm is sometimes regarded as a
mere perquisite of the lender and the borrower is required to meet his
obligations from other sources. The crop of a high-yielding farm may· be
considered sufficient return to liquidate both the capital and interest
in an agreed number of years. In other cases, the borrower remains in
possession of ~he farm. He may give the lender two thirds of the crop
--one third being for repayment of capital, and the other third being
for interest--and retain the remaining one third as consideration for
his labour. 100
Interest rates generally varied anywhere between twenty-five and lOO per cent.
Shephard sampled, in his investigations, ninety-three farmers who had borrowed,
between them, £2,015; they had already paid a total of £456 in cash for these

c

99 Letter toR. Beaver, Commissioner, Eastern Province, from Theodore
Asiedu, of Tinkong, dated 17 May 1912, in GNA Adm.ll/1/411.
l 00 0p.

ait., p. 41.
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debts and supplied their creditors with 2,495 loads of cocoa, nevertheless they
still owed some £2,379.1°1

In 1933-34 he estimated that some seventy-five per

cent of all farmers in Ghana had pledged part of their crop to money-lenders;
moreover thirty per cent of the farmers had pledged one or more farms and five
per cent had pledged all their farms.102
The cocoa broker with his advances, and the rich farmer with his loans,
were figures of no little power in the rural Ghanaian community.

By lending

money to farmers in return for a pledge of their crops, they could keep the
farmers in perpetual debt.

Rural society began rapidly to differentiate be-

tween "Kulaks" and "peasants," both groups tied into the system of cash-crop
production for the external market but the former successful both in production
of its own crop and in the expropriation of the crop from others, while the
latter succumbed to debt and poverty.
The characteristics which distinguished the "Kulaks 11 from the peasants
were not only their greater wealth and their ability to indulge in activities
such as money-lending, but also the fact

th~t

the former employed labour while

the latter did not;.peasant agriculture was confined to the use of family
labour.

Although he was a cash-crop farmer, in the sense that he, as well as

his wealthier compatriots, produced for the external market, the peasant was
using what were basically traditional modes of production.
vestments in production as extensive as the Kulaks'.

Nor were his in-

Nevertheless, the

retention of tribal structures and especially of the custom of family obligations in the llider kinship network ensured some guarantees of support to the
peasant; moreover, although he could lose the produce and even the usufruct of

101Jbid., P• 127.
102Ibid.' P· 41.
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his land, he always retained ultimate possession of the farm since the system
of private ownership of land had not developed to the stage at which it could
be completely alienated to a creditor.
Thus in Ghana it was never the case that a class of landless labourers
emerged, a class which had been dispossessed of its own land and was therefore
obliged to hire itself out as labour on the farms of the wealthy.

A class of

labourers in the cocoa areas existed, but these were migrant labourers from
the Northern Territories and from the surrounding French colonies, who might
have been landless in Ashanti or the Colony but who retained land in their
homelands.

These migrant labourers travelled to the Colony and Ashanti in

order to work both on the cocoa farms and f,:>r the mines and on Government construction projects.

Their number increased steadily during the early twentieth

century as the demand for their labour grew.
Migrant labourers generally congregated by tribe, new labourers joining
their countrymen.
headman.

Each tribal group had its own headman, known as the "Zongo"

The headman acted as an agent for the labourers and also as their

protection, providing them, for instance, with credit before they were paid.
Normally, a labourer entered into a semipersonal relationship with his employer
and worked for the same farmer year after year,l 0 3

It was estimated that some

five per cent of the migrants sta.yed in the colony each year, instead of returning home after the cocoa season was over. 1 0 4

Some migrants were given land

of their own to work on and could thus establish residence in the new areas.

103This

information is taken from a report by M. Y. Hewson, Acting District
Commissioner, Koforidua, dated 25 April 1938, entitled "Memorandum on Northern
Territories and French Sudan Labour on the Cocoa Farms of the Eastern Province,"
in GNA, Adm.29/6/14.

0

104 "Annual

Invasion of the Gold Coast -by French and Northern Territcries
Subjects in Search of Labour," report filed as GNA Adm.ll/1076.
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The labourers from the Zongos may be divided into two classes; those
who reside there throughout the whole year and those who live there only
during the cocoa season. The former came from the North probably many
years ago and have established permanent dwellings with small food farms
attached. Although many earn their living by petty trading and home
crafts~ there is always a large floating population ready to work for
wages. Such a labour surplus would not however be sufficient to meet
with the heavy demand of the cocoa season, were it not supplemented
yearly by fresh inundations from the North a great proportion of which
came from French Territory.l05
The terms of payment for migrant labourers varied, although in general,
by the late 1930s, a labourer would receive about eight pounds a season.

In

different regions of the country methods of payment varied.
With regard to the terms of the labour contracts entered into, systems
differ in various native states. All that can be definitely said to be
common to all, is their general vagueness since the reward to be paid is
not fixed in advance but left subject to certain eventualities. In
Krobo country it is customary for the farmer to supply the labourer with
a certain amount of food during the season, and to give him a sum of money
at the end. In Akim it is common to pay the labourer in cocoa leaving
him to conduct his own sales . • • . But the most general practice, and
that which appears likely to become in time universal~ is to pay the
labourer at the end of the season a percentage of the actual money received from the sales; the sum varies from 1/6 to 2/- for every 10/obtained by the farmer for his cocoa.l06
There were three basic methods of payment.

One was to give the labourer a

third of the crop at the end of the season; this was his sole reward for his
season's work and it was up to him to market the cocoa as best he could.

An-

other was to grant him a piece of land which he could farm as his own, so that
he could sell the produce from that land, or live on it himself.
might be paid in cash at the end of the season.
wait out the entire season before he was

paid~

Finally, he

The labourer generally had to
and his total payment depended,

except in the few cases in which a lump sum was agreed upon beforehand, very
much on the state of the cocoa crop and the amount which his employer could

l0 5Hewson Report, op. ait., in GNA Adm.29/6/14.

l06Jbjd.
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obtain from the cocoa.
Thus the introduction of cocoa into Ghana produced an almost completely
monocultural agricultural export economy: which resulted in differentiation in
the countryside among rich farmers or "Kulaks," poorer farmers , and hired
labourers.

It also resulted in a situation in which, because they were be-

coming increasingly occupied by one-crop agriculture, Ghanaians became ever
more dependent on imported consumer goods to satisfy their daily needs.

Depen-

dence on the world cocoa market was exacerbated by dependence on Europeanproduced and -controlled manufactures.
3.

Ghana as a Consumer of
Manufactured Goods
In return for the mineral and agricultural goods which they so willingly

produced for the international, European-controlled world market,

Ghanaia~s

were sold a variety of manufactured goods which varied surprisingly little over
the period 1886-1939.

In effect, Ghanaians consumed mostly light manufactured

goods which were for personal use; textiles, foodstuffs and provisions, ornaments, liquor and tobacco, and arms and ammunition.

Very few of their imports

were investment goods of any description.
Table 6 presents figures for 1900 to 1939 of the majqr imports into
Ghana, divided roughly into consumer and investment goods,

It can be seen that

until 1900 only about twenty per cent, or less, of Ghana's imports were for
investment purposes.

After 1905 the percentage varied, for the next thirty

years, at about the thirty per cent mark, rising to about thirty-seven per cent
in 1939.

The investment-oriented goods consisted primarily of construction

goods, fuel, machinery, and transport goods.

Construction goods were used by

both Europeans and Africans; by the former to build mines, Government buildings,

c

storage sheds, and European residences; by the latter primarily for their own
housing needs and secondarily for retail shops.

Fuel, which varied around a
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16
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17
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15
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9
11
13
13
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3
3
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5

6
6
6
6
5
6
7
7
7
6

12
11
11
11
9
10
12
12
12
10

32
30
29
29
26
30
35
36
35
32

29
26
28
29
26
27
25
23
26
26

21
25
24
26
29
28
28
39
29
29

15
13
15
12

65

6
8
8
7

13

68

11
10
9
9

12
13
11
13
13

67
66
73
68
68

5 9
5 10
4 7
4 7
4 7
5 7
5 7
4 6
5
7
8
5

31
33
28
27
26
26
27
22
25
27

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

37
34
44
35
39
35
33
24
31

1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

2~(

6~(

67
72
67
61
59
59
63
61~

67
67

9

6

8
9
7
8
8

6
6
5
5
6

4

l07source: Raw figures in Kay, op. ait., Table 20a, "Value of imports by
commodity group, 1900-1960, 11 pp. 327-328. The totals for these imports do not
coincide with the figures given by Kay as total :imports in his Table 18, "Imports, exports, and the balance of visible trade 1900-1960," pp. 325-326,
presumably because only major import groups are considered in Table 20a. Since
it is the relative percentages of imported consumer and investment goods which
are of importance here, it is assumed that the discrepancy in totals can be
overlooked, and the table is calculated on the basis of the totals given in
Kay's Table 20a.
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was used for rail and lorry

Machinery had several uses, one of the most important of which,

however, was in the expatriate mining sector.

Only transport goods could be

considered major investments for Africans in the sense that they encouraged the
development of an indigenous transport business alongside the larger European
transport concerns.lOS

Very few of the so-~alled "investment" goods imported

into Ghana had any long-term uses, or could be used to further economic development by providing basic infrastructure.

Their purpose was to facilitate the

export of minerals, cocoa, and other goods from the coast, by providing transportation and storage facilities.

African investment in transport was of some

use in building up capital which could be used for other purposes, but African
investment in houses, while fulfilling consumer needs and acting as much-needed
collateral for credit from European banks, had little effect in terms of

108 The indigenous African transport business is discussed below, Chapter

V.
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promoting a more active or independent economy.
Table 7 presents a detailed list of imports for the year 1886.

iVhile

the total importation of major consumer goods for that year was same £183,000,
the importation of "investment" goods was little over £26,000, or barely fourteen per cent of the total consumer goods, even when such expendable goods as
bags, sack, cord and twine are included as investment goods.

The largest

single group of imports was for liquor, tobacco, and arms and ammunition; with
rum alone accounting for £59,000 worth of imports.

This group was followed by

textiles and wearing apparel, which in turn was followed by provisions.
With the exception of the category liquor, tobacco, and arms and ammunition, which declined drastically in importance after the turn of the twentieth
century, the composition of imports in 1939 was very similar to 1886.

In that

year, the United Africa Company described the import trade into West Africa as
follows:

c

The articles imported into West Africa are of infinite variety. They
can be divided perhaps into two parts:(1) Staple articles of trade for which a demand . • . always exists, they
are-( a) Cotton piecegoods of all kinds for use as clothing
(b) Articles of food or its equivalent (because the African native
does not produce all his own foods) such as-Tobacco
Flour
Salt
Certain canned meats and fish
Rice
Spirituous liquors
Dried Fish
(c) Yarns for local manufacture of cloth
(d) Fishing twine
(e) Kerosene and petrol
(f) Building materials as-Cement, Iron sheets, Sawn Tj~ber
(g) Articles of hardware of everyday use which are better imported than
made locally (e.g. iron pots)
(2) Articles which are not strictly essential but which are nevertheless
desired by the native peoples of West Africa in varying degrees according
to their method and standard of living, e.g.
(h) Clothing and Haberdashery of all kinds
(i) European provisions
(j) A wide range of miscellaneous hardware
(k) Medicines
(1) Motor vehicles and Bicycles

118
Table 7.

0

Major Imports into the Gold Coast Colony, 1886110

Consumer Goods
Textiles:
cotton goods
haberdashery
hats and caps
leather goods
silk goods
umbrellas
wearing apparel
woolen goods

Value (£)

Investment Goods

12,782
11,860
1,117
1,097
5,432
1,070
2,272
2,162

Total

Total

95,457
1,300
2,886
3,811
1,104
6,972
3,204
22912
22,249

Total
Other:
brass and copperware
drugs and medicine
earthenware
furniture
kerosene oil
lead bars
lumber
perfumery
soap
stationery

c

Total
Total Consumer Goods

bags and sacks
boats and canoes
building materials
cooper' s stores
cordage and twine
machinery

2,122
2,100
1,556
13,434
4,339
2,541

Total Investment Goods

26,092

37,792

Liquor, arms and ammunition, tobacco:
2,300
ale and porter
gin and geneva
9,010
rum
58,695
wines
2,814
gun powder
3,858
guns
4,788
tobacco
132992

Provisions:
beef and pork
bread and biscuits
flour
mineral waters
provisions (general)
rice
sugar

Value (£}

4,800
1,961
2,172
2,177
2,009
1,711
2,861
4,944
2,703
1 2811
212142
182,647

llOsource: Gold Coast, Blue Book
All imports of over £1,000
were included in this table. Total
imports for 1886 were £376,530.

(1886}.
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0

0n) Clocks, watches, etc.
The above is not, of course, an exhaustive list, but only an indication of
the range of goods taken by the Company into West Africa; naturally the
margin of profit on the second class of articles is larger than on staple
goods, because the demand for a particular article is less constant, and
the quantities sold are smaller, so that the expense of handling and the
risk of goods being left unsold.is greater.lll
The decline in importance of arms and ammunition as articles of import
followed quickly upon the final subjugation of Ashanti in 1900.

The Colonial

Government passed a law forbidding the indiscriminate importing of arms and
ammunition and their sale to whichever Africans, friend or enemy, wished to buy
them.

It would seem reasonable that it wished to deny arms to Ashanti, a

nation which had just been conquered, but by 1902 the business community in the
Gold Coast was complaining of the loss of revenue occasioned by the prohibition.

In 1905, therefore, the government removed some restrictions and drew up

a list of selected Africans who were to be allowed to buy arms. 112

After that

time, as one merchant reported, "We sold Long Dane muzzle loading guns, these
could only be purchased with a government permit, permits were also necessary
for buying lead bars and gunpowder.

nl13

The decline in importance of arms imports after 1900 was paralleled by
a decline in the importance of liquor imports.

Although in 1875 the value of

liquor imports was £58,705, in 1895 £120,641 and in 1910 £176,359, nevertheless
its importance as a percentage of total imports declined drastically from nineteen per cent in 1879 to fifteen per cent in 1894 to seven per cent in 1910.114
ll 1 From "Notes on the United Africa Company Limited," report 5, UAC Rankin
file.
ll 2LivCC, 30 October 1902, 5 August 1906.

0

ll 3Harry Martin, "Reminescences as a member of the trading firm of Swanzy
in the Gold Coast from 1902" (Typewritten Ms: Rhodes House, Oxford, 1965).
1 14Raymond E. Dumett, "The Social Impact of the European Liquor Trade on
the Akan of Ghana (Gold Coast and Asante) 1875-1910," Jour>naZ of Interdisciplinary Histo~, no. 1, vol. 5 (Summer, 1974), p. 77.
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Europeans were inclined to attribute to Africans an incapacity to "hold their
liquor" and to assume that the "demon rum" was destroying the fabric of African
society; hence at a later date the
trols on liquor imports.

GoverP~ent

began to impose stringent con-

Between 1913 and 1923 the import duty on liquor was

raised over 400 per cent,llS ostensibly to discourage drinking but also, one
suspects, for revenue purposes.

In 1919 a prohibition was placed on the impor-

tation of low-quality "trade spirits" (a prohibition which incidentally
seriously affected the American trade in rum which had formerly been one of the
staples of the trade of the Swanzy company) but by this time some Africans were
earning enough money to be able to afford beer and better quality liquor.

The

decline in consumption prior to 1913 indicates that as their incomes rose,
Ghanaians spent less on liquor and preferred to buy other goods, such as
c1oth. 11 6
Indeed, as is well known, textiles were one of the mainstays of the vlest
African trade, enabling many a Manchester merchant to make his fortune.

Gener-

ally speaking the import of clothing, textiles, and leather was responsible for
about twenty per cent of Ghana's total import bill, although it is worth noting
that during the prosperous 1920s the figure was closer to the thirty per cent
mark.

Much of the clothing which was imported was in fact second-hand European

clothing, a fact disguised by the statistics which listed clothing according to
type, as dress, shirt, and so on.

Second-h~d

clothing from America, where the

southern climate more closely approximated that of Africa, was a booming business in which most of the British expatriate firms engaged with some

11 5"Report of the Royal Commission on Trade and Taxation," Cmd.l600 (1921)
Q.2254-57.
116This

point is made by Dumett, "The Social • • • -1910," op. ait., p. 94.
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considerable success.ll7

But although the trade in second-hand clothes was

large, the bulk of the textile trade was in lengths of printed cotton which
Africans could use to make up clothing of their own.

The large firms such as

the predecessors of the United Africa Company had their own cotton mills in
Manchester where cottons were printed to order.

Any cloth pattern which became

popular was jealously guarded by the firm which owned its patent.

At the end

of the nineteenth century a great deal of controversy occurred within the West
African business community over extending the Merchandise Marks Act to the
African coast, in order to protect these patterns.

The Colonial Office was

finally induced to protect patterns in the colonies, thus granting competitive
advantages to the expatriate firms who had already cornered large sections of
the textiles market ,118
While the firms were concerned to protect their own privileges, however,
they were less concerned to protect the African consumer.

Occasionally both

the Colonial Office and the Government in Accra attempted to institute measures
of quality control over imports.

During the 1890s the Government attempted to,

and eventually did, enforce a law known as the "Folded Woven Goods Ordinance."
Africans were accustomed to buy European cloth by counting the number of folds,
to determine the length of the piece.

The Europeans, however, had adopted the

custom of folding the last piece short, so that it was not as long as it seemed.
The British business community, while it acknowledged that "falsely folded
goods" were prevalent, complained bitterly against the passage of controls
which would leave them with short pieces of cloth which they could not sell.ll9

c

117 Interview with several former European traders of G. B. Ollivant,
Manchester, November 1974. The centres of the second-hand clothes trade were
London, New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles and San
Francisco.
118 Interview with an executive of Tootal Corp., Manchester, October 1974.

119ManCC, 10 April 1894.

122

Lest it be thought that business morals improved after trade became more regularized, it should be noted that the same sorts of arguments, that they would
not be able to sell their produce, were made in 1931 when the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti tried to introduce regulations over a broad range of imported
goods, included short-weighted bags of rice and corrugated iron sheeting so
thin that it was ruinous for Africans to invest in it for their houses.
London Chamber of Commerce argued against this idea on the
11

The

that

gro~~ds

Ithe] nativeisJ should not be barred from obtaining cheap goods if they

were unable t<:> afford the better quality. 11 120
The large amount of money spent on European-manufactured consumer imports in Ghanal 2 1 indicates the increasing wealth of the Ghanaian community
which followed upon its rapid and ever-closer integration into the world
economic system.

It also indicated, however, an increasing dependence on

foreign goods to the detriment of local industry and production.

The point

must not be oYerstated; in some cases foreign goods were provided vrhich Africans
could not have provided for themselves, in other cases, new wants created new
indigenous industries.
sector in

Wes·~

As Hopkins states, "The composition of the manufacturing

Africa, as in pre-industrial Europe, reflected the embryonic

nature of the market, and was based on clothing, metal working, ceramics, construction, and f'ood processing." 122

But as soon as the European presence in

West Africa became strongly felt, and Africans began to produce for the market,
African needs moved out of the "embryonic" stage.

12 0Meeting of the London Chamber of Commerce with

Mr. H. S. Newlands,

Chief Commissioner for Ashanti, LonCC, 22 June 1931.
121For figures on total imports into Ghana, see Table 8 below.

c

1 22A. G. Hopkins, An Eaonomia Histo:cy of West Afriaa (London:
1973), P• 48.

Longman,

123
Everything which was imported into Ghana was used; singlets were made
out of flour sacks, wooden cases were used for construction, iron hoops holding
together packing cases could be converted into knives.l23

New opportunities

for consumption and a higher standard of living resulted from the income from
cocoa farming.

But at the same time European manufactured enamelware and

brassware partially replaced the indigenous pottery industry.

Moreover, while

it cannot be argued that the large amount of textile imports replaced an
indigenous cloth industry, inasmuch as the cheap, mass-produced textiles
catered to an enlarged market which the indigenous, narrow-weave Kente cloth
industry would not have been able to supply, nevertheless it would seem that
there was same decline in African-made textiles as a result of the influx of
imports.

In 1923 a witness to the Trade and Taxation Cammi ttee argued "I

should think you would find native-made clothing amongst the very poor and the
very rich,"1 24 presumably because the poor would wear whatever they could get
hold of, while the rich could afford the elaborately patterned, hand-woven
Kente.

But on the whole, the market for African cloth declined, and "tradi-

tional 11 centres of African weaving lost their role in the Ghana economy.

In

1939, an anonymous witness wrote of the decline of the Keta cloth industry as
follows:
Notes on Changes in West Africa.
Keta Native Cloth Industry
The cloth is made from yarn generally imported from Manchester. Up
to the war lWWIJ there was an enormous trade in this cloth. Practically
every family along the lagoon had primitive native made looms. The main
income then was derived from cloth making. This industry has practically
disappeared. European imported prints and garments are replacing the
locally made article.l25

1 2 3rnterview, G. B. Ollivant, Manchester, November 1974.

c

12 4"Committee on Trade and Taxation," op. cit., Q.2144.
125Anonymous report found in UAC Rankin File.

The Keta cloth industry i's
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A more serious criticism of the pattern of imports which established
itself in Ghana is that many foodstuffs and provisions began to be imported
which, presumably, Ghanaians could have produced for themselves.

Cash-crop

farmers, of course, often preferred to buy imported foods rather than devote
time to subsistence farming.

While many farmers did produce foods both for

subsistence and for the local markets, patterns of transportation, especially
prior to World War I, were such as to facilitate the movement of imports on
railways rather than the movement of indigenous foods by road.

" • . • ft]here

would be no need for large imports of foodstuffs if non-cocoa farmers had been
able to increase production to meet the

ever~growing

demand.

Unfortunately

this was made difficult by the lack of feeder roads and marketing facilities, "1 2 6 But transportation patterns alone do not suffice to explain wr.y, for
example, Ghana imported rice, which could have been grown in the Northern
Territories, or salt, which had been produced for centuries in the salt flats
at Ada.

Government policy was directed to encouraging both cash crop produc-

tion for export, and African dependence on European imported goods.

Prior to

World War I, Africans who sold goods direct to Europeans were often paid in
chits redeemable only at European stores.

Patterns of European-oriented con-

sumption were established and reliance on internal production of food was
actively discouraged by both expatriate firms and the colonial regime.

As

early as 1889, the "Report of the Commission on Economic Agriculture in the
Gold Coast," pointed out the irrationalities of Ghana's food dependence,

also mentioned in W. M. Macmillan, "African Development," in C. K. Meek (ed.),
Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 80.

Europe and West Afriaa (London:

c

1 26J. C. de Graft-Johnson, Afriaan Experiment: Co-operative AgriCJUlture
and Banking in British West Afriaa (London: Watts and Company, 1958), p. 117.

125

stressing among other arguments that the rice grown in Ghana was more nutri-

0

tious than the excessively cleaned rice brought in from Europe. 127

This report,

however, was never acted upon by the Government, concerned as it was with
promoting palm oil and cocoa production.l 2 8
The composition of Ghana's imports, then, like the composition of her
exports, encouraged reliance on the external capitalist market while discouraging self-reliance or indeed any trend towards development of those
agricultural or industrial resources which characterized her colonizer.

The

peripheral status which she held in the world economic system was reinforced by
the regionalism which developed very quickly within the country.

4. Regionalism and Peripheralization
The development of Ghana as a supplier of minerals and agricultural
goods for the world market resulted in the division of the colony into areas
with different economic functions and different opportQnities for growth and
development.
The Gold Coast Colony itself, the area taken over politically by the
British in 1874, was the centre of African contact with Europeans • After centuries of commercial relationships, a trading class had emerged which acted as
an intermediary between producers, sometimes from the Colony hinterland and
sometimes from Ashanti, and European buyers.

This class spread out all along

the coast of the Colony but it was centred primarily in Cape Coast, Sekofidi,
and Accra.

After the institution of colonial rule, however, the capital of the

Colony was moved to Accra for the sole reason that Accra's climate was more
congenial to Europeans than any other spot along the coast.

Cape Coast

127ap .01.-.,p
't
•36
•

0

128For details on Government policy as to agricultural diversification,
see Chapter VI.

126
consequently entered a decline as a centre of trade, a decline which was given
the final fillip when the Central Province Railway was built in the 1920s and
by-passed the formerly active surf ports of Cape Coast, Winneba, and Saltpond.
Sekondi similarly declined in importance when its twin town, Takoradi, became
the location for a large port in 1928.
The trading class was joined by a large, educated group of

Gh~~aians

which quickly took over a great deal of the political power in the Colony.
Ever since the first African university graduate returned to Ghana in the
1760s, 129 it had been commonplace for wealthy Ghanaians to send ~heir sons
abroad for university training, especially in the fields of teaching, preaching, and the law.

In this behaviour the coastal Africans were emulating the

standards of their European contacts; they were also assuring incomes to their
sons as the fortunes made by Africans in the import-export trade were as
easily lost as won, and in any case indigenous inheritance and family systems
militated against the handing over of large sums from father to son.

The edu-

cated southerners fulfilled the role of intermediaries between Europeans and
Africans; playing, in such crucial issues as the 1897 Lands Bill, an active
role.
In comparison to the Colony, Ashanti, while perhaps more important as a
producer, had a lesser political role and was often dependent on its traditional enemies, the Fantis from the south, for spokesmen in the Legislative
Council.

Most of the gold exported from Ghana came from Ashanti.

Moreover,

Ashanti shared with the Eastern Province of the Colony the honour of being the
major producer of cocoa.

As soon as Ashanti TN"as taken over by the Europeans,

railroads and roads were built to facilitate export of its valuable products.

c

129 F.

L. Bartels, "Philip Quaque, 1741-1816," Tr>a:nsaations of the GoZd
Coast and TogoZand HistoriaaZ Soaiety, vol. 1, part 5 (1955).
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At the same time, Europeans quickly moved in to Kumasi to take advantage of the
market for imported goods which the cocoa farmers, ever wealthier, provided.
Politically, however, Ashanti was effectively quashed for many years by the
exile of its traditional leader, the Asantehene, in 1900, and the breakup of
its empire into independent

11

tribal 11 units.

Ashanti also, partly because of

its persistent policy of isolation from Europeans prior to its conquest, did
not have an educated class which could deal with the Europeans as could the
coastal Fanti.
But it was the Northern Territories which profited least from colonial
rule, in the sense at least of prospering economically from integration into
the world market.

Prior to the European takeover of the North, caravan tolls

had provided most of the revenue of that area.

These tolls were abolished by

the British in 1907, as they were considered to be hindrances to the free
movement of impo1~ed goods.l30

Thereafter, the Northern Territories' revenue

declined, as also did their traditional trade to the Sahara routes.

Kola, once

one of the biggest items of trade in the north,. declined into insignificance)31
Indigenous trade gave way to European tradE as European traders began to bring
imported goods into the newly-opened territories.
The function of the Northern Territories, in the eyes of the administration, was to act primarily as a labour

res~rve

for the mines, Government

projects, and cocoa farms to the south!, and only secondarily as a producer of

130Bourret, op. cit., p. 85.

c

l3 1During the early 1920s the kola trade was much debated and various
measures were attempted to encourage it, without success as kola exports were
taxed too heavily to make their carriage from Ghana to the market in Northern
Nigeria profitable. See for example the statement by one European unofficial
member, Mr. Rosenthal, in GCLegCo, 27 February 1922, 11 We do not do one tenth of
the trade through the North which was done in pre-war days. 11
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agricultural products.

The North also provided cattle for Ashanti and the

Colony, but it did not provide goods for the external market.

Some attemyts

were made to promote agricultural production, especially shea-nuts.

As early

as 1907 inquiries were being made in Tamale, the newly-designated capital of
the Northern Territories (a designation which had serious adverse effects upon
traditional centres of trade such as Atebubu and Salaga) as to the extent of
cultivation of shea-butter for export. 132

There was some pressure put upon the

Government by the British Chambers of Commerce, anxious to exploit any source
of production, to build a Kumasi-Tamale railroad. 133

The indigenous inhabi-

tants of the area, also fully aware of the benefits of transportation
facilities, were eager to participate in railroad construction.
Chiefs and people of the Northern Territories, impressed during the
visits which they have paid to the south by the prosperity which
railways and roads have brought to the Colony and Ashanti, have already

volunteered to turn out in thousands for the oonstruotion of earthworks

if only they oan have a

railway.l34

The Northern Territories Railway, however, was never built.

It was decided

that the shea-nut export industry was not profitable enough for it to pay, 135
and, moreover, the labourers from the area did not need railways in order to
move to the south for seasonal work in mines and on farms.
The position of the Northern Territories in its relationship with.
Ashanti and the Colony paralleled the position of the whole of Ghana in its
relationship with the external world on which it was so dependent both economically and politically.

132 Circular

The very concentration on Ghana's import-export trade

from Tamale, no.T.2/1907, 30 December 1907, in GNA Adm.56/l/57.

133 LonCC,

2 June 1930.

134Speech

by the Governor to GCLegCo, 3 March 1927.

135 Speech

by the Governor to GCLegCo, 17 February 1930.

(Italics in original.)
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which characterizes all analyses of her economy
ternal economic growth was a

~unction

this dependence.

In-

of Ghana's position in the world

capitalist market as a primary producer.
more could be bought.

re~lects

As more was sold to this market, so

Table 8 below indicates the growth of both imports and

exports in Ghana between 1886 and 1939.

Although the long-range trend was for

a steady growth in the import-export trade, the Ghanaian economy reflected
world economic trends and slumped considerably during the Depression of the
1930s.
market

During the war years of 1917 and 1918, as also in 1921 when the world
~or

cocoa slumped, imports and exports declined considerably.

Ghana's increasing monocultural dependence has already been discussed in
Section 2 above.

The varied composition of her exports

way to an almost completely monocultural situation

a~ter

~rom

1886 to 1910 gave

1915.

The only major

export fiom Ghana which could in any way compete in value with cocoa was gold.
But the price

o~

gold was subject to controls on the world market, and it was

only in the 1930s, when gold was allowed to float after Britain went
gold standard, that its price rose
Ghana's export composition.

suf~iciently

of~

the

to make any serious inroad on

In any case, although gold was important to Ghana's

economy, its importance on the world market was very small, as it contributed,
between 1891 and 1931, only .04 per cent to 1.88 per cent
supply.l36

o~

the total world

With such a miniscule percentage of the world gold market dependent

on it, Ghana had no room to manoeuvre, especially as expatriate mines controlled
gold production.
Other mineral exports, while they had some importance to the Ghanaian
economy, did not become items

o~

trade until the post-World War I era.

ese rose to constitute at its highest point some eight per cent
exports, while diamonds rose to six per cent.

c

136 GCCMines,

o~

Ghana's

Neither could make any

Fifth Annual Report (1932}, p. 23.

Mangan-
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Table 8.

Year

Imports Exports
( £000s} (£000s)

Ghana.: Total Imports and Exports
by Value: 1886-1939 1 3 7
Balance
of Visible
Trade
( £000s)

1886
1887
1888
1889

377
364
432
441

407
372
382
416

+
+

30
8
50
25

1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899

562
666
597
718
813
932
910
911
1,102
1,323

601
684
665
722
850
878
792
858
993
1,112

+
+
+
+
+

39
18
68
4
37
54
118
53
109
211

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

1,283
1,795
2,120
2,082
2,001
r,486
2,058
2,366
2,029
2,394

885
560
774
980
1,340
1,646
1,996
2,641
2,525
2,655

398
-1,235
-1,346
-1,102
- 661
+ 160
62
+ 275
+ 496
+ 261

1910
1911
1912

3,439
3,874
4,023

2,697
3,792
4,307

-

137source:

-

-

742
82
+ 284

Year

Imports Exports
( £000s) (£000s)

Balance
of Visible
Trade
( £000s)

1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919

4,952
4,456
4,509
5,999
3,386
3,256
7,946

5,427
4,942
5,943
5,816
6,364
4,472
10,814

+ 475
+ 486
+1,434
- 183
+2,978
+1,216
+2,868

1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

15,152
7,661
7,900
8,448
8,315
9, 782
10,285
13,770
12,200
10,082

12,352
6,942
8,335
8,959
9,914
10,890
12,104
14,350
13,824
12,677

-2,800
719
435
+ 511
+1,599
+1,108
+1,819
+ 580
+1,624
+2,595

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

8,953
4,803
5,605
5,543
4,848
'"(,956
11,656
19,228
10,380
10,626

11,287
9,300
8,348
8,048
8,117
9,971
12,636
16,218
15,425
16,235

+2 ,334
+4,497
+2,743
+2,505
+3,269
+2,015
+ 980
-3,010
+5,045
+5,609

+

1886-1899: Gold Coast, BZue Books
1900-1939: Ka.y, op. ait., Table 18, "Imports, exports, and
the balance of visible trade, 1900-1960," pp. 325-326.
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significant change in the basically monocultural pattern which arose after
1915.

Rubber, timber, palm oil, and palm kernels, once important exports, de-

clined to miniscule amounts.
cocoa as an export crop.

Ghana was left almost completely dependent on

While in percentage-value terms its importance varied

as the price of gold rose or fell, it was the only major employer of labour,
land, and capital in African hands.

The internal development of Ghana depended

almost totally on the cocoa export trade.

But as an agricultural export indus-

try, cocoa cultivation had no linkage effects.
unsophisticated.

Tools were simple, labour

Investment in farms consisted almost completely of extension

to new areas of cultivation.

Because Ghana produced salable cocoa at all

times, even though it was not always of the best quality, Government saw little
need to invest in its production.l39
The reliance of Ghana on cocoa, moreover, left her dependent for most of
her trade on the countries of Western Europe and the United States.

From 1900

to 1939, France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United
States imported over eighty per cent of the total world supply of cocoa.
Ghana's share of this total world supply rose steadily until the mid-1930s when
competition from Nigeria began to assume some importance, but at its peak it
was never more than forty-five per cent.

A higher percentage of Ghana's cocoa

than the world average went, of course, to the United Kingdom, because of colonial political and economic ties.
At its peak, Ghana produced a significant percentage of the world's
cocoa.

But because the marketing of cocoa was controlled by Europeans, it ben-

efitted the expatriate commercial class more than it benefitted the African
farmers.

c

Even the European commercial class, however, was limited in its powers

139For a discussion of cocoa quality, see Chapter VI.
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Table 9.

Year France

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

18
17
16
16
15
15
15
14
13
11
12
12
11
ll

10
11
13
14
13
13
12
9
9
9
9
9
9
6
7
6
8
8
8
8
7
6
7
7
6
7

World Net Imports of Raw Cocoa as
Percentages of the Totall40

Germany Netherlands Switzerland

20
17
17
17
19
21
23
21
21
20
22
22
22
21
20
14
4
2
12

26
20
11
19
17
13
15
16
14
16
16
14
14
18
11
10
11
12
11

6
9

7
9
8
8
7
8
10
9
9
10
10
12
12
13
7
3
1
9
7
7
9
9
9
9
9
8
10
9
11
11
7
8
9
9
10
8
11

10

4
4
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
3
5
4
4
4
4
6
5
4
6
4

United United
Kingdom States

20
17
17
14
16
14
12

3
2
1
1
2

13
15
14
13
11
11
12
11
18
23
18
15
20
16
8
11
13
9

1

12

1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2

11
13
12
12
11
12
13
13
12
14
16
14
20
16

Total % of
World Supply

18
18
20
22
22
23
23
25
22
28
24
26
26
24
29
24
34
50
53
38
38
32
36
41
36
35
39
40
34
40
34
34
39
38
34
40
39
42
30
39

140 source: Gill and Duffus Limited, Cocoa Statistics (London:
1970), Table 7 "World Net Imports of Raw Cocoa," pp. 21-23.

86
82
82
83
85
85
84
85
85
85
85
85
84
84

e6

86
86
89
88
86
88
84
86
84
84
83
82
84
81
82
81
e3
82
82
81
81
83
83
80
85
February

134
by the fact that cocoa was not a necessary good.

The demand for cocoa was more

or less inelastic in an upward direction; it was an everyday luxury and consumers did not buy more of it when their income was raised.

On the other hand,

the demand was elastic in a downward direction, since in times of economic recession or depression it could be easily eliminated from the consumer's
diet. 141
Ghana was dependent to a very high degree on Britain for her trade.
From 1900 to 1939, rarely was less than fifty per cent of her trade conducted
with the "mother country"; usually sixty or seventy per cent of her total imports and exports originated in or were destined for Britain.

As shown in

Table 10 and Graph 4, another twenty per cent, approximately, of her trade was
with Western Europe, while about ten to twenty per cent was with the United
States and Canada.

This pattern owed itself, not to imperial preference, but

rather to expatriate control of her import-export trade.

As long as the trade

remained largely in British hands, Britain would absorb most of her products.
Even when imported goods originated in other cotmtries, they arrived in Ghana
through British intermediaries.

Some non-British firms had branches in Ghana,

but these were of Western European origin; no American firms traded in the
colony.

The control of trade by the expatriates, who also had considerably

more access to the Colonial Government than did Africans, meant that not all
opportunities for trade were exploited and Ghana's dependence on the colonial
power was increased.

141 Interview, Gill and Duffus (cocoa brokers), London, December 1974.
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Table 10.

Q

Ghana: Direction or Trade
(Percentage Figures) 1900-1939 142

Year

United
Kh1gdom

u.s. and
Canada

Other
Commonwealth

Western
Europe

Total

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916.
1917
1918
1919
.1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928

45
67
65
66
69
71
77
74
75
71
72
71
64
67
69
72
68
66
65
59
64
62
59
51
45
47
4o
44
41

5
5
4
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
4
3
3
7
11
19
21
27
17
14
17
18
15
17
19
18
17

38
21
24
20
21
19
15
17
16
19
20
20
21
17
18
12
14
9
1
9
8
12
16
23
31
28
28
28

1929

37

23

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

43
50
51
49
56
55
23
48
6o
63

14
15
17
14
13
13
63
17
11
13

9
7
7
7
5
6
5
6
4
6
4
5
8
7
6
7
5
4
10
3
3
4
5
3
4
3
7
4
3
4
4
3
3
4
4
5
2
4
4
q

91
100
100
96
97
97
98
98
96
97
97
98
97
94
96
98
98
98
97
98
92
92
97
95
95
95
94
94
92
92
90
93
92
89
89
93
97
92
92
92

142 source:

31
28

29
25

21
22
16
20
9
23
17
12

Raw figures from Kay, op. ait., Table 22a "Direction of trade,
1900-1960, 11 p. 341.
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CHAPTER IV

OLIGOPOLIZATION OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY
Oligopolization, the control of trade by a few large firms, was a
crucial aspect of the Ghanaian economy during the colonial period.

Whatever

possibilities for independent commercial action might have existed for Africans
within the overall framework of the monocultural, peripheral economy were almost completely eliminated by the tight control which European entrepreneurs,
through the process of oligopolization, accrued.

The economy was dominated by

a few large British firms which controlled the import-export trade, shipping,
and banking.
It must, however, be kept in mind that oligopolization alone was not
responsible for the peripheral role which Ghana played in the world economy.
Chapter III explained in detail the role which was created for Ghana by the
early twentieth century as a- producer of raw materials and a consumer of light,
cheap manufactured consumer products.

Ghana was undeveloped, in comparison

with Europe, long before she was taken over politically by Britain.

Essential-

ly, Ghana became a peripheral nation in the world capitalist system because
that was the only role she was fit to play.

But even this role was limited

after the initial integration into the world system by measures taken by
European capitalists to safeguard their interests in Africa.

African business-

men were denied opportunities for which they were actually fit by monopoly,
price fixing, and product distribution agreements made by the Europeans.

They

were also denied access to banking and shipping facilities, or treated by the
bankers and shippers on an unequal basis.

This chapter will enumerate the

steps by which this oligopolization took place.
Again, it must be noted that the

ev~dence

137

of oligopolization and of

138
practices which are generally considered illegitimate by those who adhere to a
free-trade model of capitalism, is not entirely sufficient to explain the role
of African entrepreneurs in late nineteenth and early twentieth century capitalism.

They were indeed deliberately excluded from certain opportunities, the

long-range effect of the exclusion being that an indigenous bourgeoisie ·was not ·
able to form as it might otherwise have done.

But small-scale European traders

were also excluded from the system, and indeed the history of the United Africa
Company is largely, although by no means exclusively, the history of small
firms which

s~ccumbed

to economic forces beyond their control and were then

integrated into larger firms.

Some of the evidence presented in the following

pages of discrimination against small traders and shippers applied equally to
Europeans and Africans; but there is also evidence of additional burdens put
upon African entrepreneurs in some cases.
Africans lost out in the struggle for control of trade and commerce because they did not then possess, and could not evolve at the level of economic
development at which they then were, the institutions needed to compete effectively on a world scale.

The development of the steamship in the 1850s was

the beginning of a new system of trade in which individual traders sold their
small sailing ships and either bought very large steamships, if they could
afford to do so, or relied on large steamship companies.

A new force therefore

emerged on the capitalist scene, the shipping company which controlled transportation.

Only the largest firms were able to negotiate with shipping

companies on an equal basis.

With the elimination of small, individual

shipping expeditions to the West Coast of Africa came the elimination of close
personal contacts between European and African, whether the latter was sup-

c

plier or customer.
routinized.

Credit, previously giYen on a personal basis, became

European traders stopped giving credit and the banks took over the
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A.

Major Firms Forming tl1e Unjj;ed Africa Comoanv 1
African Association
(1889)(1896)*

c

Alex. Hiller Bros.
(1865)(1868)

&

Co.

F. & A. Swanzy
{1789}(1789)

Niger Co.
(1884)

A-fr-~-·c-an---a~n-d__E_a-st_e_r_n____________ltaken over by Lever

.______________

Trade Corvorationt
Brothers in 1920§
(1919) (1919) . ~. .1_ _ _ _ _ _ _, _ . . - - - - '
United Africa Company (1929)(1929}~
B.

Principal Competitors of the United Africa Company after 1929 2
Other European

British
Cadbury Brothers Ltd. (1889)(1907)
J. S. Fry and Sons Ltd. (1896)(?)
(amalgamated with Cadbury 1918)
J. Lyons and Co. (1894)(?)
W. Bartholemew and Co. (1926)(1926)
Busi and Stephenson Ltd. (?)(c.l930)
John Holt and Co. (Liverpool) Ltd.
( c.l86o )( c .1935)
G. B. Ollivant Ltd. (1840)(1918)
Paterson, Zochonis and Co. Ltd.
(1890)(c.l933)
C.

Cie. Fran~aise de l'Afrique
Occidentale (c.l845)(1909)
Societe Con~erciale de l'Ouest
Africain (1907)(1914)
Swiss African Trading Company
(1922)(1922)
Union Trading Company (Basel ~fission
Trading Company) (1865)(1865)

Principal Shipping Companies
Elder Dempster and Co. Ltd. (1899)(1899)
African Steam Ship Co. (1852)(1852)
comprising {
and
British and African Steam Navigation Co. (1865)(1865)
Woermann Lines (1882)(1885)
Elder Dempster and Woermann Lines joinei into the West African Shipping
Conference in 1895.

D.

Banks
Bank of British West Africa Ltd. (1894)(1896)--formed by Elder Dempster
and Co. Ltd.
Colonial Bank (1836)(1917), name changed to Barclays Bank, Dominion,
Colonial and Overseas, 1925.
Chart 1.

European

Fi~s

in the Gold Coast

*First parentheses indicate date of incorporation, second parentheses
indicate date of entry into Ghana.
tAside from those mentioned above, Africa.YJ. and Eastern included twentysix other West African comp~nies.
§And joined to tvrenty-three other West Af::·ican companies previously or
subsequently acquired by Lever Brothers.
NBetween 1929 and 1938 UAC acquired twenty-nine more West African companies.
1From

"Notes on the United Africa Company Ltd., 11 in UAC Rankin flle.
2 Dat.a on UACs competitors, the banks, and the shipping lines, is from
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function instead.

But the banks had no way of 1mderstanding the African busi-

nessman, who was not conversant with or a practitioner of the rational,
standardized bookkeeping procedures which had evolved over four centuries in
capitalist Europe.

They therefore completely avoided the responsibility of

providing credit to Africans, because, indeed, by their criteria, Africans were
unreliable.
As the trade between Africa and Europe became more and more international, Africans were placed at an ever greater disadvantage.
contracts on palm oil and cocoa for

delive~J

Forward

to Germany, France, or the USA

were more thrul an African, without contacts beyond his own country, could
handle.
est.

The agents through whom he worked vere often unscrupulous or dishon-

Nor could he buy from the myriad sources of imported goods for the

Ghanaian market, and once he relied on an Englishman to buy for him in Japan
or India or Germany or America it became easier for the Englishman simply to
treat him as an employee, not as an independent client.
The following chapter documents the process of oligopolization of the
Ghanaian economy throughout the colonial period and, concomitant with this
oligopolization, the disadvantages which accrued to Ghanaian entrepreneurs in
competition with Europeans.

The argument is made that at least part of the

undePdeve l-opment of the Ghanaian economy wa~3 caused by the denial, even of such

opportunities of which they might have been able to avail themselves, to
Ghanaian entrepreneurs.

The denial of opportunities to Ghanaian entrepreneurs

reinforced the deleterious effects of monopoly, obliging Africans to play the
roles of customers and suppliers to European firms with little hope of ever

c

published sources and interviews. Question marks indicate that the exact date
of incorporation or entry into Ghana is not known. The histories of many of
the companies rivalling UAC remain obscure.
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c

achieving substantial economic independence for themselves.
1.

01igopo1ization of Ghanaian Trade:
The United Africa Company and
Its Competitors3
It is anachronistic, no doubt, to refer to the United Africa Company as

the most important of the companies trading in Ghana between 1886 and 1939, as
the company was not actually formed until 1929.

Nevertheless, the reference is

appropriate since, although the Company itself did not exist until 1929, its
predecessors not only existed but thoroughly dominated the Ghana trade from the
early nineteenth century.

This section will therefore briefly review thE:: his-

tory of the United Africa Company, and then consider what competitors it had
in trade.
The United Africa Company was formed as a conglomeration of several
companies which had dominated the British West African trade, especially in the
Gold Coast and Nigeria, since the turn of the nineteenth century.
outlines in brief the major steps in the formation of the company.
on the Gold Coast, there had been many small trading firms.

Chart 2
Orig:i.nally,

Competition was

easy to enter because there were few advantages of scale; anyone who could buy
a sailing ship could trade to West Africa.

In the first half of the nim:teenth

century, the major British firm in Ghana was that of Forster and Smith, with
that of Swanzy, a firm which began trading in 1789, a close competitor.

Swanzy

and Forster and Smith made agreements together after 1852, when the invention
of the steamship facilitated the regular carriage of small lots of goods and

c

3Research for this section was conducted prior to the publication of
Frederick Pedler's The Lion and the Uniaorn in Afr-iaa: 1~e United Afr-iaa Company 178?-1931 (London: Heinemann, 1974). Pedler's sources and this author's
are similar, although of course Pedler's history is far more extensive. However, my conclusions as to the function of the United Africa Company as a
contributor to the overall development of Africa differ radi.:!GI.lly from PE::dler' s.
See my review of his work in Canadian Journal of A.froiaan Studies, forthcoming.
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Date

African and Eastern Side

1789

F. and A. Swanzy founded
in London

1841

Establishment ofT. Harrison
& Co., Liverpool (the leading firm in the formation
of the African Assn. 1889)

1865

Establishment of the Miller
Companies in Glasgow and
London

1889

Formation of the African
Assn. by T. Harrison and
eight other companies

18901894

Savage competition between African Association
and the Niger Co. which ends by African Association withdrawing from the Niger River in
return for a share interest in the Niger
Company
Cancellation of
the Royal Niger
Company's
charter

1899

19191921

United Africa Company

Formation of the
Royal Niger Co.,
London

1885

Absorption by African
Association (now
African and Eastern
Trade Corporation) of
Miller firms and
Swanzy

1920

Acquisition of the
Niger Co. by
Lever Brothers
Ltd. and consolidation of all
Lever West African
interests

1920

Abortive attempts at amalgamation of African and
Eastern and Niger Companies

1929

Amalgamation under the name of United Africa Company Ltd.

1932

c

Niger Co. Side

Eighty per cent
control of UAC obtained by Unilever
Ltd.
Chart 2.
4Adapted from

11

Chronological Chart of Main
Events in the United Africa Company's History4

Chronologica1 table of main events in the Company's
History," in UAC Rankin file.
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therefore the entrance of more small firms into the trade,5

Nevertheless, by

1873 Forster and Smith had disappeared from the coast, leaving Swanzy a free
hand. 6

Swanzy apparently was a more enterprising firm, willing to take more

risks in the trade.

It established a series of "factories" along the coast and

was willing to send goods out unsold, ahead of time, to be sold on arrival,
whereas the normal business practice before this change had been to send out
goods only after they had been paid for by commission agents.?

"

Swanzy's main

business was done not between the West Coast and Britain, but rather between
Africa and the United States.

Itsimports to Ghana in its earlier years in-

eluded such goods as rum (until the United States' declaration of prohibition
in 1919), tobacco, lumber, medicines, and sewing machines.

Swanzy exported

gum copal, rubber, and palm oil, and sometimes more unusual items such as

parrots and monkeys.B
By the beginning of the colonial period the main rival to Swanzy in
Ghana was a Glasgow-based firm, Millers Limited.
than of Swanzy.

Less is known of this company

It had originally started as Alexander Miller, Brother and

Company, and had been operating in the Gold Coast and the Niger area since
1868.9

The two firms, Miller and Swanzy, were not long in direct competition,

for they quickly began to come to agreements on prices and market distribution.
Miller reorganized in the early t>ventieth century, forming Millers Limited,

5Freda Wolfson, "British Relations with the Gold Coast, Nineteenth Century" (University of London: unpublished Fh.D. Thesis, 1951), p. ii.
6 Ibid.

, p. 106.

7 Henry Swanzy, "A Trading Family in the Nineteenth Century Gold Coast,"

Transactions of the Gold Coast and TogoZand Historioal Sooiety, vol. 2, part 2
(1956), p. 113.
8 "The

Story of UAC in Ghana," The Unioom (House Magazine of the United
Africa Company in Ghana), no. 3, vol. 16 (t•lay/June 1970), p. 2.
9Rankin, op. oit., p. 60.
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which traded in Ghana in 1904, and Miller Brothers (of Liverpool) Limited,
which traded in Nigeria, in 1907. 10

In what can hardly have been a purely eo-

incidental development, in 1904 Miller also moved to take over control of
Swanzy, which as a result of overinvestment in gold mines was then in financial
difficulties.

Miller decided to bail Swanzy out, on condition that it would in

future have a say in Swanzy's policies.

The board of Swanzy was increased to

four, of which two were Miller nominees.

Thereafter the two firms remained

nominally distinct but they worked in the closest cooperation both at home and
in Ghana.

"IO]n the Gold Coast control was centred in the person of a single

Supervising Agent. " 11

For many years this agent was J. H. Batty, later to be-

come chairman of the African and Eastern Trade Corporation, and still later·
chairman of Ashanti Goldfields. 1 2
The main competitor to Miller and Swanzy after 1889 was the African Association, a conglomeration of companies which had been formed into one group
in Nigeria in 1889 in order to be able to better compete with the Royal Niger
Company.

The most important of these firms was T. Harrison and Company; the

others included the British and Continental African Co. Ltd. (Liverpool),
Couper, Johnstone and Co. (Glasgow}, Hatton and Cookson (Liverpool), Holt and
Cotterell (Liverpool), Richard and William King (Bristol), Stuart and Douglas
Ltd. (Liverpool), Taylor, Laughland and Co. (Glasgow), and George 'ivatts
(Liverpool). 13

The object of the formation of the Association was to obtain a

charter in the Oil Rivers similar to that w:·J.ich the Royal Niger Company held,
up to 1899, for the Niger River.

In this object the company failed; it did,

10

Ibid. ' p. 68.

c

11 Ibid.

' p. 72.

12 Directory

of Directors (1915, 1925, 1935}.
13Rankin, op. cit., p. 73.

however, manage to reach a modus vivendi with the Royal Niger Company without
which no doubt the several small companies would have gone under completely.
This modus vivendi was doubly important because of the close connections between Miller and the Royal Niger Company.

Alexander Miller had been appointed

a Joint Managing Director of the National African Company, the Niger Company's
predecessor, and for many years the business of the Niger Company and Miller
Brothers was conducted from the same office in London. 14
in 1899 between the Niger

Company~

An agreement was made

the African Association, Alexander Miller,

Brother and Company, and the Company of African Merchants that they would not
intrude on each other's territory and that they would pool their profits and
divide them in specified proportions.

The agreement was investigated by the

Colonial Office in 1900 and approved.l 5
Thus although the United Africa Company itself was not formed until 1929
it can be seen that the close connections between the various dominating firms
in the British vlest African trade were formed very early in the formal colonial
period.

The African Association was a competitor with Miller and Swanzy in the

Gold Coast, and as a group was fighting to maintain its existence against the
competitive onslaught of the two large, closely organized and cooperating
firms.

Yet by 1919, the African Association, Miller, and Swanzy had all united

into the African and Eastern Trade Corporation.

The reason for this new organ-

ization was not simply that more cooperation was deemed necessary, but rather
that all three firms by this point were worried about a new competitor, Lever
Brothers.

It seemed logical for the three firms to unite, as their

been one of fairly close cooperation since 1900.

c

11+ Ibid.

'

1 5 Ibid.

, p. 87 .
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started its first store in Ghana in 1896. 16

0

By the early twentieth century it

was making agreements with its two competitors to divide profits from a common
pool on a pro rata basis. 17
imported merchandise.

The first agreement, in 1901, fixed prices for

In March 1904, an agreement was made to pool net profits

and to divide them according to each company's capital worth.

Later on, the

three original companies joined with the Basel Mission Trading Company, J. J.
Fischer and Company, and the German West African Trading Company (which was to
disappear during the First World War) in an agreement to fix prices and pool
profits on all staple exports. 18

The path to unity was further smoothed by

cooperation during World War I, ·w-hen

11

a series of trade agreements started

whose purpose was to regulate the purchase and division of produce.

Nearly all

the produce-buying houses entered into them."19
The final impetus to unity, however, was provided by the introduction of
Lever Brothers into the West African Coast, with its consequent threat of monopoly and

de~truction

of all the carefully-organized trade patterns built up

by the older trading firms over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Lever had had interests in West Africa from 1896, through the Oil Rivers

and Exploration Company Limited.

Shares in this company had however been sold

in 1904 and Lever Brothers had not acquired any further interest in the trade
until 1910, when it acquired the firm of Maciver and Company. 20

This firc;t

acquisition was followed by a series of others, the purpose of all of them being
to increase Lever Brothers 1 control over the world supply of edible fats 'N"hich

16Dumett,

11

British . • . ,"op. ait., p. 334.

17 Ibid., p. 320.

18 Ibid.' p. 321

c

19 Rankin, op. ait., p. 90.
20 Rankin, op. ait., p. 5.
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it used in its soap and margarine manufacture.

The aim of Lever Brothers had

originally been to start West African plantations.

However in 1902 its request

for land for plantations was denied by the Colonial Office, which was willing
to offer only a twenty-one year lease in Sierra Leone, not considered adequate
by Lever for mechanical developments and reorganization of production. 2 1

Lever

then turned to the Belgian Congo for plantations, entering West Africa as a
buyer, not a producer, in 1910.
Realizing that Lever was out to acquire as much of a monopoly of oil
palm supplies as it could, the African Association, Miller, and Swanzy united
in 1919 to form the African and Eastern Trade Association to protect their own
interests.

In July 1920 Lever Brothers bought the Niger Company.

According to

a former director of Lever Brothers, Lever
• • . wanted to make sure that he would get a certain proportion of
his requirements for the soap firms . • . • He may have paid too much for
it but the Niger Company strengthened Lever's hand by the quantity of
produce that they were able to buy and import as against opposition. They
had a land and a monopoly, the land belonged to them. If you wanted to
establish on the river Niger, you couldn't do it then without the Niger
Company . • • • He ILever] had a monopoly. He didn't have the opposition
that he had in other parts with the African and Eastern. . • . [A]n
organisation such as Unilever, should not depend upon the market for raw
material. . • • [T]hey ought to have something of their own to fall back
on. . • . They could make a ring against Levers but with Levers having
their own suppliers it made them independent of the ring--they could get
together, but they couldn't stop the machinery for supplying the margarine
firms or the soap plant.22
Although Lever Brothers originally entered the African trade in order to
guarantee supplies of palm oil and kernels to itself and its sister companies,

2lcharles Wilson, The History of VniZever (London: Cassell and Co.,
In making this decision the Colonial Office was adhering to its policy of leaving land in African hands, as described in Chapter

1954), pp. 165 and 180.

II.

c

22 Interview by Dr. P. N. Davies with W. K. Findlay, former director of
Lever Brothers and Chairman of the Niger Company, Liverpool, 4 March 1964.
Included in P. N. Davies (ed.), Trading E:;,perienees in West Afr•iea_, 1840-1914
(London: Croom Helm, 1976). I am grateful to Dr. Davies for allowing me to
use the original interview.
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Jurgens and Van den Berghe of the Netherlands, it soon became evident

0

that it would enter other aspects of the trade, particularly, in Ghana, the
import-export trade based upon cocoa.

The slump in cocoa prices in 1920 en-

abled it very quickly to buy up some of the smaller firms which had been trading in Ghana independent of the African and Eastern Trade Corporation . . It
immediately tried to buy out African and Eastern as well, and a "nine-year
struggle 11 ensued.

On the whole African and Eastern did better business than

the Niger Company during the years 1920-28.

But in 1929, with the onset of the

Depression, African and Eastern lost its financial backing, while the Niger
Company was able to continue because of its "fairy godmother," Unilever. 2 3
Without credit, African and Eastern was forced to succumb, joining the Niger
Company to form the United Africa Company on 3 March 1929.

Originally the two

companies entered the union on equal terms, each holding fifty per cent of the
United Africa Company shares.

But in its first few years the United Africa

Company faced serious financial difficulties from which only Unilever could
bail it out; consequently, by 1932 Unilever, through the Niger Company, had
eighty per cent contro~. 24
By 1929, therefore, a large number of independent British firms which
had traded in the Gold Coast over the space of 140 years, had succumbed to the
forces of oligopoly and had been joined together under the umbrella of the
United ATrica Company, which to the time of political independence was to remain the single most important firm in Ghana.

Lest it be thought, however,

that the United Africa Company maintained complete control of the trade at all
times, it should be noted that it never managed to incorporate into its empire

23 Rankin,

0

op. cit., p. 108.

24 Ibid., pp. 128-29.
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the independent manufacturing firms which were buying in Ghana:

that is, the

chocolate manufacturing firms vrhich bought cocoa for their own use and were not
engaged in the import-export trade.
The three chocolate manufacturing firms which became buyers in Ghana
were Cadbury Brothers Limited, J. S. Fry and Sons Limited, and J. Lyons and
Company.
rant

The latter was a giant concern which included many hotel and restau-

interests in England, while the former two were more strictly concerned

with the manufacture of confections.

Cadbury Brothers and J. S. Fry amalga-

mated their business on the Gold Coast as of 1918 (buying also for Rowntree)
and in 1919 a holding company, the British Cocoa and Chocolate Company Limited,
was formed with directors from and holdings in both companies.2 5
Cadbury Brothers Limited was formed in England in 1900 and moved

i~to

the Gold Coast in 1907 (after deciding to stop buying cocoa from Sac Theme and
Principe because of the Portuguese use of slave labour.)

Cadbury, a business

owned by Quakers, 2 6 was concerned to establish fair dealings in Ghana and not
to be guilty of some of the trade abuses practiced by its competitors at the
time.

A recommendation made by their first Gold Coast agent firmly condemned

the business practices of the firms such as Hiller, Swanzy, and the African
Association, already on the Coast.

"The Firm would need to offer a better

price for good cocoa that was being paid by a ring of buyers whose main activity
was trading in imported merchandise.
'chits' on the local store.
25 stoak

c

Most payments were not in cash but in

Payment in cash was strongly recommended." 2 7

Exahange Yearbook (1939).

26 Cadbury's Quaker motives are questioned by Roger Southall, in his
"Cadbury on the Gold Coast, 1907-38: The Dilemma of the Model Firm in a Colonial Economy" (University of Birmingham: unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1975). I
am grateful to Dr. Southall for having allowed me to read a draft of his dissertation in 1974.
27 Norman Edwards, Cadbury on the Gold Coast (Bournville: Publications
Department, 1955), p. 4.
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Cadbury also made a strong resolution to buy only good quality cocoa, and to
encourage the farmers, by the payment of higher prices, to invest more time and
money in their produce.

This policy, however, did not succeed, as the farmers

found that Cadbury was rejecting poorer quality cocoa which they had often
travelled miles to sell, and as a result they were embittered against the
company.

" • • • competition from trading firms had stiffened, and it was felt

that the Firm's buyers had refused too much cocoa which, if not of the highest
standard, was reasonably good.

This had annoyed many African suppliers who had

often brought the cocoa many miles •

tt28

The stiff competition against Cadbury was a result of its policies not
to engage in trade abuses and not to buy poor quality cocoa.

A transport boy-

cott against Cadbury was formed on its entrance into Ghana, but it was soon
broken and by 1911 Cadbury was a leading cocoa buyer.

After the sudden <imm-

swing in the cocoa market in 1920 (as a result of the post-war glut of the cocoa
market) "Tempting offers were made to manufacturing firms and blatant attempts
were made by trading companies to jeopardise the position of the Cadbury-Fry
agency on the Coast.

. . .1129

When the United Africa Company was formed, yet

another attempt was made to oust Cadbury from the Ghana trade.

The company was

obliged to charter its own ships because UAC pressure on the shipping companies
resulted in its being denied space; further, the UAC outbid Cadbury for cocoa
by as much as ls6d per cwt., then undersold it on both the Liverpool and the New
York cocoa markets.

(Cadbury and the other manufacturing firms customarily

sold surplus supplies on the open market.)

As a result negotiations took place

in 1932-33, and an agreement was made on prices to be paid on the Gold Coast

c

28 Ibid.' p.
29

14.

Ibid.' p. 22.
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and a system of regulating supplies in Europe. 30

By the time that the 1937-38

Cocoa Pool was formed, Cadbury had joined the common organization of European
firms, albeit with a certain degree of reluctance.

J, S. Fry, as its partner,

and J. Lyons independently, were also members of the Cocoa Pool.
Along with the competition offered to the UAC and its predecessors by
the manufacturing firms, was that offered by the few other British trading
firms which were able to compete effectively with the UAC and retain their independence, at least for a few years, of its control.

These firms, as

indicated in Chart 1, were John Holt and Company (Liverpool) Limited, W.
Bartholemew and Company, Busi and

Stephenso~

Limited, Paterson, Zochonis and

Company Limited, and G. B. Ollivant Limited.

They were the largest of the

myriad firms which were scattered all over #est Africa during the colonial
period and which eked out, for the most part, a meagre existence.
John Holt entered the i'lest African trade in the 1860s, beginning with
the export of cheap manufactured goods to Nigeria and branching from that into
produce buying.

It did not enter the Gold Coast until 1935, although it had a

factory at Keta, near the Togoland border, from the early 1920s.3 1

Its expan-

sion was rapid, however, and by 1938 it had sixty-one "selling points" and
twenty-seven cocoa-buying stations in Ghana.3 2
a founding member of the African

Associatio~

The firm of John Holt had been

in 1889, but quarrels with the

other members of the Association had resulted in its withdrawal in 1896.33

30Ib'd
"' • ' pp. 29-31.
31 Cherry Gertzel, Merahcmt Adventu1•e (Liverpool:
1951), p. 48.
32JH:

John Holt and Company,

Jacket no. 536 (ii).

3 3H. D. Cotterell, "Reminiscences of One Connected with the West African
Trade from 1863 to 1910," in Davies (ed. ) , Trading Experiences • . . , op. ait.
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Thereafter, the firm remained independent, and as such it was a significant
check on the monopolist tendencies on the West African Coast, even though it
did not enter Ghana herself until the mid-thirties.
W. Bartholemew and Company was formed in 1926 and entered Ghana in the
same year, specializing not only in cocoa buying and merchandise selling, but
more specifically in the importing of motor cars.3 4

Like Bartholemew, the

firms of both Busi and Stephenson and Paterson Zochonis entered Ghana quite
late, the former in the late twenties or early thirties, the latter about

1933.3 5 But whereas Busi and Stephenson was not formed until that time,
Paterson and Zochonis was, like Holt, a firm which had traded in other West
African colonies for a considerable period of time, having been started in
Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 1890.36
It should be noted that many firms entered Ghana in the late twenties
and thirties.

The thirties was also a period of entry for Lebanese traders and

for a number of independent Continental Europeans.

'l'his entry of new firms

into the trade contradicts the theory that in times of economic depression
small firms are pushed out of.trade in favour of larger firms.
firms competed for a diminished world cocoa market.

In Ghana, more

One possible explanation

for this phenomenon could be that, in order to keep their profits up, firms
such as John Holt, formerly content with fewer sources of supply, sought to
expand.

Another explanation could be found in the fact that even during the

Depression, comfortable dividend rates were being paid by the firms investing

34stook Exohange Yearbook (1939).
3 5Interviews with office managers, Paterson Zochonis and Busi and
Stephenson, Accra, July and August 1974.

c

36w. Bartholemew amalgamated with John Holt in 1957 and the company John
Holt Bartholemew later became part of Lonrho. Paterson Zochonis and Busi and
Stephenson are still independent fir1ns in Ghana.
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c

in the import-export trade in West Africa.

Oligopolistic organization, into

which the newer firms joined, counterbalanced the effects of the Depression. 37
The largest independent British firm to compete with the UAC was G. B.
Ollivant, a Manchester-based concern which was started in 1858.

In 1923 it was

recorded as having three branches in Ghana, at Accra, Winneba, and Keta. 3S

GBO

was the firm most concerned with the import of Lancashire cottons into West
Africa.

In 1934 it became financially associated with UAC, but it continued to

compete with the actual UAC organization until the 1960s; there was, in other
words, regulated internal competition. 39

GBO was perceived as a separate or-

ganization by its African customers.
But all of the companies mentioned above were to eventually cooperate
with the UAC in the Gold Coast Cocoa Pool of 1937.
with its predecessors.

Many had already cooperated

So also those few foreign firms (that is, non-British

firms) which were able to establish themselves over significant periods of time
in Ghana, cooperated with the UAC.

Both the Compagnie Fran<_;aise de 1 'Afrique

Occidentale and the Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain 4 0 had extensive
networks in Ghana, the former having entered the Colony in 1909, and the latter,

37Maurice

Dobb observes that in general, there was a ''most marked persistence of the small firm" in Europe during the Depression years. He points out
that one reason for their persistence might have been the liaisons which were
made between the small firms and the larger firms which maintained the latter's
controL He further remarks that the general dividend rate remained at about
six per cent throughout the Depression years in Europe. Both these phenomena
could be accounted for by the theory of increasing monopolization of capitalism
in the twentieth century. Studies in the Development of Capitalism (New York:
International Publishers, 1963), pp. 341-42, 329.
38 "Your Compa..r1y in Ghana,"

The Horseman (House Magazine of G. B. Ollivant

(Nigeria) Limited), no. 7 (Aprill964), p. h.
39 11 G.

c

B. Olli vant Ltd. : A History," Link (Magazine of the UAC Group in
Nigeria) no. 1, vol. 4 (March 1970), p. 1, and interview, G. B. Ollivant,
Manchester, November 1974.
1

+0 Both

companies still operate as in<iependent concerns in Ghana.
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actually a breakaway firm from CFAO, in 1914.

They engaged, as did the British

firms, in general import and export trade, concentrating on cocoa.

Lilce the

British firms, they shipped through the Elder Dempster and Woermann lines.

The

only substantial difference they had with their British competitors was that
they tended to be financed by European banks and a higher proportion of their
goods and produce came from or was destined for the Continental market.

They

suffered no discrimination on account of their national origins.4 1
A smaller Continental company, the Swiss African Trading Company, which
entered the Gold Coast in 1922 specifically as a cocoa-buying firm with its
headquarters in Kumasi, was bought out by the UAC in 1936, 42 although it remained nominally distinct after that date.
In general the policy of the Government, until the 1930s when the
Depression induced a certain amount of protectionism, was to allow all companies equal access to Ghana.

In the case of French firms (CFAO was a French

firm, while SCOA was Swiss) this right was guaranteed by the Anglo-French
agreement of 1898.

There was in fact only one Continental company which

suffered any discrimination in Ghana as a result of its national affiliation.
This single exception was the Basel Mission Trading Company.

This company was

one of the largest and most successful in Ghana, even though, because it was
mission supported, it had a stated and strict policy of not selling two very
important trade items, arms and liquor.

During World War I, many accusations

were made both in England and in Ghana, to the effect that the Easel Mission
Trading Company was a German firm; and indeed, although it was registered in
Switzerland many of the members of the mission w>d of the firm's management
were German.

c

Pressure built up to confiscate the Company and turn over its

41 Interviews, SCOA and CFAO, Accra, February and March 1974.
42 Interview, s,dss African Trading Company, Accra, March 1974.
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assets to British firms; significantly, much of the pressure came from persons
such as J. H. Batty, Chairman of the Combine firms of Miller, Swanzy and the
African Association, who suggested that it only be allowed to operate under the
supervision of an English company.43
Although the Government acknowledged that the Basel Mission Trading
Company was Swiss, it nevertheless confiscated its property in 1918, and turned
the assets over to an independent British firm, the Commonwealth Trust Company,
which was supposed to carry on the good work of the Basel Mission by devoting
all of its profits above five per cent to the improvement of the "natives" of
the colonies (the Company operated in India as well as in Ghana) in which it
operated.

The Mission Company, angered at the confiscation which it perceived

as unjust, reformed under the title of the Union Trading Company in 1921.

A

long and bitter legal struggle ensued and eventually, in 1928, the company was
paid £250,000 compensation.

The Commonwealth Trust, however, was also allowed

to continue its operations (significantly perhaps, it included among its directors R. L. Holt of John Holt and Company) and was paid an additi.onal £55,000 to
help it over its immediate financial difficulties.
money

vTaS

All of this compensation

paid. not from the Imperial Treasure, although the Home Government had

originally decided to confiscate the Mission's property, but from the colonial
revenues, over the opposition of the Unofficial African members of the Legislative Council. 44
This type of persecution of non-British companies in the Gold Coast was
unusual, however.

The informal, extralegal means of control of trade were

43 Letter from Hugh Clifford, Governor, Golo Coast, to Bonar Law, M.P.,
30 December 1915, in GNA Adm.l2/5/141.
4411 Memorandum:

Trust" (Gold Coast :
1928.

The Basel Mission Trading Society and the Commonwealth
Printing Office, 1928) and GCLegCo, 25 October

Goverr~ent
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usually sufficient to guarantee that a large percentage of the trade was kept
in British hands.

The Government confined its role to bland statements that it

could not interfere in arrangements made among the firms to regulate trade; it
did not actively forbid outsiders or Africans from trade.

In fact the primary

aim of the Gold Coast Government, in regulating its trade policy, was to encourage as much trade as possible, with whatever country, in order to increase
the revenues which it obtained from import and export dues. 4 5

Only during the

Depression of the 1930s was there significant pressure to close Ghana to foreign traders, and this pressure was aimed not at England 1 s real rivals, that
is, America, France, and Germany, but against the relatively weak rivals of
Japan and Russia.

The reason for this was that any pressure for restriction of

imports from the three former countries would result in retaliatory measures by
their governments against Gold Coast exports.

Moreover, an agreement had ex-

isted between France and England since 1898 guaranteeing that each country's
nationals would be treated equally with the other's in either British or French
colonies between Senegal and the Cameroons.

Although there were occasional

complaints against this agreement by British traders, in general it was acknowledged that in fact they benefitted greatly from the equality of treatment
which they received in the French colonies.
fThe Anglo-French Convention] had caused the granting of equal treatment to British and French subjects in matters of commerce, tariffs and
other fiscal affairs in the Colonies of the French Ivory Coast, the Gold
Coast, French Dahomey and Nigeria (excluding Togoland) . • • . [T]he
Convention . . • had all along operated in favour of British trade.
Statistics . • . show the strength of this argument. 4 6

45This point is made by C. W! Newbury in "The Tariff Factor in Angle-

French West African Partition," in Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis (eds.),
Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1971), p. 256.

Franae and Bt'itain in Africa:

c

46Memorandum

of the <Toint West Africa Committee, 7 March 1928, reported
in ManCC, 9 May 1928.
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On the whole French traders were more likely to oppose the Convention than
British traders, since they felt more severely the impact of British manufactured goods.
No similar convention existed with Germany for equal trade for the two
countries, however, except for one treaty regarding trade between the eastern
Gold Coast and Togoland which was in effect from 1894 to 1904, and which was
not renewed as the Germans decided to increase their duties for revenue purposes.47

The hostilities which existed in Europe, however, between Germany and

Britain, were reflected in Gold Coast policy.

~~ring

World War I all German

traders and their agents were expelled from the colony, and their property was
auctioned off to British traders only, thus effecting a redistribution of commercial properties in the eastern Gold Coast adjoining Togoland.

After W::>rld

War I the Gennan traders were allowed to re-enter the Colony under strict
immigration procedures.

No hostility was felt against them until the 1930s,

when European Unoffical Hembers in the Legislative Council began to protest
generally about the presence of foreigners in the colony.

The Germans were

accused of paying their European staff lower wages than the British, of hiring
fewer Africans, and of selling British goods at lower prices than the British
themselves could manage.48

However the Germans were not expelled, but were

left to pursue their activities.

During the 1937-38 cocoa boycott several

German citizens offered to ship cocoa for Africans on a commission basis; at
least one firm, Fuerst Brothers, was reasonably honest and might indeed
been able to fulfil its promises. 49

Providentially for the large firms,

47 Newbury, op. oit., p. 256.

c

48 LonCC, 22 June 1931.
49 Interview with a .former British barriste!', Accra, May 1974.
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however, all Germans in the colony were interned in 1939.
Rumblings were also heard in the West African trade community during the
thirties against several other nations, all of whom were infringing on the now
closely-guarded empire of the large British firms.

The Liverpool Chamber of

Commerce tried, without success, to persuade the Home Government to place a
prohibitive duty on Russian and Norwegian whale oil imports to Britain as whale
oil was competing with palm oil. 50 The Sheffield Chamber of Commerce, through
Manchester, tried to persuade the Gold Coast Government to place a tariff on
Continental manufactures so that Sheffield could make more exports of agricultural machinery, and road and mine-building equipment to Africa. 51
Manchester, concerned for its textiles, pressured the Government for protection
against Russian greys.s2
But the only successful move against foreign competition was that
against the import into Ghana of Japanese textiles, which began to increase
during the mid-1930s.

The Japanese share of Gold Coast trade was miniscule.

Nevertheless its share of certain cotton imports started to affect British
sales in 1934.

For cotton piece goods imported into Ghana the shares were the

following: 53
Table 11.

Japanese and British Cotton Piece Goods
Imported into Ghana

Country

1932

1933

1934

88%
1%

76%
5%

61%
18%

United Kingdom
Japan

50Reported in ManCC,

March 1933.

51ManCC, 18 January 1934.

c

52ManCC, 1934-35.

"Greys" are bolts of raw cotton.

53 statement in the GCLegCo by the Comptroller of Customs, 12 June 1934.
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Since Japan was not a customer for exported goods, it was easy enough to impose
a quota on her imports, on the grounds that the economy of Ghana, and also of
the Empire, would suffer if those who sold to her did not also buy from her.
The Textiles (Quotas) Ordinance was passed in 1934, with the object

11

•

to

restrict the annual imports only of certain textile goods manufactured in
Japan."54
During the 1930s, pressure also began to be generated inside Ghana to
restrict the number of non-Africans emigrating into the colony.
this pressure was directed against Italians and Lebanese.

Specifically,

Italians were be-

coming a significant force in the internal economy as unlike the English, they
were not afraid to perform manual labour and they were engaged, not in trade,
but in contracting work.

In 1931, forty-three per cent of the Government's

small contracting·work was given to Italians and Syrians, and forty-eight per
cent to Africans. 5 5 Because the Italians charged less than the British, certain Europeans felt that they must be doing shoddy work and paying poor wages
to their employees.

The Government, howeve:, argued that a significant per-

centage of railroad contracts still went to British firms, and moreover that
all contractors were obliged to use British materials, and therefore refused to
move against the Italians.56
Similar objections were made against the Syrians (Lebanese) who began to
move into the colony in increasing numbers in the 1930s.

Always ready to in-

voke African interests when it helped their own case, the London Chamber of
Commerce expressed the fear that Syrians would take over opportunities from

54 Importation of Textiles (Quotas) Ordinance 1934, in GNA Adm.29/6/8.

c

55 Statement by the Acting Director of Public Works, in GCLegCo, 23
February 1931,
56Memorandum from the Colonial Office to the Joint West African Committee,
13 December 1929, reported in ManCC, ll FebTuary 1930.
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11

the African trader, the African clerking class, the African Property Owner and

the European Merchant."5 7

Africans also complained against the Syrians, whom

they accused of unscrupulous pawnbroking and of denying opportunities to
Africans for employment.
Parents in this country feel that certain Syrians are ruining the youths
of this country, and the youths must be protected . • • • These Syrians do
not scruple for a moment to take or pawn anything even from an infant; and
the amount of gold which is carried away from this country, illegitimately,
is enormous. 58
I came across during my travels a Syrian who was a cook for himself,
and who, one occasion, was unloading a lorry containing yams, pepper, and
onions which he had bought for himself from another place. He would not
even pay a farthing to a labourer to remove the things from the lorry. A
man like this leaves nothing to the country. He is taking all the money
away to a foreign country, and we get nothing from it. 59
The Government was indeed concerned with the influx of Lebanese into the

colo~r,

but more for cultural reasons, one suspects (since Lebanese were certainly not
black and yet not quite white) than for economic.

Their incursion into petty

trade did not affect the large European firms.
On the whole, then, the policy of the Ghana Government throughout the
colonial period was

one of free access to all traders, of whatever nation.

Restrictions on trade were imposed by the firms themselves, through their
monopoly agreements, not by the Government.

There were only two exceptions to

this policy; the exclusion of Germans during and immediately after World War I,
and the imposition of quotas on Japanese textiles after 1934.

In both of these

cases hardships resulted for the indigenous population as a result of the
policy.

The removal of German traders from eastern Ghana left trade there in

57 Letter dated 13 July 1933, from the Commonwealth Trust to the Lon1on
Chamber of Commerce, in LonCC, 9 October 1933.
58 statement in GCLegCo by Mr. Korsah, 15 March 1937.

c

59 statement in GCLegCo by Nana Ofori Atta, 23 1~arch 1938.
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the hands of a few British, who found it easy to collude against the African
middleman trader.

The removal of Japanese textiles from the market in the

thirties imposed an additional hardship upon the already squeezed African consumers.

There was some opposition among Africans to the move, especially as

they suspected that after the imposition of the quota they would be sold the
same Japanese goods under a British label at a higher price.
It is confidently felt that the Government cannot, after appealing to
the people to join in putting this embargo on the Japanese, hesitate to
bring down to the lowest ebb our present inflated import duty--the only
cause for the rush after Japanese goods • • • . It is stated that the
Empire is analagous to a large fa~ily, the members of which should watch
with jealous care the interests of each other. That being so, it cannot
be conjectured that iw~ediately the Gold Coast Market is relieved of
Japanese imports of cheap prices, then the same goods re-appear with
different labels, and, with extortionate value in the same market.6°
In cases in which the interests of African consumers conflicted with those of
British traders, the interests of the latter took priority.

It was more im-

portant to protect British textiles (and Lancashire textile workers, whose
political clout was far more potent during the Depression, than that of African
peasants) than to supply cheap cloth in Ghana.

But where the interests of

British traders conflicted with those of the Empire as a whole, the latter took
precedence.

Trade patterns with other nations had to be considered en bZoa,

and protection for Ghana might mean retaliation against another part of the
Empire.

It was left to the business community to make its private deals to

ward off competition, deals which were neither influenced by nor the responsibility of the Colonial Government, and of which it could deny knowledge were it
accused of not acting in the best interests of the African.

60 Statement from the Provincial Council of Chiefs, Eastern Province, to
the Commissioner for the Eastern Province, l June 1934. In GNA Adm. 29/6/8.
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2.

Cooperation and Competition
Many of the independent firms which had traded in Ghana from the mid-

nineteenth century onwards had amalgamated by the turn of the twentieth
century.

Further amalgamations took place in 1919 with the formation of the

African and Eastern Trade Corporation, and in 1929 with the final amalgamation
of A and ETC with the Niger Company into the United Africa Company.

Ghanaians,

well cognizant of the fact that despite their different names, the British
firms were often legally amalgamated or at least acted in concert, referred to
African and Eastern, Miller, and Swanzy, as the "Combine" firms.

They were

aware that the Combine firms and their inheritor, the United Africa Company,
could not simply impose prices either for produce or for imported goods, since
there were still a number of fairly large independent firms, both British and
Continental, trading in Ghana.

However, it was known, although difficult to

substantiate, that it was common practice for the Combine firms to make agreements both among themselves and with their major rivals.

Such agreements

usually covered both the prices to be paid for agricultural goods produced by
Africans and the prices to be charged to them for imported manufactured goods.
During the 1930s, the UAC, in concert with a number of its major rivals,
formed a Merchandise Agreement group; that is a group of firms who agreed on
prices and share of the market for a number of major imports into Ghana.

This

group of cooperating firms became known as the Association of West African
Merchants (AWAM).

Surviving into World War II and beyond, the Association was

the centre of power in the Ghana (and Nigeria) trade.

In Ghana, its membership

was comprised of the UAC and its subsidiaries, John Holt, Compagnie

Fran~aise

de l'Afrique Occidentale, Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain, Paterson

c

Zochonis, the Union Trading Company, and the Commonwealth Trust.61
61 P. T. Bauer, West Afriaan Trade:

Again,

A Study of Competition, Oligopoly and

Africans were well aware of the existence of the Association, and often referred to it as the chief power behind the Colonial Government. 62
The list of agreements made by the European firms to control import and
export prices, as well as the share of the market to be allotted to each participating firm, extends from the early twentieth century to 1939.

The most

well-known of the agreements was the 1937 Cocoa Pool, which precipitated the
boycott by cocoa growers of the major European firms during the 1937-38 cocoa
season, 63 but that Pool had many predecessors.

Table 12 lists only some of

these agreements.
There is no reason to assume that even this list of agreements is
plete.

~om-

It includes, for example, few agreements during the 1910s, yet the

official historian of the UAC states that during World War I most of the large
companies entered into agreements on the purchase and division of produce. 64
The Nowell Commission in 1938 reported a series of agreements which more or
less coincide with the list presented below; it concluded that periods of eooperation were interspersed with periods of intense and damaging competition.
We have had described to us in evidence a cocoa Agreement entered .into
in 1903 by the leading exporters in the Gold Coast, which had certain
similarities, including the division of purchases, to the Buying Agreements
with which we are concerned. A1 though the 1903 Agreement was apparently
limited to one year, subsequent agreements were made in 1903 [sic], 1905,
and again for a period of five years in 1906. From 1910 there followed

Monopoly in a Changing Economy (London:

Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp.

66-67.
62 This author contacted a number of companies and jnstitutions, but was

unable to locate any documents of the Association of West African Merchants.
One reply to a request for information stated that AWAM documentation had been
destroyed by bombing during World War II; other replies denied any knowledge of
the existence of' the organization.

c

63 For a detailed discussion of the 1937 Pool and the cocoa boycott, see

Chapter VII.
6 4Rankin,

op. ait., p. 90.
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Date

Trade Agreements in the Gold Coast 65
Description

1.

01/05/1900

Agreement for pooling produce of West African business between the African Association, the Niger Company, and
others.

2.

01/10/1901

Pooling agreement between the African Association Limited,
Alexander Miller and Company, and F. & A. Swanzy Limited.

3.

20/02/1902

Agreement regarding palm kernels, etc. , between the African
Association Limited, Alexander Miller, Brother and Company,
and the German West Africa Company.

4.

03/11/1903

Pooling agreement between Messrs. F. & A. Swanzy Limited,
and Millers Limited.

5.

01/03/1904

Agreement regarding sharing in proportion to the capital
of each party the net profits of the businesses of the
parties carried on in the Gold Coast and the German Colony,
between F. & A. Swanzy Limited, Millers Limited, and the
African Association Limited. Expired 31/12/1913.

6.

10/05/1906;
11/07/1910:
22/05/1913

Agreements between F. & A. Swanzy, Millers Limited, and
the African and Eastern Trade Corporation Limited (the
African Association).

7.

1905

Accra Produce Agreement between F. & A. Swanzy Limited,
Millers Limited, the African Association Limited, J. J.
Fischer and Company, the [Basel] Mission Trading Company,
and the German West A~rican Trading Company.

8.

13/02/1906

Volta Produce Agreement for pooling purchases of cocoa,
rubber, palm oil and palm kernels between the [Basel]
Mission Trading Company, F. & A. Swanzy Limited, Millers
Limited, and Chevalier and Company.

1905,1909,1914

Sundry timber pool agr~ements between the Gold Coast Machinery and Trading Company Limited, F. & A. Swanzy
Limited, Millers Limited, and the African Association
Limited.

10.

27/07/1912

Agreements regarding staple articles between the Basel
Mission Trading Company, the African Association Limited,
Millers Limited, and F. & A. Swanzy Limited.

11.

1925/1926

Cocoa pool agreement.
tion and others.

African and Eastern Trade Corpora-

65 This table is taken from listings of the United Africa Company archival
holdings in London. Unfortunately the author did not obtain access to the
actual agreements. It is presumed that the list is incomplete.
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Table 12 (cont'd.)
No,

Date

12.

01/01/1930

13.

27/07/1934

Description
Agreement for the purchase and sale of palm oil and palm
kernels between the UAC, John Holt and Company (Liverpool)
Limited, G. B. Ollivant, and Paterson Zochonis.
Gold Coast Merchandise Agreement (and Supplement

18/06/1937).
14.

18/05/1936

Agreement regarding the Gold Coast Motor Business between
Cie. Fran~aise de l'Afrique Occidentale, Societe
Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain, Union Trading Company,
W. Bartholemew and Company, and UAC.

15.

30/1111937

Agreements covering the sale of palm oil and palm kernels
between UAC, John Holt and Company, and G. B. Ollivant
Limited.

16.

10/11/1937

Agreement between W. Bartholemew and Company, UAC and
others for division of cocoa in the Gold Coast (the Cocoa
Pool).

a period of cocoa buying and selling agreements [i.e., agreements including provision for the pooling of sales as well as of purchases]
which lasted until 1917. After the War, probably owing to the efforts
at amalgamation between the two largest concerns, agreements were less
common, but a cocoa Agreement of the earlier type was in force between
1925 and 1927; and a cocoa buying and selling Agreement operated during
the first three years of the United Africa Company's existence •
• • • it appears from admissions to us in evidence that agreements have
tended to be regarded as 'breathing spaces' between bouts of fierce
competition, and that they have invariably broken down through competitive
forces re-establishing themselves.66
The companies argued that competition was irrational within the context
of West Africa; that there was a limited amount of trade available, which could
not be expanded, and that therefore it behooved them to organize and share out
that limited amount among themselves rather than allow a dog-eat-dog situation
to develop in which the weak would suffer.

c

The Firms do not co-operate to make exorbitant rates of profit. They
well know it to be impossible. What they seek is to stabilise trade and
create such conditions as will enable them to obtain a modest but fairly

66 Nowell Commission, op. ait., p. 49.
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steady return on their capital. 67
In new markets. You are there. Another man comes and sets up as well.
Only a certain amount of trade to be done. Necessary to make double your
profit. In new markets therefore competition does not keep down prices,
for if there is only a little trade everybody has to ask for higher
profits . • • • Very few fortunes have been taken out of West Africa. As
much money has been lost as made. There is an idea that merchants make
large profits. But all this co-operation has not resulted in excessive
profits, but has only arrested the downw·ard slide. No great profits
during the last twenty years. Co-operation is not confined to British
firms but is international--French, German and Swiss as well.68
The point of the agreements which were made, according to the firms, was not to
be able to make excessive profits, but rather to be able to guarantee a certain
percentage of the trade to each firm and to guarantee a certain return.

The

prime aim was to create stability in a limited trade which, at least on the
export side, was subject to extreme fluctuations in the world market.

When the

world market could not be controlled, the firms tried to establish control of
the local market.
Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact profit rates of the cornpanies operating in Ghana during this period, what little evidence is available
does suggest that the firms' argument was basically correct; that in fact their
profits were not excessive.

Nevertheless the profits were steadier, especially

during the Depression period, than the firms maintained.

Much of their profit

came not from the cocoa crop but from the sales of imported goods, which could
be bought at a consistently cheap rate from the suppliers but sold at whatever
the market could bear.

Money lost on the cocoa crop could be made up by im-

ports.
Table 13 presents the actual profit rates during the mid-l920s for

c

67Rankin, op. oit., p.

148.

6 8Notes taken by Mr. Rankin at a conference with Mr. Muir and Hr. Samuel
(UAC Directors), 24 November 1938. UAC Rankin file.
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Table 13.

Profit Rates in the ~-lid-twenties for Several
Firms which Amalgamated into the United Africa
Company in 1929 69

Firm

Year

The Tarquah Trading Company
Limited
1924

Turnover

Profit

Profit as %
of Turnover

£153,541 £ 369,712
166,440
446,007
120,822
404,693
123,381
399,547

£ 20,739

12,432
9,427
31,908

5.61
2. 79
2. 33
7.99

53,958
70,549
55,981
56,291

131,880
143,071
119,635
140,078

12,305
7,827
6,175
14,606

9.33
5.47
5.16
10.43

58,537
50,150
36,593
39,243

99,153
116,770
114,398
138,915

4,158
-1,278
3,905
12,625

4.19
-1.09
3.41
9.09

89,878
82,061
67,333
46,420

166,639
228 '093
219,384
225,574

4,162
-2,911
-1,780
11,990

2.50
-1.28
-0.81
5.32

351,005
869,153
1925 380,066 1,081~,530
(9 mos.) 1926 368,000
650,253
1926-27 322,971 1,172,402

104,727
107,862
66,026
137,106

12.05
9-95
10.15
11.69

1925
(9 mos.) 1926
1927
Gold Coast Machinery and
Trading Co. Ltd.

1924
1925
1926
1927

McLaren Brothers (Manchester)
Limited
1924

1925
1926
1927
Crombie Steedman and Company
Limited
1924

1925
1926
1927
The African and Eastern Trade
Corporation Limited
1924

c

Trading
Stocks

69 Source: UAC Rankin file: reports 38 and 55 to Head Office, 1928, on
state of affairs on the West Coast.
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several firms which were amalgamated, in 1929, into the United Africa Company.
Unfortunately several of these are smaller

~ompanies,

had some reputation in the local community.

albeit companies which

The profits for the mid-twenties,

a very prosperous period, varied around five per cent to ten per cent per year
for these companies.
Table 13a presents the profits for the United Africa Company itself
during the period 1932-37, thus, along with section five of Table 13 (profits
of the African and Eastern Trade Corporation for 1924-27), giving some indication of rates of profit for the largest firms involved in the Ghana trade.
Table 13a.

United Africa

Period

Comp&~y

Profits 1932-1937 70

Profit

April 30-September 30, 1932
1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936-37

£

141,359
428,386
581,117
1,123,305
1,532,866
1,811,099

Dividend (%)
1
2
3-3/4

8
10
11

Table 14 presents dividend rates for several companies including the
African and Eastern Trade Corporation, the United Africa Company, the Niger
Company, and Unilever.

Dividend rates are of course not a completely accurate

reflection of profits, especially because payments are made according to decisions on reinvestment policies; moreover, in poor periods dividends can be
paid out of reserve funds.

Furthermore in the cases of J. Lyons and Unilever,

the dividend rates reflect their overall business, not simply their business on
the West Coast of Africa.

It should be noted that the African Association/

African and Eastern managed to pay

c

70

source:

consiste~tly

high dividends, with the single

Rankin, op. ait., p. 131, and Stock Exchange Yeca•book, 1939.
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Table 14.

~

Niger
African
Association/ Unilever
Co.
A&ETC

Year

c

Ordinary Dividend Rates for Selected Companies,
1886-1939 'lJ

1886
1887
1888
1889

nil
nil
6
6

1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899

6
6

7~

1-~

5

6
6
6
6
6
6
28

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

n. a.
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

15
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12

15
15
15
15
15

1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
nil

12
12
12
12
5
15
20
20
30
30

15
15
15
15
10
10
10
15

71

J. Lyons

Commonwealth
Trust

Bartholemew

UAC

6
7~

4
nil
4~

6
15
15

.
10
10
10
12~

15
15

17~

7~

8
10
12~

17~
17~

10
nil
8
15
17~
23 3h
26~

28 3/4
30

30
30
32~
32~
32~
32~
32~
42~
42~
42~
42~
32~

25
25
25
35

Source: Stook Exchange Yearbook (1895, 1905, 1915, 1925, 1935, 1939).
N.B. n.d. ~no data. In several cases, fiscal years, not cal~dar years, are
listed in the Stook Exchange Yearbook. For the sake of simplicity, in such
cases the figure is listed under the calendar year, e.g., 1893-94 is listed
under 1894.
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Table 14 (cont'd.)

0
Year

1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

Niger
eo.

nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
5
nil
nil
nil
nil
5
10
10
nil
n.d.
n.d.

African
Association/ Unilever
A&ETC
17~

nil

8
8
8
8
6

8
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
7~
11

n.d.

J. Lyons

20
10
10
10
10
nil
nil
5
5
10
10
10
15
15
15
15
15
10
n.d.
n. d.

42~
42~

25
25
25
25
21~
21~

221-1i
221-2
22~
22~
22~
22~
22~

221-1i
221-2
22~2

22~

n. d.

Commonwealth
Trust

5
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
10
20
10
5
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
11~

10
20
n.d.

Bartholemew

UAC

103/4
60
100
60
20
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
nil
n.d.

~

1
23/4
3 3/4

8
10
11
n.d.
n.d.

exception of 1921 following the cocoa market failure of 1920, until the Depression.

And the United Africa Company, although it was formed on the verge of

the Great Depression, managed nevertheless to pay some dividends and by 1937,
the year it orgaDized the Cocoa Pool to protect itself against instability, it
was paying dividends of eleven per cent.
To keep these profit and dividend rates up, then, the large British and
Continental firms in Ghana made a series of agreements which were rigidly enforced.

The agreements (which never included any AfricaD firms) covered

produce, including cocoa, palm products, rubber, a11d timber, as well as imported
merchandise.

c

Strong sanctions were imposed on those parties to agreements who

did not adhere to the agreed structure.

Employees who decided on their own

initiative to pay more for cocoa, or sell goods at less than the price agreed

171
upon, were summarily and angrily dismissed.

c

An employee of one major firm '.ras d.ismissed in

what became known inside his firm as the

11

1939, for example, in

Club Beer price cutting case."

As

his superior reported:
I had no idea whatsoever that Hr. _____ was cutting prices in the Shop.
I had caught him only four days previously on Bergedorfbeer and told him
in rather strong terms that this is against my instructions. Yet when
the Local Committee investigated matters . • . it was found out that
seven [cases] had been sold at 39/- instead of 40/- • . • • The only
remedy is to replace this man, since I have caught him again undercutting
the sale price of soap (agreed) after the incident. 72
In this case the superior officer was particularly upset

becat~e

an employee of

the United Africa Company had complained to the "general Hanager' s Commit tee, 11
a local committee of all the firms which periodically set prices, that his particular firm was deliberately undercutting the agreement.

Reports of this kind

could endanger a small firm's chances of being included in price-fixing and
share-distributing agreements.
During the 1930s, the share-distributing agreement, confined to members
of the Association of West African Merchants, covered many popular brands of
goods imported in large quantities, including salt, sugar, dried fish, and
dyes, as well as other consumer products. 73

Agents of each firm kept a sharp

eye upon one another and informed their principals whenever there was any infraction of the price-

~~d

share-fixing rules.

A letter from John Holt to his

Agent in Accra in 1936, for example, complains that

11

Messrs. Busi and Stephenson

have told us that our agent in Kumasi has been paying up unnecessarily and
spoiling the market for everybody without increasing our share of the tonnage

c

72 From a letter dated at Kumasi, 7 April 1939. Access to this letter wab
obtained privately through a former employee of one of the major firms in
Ghana.
73 Bauer, op. eit., pp. 131-132.
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Both educated Ghanaians and chiefs were aware of the amount of monopoly
in the Gold Coast and frequently raised objections to it.

The progressive

amalgamation of so many firms into what eventually became the United Africa
Company was viewed not as a benign development, but as a means both of limiting
free competition and of squeezing out the indigenous African trader.
Our interests demand that the trade of the Colony be open to as many
competitors as possible, and I therefore strongly urge that anything
tending to strengthen or to lend the support of the Government to the
monopolistic policy under which the natives have suffered during the past
years should be seriously deprecated and discouraged. 75
The above speech by Nana Ofori Atta was made before any of the larger amalgamations of firms had taken place; already, however, the African community was
aware, even if only vaguely, of the many agreements which were made in restraint of trade, and was accustomed to refer to the large firms as the
"Combine" firms.

When the formation of African and Eastern was in the wind,

Ofori Atta questioned "Whether the designed amalgamation of the already existing large trading firms [into the A&ETC] should not be viewed with grave
apprehension from the point of view of the future of the countries wherein such
finns are going to carry on their activities?" 76

T. Hutton-Mills, a representa-

tive of the educated Ghanaian community, was concerned that the European firms
would squeeze the African community out of trade, and felt that the Government
should assume obligations to make sure that the different commercial sectors
should all have opportuni t:i.es in trade.

74Letter from John Holt (Manager in Liverpool) to District Agent, Accra,
19 November 1936. JH: Jacket no. 92.
75 speech by Nana Ofori Atta in GCLegCo., 2 November 1918.

c

76 Question by Nana Ofori Atta in GCLegCo, 30 December 1920.
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There are three classes [in Ghfu!a] who are virtually entitled to
participate in the trade of this Colony; the European merchant, company,
corporation or firm on the one hand, the native trader on the other and
the native chiefs with the concurrence and assent of their councillors.
In distributing trade amongst the inhabitants I would ask that the monopoly
should not be given to any particular class and to avoid complication and
unsatisfactory murmuring the educated classes should always be recognised
--some of them at any rate--as being entitled to a share of the trade in
their own country.77
But far from responding to these requests and objections from the
Africans, the Government made no attempt at all to restrain the increasing
oligopolization of the Gold Coast economy.

Britain was, on the whole, less

concerned with problems of monopoly thru1 other countries, especially the United
States; certainly within the colonies she would make no move to restrain any
developments which might guarantee a higher share of trade to British firms.
No matter how the African members of local legislative councils might object,
the British firms, with regular access to the Colonial Office in London, were
in a position to push their own point of view much more effectively than the
Africans.
Individual members of the Colonial Government, however, did sometimes
object, especially later in the colonial period, to the amount of monopolization of the economy and the takeover by the United Africa Company of so many
smaller enterprises.

One UAC Director complained that:

There is a terror of what they call 'monopoloy' in Government circles.
For instance, this Company was going to link up with an existing cold
storage company in the Gold Coast, for the sake of econoF~; yet we had to
go to extraordinary pains to prove to officials that the proposition came
from the smaller cold storage company, as it is always assumed that it is
this company which is eating up all the others. Amalgamations are formed
not out of strength but out of weakness, as in the case of the amalgamation of the Niger Company and the African and Eastern.78

c

77 Speech by T. Hutton-Mills in GCLegCo, 2 November 1918.
78Notes of .fvl_r. Muir's (a UAC Director) and Mr. Mellor's (a UAC official)
conversation with Mr. Lunn, undated. UAC Rankin file.
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The United Africa Company was sensitive to the issue of its extensive

0

holdings, sensitive enough that when its official history was written the historian was advised not to stress its various properties.
director wrote to the historian that

11

For instance, one

the feeling of the Gold Coast Con-

trol is that the bakery at Accra should not be referred to in the History. 1179
The bakery in question was only one of the Company's many holdings; holdings
which included interests in motors, lighterage, mineral waters, chemists'
shops, and machine supplies. 80

Where it did not have its own monopoly holdings,

the Company often made agreements as to restrictions of trade with other cornpanies.

In 1930, for example, it made an agreement with Maypole Dairy of Accra

that Maypole would submit to certain restrictions of its trading rights in
return for shares in UAC. 81

Nor was it only in the 1930s, with the formation

of the UAC, that this type of activity developed.

The A&ETC, for example, had

a monopoly of the distribution of petrol, kerosene, and packet candles in Ghana
during the 1920s.8 2

It also owned various manufacturing companies in Europe

which provided it with diverse goods for the West Africa trade, such as oil
palm casks, and which processed goods from West Africa.

The firm of A. J.

Caley, purchased by the Combine of Miller, Swanzy, and the African Association
in 1917, manufactured chocolate and cocoa.83

Joseph Dunkerley and Sons,

purchased by .African and Eastern in 1919, manufactured handkerchiefs, shawls,
and similar small articles of haberdashery to export to West Af'rica.84

79 Ibid.,

Table

letter from A. A. Cowan to Mr. Rankin, 9 November 1938.

80A complete list of all companies acquired by the United Africa Company
by 1938 is found in Appendix A.
81 UAC:

"Agreement with Maypole Dairy Company."

8 2UAC Rankin file:

c

83 Ibid.)

84Jbid.

report 38 on A&ETC holdings.

document A&ETC, "Manufacturing and Miscellaneous Compa..'1ies."
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15 lists a number of such firms owned. by African and Eastern in 1928.
The vertical integration of the principal West African firms with manufacturing and processing firms in Europe was complemented. by the horizontal
integration of the firms, not only with each other but also with various companies in Britain, Europe, and other parts of the world.

Table

16 presents a

selected list of interlocking directorships in the West Africa Trade.

From

this list it will be noted that there were strong ties among shipping, banking,
and trading interests in West Africa.

There were especially strong ties be-

tween the Bank of British West Africa and the Elder Dempster shipping company,
two firms which, as will be seen below, were extremely powerful in Ghana.
There were also ties among these two firms, the United Africa Company, and
Ashanti Goldfields, the foremost gold mine in the Colony.

Added to these ties

were a host of external connections to banking, shipping, railway and insurance
companies in Britain, and to the international mining consortia.

The network

of interlocking directorships was a crucial mechanism in guaranteeing the cooperation of the major European firms.

Informal agreements ensured their

successful domination of the West African trade.
It was not only the smaller European firms, of course, which suffered
from the oligopolization of trade by the United Africa Company and its allies.
A number of mechanisms were also employed by the European firms to exclude even
a minimal amount of indigenous Ghanaian competition.

Africans who tried to

engage in trade on their own could be, and were, easily undercut by their
European competitors, with the help of the expatriate Government.

As early as

1887 legislation was passed which made it difficult for the small African entrepreneur to trade.

c

This legislation imposed a licence fee of five pounds on

all retailers and wholesalers in the Gold Coast Colony; a licence of five
pounds, while almost irrelevant to a European wholesaler, could break an
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Table 15.

Miscellaneous Manufacturing Firms Owned by African
and Eastern Trade Corporation, 1928 85

Name of Firm

Date
Date
Established Acquired

Products

Brice Whyte and Sons
Ltd.

1880s

1915

palm oil casks

A. J. Caley and Son Ltd.

1863

1917

mineral waters, chocolate, cocoa

Joseph Dunkerly and Son
Ltd.

1837

1919

handkerchiefs, shawls, small
haberdashery

T. H. Harris and Sons
Ltd.

1829

1920

household, laundry and toilet
soaps

Joseph Holt and Sons
Ltd.

n. d.

1919

cotton cloths

Hunt and Son (1920) Ltd.

1920

1920

mineral waters, toffee, boiled
sweets

George Kay and Co. Ltd.

1889

1917

calico printing

Loders and Nucoline Ltd.

n.d.

1920

fats and butter substitutes,
crushing of copra and oilseeds

T. Middleton and Co. Ltd. 1856

1919

coloured cotton cloth

Poulton and Noel Ltd.

1869

1919

preserves, meats, vegetables,
fish, cereals

Cia Pesquerias de San
Cristobel S.A.

1926

1926

dried fish

Ribbleton Mills Ltd.

1864

1920

grey cloth

Rice and Co. Ltd.

1889

'1920

coloured woven cotton cloth

A. J. Seward and Co. Ltd. 1919

1919

pomades, perfumes, soap and
toilet requirements

Thomas \>lelch and Co. Ltd. 1857

1920

calico printing

Wenn Lim:i ted

1919

boxes and cases

c
85Ibid.

n. d.
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Table 16.
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Interlocking Directorships
in the West Africa TradeE6
Companies Directed

Year

Name of Director

1905

Sir Alfred Lewis Jones

Elder Dempster Shipping Limited
Bank of British vlest Africa

1905

Owen Harrison Williams

Elder Dempster Shipping Limited
Bank of British West Africa

1915

Clifford Blackburn Edgar

Bank of British West Africa
Niger Company

1915

Mazzini Stuart

African Association Limited
Bank of British West Africa

1915

Lord Wargrave

African Steam Ship Company
British and African Steam Navigation
Bank of British West Africa

1925

James Henly Batty

African and Eastern Trade Corporation Limited
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation

1925

0. V. G. Hoare

African and Eastern Trade Company Limited
Colonial Bank

1925

Lord Kylsant

Elder, Dempster and Company Limited
Bank of British West Africa

1925

Mazzini Stuart

African and Eastern Trade Company Limited
Bank of British West Africa

86 This list is compiled from a total of 380 directors of thirteen major
companies in Ghana, for the years 1885, 1895, 1905, 1915, 1925. The list is
confined to interlocking directorships among these major firms, especially
among trading, shipping, and banking firms. By 1935 the boards had been separated and there were no longer any interlocks among the major trading, shipping,
and banking firms of Ghana, although interlocks among major firms and their
subsidiaries, as well as to outside firms, remained. Appendix B is a select
list of directorships showing connections worldwide to a wider variety of other
firms and institutions. Directory ofJJireators (1885, 1895, 1905, 1915, 1925).
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African retailer.

As one European

ar~1ed

Increasing the duty to be paid for a Retail Licence to Five pounds
•• would probably drive half of the small retailers out of the town.
From his own personal knowledge as Agent to Hessrs. Swanzy and Co. , and
having numerous transactions with small traders he was satisfied, owing
to the smallness of the profits made during the year by petty retail
traders that they were not in a position to pay this increased duty, and
the proposed Bill would . • • cause great dissatisfaction amongst them,
as they have to close their stores in town, and seek a new means of
earning a livelihood.87
There were also purely commercial means of forcing out the independent
African from trade if legislative means failed.
·The traders here would buy and sell from the European companies, some
even imported en their own. But you could not get very big. There were
no restrictions, but these monopoly companies could break you if you did
well. Especially if you brought in a new line, which would compete with
something they were selling. They had so many reserves, they could reduce their prices and show losses, until they forced you out of business.
We could not do that because we did not have the reserves. 88
Another method to undercut Africru1 competition was to offer the independent
African a position as an agent for a European finn, with a guarantee of more
custom than he could obtain on his own.
Around 1900, the early part of the century, there were so many merchants, especially in Cape Coast • • . • But then UAC and the other big
firms would give them positions as agen+,s if they were competing. If
they were selling something cheaper than the European firms, the firms
would offer to give them jobs as their agents. And then the European
firm would tell its customers that they had to go to this particular ~gent
rather than direct • • • • The firm absorbed Africans because it was wellestablished in Europe. It would write Europe that it wanted to take on
a particular man as an agent. And then it would name the man as dist:dbutor and tell its customers they must apply through the distributor fo~
goods, instead of directly. UAC would have a catalogue, and they would
have to order through the commissioned agents. 89

87 Speech by Mr. Waters in GCLegCo, 28 September 1897.
was passed on 19 December 1887.

c

The licence Bill

88 Interview with a retired African employee of UAC, also formerly an
independent businessman, Accra, June 1974.
89 Interview with a retired African employee of Union Trading Company,
Cape Coast, June 1974.
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Africans could also be tied to European firms through the passbook
system.

Under this system, African traders obtained "passbooks" which entitled

them to make wholesale purchases on a credit basis from certain European
stores.

The amount of' credit which each African could obtain depended upon his

record with the particular expatriate firm, but also upon the particular
European official with whom he or she dealt.

Thus often, the figure was arbi-

trary, and could be changed overnight if' an official were replaced.

The

African trader was also tied to the creditor firm for his source of supplies,
since the granting of credit was contingent upon his spending his money in the
store that granted it.
banking system in Ghana,
to Af'ricans.

The system continued even after the establishment of' a
as the European-cominated banks did not give credit

The passbook system contained some abuses of its own.

"These

included • • • illicit behind the counter sales, cash sales by chits of essential goods, also

m~~ing

the sale of' scarce goods conditional upon the purchase

of stagnant lines. n90
The commercial system in Ghana quickly became one in which Af'ricans were
tied, as agents or distributors, to individual European firms.

They might be

"independent" in the sense that they did not work on salary, but they were no
longer independent importers and exporters as many had been in the precolonial
period.

Nevertheless,~even

were limited.

the opportunities to be such agents or distributors

The table below demonstrates that in 1928 eleven of' the

l~rgest

European companies had at most 6,513 Afric!ill wholesale customers among them, in
six West African territories.
Often, independent Africans, having been pushed out of business, became
"storekeepers" for Europeans, working on a commission basis or simply on

90 Nii Kwabena Benne III,

(Middlesex:

Milestones in the Histor;J of the Gold Coast
Wodderspoon and Company, 1953), p. 65.
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Table

17. Number of Stores and Customers at 31 October 1928
(Gold Coast, Togoland~ Dahomey, Ivory Coast,
Liberia and Fernando Po).91
Stores
Wholesale

African and Eastern
Trade Corp.
F. & A. Swanzy Ltd.
Millers Ltd.

Retail

Native
Traders

European & Sundry Cocoa
Native Accounts Clients

20
27
27

269
389
354

603
6oo
722

334
774
747

3
6

23
101

89
278

169
665

7

14
4

2
2
9
1

62
45
43
13

33
74
195
100

27
30
271
60

71

104

1,317

2,694

3,748

71

Ashanti & Obua.si
Trading Co. Ltd.
Tarquah Trading Co. Ltd.

G. C. Machinery

Customers

& Trading

Co. Ltd.
Kingsway Chemists
Crombie Steedn\an & Co.
Ltd.
McLarens Ltd.
W. D. Woodin Ltd.
Ambas Bay Ltd.
TOTALS

c
91 uAc Rankin file.

671
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salary.

The job of storekeeper was not easy, ru1d required a fair degree of

education and a practical turn of mind on the part of the man occupying the
position..

One African agent in 1902 had the following job:

"This gentleman

was entirely in charge of the store, attended to the shipping of any palm oil
or palm kernels and took delivery of any goods arriving by Cargo boats from
England or the continent and kept proper books and accounts. " 92

The store-

keeper was responsible for hundreds of different articles of trade •
• [the] small stores in surrounding villages [were] all kept by
mission educated natives, sales sheets had to be made out every day,
cash paid in every week, stocks were taken at the end of every month
and although there were hundreds of lines each article had to be
accounted for .• ,93
Although he was held responsible for any losses his store might incur, the
storekeeper was given very little responsibility in buying and selling, and
even less in financial matters.

He could not, for instance, write cheques. 94

To ensure his financial responsibility, he often had to post bonds of from £200
to £500, or to mortgage his house to the expatriate company, before he could be
employed.

In addition, the company would withhold his first several hundred

pounds commission (if he worked on commission basis), paying perhaps five per
cent interest, as a guarantee against his absconding. 95
Very strict regulations of employment (applying to European as well as
African storekeepers) were enforced to

ensure that employees could not go into

trade on their own or change companies, taking "trade secrets" with them (and,

92Martin, "Reminiscences

. . . ,"

op. oit., p. 2.

93Ib.
::1
1-u. , p. 11.

94 Interview with a retired African employee of Union Trading Company.

c

95Examples of such agreements can be found in UAC files entitled
"Pickering a.TJ.d Berthoud Native Storekeepers Agreements~ ll and "John Walkden and
Company."
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in the case of Europeans who were allowed to grant credit, often taking African
customers with them as well).

Storekeepers had to sign contracts stating that

they would not give away trade secrets or divulge the names of a company's manufacturers or agents.9 6

These regulations were perceived by Africans as being

in restraint of trade, but there was little they could do about them.
In 1915, for example, Millers Limited sued a former European employee,
one Crombie Steed.Ir..an, who had set up in business on his own and, Millers alleged, stolen some "native customers" in so doing.
It is ll.r. Steedman who has to give his consent to this or that and
who helps them [Africans] in one direction or another. The Company's
name does not come forward but the personal influence of the man who
represents the Company really controls and adds to the Company's
interests so that if Mr. Steedman leaves us and ~oes elsewhere the
natives wculd still naturally look to him • • • . 7
Millers won their case against Steedman, and the firm of Crombie Steedman was
integrated into the African and Eastern Trade Corporation complex.

The EastePn

Star and Akuapem Chroniole, an African newspaper, editorialized about the
Steedman case:
It seems
• most extraordinary to us that any injunction can be
obtained seeing that the Colonial Building Company Limited, of which Mr.
Steedman is the Managing Director has been competing with Millers Limited,
since they commenced business in Timber and other materials. In fact
Colonial Building Co. Ltd. must have the largest business in the sale of
all building materials. It would be a sorry day for the Colony if all
'Combine Firms' and firms of that class, were allowed to dominate the
trade, and to continually gain the enormous profits they must have made
this year.
It is absolutely against the interests of the nation and the Government should see to it that a check is put upon monopolies that prey on
the industry of the people,98

c

9 7uAC:
98

file entitled "Millers Limited 1915."

Ibid., article entitled 11Monopolies,." dated 19 May 1915.
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With such conditions laid upon their employment, many Africans working
for expatriate firms found that their individual enterprise was stifled, not
rewarded.

Africans moreover were not promoted within the expatriate firms;

although they were competent, the idea of using Africans for senior positions
was unattractive to European businessmen.

When, for example, all the white

employees of Alexander Miller died in Ghana in the 1880s, the company was
forced into the position of "devolving the care of the firm 1 s interests on the
African staff, a condition of affairs which had never existed before and -Nhich
Mr. Alexander Miller contemplated with much disquietude. • • •!l

Rather than

trust Africans with the business, the office was temporarily closed. 99

By

1938, however, the United Africa Company claimed that it was willing and eager
to promote Africans in its establishment.
Let it not be thought • • • that the Company regards the African
simply as a hewer of wood and drawer of water. The whole of the clerical
service is open to the educated African. • • . No purely clerical wor'~
is performed by Europeans, but all by Africans • . • . There are Africans
holding executive posi tlons as important as that of District Manager • 1 00
In reality, in 1939 the entire United Africa Company (not solely the company in
Ghana) had only thirty-nine African managers.101
Africans who held the sam.e jobs as Europeans were consistently treated
less well and paid less.

While records of Africans in employment are difficult

to obtain, a report written by an African agent by the name of Coker, on the
occasion of his retirement from the firm of John Holt in Nigeria, can be taken
as indicative of the general European policy towards African employees.

99 Rank"ln,

c

op.

't ., p.

o~

66 •

100Ib'd
4
~.,p.l5.
101 united Africa Company, Your Company (London:

UAC, 1959), p. 60.
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One of the irritating things in !Ugel:'ia and which helps to hinder the
progress of trade at a statj_on occupied by a blackman is the tendency on
the part of some of the authorities to give more credence to what a
European of another firm tells them to that of a black man working for
them. Take a station at which white and black are in charge of the
factories and there be an agreed rule between the firms as to prices and
dashes, in nine cases out of ten, the European will break the rules in
order to get more than hi.s share of the produce, if your blackman were to
report or do the same in order to get for you your full share of the
trade no credence will be given to his report and he will be told stop.
As a wire was once sent to a certain black man 'Stop buying produce with
soap dashes else I remove you from charge'. In very truth the white man
who reported him was giving out ten times more soap and tobacco dashes.
[I]f one visits the stations he will see the difference; stations
occupied by whites will be well-stocked, all facilities given for the
success of the trade, and everything will be done for the European's
personal comforts; on the other hand at Stations where blacks are in
charge, you will see a poorly stocked shop, facilities not one tenth of
that given to the European; personal comforts, • • • Sometimes not even
a bed, a chair, or a table • • • . 102
Within the context of the import-export trade, there were of course also
some roles for African middlemen to play as brokers, that is as persons buying
cocoa on behalf of the exporting firms. 10 3 According to a census taken in
Ghana in 1931, there were at that time 1,500 cocoa brokers and 37,000 "suobrokers" in the country. 104

The 1,500 brokers were obviously the more powerful

of these two groups; they were the ones who had direct dealings with the
European firms and who were able to receive credit from the firms in the form
of cash advances, and use it to their own profit.

The sub-brokers, on the

other hand, were agents for the brokers who might simply be working on a few
pounds advance, with little power of their

102 Report by Coker to John
Davies, Trading Experiences . •
allowing me to use the ori gine.l
given to customers to encourage

c

ovm

to wield.

Halt and Co., 28 March 1921. Included in
• , op. ait. I am grateful to Dr. Davies for
manuscript. ("Dashes 11 were gifts, or bonuses,
their patronage.)

103 The role of cocoa brokers will be discussed in Chapter VII below.
104 United Africa Company, 11What Cocoa Means to the Economy of the Gold
Coast, 11 Statistical and Economic Review, no. 2 (September 1948), p. 11.
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In the face of European oligopoly, Africans were ingenious, untiring,
and inventive in their attempts to become traders in their own right.

Many

Africans moved into more than one line of business, engaging, for example, in
cocoa-farming, brokerage, timber exporting, and shipping.

A typical career

pattern, though more successful than most, was that of Nii Kwabena Bonne III,
a Ga chief from Accra.

During his youth, before being installed as chief, Nii

Bonne worked as a clerk, a contractor, a builder, and a merchant.

He became

actively engaged in the import-export trade and in that capacity travelled all
over the world, at one point making a journey overland from Europe to Japan in
order to reclaim a debt from some Japanese customers.

Nii Bonne formed various

companies, none of which lasted for any significant amount of time, and all of
which were plagued by various forms of swindling by both his British and his
African colleagues.

He also, at one point, tried to ship gold, but was ar-

rested and fir..ed for trying to export diamoads illegally as we11. 1 05
Nii Benne's activities as a contractor included building drains, houses,
and "factories" for Europeans, as 1-rell as building the Dodowa market on contract to the Government.

These activities indicate that Africans were not

content simply to try the traditional means of enterprise in Ghana, the importexport trade, but that they were also interested in developing some industry
within their own country.

As is well known, Ghanaian farmers often built their

own roads and bridges in order to facilitate the export of their cocoa.

But

they also used their construction skills to build railroads for the Government
and mines.

"In the case of each Railway much of the work was done by minor

contracts entered into with the natives.

Contracts of this sort ranged in

value from £1 to £30 and even more. nl 06

c

105Nii Benne's fascinating career is recounted in his autobiography,
s tones in the History of the Go Zd Coast, op. ei t.

l06McPhee, op. oit., p. 113.
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Various other attempts were made to enter manufacturing or processing,
but all met with discouragement either from Government or the expatriate firms.
Far from granting help to ind.igenous manufacture, the Government from as early
as 1887 imposed duties on all goods manufactured in the colony, 107 yet at the
same time it allowed goods which were necessary for European industrial development, especially mining plant, to be imported free of duty.

When an

African invented a palm oil processing machine in 1912, the Government refused
to give him time off from his official duties with the Agricultural Department
to perfect the machine. 1 08

Africans could not, of course, compete with

European-made products and so indigenous industry declined in the face of imports.

African processes of manufacture were too simple and expensive to

compete with European.

In 1891, for example, Prince Edward Aggrey of Cape

Coast tried to interest the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce in an indigenous
dying process.

The Chamber dismissed his attempt, saying;

Samples of red and black dyes, and specimens of the bark from which
they were prepared, were • • • received from Prince Edward ft~grey of
Cape Coast. It was reported that such dyes, etc., could be produced
here in greater ~uantities from superior materials and at less cost
than in Africa.l 9
Thus it was not because of lack of initiative on their part but rather
because their undeveloped economy could not compete with developed European
capitalism that Africans were obliged, if they were at all enterprising, to
enter trade as the only wa:y in which they could make large sums of money.

Many

of the most prominent of Ghanaians were active in trade as either their primary
or their secondary occupation.

But most of the companies which African entre-

preneurs set up failed; they could not compete with Europeans who had more

0

107 GCLegCo, 25 Ma:y 1887.
108see the section on diversification, Chapter

109 LivCC, 41st

Annual RepoPt, p. 91.

V! below.
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knowledge, financing, and resources.

In the battle for primacy in the economic

marketplace everything conspired against the African and for the European.
Africans could not join European firms, they could not ship on European lines,
tney could not get credit from European banks.

The entire thrust of the poli-

cies of the two major shipping lines, and the two major banks, which dominated
transportation and finance in Ghana from the late nineteenth century until
1939, was to service the oligopolistic, European-dominated, import-export trade
sector, not to encourage enterprise or trade by the indigenous inhabitants of
the colony.
3.

Oligopolization of the Shipping Industry:
The West Africa Conference

By the turn of the twentieth century, shipping over most of the high
seas was organized into a group of

11

Conferences," which set prices for shipping,

organized scheduled services, and arranged which lines should be allowed to
enter which ports.

The West Africa trade was no exception:

agreements on the

control of shipping to West Africa were being made as early as the 1870s, and
in 1895 an actual Conference was established.
With the advent of the steamship in 1852, the need for regulation of the
shipping industry had become evident.
did not depend on the wind.

Steamships were fast and regular; they

With their speed they were able to transport

previously untransportable perishable commodities.

But they also required

large investments, which most merchants could not afford.

A new industry, that

of shipping agencies, therefore developed and more and more merchants began to
abandon their fleets of sailing ships and rely on the regular steamship lines
to transport their produce.

The advent of shipping lines facilitated competi-

tion because merchant houses could now send small, regular packages to the west

0

coast of Africa, instead of sending large shiploads comprised completely of
their own goods, which, if they sank, would bankrupt the merchant in question.
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Small shippers who could not afford even to buy their own sailing boats were
also able to ship by the regular steam lines.
The roots of the West Africa Conference are found in the two earliest
steamship lines which traded to West Africa.

These were the African Steamship

Company, incorporated in 1852, and the British and African Steam Navigation
Company, incorporated in 1869.1 1 0

The two companies competed outright only for

about a year, after which they came to an agreement.
divided the West African trade between them.l 11

As of January 1870, they

Both firms were based in

Glasgow, but as most \-lest African shipping by the late nineteenth century was
conducted through the port of Liverpool, control of the firms' actual operations was held to a large extent in the hands of their Liverpool agents, Elder
and Dempster.
In 1878 a new competitor entered the shipping trade.

Alfred Lewis Jones

established a firm under his own name in Liverpool, to trade to West Africa. 112
He began by buying sailing ships, no threat to either of the two companies
mentioned above, but within a few months he began to charter steamships.

At

this, the African Steamship Company and the British and African took fright,
and Jones was asked to join the Elder and Dempster agency to preclude his becoming a successful independent competitor.
By the time of his death in 1909, Sir Alfred Lewis Jones (he had in the
meantime been knighted) was the single most important man in the British West
African trade,113 so much so that he could announce to the Colonial Office,
110 P. N. Davies, The Trade Makers: Etder Dempster in West Afriaa~ 18521972 (London: George All en and Unwin, 1973), pp. 41 and 51.
111 Ibid.,

c

p. 62.

11 2Ibid. ' p • 77 .
l13For details of his career, see the rather laudatory contemporary biography by A. H. Milne, Sir Alfred Lewis Jones K. C.M. G.: A Story of Energy and
Suaaess (Liverpool: Henry Young and Sons, 1914).
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when it was setting up a committee to investigate West African trade "I am West
Africa."l 14

He had gained control of the two independent shipping firms by the

simple mechanism of buying out their shares, and in 1894 he had taken over the
agency of Elder and Dempster.

Thus by 1894 control of shipping to West Africa

from England was entirely in the hands of the Elder Dempster shipping line.
Elder Dempster was to remain the single most important British shipping firm in
the Gold Coast until 1939, and the only British firm within the West Africa
Conference.

In 1896, with its establishment of the Bank of British West

Africa, 115 it became the most important expatriate firm in Ghana until the
formal creation of the United Africa Company in 1929.
Elder Dempster's most important rival in the West Africa trade, prior to

1895, was the Hamburg-based shipping line, Woermann.

The Woermann line was

established by the merchant trading firm of Carl Woermann and began trading to
Africa as early as 1849. 1 16

In 1885 the shipping side of the business was

separated from the trading side and the (German) African Steamship Line Incorporated (Woermann Line) was formed. 117

The company remained in the hands of

the Woermann family until after World War I, when the expenses of reconstructing the entire fleet, which had been either confiscated or destroyed by the
British, compelled the family to abandon control to a North German syndicate.Il8
Because of German state subsidies to shipping, Woermann, although it had far
fewer connections in the West African trade than did Elder Dempster, and
114Anecdote related to author by Mr. Richard Fry, London, November 1974.
See Richard Fry, Bankers in West Afriea: A History of the Bank of British West
Afriea (London: Hutchinson Publishing Group, 1976).
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115see section 4 below.
ll 6The history of the Woermann Line is taken from the booklet "Deutsche
Afrika-Linien: A Short History of the German Africa Lines" (Hamburg: Deutsche
Afrika Linien, 1971).
117Ibid.

, p. 9 •

118Ibid.' p.

23.
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although there were fewer established German colonies, managed to build up a
large fleet in a relatively short time.
It should be noted that Woermann lines had complete access to British
colonial ports; the British Government never limited access to its colonies to
its own nationals but instead relied on informal controls and cartelization to
guarantee British priority in shipping.

Agreements between British and German

shipping lines were first negotiated in 1888, " . . . to stop a mutually disastrous competition .

11119

The trade at this time was characterized, as it

was to be throughout the colonial period, by an oversupply of tonnage.

Both

Germany and Britain predicated their tonnage needs on wartime, not peacetime,
requirements; they encouraged their shipping industries accordingly, with the
result that except during wartime, too many ships were on the high seas. 12 0
Because of overcompetition, worldwide freight rates had declined by about forty
per cent between 1889 and 1895. 121
In 1895, therefore, Elder Dempster and Woermann Line joined

in

a shipping conference designed to ensure them adequate patronage and, with this
1

patronage, adequate· return on their investments.

Follow·ing the pattern of

similar shipping conferences established elsewhere, they used the "rebate system" as their main weapon in the control of trade.

This was a system whereby

traders who shipped only on Conference lines were guaranteed a ten per cent
rebate on their shipping charges at the end of every six.months'

The

traders had to guarantee to ship only on Conference lines and no other; that
is, not to ship either on their own boats or on "tramp" steamers.

119 Ib'd

't • '

c

They also

p. 10 .

120 Daniel Marx Junior, International S11ipping Cartels (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 38.
1 21 Davies,

The Trade Makers . .• , op. cit., p. 91.
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had to wait a total of two shipping periods, or twelve months, for each rebate.
In return for their loyalty to the Conference system, traders were guaranteed
regularity of service, which the tramp steamers could not provide.

A Confer-

ence steamer, whether it had its full load or not, would sail according to its
scheduled dates.

The traders were also guaranteed security of rates; charges

no longer fluctuated wildly as they had done under the system of free competition; calculations of costs could therefore be made on a long-term basis.
According to the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, which investigated
the West Africa Conference in 1909, along with all the other shipping conferences in which British shippers were engaged, the exact provisions of the West
Africa Conference were as follows.
West African Conference:
Area: The trade between the United Kingdom and the Continent and the
West Coast of Africa as far south as and including Tiger Bay.

Personnel:
African Steamship Company (Elder Dempster and Company)
British and African Steam Navigation Company (Elder, Dempster and
Company)
3. Woermann Line, of Hamburg.
4. Hamburg-America Company, of Hamburg.122
1.
2.

Lines one and two are exclusively entitled to the trade from the United
Kingdom to West Africa and have equal rights with three as regards sailings
from German and other Continental ports.
Conditions:
Amount of rebate: ten per cent.
Periods~
Six months for account, and six months for deferment.
Rebate on all shipments outwards, but only on palm oil and palm kernels
homewards: but loyalty is required on other goods.

122 In 1904 Woermann signed an
granting Woermann seventy-five per
of trade to West Africa. Woermann
the two German firms shipped under
Linien, op. cit., p. 18.

agreement with the Hamburg-America lina
cent and the other line twenty-five per cent
however retained control of management, and
the name of Woermann. Deutsche Africa-
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Rebate to be claimed within 12 months of shipment, and to be claimed by,
and is only payable to the principal, i.e. merchant who is the owner of the
goods. Crown Agents are treated as pri~cipals in respect of Government
goods.
Disloyalty on outward shipments involves forfeiture of rebates on homeware shipments and vice versa.l 23
This succinct summary of the provisions of the West Africa Conference revealed
a number of provisions which seemed to have no reasonable basis; for example,
that British ships could sail from Continental ports but not vice versa, and
that "loyalty" was required on all goods shipped, i.e., that goods for which
rebates could not be obtained must nevertheless be shipped only on Conference
lines, even though rebates would be paid only on outward-bound goods (from
Europe) and on returning loads of palm kernels and palm oil.
Indeed the shipping industry of Ghana was a monopoly within the monopoly
of trade by the Europeans; it was a monopoly which affected smaller European
traders far more than it affected Africans who, by 1895, were more or less out
of the running as far as international trade was concerned.

In fact it was

argued by many, including the Royal Coroo1ission, that better opportunities were
provided for Africans under the Conference system than formerly, as they could
be assured of regular shipping times and eq-..1al treatment for all traders, large
or small.

But a more cogent argument as regards the Conference's effect on

Africans is simply that, because of its monopoly control, the Conference could,
and did, charge as high freight rates as the traffic would bear.

"Increased

freight rates on imports have an effect similar to the imposition of a tariff.
11124

Since ultimately, all extra costs in international trade were passed

on to the consumers of imported goods or the producers of exported goods,
Ghanaians were paying more for their store-bought belongings and receiving less

1 2 3RCSR:
12 4Marx,

Col. 4669, Part 1, p. 1.

op. cit., p. 29.
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for their produce in return, under the Conference system.
Moreover, the shipping pricing policy tended to reinforce the international division of labour.
The policy often followed by liners, of charging what the traffic will
bear, usually has the effect of requiring finished goods to pay higher
rates than semi-finished articles • . • [L]ow ocean freights have benefitted European industry by permitting raw materials to be imported at
delivered prices only slightly higher than those which have prevailed
at their sources.125
The two shipping lines in the West Africa Conference had a joint policy of
charging higher freight for processed than for nonprocessed goods, encouraging
merchants to ship as much produce as possible in an unfinished state.

(Unfor-

tunately, howeyer, this policy did not work in reverse and merchants did not
ship unfinished manufactured goods to Ghana to be finished there.)

Prices were

not fixed according to real costs but according to how much the shipping campanies thought they could extort from the shippers.
The question arises as to why the large European firms such as the
African Association were willing to accept such a blatant transport monopoly.
In reply, it should be noted that the Conference was introduced more or less
as a fait accompli, with only one month's notice to the traders. 126

They had

no choice to agree as, if they had not, they would not have had shipping space
for the cargoes they were planning to send out in the months ahead.

Once they

had agreed, they had no choice but to remain within the system, as they soon
had thousands of pounds tied up in rebates, held without payment of interest by
the shipping companies.

John Halt, in his testimony to the Royal Commission,

estimated that at any one time Elder Dempster probably held £6,000 in rebates
for Halt alone, and a total for all companies of about £50,000.1 2 7 The
125Ib'd
1, •

'

12 6Davies,

127RCSR:

p. 28 •

The Trade Makers • •• , op. cit., p. 110.
Cd. 4670, Q. 53'T8.
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0

companies were willing to lose interest on these rebates if in turn they could
be guaranteed regular shipping dates.
system at all:

" . • • we have no love for the rebate

we do not care about it, and we do not like it, but if it is

the only means of getting regular sailings, then as long as it is not abused,
we consider that regular sailings are of even more importance . . • than low
rates of freight." 128
The abuses of the Conference system were investigated by the Royal Cammission on Shipping Rings in 1909, and its successor commission, the Final
Report of the Imperial Shipping Committee on the Deferred Rebate System, in
1923. 129

Although there were no reported cases of rebates actually having been

forfeited owing to nonadherence to Conference regulations, the system was open
to attack on several counts ,13 0

The first of these was that while "loyalty"

was required on all goods shipped, that is, no goods could be shipped by other
than-Conference steamers, homeward rebates were paid only on palm oil and palm
kernels, the two products which comprised the bulk of homeward shipping at the
time that the Conference was established. 1 31

But by 1909, when the investiga-

tory commission was set up, goods such as cocoa comprised a far higher
percentage of the homeward cargo.

These goods were still being shipped at

rates imposed when they were only a small percentage of the cargo; fifty
shillings a ton, for example, was being charged for cocoa. 1 3 2

The articles for

which rebates were not enjoyed were all shipped at rates higher than the rates

128 Ibid.,

testimony of J. A. Hutton, Q.13513.

129Cmd.l802 (1923).

0

130 RCSR:

Cd. 4670, testimony of Sir Ralph Moor, Q.7009.

l3 1RCSR:

Cd. 4668, p. 16.

132 Leubuscher,

op. ait., p. 22.
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for palm oil and kernels.133

To many merchants, in any case, all that the re-

bates meant was that they paid ten per cent "primage" to the shipping companies
at the beginning of a trip, which was returned to them six to twelve months
later without interest:

not, certainly, that they received an actual refund.

The primage was being paid for goods such as cocoa without the refund.
Many firms opposed to the Conference wanted to have a "free period"
during which they would be able to charter ships or ship on non-Conference
lines without forfeiting their rebate.

In other words, after each six months'

accounting period, they wanted' a breathing space in which they could, if they
wished, re-evaluate their methods of shipping. 1 34

But such a breathing space

would allow the large firms to break out of the system while the small firms,
which could not charter entire ships, were still tied into it, something which
would give the larger firms an advantage.

And it was almost unanimously agreed

that the one advantage of the rebate system was that small firms were given an
equal opportunity; large shippers and small all paid the same rates .
. • . the rebate system is of great advantage to the small shipper. It
gives him security of equal treatment and regularity . . . . [I]f merchants
were not bound, and were at liberty to charter steamers, such chartering
could only be done by the wealthy merchants in a large way of business.
This would cause the shipowners to run their steamers irregularly, at such
periods as would give them full cargoes. The smaller traders would be
wholly dependent on the shipowners.l35
But in fact the small traders were not granted the same rights as the
large; many secret deals were made by Elder Dempster with its largest customers
simply in order to prevent them from branching out and acquiring their own
ships.

Preferential contracts were given to firms who were willing to

133 RCSR:

0

Cd. 4670, testimony of George Miller, Q.4797.

134Jbid., testimony of G. B. Zochonis, Q.l339l.
135 Ibid.' Q.l3289.
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guarantee that they would ship by Conference lines for the next five years.
Such guarantees, of course, could also be made by small shippers, but were less
likely to be regarded as of any significance.

Moreover, the 1909 Commission

found that the liners did" . • . make contracts for the carriage of
quantities at net rates considerably lower than those which would be charged to
the general merchant shipping similar goods in small qua.ntities." 1 36

The John

Holt Company, for example, had decided early in the Conference system to buy
and outfit its own ships.

In order to prevent it from becoming a general ship-

per, Elder Dempster agreed that Holt could fill its own ships with its own
produce and still send the bulk of its cargo on the Conference lines at preferential rates. 1 37 From 1925 to 1929, the African and Eastern Trade Corporation
bought and began shipping by its own steamers; not only did Elder Dempster
tolerate this practice but an agreement was reached that whatever leftover
cargo was carried by the Conference for African and Eastern would be given
"most favoured" terms.138
Not only were small traders, both European and African, in practice discriminated against in favour of the large, but the existence of such favourable
contracts served to discourage the existence of tramp or charter steamers which
might otherwise have been able to undercut the prices charged by the Conference.

Presumably, some of the larger companies would have been willing to

forgo six months 1 rebate if they could charter tramp steamers to carry their
bulk cargo, especially considering that prices for carriage of goods such as
cocoa were for so long inflated.

136RCSR:

Daniel Marx argues that in fact this would

Cd.4668, p. 26.

l37Davies, The Trade Makers • . • , op. ait., p. 173. ,

l38Ibid.' pp. 225-228.
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not be the case because liner and charter, or tramp, rates fluctuated in the
same direction during most of the colonial period; from 1873 to 1908 there was
a downward trend in both kinds of shipping, followed by an upward trend until

1918 and then another downswing till 1937.139

Leubuscher argues moreover that

in any case the West African trade was unattractive to tramps, as they had to
call at a large number of very poor harbours to get a full load, and they were
dependent on surf boats, owned and operated by the Conference lines, to load
and unload their cargoes. 14 0

Nevertheless the merchants did feel a need for

tramps' services, especially during the heavy cocoa export season when the
liners could not fulfil the demand for immediate bulk transport. 141

But by the

end of World War I, many tramps had been absorbed or bought out by regular
lines as they were no longer profitable.

There was no longer an available pool

of shipping which could challenge the monopoly structure.
The fact that all lighterage (that is, the surf boats which carried
cargo between the large ocean-going ships and the Ghana shore) was controlled
by the Conference system further discouraged competition.

It was Elder

Dempster's policy at the time of the Royal Commission's investigations to
charge an extra five shillings per ton for lighterage services to its customers, whether or not they actually used the Elder Dempster service.l42

Under

such circumstances there was no point in any of the firms' maintaining their
own lighterage fleets, and indeed they rapidly sold what fleets they possessed
to the monopoly shipping companies.

139ap •

•t ~

(J£,

'

Only the firm of Swanzy maintained its own

p • 2 42 .

140 op. cit., p. 18.
14 1RCSR:

Cd. 4670, testimony of Sir Ralph Moor, Q.7005.

1 4 2Ibid.,

testimony of James Batty, Q.6934.
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lighterage company, performing from 1908 on all lighterage work for the
Woermann line.l43

All other lighterage was done by the Elder Dempster-owned

West African Lighterage and Transport Company Limited, and its subsidiaries. 144
Through its control of lighterage, the Conference controlled which ports
could be used in West Africa.
use in Europe.

Similarly, the Conference controlled ports in

The provisions of the Conference were that Elder Dempster could

call at British and European ports, but that Woermann could call only at
European ports and not at British ports.

Hence anyone shipping into or from

Britain had to ship by Elder Dempster, which implied shipping via Liverpool.
Many traders,

those based in Manchester, complained that they could

not use any other harbour in Britain without forfeiting their rebate.
tramp were

If a

from Ghana to Bristol, and the destination of a firm's goods

was Bristol, it could not nevertheless use that tramp.

It would have to ship

to Liverpool by a Conference ship and then trans-ship to Bristol.

Cargo, simi-

larly, which was ultimately destined for France had to be trans-shipped, since
Elder Dempster landed only in England and Germany.

Trans-shipment costs were

very high. 145
While British firms paid for trans-shipment costs, however, they had to
endure the

of American firms shipping to Ghana from America, on

Conference lines, for the same price as British firms shipped from Britain.
The object of such rate is to prevent either the establishment of a
direct line under the American flag or the chartering of steamers for
service between the ports concerned. The result is that American

143 Report on Swanzy's Lighterage Company to the Chairman, African and
Eastern Trade Corporation, 19 December 1928. UAC Rankin file.

0

1 44 Including the Saltpond Boating Company, Winneba Boating Company,
African Cold
Company, Calabar Lighterage and Transport
Cameroon
erage Department, Accra Boating Company, Cape Coast
Company Limited, Sekondi Lighterage and Hotel Company Limited, Davies, The Trade
Makers ••• , op. ait., p. 116.
l45RCSR:

Cd.4668, p. 28.
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Manufactures are thus placed on the same footing as British Manufactures
in the markets of British West Africa. •
146
While some argued that by granting preferential rates to Americans, African
consumers benefitted by having cheaper American goods available, it was evident
that the real reason for this concession was to prevent any American line from
competing with the Conference.

This tactic was only partially successful, how-

ever, as the American Bull Line did enter the West Africa trade after the Great
War.

But the Conference lines were successful in forcing the Bull Line to give

up its New York to Manchester run.1 4 7

In the 1930s, the Barber Line began to

cross the Atlantic to West Africa; with the support of UAC behind the Barber
Line, the Conference was not able to force it off the seas.148
One of the reasons that the Government was not as hard on the Conference
system as its opponents might have liked it to be, was that it was itself
benefitting from the system.

The Crown Agents often complained because the

system was so designed that the "Government" of all four West African colonies
was regarded as one customer for rebate purposes; thus, if one colony was
loyal" in its shipments, all colonies would suffer a loss of rebate.

11

dis-

On the

other hand, however, the Crown Agents were charged lower rates than other
customers. 14 9

In return, the Government made it its policy to conduct all its

shipping by British lines, which, of course, meant Elder Dempster.l50
Moreover, until the publicity of the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings

1 4 6Testimony of Mr. Batty to RCSR, recorded as his view in LonCC, 13
February 1907.
147Davies,

148 UAC:

The Trade Makers . •• , op. cit., p. 223,

document 559.

14 9Leubuscher, op. cit., p. 18.
150 statement by the Government to this effect is found in GCLegCo, 16
October 1905.
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forced the discontinuance of the practice, the Government countenanced a system
whereby all cement imported into the West African colonies was monopolized by
Elder Dempster, ostensibly to prevent competition from "foreign" cement.
. . . there is only one cement that is allowed to be taken by the local
government, and that must come from the Burham Cement Company. .
We
[John Holt] used ourselves to buy from that company, and we
several cargoes out before this rebate system was on, until one fine day
we found out that we could get it no longer from them. We made inquiry
why, and they said 'Because we have given Elder, Dempster and Company the
monopoly of this brand'. So we are in this position, that we could not
offer any other brand, because the Burham Company's brand is the only one
allowed by the Crown Agents, and Elder, Dempster and Company had the
monopoly of that one brand; therefore we were out of it.l51
A similar monopoly on the carriage of coal was held by Elder Dempster from 1895
to 1905; 152 even after this monopoly ceased to exist Elder Dempster could, and
did, outsell all of the merchant firms in coal because it owned collieries in
the Canary Islands and transported coal from there, charging itself only cost.
The firms constantly complained about this practice of "trading on

1

s

account," that is, of shipping companies' acting as traders as well as transporters.
The various abuses or inconveniences suffered by European traders under
the Conference system were of course felt much more keenly by African traders.
None of the independent Ghanaian firms was big enough to qualify for the special
treatment afforded to

European firms; certainly none was big enough to

disregard regulations and charter its own ships.

The extra expenses of trans-

shipment from Conference ports and overpriced shipping charges bore hard on the
African.

In addition, as the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings discovered,

the African often did not even receive his legitimate rebate.

Generally speak-

ing, British agents acting for Africans retained their rebates, although

l5 1RCSR:
152 Davies,

Col.

4670, testimony of John Holt, Qs.5041,5043.

The Trade Makers . .• , op. cit., p. 150.
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officially, rebates were only supposed to be paid to principals.
Q. Do you know the course of practice in connection with your business,
whether those agents who act for these African merchants retain the rebate,
or credit their principals in West Africa with the rebates? A. Take a
commission agent here in connection with natives out there, he would find
great difficulty probably, in letting them have back, after six months or
nine months . • . the rebate that he has received from the steamship
companies, because, taking West Africa, native traders there, usually
speaking, are only small natives that do a limited business.
Q. You are speaking of an agent who acts for several natives? A. Yes.
Q. Does he get directions from the natives themselves? A. A native
writes to a firm that he has heard of in England, say, and he sends to that
firm an order . . . and he usually sends with that order a remittance.
Then the commission
here buys those goods and
them to West
Africa.
Q. So that the native does not give his directions through an English
firm settled in Africa, but he communicates direct with the English firm
in England? A. Yes, that is one transaction, and then you will have
another transaction, where he communicates with a firm here, but, speaking
generally, the usual
is for the native to communicate with the
European commission
Q. Then you say that the agent here might have considerable difficulty,
often say nine or ten months, in returning the rebate to the native? A.
I should think so.
Q. In fact, do you not think he does [return it]? A. I should not
say so in practice.
Q. What is the difficulty? A. You see, these natives out there start
trading with a small amount of money, it might be only £10, it might be
£15, or more. He may order certain goods, and he finds after six months
or longer . . . that his form of trading does not pay him. Then he ceases
to exist and it would be extremely difficult to identify that native
afterwards.
Q. So that the agent here generally gets his commission and the benefit
of the rebate? A. I should say so.l53
Aside from the abolition of the cementmonopcily, none of the Conference

practices complained of to the 1909 Royal Commission was rectified.

The Con-

ference carried on in its monopoly until the outbreak of the First World War,
when of course the assumption of hostilities between Britain and Germany preeluded any further collusion between the two shipping lines.

Elder Dempster

was thus in the enviable position, during the whole of the war, of being the
only liner agency travelling to West Africa, and therefore of also being able

0
153RCSR:
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to charge what rates it pleased.

The records of the London, Liverpool, and

Manchester Chambers of Commerce during the Great war are full of letters of
complaint to the Colonial Office about Elder Dempster's exorbitant rates.

Some

companies went so far as to charter sailing boats to escape Elder Dempster's
monopoly.
For a few years after the end of World War I, Elder Dempster continued
to have the field clear for itself.

But German shipping was rebuilt quickly,

and at the same time, Dutch shipping had been strengthened during the war (as
Holland had been a neutral country) and now had to be taken into consideration.
Following upon a rate war in the earlier 1920s, a new Conference was established
in 1924.

The terms of the 1924 Agreement were never published, but they con-

tained essentially the same features as the prewar Conference.

The two

Continental lines were still forbidden to use British ports, although they were
now permitted to embark and disembark passengers at Southampton.

The deferred

rebate system was changed and confined only to outward voyages from Europe, but
in effect this made little difference as non-Conference
ting outward cargo and in any case
contractual
too. 11 15 4

11

•

•

•

e~:teh

had trouble get-

shipper had to enter into a

to use only conference ships for homeward-bound cargo

Thus "loyalty" was still demanded, even where no rebates were award-

ed.
Nevertheless the Conference monopoly on shipping was never as complete
after as before World War I.

There had always been hostility to the Conference

and various efforts had been made to circumvent it, hence for example the special arrangement mentioned above with John Holt.

The smaller shippers had also

organized into various associations to try to have some bargaining power with

15 4 Leubuscher,

op. eit., p. 40.
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the Conference lines.

The Manchester Association of Importers and Exporters,

for example, was formed in 1908 to counteract the influence of Liverpool in
shipping and to press for shipping services through the Manchester Ship
Canal. 15 5

The 1923 Commission on Shipping Rings regarded the establishment of

such organizations as the only effective means of negotiating with and controlling the Conference.

On its recommendation the Association of West African

merchants (AWAM) set up, in March 1930, the West African Merchants Freight
Association, which made yearly agreements on behalf of its members with the
Conference.

11

it may be inferred . . • that the principal concessions

which the Merchants Freight Association obtained, was an assurance that its
members would be charged freight rates no higher than those payable by other
.
s h l.ppers.
• • • 11]56

Such an assurance, then, was merely a guarantee that no

large shipper would be granted a privileged position.
In 1930, the United Africa Company set up its own shipping line, drastically affecting the competitive position of the Conference lines.

As early as

1909, on the death of Alfred Lewis Jones, the "Combine" firms, who were later
to form the UAC, had united to try to buy out Elder Dempster, without success.
The other half of the UAC empire, Lever Brothers, had started the Bromport
Shipping Line in April 1916 but in 1922 this line was taken over by the Conference.

"In return for an exclusive freight arrangement, the shipping companies

undertook to carry Lever's cargoes at a rate which was to be no higher than

155 Ibid., p. 43.

In the mid-1890s the General Steam Navigation Company
was formed in Manchester specifically to ship ~hrough the Ship Canal and outwards from Liverpool. As soon as it was formed, however, the Conference lines
moved in with an offer of ten per cent rebates and regular services. In contrast, the GSNC said that the most it could do would be to "try" to guarantee
one ship every three weeks. The Manchester merchants, despite their hostility
to Liverpool, had no choice but to accept the Conference offer. ManCC, 20
February 1895.
l56Leubuscher, op. cit., p. 51.
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paid by their rivals."l57
scandal and imminent
Kylsant,

~or

11

But in 1930 the Elder Dempster empire was rocked by

~inancial

ruin,

a~ter

juggling the books" in 1929.

company followed.

the conviction

o~

its Chairman, Lord

A major reorganization of the

At the same time, UAC, under the control of Lever Brothers,

was just beginning to consolidate its strength.

It demanded several privileges

from the Conference, including a special rate for its bulk-shipped palm oil,
priority over other traders for cargo space, and the handing over of all Elder
Dempster's West Coast agencies and lighterage ~acilities to itself. 1 58

At this

point the United Africa Company already owned five steamers and it would seem
probable that it deliberately made such exorbitant demands so that the Conference's refusal could provide it with an excuse to set up its own shipping
company.

The smaller traders opposed any takeover by the UAC of these facili-

ties as they would then be completely in the hands of their conglomerate rival.
As ~ar as is known, the demands made by the UAC Ltd., on the Shipping
Conference Lines in
to agencies, lighterage, and large exclusive
preferences, are still maintained, and it would be idle to deny that were
they acceded to, the position of other merchants in the West African trade
would be rendered difficult if not impossible. In fact, the position of
twelve of these other traders has necessitated their forming an association for the purpose of making general representations to the
conference on matters
the welfare of the trade, and I may say
that this association so framed represents somewhere around fifty per cent,
of the West African trade, and it is manifestly wrong, therefore, for the
United Africa Company, Ltd., to indicate in any way that it is acting ~or,
or supported by, the whole of the West African trade. 15 9
For a short period of time the rivalry between UAC and Elder Dempster forced
the latter company to reduce its rates to the trade as a whole, in order that
UAC could not enter the West Coast trade as a general carrier and take away its

157Davies, The Trade Makers • •• , op. ait., p. 221.
158 Ibid., p. 241.

159 statement of Mr. Whitfield, European unofficial representative for the

shipping interests, to GCLegCo, 17 February 1930, p. 174.
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custom.

0

B,y 1931, however, the rates were raised again when Elder Dempster and

UAC reached a compromise in which it was agreed that UAC could continue to use
the Conference ships for goods which it could not handle itself, and get rebates on this cargo, although it would not be given any preferential rates. 160
Thus the establishment of a rival line did little to benefit the small traders,
especially as most of UAC's space was taken up by its own empire.
Whereas as late as 1924-25 one hundred per cent of the North Europe to
West Africa shipping had been controlled by the Conference, by 1939, with the
entrance of the United Africa Company and John Holt's independent line, the
percentage had fallen to eighty.

The figures in Table 17a indieate the extent

of monopolization of transport between Ghana and Europe.

Not only did the

monopoly preclude independent shipping by small European or African entrepreneurs, but insofar as the monopolizing shipping firms granted preferential
privileges to the large expatriate trading companies, it precluded the development of an independent trading class, and especially of an African trading
class.

Transport was not, of course, the only aspect of Ghana's economy which

was thus organized; finance followed a very similar pattern.

4. Expatriate Banking
Banking in Ghana, during the period of colonial rule, was 'closely tied
in with other expatriate interests and functioned primarily as a resource for
the European, not the African, community.

Jntil 1896 no banks at all existed

in Ghana and all monetary transactions were carried out by individual firms
with their banks in London, entailing a great deal of inconvenience and expense.
Africans were dependent for banking services upon the good will of the Europeans
with whom they dealt.

c

Feeling the need for more sophisticated banking services,

160Leubuscher, op. ait., p. 52.
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Table 17a. · Shipping Trade between North Europe and West Africal61
Shipping Lines

Number of
1,000
Gross
Tons
Vessels

Tonnage as Per Cent
of Conference

Tonnage as Per Cent
of Grand Total

1913-14
124

460

100

95
29

344
116

75
25

93

428

100

70
9

342
38

80
9

14

48

11

61

309

lOO

80

42
14

220
71

71
23

57
18

5

18

6

5

Non-Conference Total 21

78

20

16
5

58
20

15

82

387

lOO

Conference Total
Elder Dempster
Woermann

lOO

1224-22
Conference Total
Elder Dempster
Woermann
Hamburg-West
Africa

100

1238-32
Conference Total
Elder Dempster
Woermann
Hamburg-West
Africa

UAC
John Holt
Grand Total

c

161 Ibid., p. 99.
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Millers Limited, under J. H. Eatty, attempted in the late 1880s to set up a
string of small commercial banks in the western district of the Gold Coast.
The function of these banks included the drawing and acceptance of bills of
exchange, cash deposits, and the negotiation of cable and mail transfers.l62
But Millers' attempt to set up a bank was soon superseded by the creation of a bank in Nigeria by the Elder Dempster shipping company.

In the early

1890s the African Banking Corporation, a South African concern, had been invited by the Government to set up a branch in Lagos.

Because of African

resistance in Benin at that time, however, the venture was not considered to be
worthwhile, and the Corporation decided not to invest in West Africa when its
assets could be more successfully deployed in South Africa.

The Government,

feeling the need for an agent to transact its currency needs for it, then decided to employ Elder Dempster as a distributor of coin in the West African
colonies.

As a result, Elder Dempster entered the banking business and the

Bank of British West Africa (BBWA) was set up by Sir Alfred Lewis Jones in
March 1894.

•

Three years later the Bank entered Ghana, establishing branches

in Accra (1897), Cape Coast (1900), Sekondi (1901) and Axim (1901). 163
During the early period of its history the BBWA did not have enough
branches to supply the needs of all its customers, although it did its best to
open branches anywhere where there was a large number of expatriate firms.

(In

1906 it had nine branches in Ghana; this increased to twelve during the 1920s
and sixteen in 1930, but declined, with the Depression, to ten in 1935.)164
Consequently, to fill the gap in services, it employed the larger trading firms

162Dumett,

l63RCSR:
16 4Kay,

"British • • •

"op. cit., p. 332.

Cd.4670, testimony of Leslie Couper, Q.9118, part 14.

op. cit., p. 419.
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as its agents and authorized them to carry out banking services in its name.
In 1905, for example, Millers agreed to act for the BBWA in Kumasi, Tarkwa, and
Winneba, for a payment of £300 per year in Kumasi and Tarkwa and £10 per month
in Winneba.

Such arrangements were made on the strict understanding that the

firms, in return for their payments, would help to ensure the BBWA's monopoly
of banking in West Africa.

In an agreement made between Millers and the Bank

in 1903, for example, it was stated that neither the Company nor the Bank would
directly or indirectly a} assist any third firm or company to
commence conduct or be interested or concerned in banking business in the
said colony [Ghana] and b} will not so assist or themselves conduct or be
interested in a banking business in the West African colonies of the
Gambia Sierra Leone and Lagos nor of any bank in the United Kingdom to
compete with the Bank in the said colonies [sia].165
By employing the major trading firms as its banking agents at a profitable rate, the BBWA ensured that they would not try to compete with it in the
colonies mentioned above.

Despite the agreements, however, the firms resented

the BBWA because of its close ties with Elder Dempster.

The BBWA had originally

been formed as a "public" company, but in fact, of its 3,000 shares, 1, 733 were
owned by Sir Alfred Lewis Jones, and 433 each by his two partners. 166

Offi-

cially, the Bank was supposed to be" • . • absolutely independent, and
restricted from engaging in business other than banking business ." 167 While
the latter condition was fulfilled, the former condition was not.
death Jones had a controlling interest in the Bank.
entirely of persons connected with Elder Dempster.

Until his

The first Board consisted
At its inception the Bank

was to deposit about £10,000 in security with the British Government; it raised
a loan of £30,000 to cover the debt and it was later discovered that the loan

165 UAC:

document 588, "Bank of British West Africa."

166Davies, The T:l'ade Ma7<.e:l•s • • • , op.
167RCSR:

ait., p. 118.

Cd.4670, testimony of Leslie Couper, Q.9118, part 7.
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had come from Elder Dempster. 168
The Royal Commission on Shipping R:i.ngs, when it investigated Elder
Dempster in 1909, investigated the workings of the BBWA at the same time.

Un-

fortunately, the Commission was forced to accede to the stipulation that the
testimony of Sir Alfred Lewis Jones be kept secret, and it has never been ·published.

Leslie Couper, however, who spoke for the BBWA, as one of its

Directors, admitted that he had formerly been an employee of the shipping
line. 169

In admitting this connection he partly confirmed accusations that the

Bank exerted power over its customers by threatening to have Elder Dempster
withdraw shipping services if they did not comply with its regulations.

Partly

because of the difficulties of colonial banking, but also because it was in a
monopoly situation, the Bank was accustomed to levy high charges for its services.

Even the Government was afraid to protest against these charges.

"The

Colonial Office was concerned about the high rates which BBWA levied on government transfers to England, but decided that nothing could be done about the
problem, because, if the colonial administrations tried to remit specie instead
Jones would have been able to counter by raising his freight charges. " 170

The

Bank also acted as Elder Dempster's agent, undertaking delivery of its goods
and collecting payment for it.l71
There was strong evidence in the Royal Commission report to suggest that
the Bank was indeed giving preference to Elder Dempster, as well as actively

168 conversation with Richard Fry, London, November 1974.
169 RCSR:

Cd.4670, Q.9128.

170 A. G. Hopkins, "The Creation of a Colonial Monetary System: The Origins
of the West African Currency Board, 11 Afriaan Historiaa"l Studies, no. 1, vol. 3
(1970), p. 113, fn. 51.
171 RCSR: Cd.466~ despatch from John Rodger, Governor of Gold Coast) to
Secretary of State, 21 July 1907, p. 196.

210
cooperating with it.

George Miller complained that

• • • the bank • • • is one of those systems by which a shipowner who
is also a banker can keep to himself a great deal of freight.
Supposing I am a poor man, and I want an advance of 80 per cent, or
90 per cent or lOO per cent, on my goods, the bank who owned [sic] the
ships says 'All right, I will give you the advance, but you are to ship
the goods by my steamers.•l72
The Bank of course denied these charges, arguing that it treated all of its
customers (that is, its European customers) equally.

It argued that the fact

that it was connected to Elder Dempster in no way impeded or directed its business.

As with shipping, the conflict between large trading houses and smaller

ones came into play to persuade the British Government to allow the close connection between the two companies to continue.

Smaller traders argued that

without the Bank, they would not be able to compete at all because they would
not be able to import specie into West Africa on their own. 173

The facilities

offered by the Bank outweighed their complaints against its connection with
Elder Dempster.
Indeed, in analyzing the role of the BBWA in Ghana it must constantly be
kept in mind that it was the first institution to provide any sort of coherent
banking facilities in the colony, and that without it, each individual trader,
whether African or European, would have had to conduct all his banking transactions through a bank in London or Europe.

Nevertheless, the development of

banking in Ghana was constrained by the virtual monopoly held by the BBWA until
the entrance of the Colonial Bank in 1917.

The BBWA originally was set up in

West Africa in order to take over from the Government the function of supplying
specie to the merchants; a function which was becoming more and more important

172RCSR:

0
v.

Cd.4670, testimony of George Miller, Q.44o6.

173For a discussion of the problem of importing specie, see below, Chapter
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as the export of primary products increased, and barter was no longer an adequate means of dealing with African producers and middlemen.

Prior to the

setting-up of the Bank, each merchant had to obtain Government permission to
import specie; having obtained it, his costs of importation, on an individual
basis, were often as high as 7~%. 1 7 4

In 1896, therefore, an Agreement was made

between the Bank and the Government. 175

The Bank was allowed complete monopoly

of the import of specie with the stipulation that it not charge more than one
per cent commission to its customers.
• • • the Bank shall not at any time during the contj.nuance of this
Agreement charge to any customer or other person requiring silver coin
to be imported into the Colony any higher premium in respect of the
importation of such silver coin than one per cent . • . • The Government
shall not at any time during the continuance of this Agreement give to
any person or persons firm or Company except the Bank any facilities
for importing silver or other coin into the Colony.176
Arrangements were made for the Bank to transact the Government's business without charge, in return for which the Government agreed to supply specie to the
Bank free of charge.

The Bank would then supply the specie to its customers at

a charge of not more than one per cent.
Many merchants objected to the above arrangement and asked why the Government could not supply specie direct to them rather than allowing the Bank to
make a profit as an intermediary. 177

The Government's reply was that the BBWA

was also assuming the risk of having to repatriate excess coin to England at
its own expense.

There was no note issue in West Africa, and moreover there

was a constant demand for new coins as African customers often would not accept
174RCSR:

Cd.4670, testimony of Leslie Couper, Q.9118, part 21.

175 "Agreement with the Bank of British West Africa, Limited, as to the
Transaction of the Banking Business of the Government (16 June 1896)" (Gold
Coast: Government Printing Office, 1900).

176Ibid.
177 RCSR:

Cd.4670, testimony of George Miller, Q.4558-63.

212
old.l 78

Because there were no notes, coins were legal tender up to unlimited

amounts~

and in fact there was almost as much coin in the British West African

territories as there was in the British Isles.

The Government of the latter,

then, worried that it might be saddled with extra coin, causing inflation, if
uncontrolled repatriation of coin were allowed.

The BBWA was to take the risk

of holding unnecessary coin and keeping it out of the British economy, in return for its one per cent commission on new coin.

However, it quickly became

apparent that, far from there being a surplus of coin, it was being absorbed
into the West African economy as soon as it arrived; the British had grossly
underestimated the indigenous economy's need for currency. 17 9 The Bank was
therefore being paid a large amount of money in return for which risk was absolutely minimal.
In 1909, recognizing the inadequacies of the monopoly provided for by
the 1896 Agreement, the Government in London decided to end the specie arrangement.

But in the midst of negotiations for its demise, Lord Crewe, the

Minister responsible, suddenly changed his mind, presumably under the benign
influence of Sir Alfred Lewis Jones.l80

As a result, the silver monopoly was

permitted to continue until 1912, when, Jones having died, the West African
Currency Board was established and the BBWA lost its monopoly, although it remained, until the 1950s, the agent of the Board.

l78Europeans argued that the "childlike 11 Africans enjoyed shiny coins and
used them for decorative purposes. But it could also be that, with the plethora
of coins in West Africa, the Africans insisted on new coins because they could
easily be cheated by an old coin from a different nation.
17 9Hopkins, "The Creation • • • ," op. cit., p. 116.

0

l80conversation with Mr. Richard Fry, London, November 1974.
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That the Agreement should have been withdrawn earlier is evident from
complaints by independent merchants against the Bank.

There were claims that

in fact it charged more than one per cent for importing currency, 181 and also
that it did not allow enough people credit.

It was also claimed that the Bank

put pressure on its customers by delaying or withholding currency. 182

In fact,

as long as the Bank held the monopoly of services within the British West
African colonies, there was little that it could not get away with.

Traders,

for good or ill, were at its mercy, since they were not permitted any longer to

import specie on their own, even if they had the resources.
In the light of the complaints which persisted against the BBWA and its
connections with Elder Dempster, it is surprising that no new bank rose to
challenge it in Ghana until 1917.
lenge the BBWA in Nigeria.

An earlier attempt had been made to chal-

The Bank of Nigeria was established by a few large

firms, including the Niger Company, the African Association, Miller, and John
Holt, in 1912.

Because, however, it was dominated by these few giant concerns,

it was viewed by the smaller firms as a closed group, even less likely to eooperate with them than the BBWA.

In any case, the essential reason for the

establishment of the Bank of Nigeria was to challenge the silver monopoly; as
has been noted above, the large firms were willing to cooperate with BBWA, and
indeed act as its agent, as far as other banking functions were concerned.
When the West African Currency Board was established and took over the importing
of silver, the sale of the Bank of Nigeria to the BBWA was quickly effected.l83
From 1912 to 1916, then, the BBWA was once again the only Bank in
British West Africa.

1 81 RCSR:

In 1916, its monopoly was challenged by the entry of the

Cd.4670, testimony of John Holt, Q.46oo.

182navies, The Trade Makers .
183Hopkins,
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The Creation .

• , op. eit., p. 119.
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op. eit. , pp. 114-116.
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Colonial Bank into Nigeria.

1836 in the West Indies.

The Colonial Bank was originally established in

It was not, however, permitted to move outside the

West Indies, until in 1916 an Act of Parliament was passed permitting it to
open branches anywhere in the Empire. 18 ~
Ghana, in Accra.

In 1917 it opened its first branch in

Other branches followed in Kumasi, Koforidua, Nsawam, Winneba

(all in 1919), Bekwai (1921), Takoradi (1930), Oda (1932), Tarkwa (1935) and
Dunkvm (1939) ,18 5 The branches were opened in areas where expatriate trade
flourished, where there were large cocoa-buying centres, and, later, in the
largest mining centres.

Given the small amount of banking business available

in the colony, however, the Colonial Bank did not generally compete with the
BBWA, but opened in towns where there were no BBWA facilities.

It changed its

name to Barclays Bank, Dominion, Colonial, and Overseas, in 1925 when the
Colonial Bank, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, and the National Bank of South Africa
were united into the Barclays
Despite earlier attempts to closely safeguard their monopoly position,
the BBWA seems to have been singularly unconcerned with the entry of Barclays
into Ghana.

According to its official historian, it was by that time a rather

sleepy organization, little concerned with innovation or expansion.l86

Indeed,

there seems to have been a gentleman's agreement between the two Banks not to
compete with each other, or at least, to keep that competition to a bare minimum.

One official of Barclays who visited Ghana in 1925 commented that

n

although keen competition in business exists, the friendly relationship between
the management

18

staffs of the two Banks is most marked, and I personally,

~Barclays Bank, A Banking Centenary:

and Overseas) 1836-1936

0

(Pl~nouth:

BaroZays Bank (Dominion, Col-onial

The Mayflower Press, 1938), p. 59.

185Colonial Bank and Barclays Bank, D.C.O.,

Reports, for years mentioned.

18 6conversation with Mr. Richard Fry, London, November 1974.
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was most kindly received and entertained on many occasions by members of the
Bank of British West Africa."l8 7 There is some speculation that there were
actual written
of this.

ag~eements

between the two Banks, but there is no known evidence

Writing in 1954, and commenting on the very high rates charged for

internal banking transactions in West Africa, Newlyn and Rowan commented that
although banks were reluctant to reveal their charges, "There appears to be
little inter-bank price competition and there are some signs of inter-bank
collaboration." 1 88

During the cocoa boycott of 1937, the two firms

fear that new banks would enter Ghana, presumably upsetting whatever arrangement might have existed.18 9 There was no fierce competition between the two
Banks until, with impending independence in the 1950s, they became rivals in
the race to open up new branches to cash in on the funds of the rising African
elite.
No doubt competition

w~s

not necessary in the Gold Coast since both

Banks, even during the years of the Depression,

good dividends.

As an

independent bank, the Colonial Bank made better dividends than it did when it
joined with the Anglo-Egyptian and the National Bank of South Africa.
Both the Colonial Bank, as a subsidiary of Barclays Bank Limited, and
the BBWA were firmly tied into the British banking system.

The BBWA had, as

its own bankers, the Bank of England, Lloyd's Bank Limited, the Westminster
Bank, and the National Provincial Bank.l 9 0

There were, of course, no African

directors on the board of either of the two Banks, rather, the Banks tended to

1 87 Colonial

Bank, Report, 23 May 1925.

188 w. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan, Money and Banking in British Colonial
Afriaa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 84.

0

189Reported at a meeting of farmers and brokers in Nsawam, 31 January
1938, GNA Adm.29/6/14.
190 stock

Exchange Yearbook (1939).

216
Table 18.

Year

Dividend Rates (Ordinary Shares) of the Bank of
British West Africa and the Colonial Bank/
Bar clays n.c.o.191

BBWA Colonial

8
1895-6
8
1896-7
8
1897-8
8
1898-9
1899-1900 8
8
1900-01
8
1901-02
8
1902-03
8
1903-04
8
1904-05
8
1905-06
8
1906-07
10
1907-08
1908-09
9
1909-10
9

BBWA

Year
1910-11
1911-12
1912-13
1913-14
1914-15
1915-16
1916-17
1917-18
1918-19
1919-20
1920-21
1921-22
1922-23
1923-24

Colonial

9
9
9
9!-z

e--2
8

7
7
8
10
10
10
8
8
8

8
8
8
10
8
6
5
5

Year
1924-25
1925-26
1926-27
1927-28
1928-29
1929-30
1930-31
1931-32
1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936-37
1937-38

BBWA
5
5
5
6
6
6

4
4

4
4
4
5
5

5

Colonial
1
3
3!-z
4
4!-z

434

4%
4%
43/4
5
5!-z
6

6!z

share their directorships with directors of other banks based in Europe, other
colonial banks, steamship companies, railways, insurance companies, and various
agricultural, manufacturing and mining concerns.
From the selected list shown

Table 19 it can be seen that not only

were the two Banks closely connected with international banking concerns and
financial institutions, but that, as well, they shared directors with the major
trade firms of West Africa.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Banks

viewed their purpose as, primarily, to service the expatriate community, both
Government and commercial.

Their functions were to supply coin, to make ad-

vances for payment for the cocoa crop, and to repatriate profits for the firms.
Basically, they assisted the import-export trade.

Large sums of money were

made available every year to the expatriate trading firms in order that they
might buy the goods produced by Africans.

191 lbid.

This money was then disbursed by the

(1905, 1915, 1925, 1935, 1939). (Dividends of the Colonial Bank
prior to its entrance into the Gold Coast are not included.)

217
Table 19.

Selected Examples o~ Interlocking
Directorships: BBWA and Colonial/
Barc1ays Bank 192

Bank

o~

British West Africa
Outside Directorships

Director
Robert Edmund Dickinson
Cli~~ord

B1ackburn Edgar

Standard Bank o~ South Africa (1925, 1935)
Westminster Bank Ltd. (1935)
Niger Co. (1915)

Sir Frederick E1ey

P. & 0. Banking Corporation Ltd. (1925)

Sir Austin Harris

Lloyd' s Bank Ltd. ( 1935)
British Steamship Investment Trust Ltd. (1935)

David Q. Henriques

Rubber Estates

o~

Ceylon Ltd. (1925)

A~rican
A1~red

Lewis Jones

Oil Mills Co. (1905)
British Cotton Growing Association (1905)
Elders and Fyf~es Ltd. (1905)

Lord Kylsant

Coast Lines Ltd. (1925)
Elders Insurance Co. Ltd. (1925)
Lamport and Holt Ltd. (1925)
Midland Bank Ltd. ( 1925)
Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (1925)
Southern Railway Co. (1925)

Viscount Mi1ner

London Joint Stock Bank (1915)
Rio Tin to Co. L-~d. ( 1915)

George Neville

Ashanti Land Ltd. (1905)

Mazzini Stuart

A~rican
A~rican

and Eastern Trade Corp. (1925)
Association (1895, 1905)

Colonial Bank/Barclays D.C.O.
Outside Directors

Director
Colin Campbell

Westminster Bank Ltd. (1925)

George Cyril Cassels

Bank of Montreal (1925)

Sir Gilbert Fox

Guardian Assurance Co. Ltd. (1925)

0. V. G. Hoare

Ashanti Gold~ields (1935)
Gold Coast Selection Trust Ltd. (1935)
African and Eastern Trade Corp. (1925)

Sir Earnest Oppenheimer

Anglo-American Corp. o~ South Africa (1935)
de Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. (etc.) (1935)

Emile Pusch

Lazard Brothers and Co. (1935)

192

Direatory of Direators (1895,1905,1915,1925,1935).

list o~ interlocking directorships
Appendix 2.

~or

A larger selected
the West African trade can be found in
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firms to their producers, who spent it largely on imported goods.

The money

was thus returned to the hands of the firms who returned it back to the banks.
Since there was no scope for investment in Ghana itself, at least in European
eyes, the money was sent back to England to be invested there.

Until 1912,

West Africa used the same currency as did Britain; after that time, it had its
own currency but as it was convertible at par with the pound sterling, there
was no incentive to invest it in West Africa rather than return it to Europe.
Decisions as to who was to receive credit based upon profits from the
import-export trade were made not in Ghana out at the Banks' Head Offices in
London. 19 3 Thus firms such as United Africa Company, who had their own London
office, were at an advantage compared both to the small European firms and to
the African trader.

Moreover the two Banks engaged in the practice of gi Ying

preferential rates to certain favoured customers, as also did BBWA' s parent
firm, Elder Dempster.

Large trading firms thus enjoyed financial advantages

not only over Africans, but also over the smaller European firms.

The system

of "most favoured mercantile customers" 194 was however kept secret, the Banks
arguing that they charged the same rates to all.

Non-British expatriate firms

tended to obtain some of their financing through banks from their own nations,
but to turn to BBWA and the Colonial Bank for large advances just before the
cocoa season.

Outside of the cocoa season, none of the firms

borrm~ed

to any

great extent from BBWA or the Colonial Bank; they tended to be self-financing
in their day-to-day needs.
Aside from supplying coin for the buying season and then repatriating it

193 This

description of banking services is taken from interviews with representatives of Standard Bank of Ghana (formerly the Bank of British West
Africa) and Barclays Bank of Ghana, as well as with representatives of several
of the leading expatriate firms still in Ghana.
194 UAC:

document 588, "Bank of British West Africa. 11
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to London after the season was over, the two Banks had few functions to perform
in Ghana.
specie.

They did, however, trure charge of the actual physical transport of
Most of the cocoa crop was paid for in two-shilling pieces, which had

to be transported to the cocoa areas by the truckload every season.

Without

notes, and without the widespread use of cheques (a use which was contingent
upon widespread literacy) the supply of coin needed was phenomenal.

No doubt

had gold been used instead of silver, the actual physical costs of transportation of specie could have been lessened, but the gold produced in Ghana was
shipped to England for Imperial use.

Another of the Banks' functions was to

escort gold from the mines to the harbours, there to make sure that it was
safely loaded onto ships for export.195
The idea of using the Banks to expand credit in Ghana, to promote investment and production, and to generalize the use of sophisticated banking
services, was never entertained, either by the Banks themselves or by the
Government.

Their function was solely to service the expatriate community, not

to participate in development projects.

They neither saw themselves, nor were

seen by others, as obligated to provide services for the African community.
In their book on colonial banking written in 1954, Newlyn and Rowan
argue that Africans were perceived as unreliable in their financial dealings,
hence the Banks were not eager for their patronage.

Reasons for not giving

loans to Africans included the following:
1. The generally poor reputation of Africans for commercial and financial responsibility.
2. The absence of organized accounts in most African businesses.
3. The failure of many African businessmen to mrute full use of their
banking accounts and their tendency to be secretive over business matters.

0

195Memoirs (unpublished) of Oswald Garnish, manager of the Colonial Bank in
Accra in the early 1920s. I am grateful to Mr. John Blandford, archivist of
Barclays Bank, London, for allowing me to read this memoir.
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4. The difficulties experienced by Africans in providing the banks with
suitable security.
5. The lack of close personal relationships between European banking
executives and their African customers, and the absence of intermediariesl96
These perceptions of Africans were even more prevalent during the early part of
the twentieth century than they were during the preindependence period of which
Newlyn and Rowan write.

It is true that African businesses often failed, that

illiterate traders could not keep modern accounts, that few Africans had the
kind of collateral which the Europeans desired, and that many were corrupt.
Within this framework, however, there were means which could have been used to
provide banking facilities.
Indigenous traders who keep exact mental records of phenomenally large
commercial empires are legendary in social science literature on West Africa.
They are also legendary in West African banking circles, and it is obvious that
in fact they were allowed credit, at least at a later date.

European banking

officials were trained to be able to evaluate an African's worth, even without
written records, by visiting his premises and inspecting his business.

Col-

lateral was based on stock turnover. 19 7 Before World War II, however, credit
of this type was given not by the Banks but by the European firms with whom the
African traders dealt.

The Banks hesitated to give any kind of credit without

solid collateral.
Unfortunately, the European view of sound collateral was immovable property such as land or housing.

As explained above, Gold Coast Africans retained

their traditional organization of property in land, a system which granted
exclusive usufruct but forbade its outright alienation. 19 8
19 6 Newlyn and Rowan,

They therefore

op. oit., p. 81.

197 Interview with an African director of Barclays Bank of Ghana, Accra,

May

1974.

198See Chapter II.
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could not use land as a basis for credit.

Nor were their productive capacities

of interest to the Banks, which were both forbidden from and uninterested in
taking over farmland and plantations.

Traders depended upon the European

import-export firms for credit, as banks were not willing to accept stocks of
cloth or other imported goods as collateral.

Africans, then, were left with

only two resources if they were to obtain credit; houses and gold trinkets.
There was a limit, however, to the amount of credit one could obtain in exchange for the "family jewels" and Europeans were reluctant to take houses as
collateral as they often found it difficult to foreclose mortgages.
It is difficult •
to secure credit upon what they look to as their
greatest asset--property in land and buildings. I am not entirely convinced that the state of the credit system at present is not at least
partly due to the attitudes of many persons who secured credit on the
security of land or buildings. My reason for saying so is that it has
been common for borrowers to place every possible obstacle in the way of
a security being realised when that unfortunate contingency has been
placed upon the lender.l99
In other words, Europeans found it difficult to foreclose mortgages on property
as borrowers could always claim that in fact the property involved belonged not
to individuals but to entire families, and therefore could not be alienated.
Nevertheless, there is some indication that the much-abused preference
of Africans for building large houses (instead of investing in their farms or
businesses) was at least partially a result of a European policy which insisted
on real property as collateral.

Money which might have been better invested in

cocoa farms or in private roads to the farms had to be put into buildings because Europeans needed visible, tangible evidence of a man's wealth.

No doubt

had there been the "close personal relationship" between African bank customers
and European bank executives, which Newlyn and Rowan discuss, such a need for
tangible proof of a man's assets would have been considered less necessary.

199Statement by Mr. Mackay, a European unoffical member, in GCLegCo, 6
March 1924.

As
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it was, however, attitudes of racial prejudice overrode any chance for equality
of treatment with European bank customers.

As long as Africans were denied

equal treatment in commercial matters, their chances of competing successfully
with Europeans were minimal; but as long as they were viewed as uncompetitive,
they were denied equal treatment.

A vicious circle existed.

Moreover, the Government's policy of paternalism towards the "natives"
militated against equality in commercial transactions.

The Government viewed

Africans either as cheats or as gullible fools; in either case they were to be
protected from the world of modern capitalism.

The close personal and formal

contacts between business and Government enabled the latter to influence the
former in their decisions as to the financial reliability of Africans.
It was the practice of the Colonial Government to exchange intelligence
about African entrepreneurs with banks and investment houses. For example,
Barclays Bank informed the colonial government of the financial status of
all the Directors of the West African Co-operative Producers Ltd. The
more serious consequence resulted when the colonial government communicated
its jaundiced views, unoffically of course, to non-British banks and
finance houses who, unlike British colonial banks, expressed a willingness
to finance some of the more reasonable schemes of Gold Coast entrepreneurs.
In very quiet, unobtrusive ways the colonial regime destroyed the prospects
of would-be borrowers by suggesting that they were 'shady characters',
'swindlers', and 'men of dubious character'. While more than a few met
this description the uniformity of condemnation was not justified by reality
and in many cases amounted to slander and character assassination. The
result of this was that legitimate African entrepreneurs could not get
loans through established commercial channels and had to turn to high-cost,
informal loans sources. This greatly increased the cost of borrowing and
encouraged them to engage in creating fanciful images of their own commercial prospects.200
No doubt, on the whole, Africans vrere not as good commercial risks as
Europeans, given their minor role in trade, their lack of capital assets, and
their isolation from the European business community.

Banks interested prima-

rily in their own profits were bound to be cautious about their African

200 Alexander Baron Holmes, IV, "Economic and Political Organizations in· the
Gold Coast 1920-45" (University of Chicago: unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 1972),
pp. 113-114.
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customers.

But there is some indication that the Banks were overly cautious,

that they did, in fact, discriminate solely on the basis of race and denied
even the most elementary, risk-free, services to Africans.

They were, natur-

ally, willing to take African deposits; in 1910, £263,000 of the Bank of
British West Africa's £1,074,793 in deposits was owned by Africans. 201
belying the prevalent notion that Africans did not save.)

(Tnus

In other services,

however, they encouraged Africans only on payment of a higher price than
Europeans were expected to pay.

While banks are unusually secretive about

their rates, and information is difficult to find, access was obtained to a
statement of BBWA rates for 1905 which indicated clearly the discrimination
against Africans.
Rates for Bank Drafts.
On any coast Branch 1% premium or 1/- minimum.
2. On Head Office or London
a) Government Officials ~% or 1/- minimum.
b) Other Europeans o/4% or 1/- minimum.
c) Natives 1% or 1/- minimum.
Rates for purchasing cheques or bills from
- Head Office or London Offices -1%
- Other English banks -1\%
- Natives or African Trading Firms 2~
-for collecting cheques or bills from
- Head office or London Office - ~%
- Other English Banks 1\%
- Natives or African Trading Firms 2%

1.

Gold
1. To be given to Europeans without charge up to £10.
2. Exceeding £10 a premium of 1% to be charged to Europeans.
3. Natives to pay 1%.
Bank of England Notes.
1. Not exceeding £50 in value and of denominations of £5, £10, and
£20 only to be accepted free.
2. 1% premium to be charged for accepting Notes of denominations
exceeding £20 and exceeding a total value of £50.
3. Natives presenting Notes to be charged 1%.

0

2 01Hopkins, "The Creation . . • , 11 op. ait., p. 112.
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Current a/c Turnover.
Europeans V3% on the quarterly withdrawals m1n1mum 5/-.
Natives £1.1.s. Op. to be charged annually and 1h% o~ quarterly
withdrawals •
Cable transfers.
1. On any Coast Branch 1~ premium or 5/- m1n1mum. Exception European
firms 3h% for transfers to Gold Coast Branches.
2. When a remittance is received from England with instructions to
collect all charges this end from payee 1% commission to be collected from
Europeans and 1~% from Natives, plus cost of cable in both cases. 2 D2
For the African, then, the monopoly of the colonial banking system by
one Bank up to 1917, and its sharing by twc Banks in close agreement after that
date, resulted not only in a denial of banking services on the grounds that
Africans were not as sound commercially as their European counterparts, but
also in deliberate discrimination on the grounds of race.

The two British

Banks had complete control over banking in the Gold Coast, but they extended
only limited services, and those at high costs, to the non-European comm·uni ty.

202 List of BBWA charges, dated l February 1905, in UAC:
11

Bank of British West Africa."
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CHAPTER V

EUROPEAN BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT CO-OPERATION I...Til' GHJI,NA:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INF"RA'3TRUCTURE

This chapter will consider the various institutions of co-operation
which facilitated close contact between Europeans in the commercial, mining,
shipping and financial sectors of Ghana's economy and the members of the
British Gover:2ment establishment who administered the colony.

Because the col-

ony was under the political control of the Bri t:i.sh, expatriate firiTls frorr the
United Kingdo::n had far more say in the making of policy than did the Swiss or
French firms ·.vhich were their colleagues ir:. the world of trade.
The influence of the British firms is crucial for understanding tbe development policy of the colonial Government.

Several aspects of the

Government's policy vdll be considered in this chapter and

Chapter\~,

with a

view to understanding how the policy fulfilled the wishes and desires of the
expatriate co"nmuni ty.

In this chapter, two of the roost crucial concerns of the

early colonial period up to World )far I, tJ:.e development of currency and the
institution of a system of transport gearea to import-export needs will te discussed.

In Chapter VI the investment policies of both the expatriate fi:rms and

the Government >.;ill be discussed, along with an analysis of the development of
monocul tural dependence after ·world War I.

It will be argued that underce-

velopment and stagnation were the major fec.tures of the Ghanaian economy· during
the inter-War period, as a consequence of the types of trr..nsport, investrrent,
and agricultural policies which emerged.
1.

~

"\.i

~Institutions

of Co-operaticn

Although several formal means of co.IrJnlmication between the British business conununi ty a..n.d the British administrative eorrJnuni ty were quickly set up in
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colonial Ghana, none of them might have had much import had it not been for the
informal ties of nationality, race, and, to a certain extent, class,

whi~h

bound the two communities together both at "home" and on the coast.

There were

very few whites in Ghana during colonial times; what white men there \>re re
tended naturally to gravitate towards one another.

Only in the larger centres

such as Accra could they afford to be at all choosy about with which of their
compatriots they would socialize.

A European club in Accra was the focus of

social events; no Africans were permitted into this club until independence in

1957. 1 Here decisions could be made over cocktails at sundown, later to be
translated into Government language for the benefit of the Africans whom both
communities ontensibly served.
In

Bri~ain

too, there were informal ties between the more powerful of

the businessmen, for example Sir Alfred Lewis Jones of the Elder Dempster
shipping line and the BBWA, and the men who made Government policy.

Members of

Parliament from Liverpool and Manchester were often also members of major
trading famil:i.es.

In London, there were close ties between the Africa Section

of the London Chamber of Commerce and members in both the House of Lords and
the House of Commons.

Entries such as the following were common in the records

of all three of the Chambers.
Mention having been made of the necessity of keeping Members of
Parliament fully acquainted with questions affecting the interests
of British African trade, Mr.
stated that he had the
assurance of Mr. w. H. Holland M.P. that he would readily place his
services to further these objects. 2
Informal contacts such as those described above were reinforced by the
ease with which former members of the colonial service could enter the business

1Inter-new with an African director of Barclays Bank of Ghana, Accra,
May 1974.
2ManCC, 20 July 1892.
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world, where indeed their familiarity with the West African coast was mo:;t
appreciated.

Occasional protests reached the ears of the.Government about

this practice, usually from groups which were not themselves recruiting such
former administrators.

In 1918 the Manchester Chamber of Commerce protested

to the Colonial Office that former Government men would possess confidential
information about the competitors of their new employers.

The Colonial Office

replied that it was not worried about such an eventuality as any breach of
confidentiality would result in the former officers' losing their pensions.

It

rejected Manchester's suggestion that it be made a condition of entering the
public service that the entrant would not join one of the private expatriate
firms after retirement. 3

In 1928 J. E. Casely-Hayford, an African, raised a

question in the Legislative Council about the proposed directorship of a new
diamond-mining firm, Alluvial Diamonds (Gold Coast) Limited, and the alleged
presence on its board of two ex-Governors and three ex-officials of Ghana.
Again, the Colonial Secretary replied that anyone with a pension must have the
Governor's permission to sit on a board. 4 The constraint of the pension> however, must have meant little to such ex-administrators as many were not :i.n fact
entitled to pens ions in the as yet disorgar~i zed Colonial Servic.e. 5

In any

case, it would have been most difficult to prove that confidentiality had been
breached.
The informal contacts between Government and the business community in
England were reinforced in 1905 by the este·.blishment of the Joint West
Committee, a committee composed of two members each from the London,

3ManCC, 12 March 1918.
4GCLegCo, 1 March 1928.
5Robert Heussler, Yesterday'sRulers: The Making of the British
Colonial Serviae (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963).

k~rica

228
Manchester, and Liverpool Chambers of Commerce which was entitled to discuss
matters of common interest to the three Chambers on a regular basis with the
Colonial Office.G

This Committee was set up only after a great deal of pres-

sure, from the early 1890s on, from the Chambers, especially in Manchester and
Liverpool.

Pressure on the Colonial Office for regular consultation regarding

West African affairs grew concurrently with Britain's increasing military and
administrative presence in that area.

In August 1892 the Manchester West

Africa Committee resolved "That a deputation be sent to the Foreign and Colonial Ministers to place before them the importance of West African questions
and asking that better attention be given to these in the future than in the
past. n7

Pressure for the formation of a ccnsultative committee continued from

this date, with the London Chamber of Commerce lagging behind in its desires
for formal channels of communication, possibly because it was more powerful in
the financial world, and also because it had more direct contact with the
Government since it was situated in the capital and could more easily contact
Whitehall.

But it also pressured the ColoLial Government for details of any

decisions made.

In 1892 "The Colonial Government was • • • asked to inform the

Chambers as to the details of any proposed treaties, and of any action proposed
to be taken affecting commercial interests. " 8

Finally, in the early years of

the twentieth century, after ten years of constant pressure, the Colonial
Office acceded to the many requests which had been made for consultation.

In

1904, the machinery of the JWAC was instituted, with the proviso that onJy

6Hereafter referred to as the JWAC. The .JWAC was in existence until at
least 1956; the author was able to locate its Minutes for 1905 to 1919, but
the Minutes for 1919 to 1939 appear to have been lost.

c

7ManCC, 31 August 1892.
8 LonCC,

Eleventh Annual Report (1892), p. 62.
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matters on which the three Charriliers agreed were to be discussed with the
Colonial Office.

The Committee's p1.1rpose was to serve as an

• • . informal means of communication between the Chambers of
Commerce and the permanent staff of the Colonial Office ln the
preliminary discussion of commercial, shipping, mining and
industrial questions relating to the West African Colonies and
Protectorates. 9
There was a continual debate throughout the colonial period about the
exact function of the JWAC:

the Colonial Office insisted that its status was

solely as a consultative body while the Chambers wanted it made an official
body with an official capacity.

As Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in

1906, Winston Churchill stated that his willingness to meet with the Committee
". • • is not intended to imply any right on the part of those bodies [ Cl.ambers
of Commerce] to be consulted beforehand in regard to any policy that may be
adopted."10

The merchants, however, contirued their pressure for the right to

make decisions, arguing (correctly) that they were in fact far more important
to the colonies than individual Governors or administrators.

They felt that

they themselves could, in fact, almost entirely run the colonies from England.
Alfred Lewis Jones, referring to the members of the JWAC, argued with the
Colonial Office that
These men represent an enormous amount of capital which has been put
into this trade to develop it, they were naturally anxious to assist the
welfare of the colonies, and wanted to help the Colonies in any way they
can. They feel a grievance and that is this--they think they have not
had that consideration in being consulted which they think they ought
to be, before money has been spent • . . • It is not a very profitable
thing for these men to come here and gjve their opinion after things
have been done IsioJ,ll

9LivCC, 31 January 1905.
lOQuoted in JWAC, 20 June 1906.

c

11 Statement made in a conference wit1l Lonl Elgin, Secretary of State for
the Colonies, JWAC, 7 March 1906.
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That the Colonial Office had considerable regard for the power and in-

0

fluence of men such as Sir Alfred Lewis Jones, and recognized full well their
'

importance for the West African scene, is indicated by the fact that, on top of
the consultative privileges which it granted to the JWAC, it also accorded to
the Chambers the right to correspond directly with the Governors of all the
colonies.

A letter from R. L. Antrobus of the Colonial Office to the Liverpool

Chamber in 1903 said
I am directed by Mr. Secretary Chamberlain to inform you that, on the
suggestion of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, he has authorized the
Governors and High Commissioners of the West African Colonies and Protectorates to correspond direct with the Liverpool and Manchester Chambers
upon subjects connected with British t:~ade. • • • He has also informed
the Governors and High Commissioners that, except in case of urgency, he
thinks that time should be allowed for the Chambers to express their views
on any proposed legislation directly affecting the interests of the
merchants ••• 12
The only conditions were that copies of all correspondence between the Chambers
and the Governors were to be sent to the Colonial Office, 13 and that urgent
matters could be acted upon by the Goven1ment without consultation.

The inter-

pretation of the word "urgent" was to resU:i.t in considerable conflict in the
ensuing years, especially over matters of i.ariff changes.

Attention to minor

details by the . Chambers was frequent and intense; the slightest change in tariffs could affect a firm's profits, and this was especially important

fo~

the

smaller independent firms which did not have the same capacity to withstand
hard times as did the "Combine" firms .14
12LivCC, 24 March 1903.
1 3LonCC, TWenty-Seaond Annual Report (1903), p.

c

62.

14In a confidential despatch from the Secretary of State to the Gold
Coast Governor, dated 17 February 1905, concerning the matter of consultation
with the Chambers of Commerce, the Secretary w~ote ". • • it was not intended
to be applied to tariff bills, which must te treated as cases of urgency, and
enacted without allowing any interval between the first and second readings."
Presumably this was to prevent speculation and rush importing and exporting.
GCLegCo, 24 April 1905.
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The privilege of corresponding directly with Governors gave the Governors a certain independence of the Colonial Office, and it also gave the
Chambers more freedom to put pressure on individual administrators.

Confer-

ences with Governors who came home on leave were frequent, and the value of
such personal contacts was very great.

The historian of the Manchester Chamber

of Commerce, in fact, gave it as his opinion that "Probably the right to correspond direct with the Governors of the West African Colonies,

proved

more valuable to Manchester merchants [than the JWAC]. nlS
That the Colonial Office recognized the power and influence of the three
Chambers was made obvious in 1919 when the question arose of allowing the soon
to be infamous AWAM, the Association of West African Merchants, to have
sentation on the J\vAC.

~epre-

The AWAM was an organization of merahants, trading to

West Africa, which excluded bankers and shippers.

In fact it had been set up

partly as a counterorganization to the Chambers vrhich were felt to be too much
under shipping and banking control.

The Colonial Office agreed not to let the

AWAM have any representation; only the Chambers should be allowed the privilege
of consultation. 16 Implicitly, therefore, the Government recognized the primacy of the interests of the monopolist shippers and bankers over those of the
independent trading firms.
Added to their ability to influence the Colonial Office in Europe was
the representation which was given to the members of the European business
community as "unofficial members" in the (',old Coast Legislative CounciL

The

Gold Coast Legislative Council was authorized, until 1934, to make decisions
only for the Gold Coast Colony; after that date it was also the decision--making
15Arthur Bedford,

(Manchester:

et al., MarwhesteP Merchants and Foreign Trade

Manchester University Press, 193h), p. 70.

16 JWAC, 23 May 1919.

232
body for Ashanti and the Northern Territories.

However, its actual powe:::- was

limited as it acted, except in a few cases, essentially as a "rubber-stamp"
for Colonial Office policies dictated from London.

Merchants and miners were

given representation on this Council, with its very limited :functions, as early
as 1886, when two European unofficial members and two African unof:ficial members were appointed.

These four unofficials were the only legal representatives

of their two communities until 1916, when the Council was expanded to include a
third European unofficial and six Africans (three chiefs, one each from the
Twi-

Fanti- and Adangme-speaking areas of the Colony, and three "educated

natives" to represent the Western, Eastern~ and Central Provinces).

The third

European unofficial was to be appointed specifically as a balance between the
mining and the merchant. communi ties of expP,triates, two communi ties which often
had serious differences of opinion especially regarding transport policy.

The

miners were concerned to build railways which could carry equipment into the
mining areas, while the merchants wanted to invest in roads to facilitate the
export of cocoa and other agricultural goods, and the import of consumer manufactured goods.
In all probability, the new member will, in the first instance, be
connected with the Bank of British West Africa; and he will be, to some
extent, an impartial European member, vrho will be able to take an
independent view as between, for example, the views held by merchants
on certain questions in opposition to those held by the representatives
of the Mining Interest. 1 7
It was, however, no coincidence that the ne:w member would represent the most
powerful expatriate concern in Ghana, the Bank of British West Africa and,
along with it, the Elder Dempster shipping line.
From 1916 to 1925 the merchants pressed for more say on the Council,

c

because even though most policy was made in London, they hoped to have some say

17

Speech by the Governor, GCLegCo, 8 August 1916.
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over decisions which might be left in the local Government's hands.

As the

local Ghana Chambers of Commerce were often concerned with issues which had no
relevance to their parent branches overseas, so the Governor was concerned
with, and made decisions on, certain issues with which the Colonial Office
would have no concern except to ratify policy.
Throughout the Legislative Council debates it is evident that whenever
business interests would seriously be affected by legislation, extraordinary
members representing the business community would be introduced. 18

But this

extraordinary representation was still considered to be insufficient.

At a

meeting in London in 1919 in which Governor Guggisberg appealed for more revenue to carry out his development programme in Ghana, the Chairman of the
London Africa Committee implied that without more representation, merchants
would not support his appeal for funds.
• • .
as these countries are developed it would be necessary to
obtain public money, and if the Government of the Colony wished to
obtain the full support of the merchants who subscribe to the loans
required from time to time, they would ask to be fully represented on
the Legislative Council, and thus have a voice in the administration.
It was obvious that the Government shotud have a majority, but both the
native and the merchant should feel thEt they have a fair representation
on the Council, so that, both officially and unofficially their views
could be placed before the Governor and registered and recorded. 19
Partly as a result of such pressure, the Council was expanded again in 1926, to
include five European unofficial members.

One mercantile member was to be

elected by a mercantile electoral committee, the members of which would be
nominated by firms who were members of recognized Chambers of Commerce (in

c

18 For example for the meeting of 24 End 28 August 1912, in which the
question of concessions was discussed, the Presirient of the Accra Chamber of
Commerce, and representatives of Millers Ljmited, the Bank of British West
Africa, and Prestea Block A Limited (a gold mine) vrere appointed. GCLegCo,
24 and 28 August 1912.
l9LonCC, 12 September 1919.
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Ghana); one mining member was to be elected by the Gold Coast Chamber of Mines;
and three Europeans were to be chosen by the Governor.

"It is probable that

among these three European Unofficial Members one will represent the banking
interests, another the shipping interests, and a third the mining interests. " 20
How much this additional representation had any meaning for the
cials was difficult to fathom.

Q~offi-

Certainly they did not consider themselves, nor

were they encouraged to view themselves, as an unofficial opposition.

While

the Government often criticized the unofficials for not turning up to meetings
and not taking their responsibilities seriously, the unofficials·replied that
they were too rarely consulted, that they were not given adequate time to study
bills to be presented to the Legislative Council, and that the Governmen·; often
did not bother answering their questions or even recording their objections. 21
Under the circumstances, the expatriate business community viewed its
access to metropolitan decision-making bodies as far more important than its
access to local ones.

None of the commercial representatives on the coast, in

any case, was an important member of his firm; indeed the directors of m<my
"African" firms had never set foot in Africa. 22

The real powers, both commer-

cial and administrative, confined their contacts with each other to London.
To supplement their power on the JWAC, the members of the business

20 Speech

by the Governor, GCLegCo, 22 February 1926.

21 For example, Mr. Hunt, an unofficial member, said in GCLegCo, 29
October 1909 11 • • • statements, however unpleasant, made by Unofficial Members
on their own responsibility should be recorded • • • • "
2211

c

• some reference was made to the difficulties which occurred
owing to the restriction of authority in the case of commercial representatives
on the Coast. The opinion was expressed that the Government had a real
grievance because these representatives were not fully authorised to spe~Jc for
the home concerns. It had on more than one occasion been suggested that
Principals should themselves make regular visits to the Coast." Man CC, 22
October 1928.
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community were given a great deal of representation on the various Royal Cammissions which at various times investigated aspects of West African trade or
development policy.

The firms were given direct representatives, for instance,

on the Private Enterprise Committee, (1924), the Committee on Trade and Taxation (1921) 23 and the West African Currency Board (which operated continuously
from 1912).

Whenever the Colonial Office informed the Chambers of Commerce

that it welcomed their views and would like to hear from them, the Chambers
replied that they wanted actual members on the Commissions on the grounds that
they, the businessmen, were the most important people in the colony.
Colonial Office did not always take kindly to this argument.

Th~

In 1912, for in-

stance, it denied the expatriate firms representation on the West African Lands
Comni ttee; 24 in 1936 it. denied theni representation on the Overseas Trade Devel-·
opment Council. 2 5 Even in cases in which i;hey were denied representation,
however, the firms were at least given ample chance to speak and present their
point of view.

With the exception of the testimony before the Belfield Cam-

mission 26 by African chiefs and educated men, no such chance was given to
Ghanaians.

Although there were plenty of educated Ghanaians, and Ghanaians who

were involved in trade and shipping, their views were never sought.

De faato,

a great deal of power accrued to the hands of the expatriate business community
which through its expertise and knowledge of West Africa could often infuence
t' 1 11 comm1ss1oners
•
•
.
.. . t'~ve b o d'1es.
s1'tt'~ng on ~nves~~ga

tl•~mpar ~a

In pursuit of their goal of influencing policy, the British Chambers of

23 Cmd. 2016 (1924) and Cmd. 1600 (1921) respectively.
24ManCC, 8 July 1912.

c

2 5LonCC, 31 January 1936.
26 See Chapter II.
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Commerce encouraged the formation of local Chambers of Commerce within Ghana,
which were recognized by the Governor as legitimate spokesmen for the eXJ.)atriate mercantile community.
Chambers of Commerce have been formed in the principal commercial
centres in all our West African Colonies. They are of comparatively
recent date and arose out of informal meetings which used to be held by
the Agents of the various companies in order to discuss matters of local
interest, and to fix prices to be offered for produce for stated periods.
These meetings developed into Chambers of Commerce, which have proved of
considerable assistance to the Governments. The existence of these
Chambers has enabled a more effective liaison between unofficials and
officials to become established, and ensures a method whereby collective
rather than merely individual views of the trading community can be put
forward. 2 7
By the early twentieth century the network of Chambers of Commerce in Ghana
was already extensive.

In 1892 a Chamber existed in Cape Coast, and in l1ay

1895 one was formed in Accra. 28

By 1902 there was a Chamber at Sekondi, 29 and

in 1911 a Chamber was formed in Tarkwa. 3 0

Several of the Gold Coast Chambers

affiliated to the British Chambers and used them as their spokesmen in the
Colonial Office.

Their preoccupations, however, were often of a petty nuture,

concerned for instance with minor changes of regulations in the colony, and
they could not always count on the support of the parent Chambers in such
cases.
The Chambers were specifically European bodies.

It was not their in-

clination to accept or encourage Africans in their midst.

African

ente~)rise

was a separate entity with clearly defined limits, and it was generally accepted by Africans that they simply were not allowed to join the European Chambers
27

"Report by the Hon. W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore M.P. (Parliamentary UnderSecretar.f of State for the Colonies) on his visit to West Africa during the
year 1926" (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926), p. 168.
28 LivCC, Fo~ty-Sixth

c

AnnuaZ Report (1896), p. 89.

29 LivCC,

15 September 1902.

30 LivCC,

19 June 1911.
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of Commerce, except as representatives of r~gistered firms. 31 Occasionally an
African joined a Chamber as a representative of his own firm; more often he was
the local representative of a European firm {in the smaller towns) and by
virtue of this position he joined the Chamber.
Although few records of the early Ghana Chambers of Commerce are now
available, two Government files on the Cape Coast and Winneba Chambers indicate
that most members were Europeans, with a fe-r.v Africans representing British
·firms and the odd African representing himself. 32

The need for election to

Chambers of Commerce would exclude many Africans whose behaviour did not meet
with the approval of their European counterparts.

The lists of members of the

Chambers indicate the predominantly European composition of the bodies which
had so much power on the Coast.

Nevertheless; in 1922 the Secretar-y of the

Winneba Chamber was able to write to the District Commissioner, regarding his
inquiry as to African membership
• • • "t-Ti th reference to representation of native traders on the
Chamber, J: have to inform you that Mr. A. W. Yamoah, who is the largest
native trader in Winnebah, is a member of my Chamber. The President also
wishes me to state that the Chamber would gladly entertain any applications from any native traders of repute who desire membership. 33
At least one attempt was made by Africans to set up their own Chamber of

31 At a conference between African leaders and European businessmen on 16

December 1930, Nana Ofori Atta asked a question about the admittance of
Africans to Chambers of Commerce. The reply from the Accra Chamber was 11 • •
the Constitution of the Chamber contained no colour bar and . • • all were
open to election provided that they represented registered firms." GNA Adm.
11/1070.

•

32 The

author made extensive inquiries as to the whereabouts of such records and could locate only one file each on the Cape Coast and Winneba
Chambers, recorded respectively as GNA Adm.23/l/255, Cape Coast, and GNA Adm.
23/1/277, Cape Coast.

c

33 Letter

from the Secretary, Winneba Chamber of Commerce, to the District
Commissioner, Winneba, 15 June 1922, in GNA Adm.23/l/277, Cape Coast.
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Commerce in Accra, not in opposition to the European Chamber but to complement
it.

In 1936 the Gold Coast Merchant's Association, as it was called, had about

thirty members, and also had branches in Kumasi and the Western Province.

Mem-

bership was open to "Any African concern established and directly interested in
the commerce and trade of the Gold Coast, [Ashanti?], Northern Territories and
Mandated Territory of Togoland." 34 Most of the members were merchants, although one or two were engaged in produce buying and some lawyers were
attached to the organization.

The principal object of the Association was

stated to be the " • • • protection of African commercial concerns, " 35 and it
was envisaged that by acting together the members would have more credibility
as businessmen, and would be able to get larger import licences, to have more
access to information, and generally to be more influential.

Both the European

Chamber and the Government looked on this venture with a benevolent paternal
eye; but unlike the European Chambers, the Merchant's Association was never
considered a representative body nor consulted as to policy by the Government.
Without the kind of access to Government, either in the colony or in
Britain, which the European business community enjoyed, the African elite was
obliged to concentrate on its representation in the Legislative Council and to
press for reforms in the Legislative Council so that its voice could be heard.
Although as of 1916 Africans were allowed six representatives on the Legislative Council, three more than the Europeans had by the 1916 Constitution and

34 Gold Coast Merchant's Association, Constitution. Information on the
Gold Coast Merchant's Association was provided by }IT. N. T. Clerk of Accra,
April 1974. Mr. Clerk was himself a photographer and trader with connections
in Europe; he and his cousin were the guiding lights behind the organization.
The GCMA existed until 1957, when it merged with the Eu~opean organizations to
form the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce. I am indebted to Mr. Clerk for
providing me with a copy of the GCMA Constitution and Rules.
35 Ibid.

239
one more than the European unofficials

0

tion meant little.

aft~r

1925, in practice this representa-

African opinion was simply not considered to be as valid,

meaningful, or representative as

Europe&~

opinion.

In any case there was an

official majority on the Council; and official members were obliged to vote for
the policy put forward by the Government; that is, by the Colonial Office; they
could not vote independently.

"It is within the province of the Colonial

Secretary to require, should he consider it necessary to do so, an offidal
member to vote for the Government." 36

But in practice official members almost

always voted with the Government without being so required.
The policy of the Government with regard to the unofficials was not that
they were, or should be, an unofficial opposition, but rather that they were a
purely consultative group of people who were, indeed, privileged to be or:. the
Council at all.

If all the unofficials were opposed to a measure, Governors

after the First World War would usually reconsider it.

But what usually

occurred was that the European unofficials Joined the official members, while
the African unofficials were in opposition.

Time after time in the Legislative

Council Africans opposed a measure which all the Europeans approved. 37

In such

cases, they had no power.
The patronizing manner with which the Government regarded at least the
African unofficials is shown in the following quote from the Governor in 1904
in his address on the Estimates.

11

The Governor concluded by saying that this is

the first occasion on which he has presented Annual Estimates to the Council,

36Statement by the Governor, GCLegCo, 26 November 1914.
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370ne of the few occasions when a bill was withdrawn was in 1930 when the
cocoa cess (tax) bill, a bill to impose an additional seven per cent tax on
cocoa exports to finance a cocoa marketing scheme, was introduced. African
opposition to this scheme was reinforced by opposition from the home Challibers;
hence the Governor withdrew the cess. GCLegCo, 4 December 1930.
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and he is glad to see that they have been comparatively little criUcized, and
that the unofficial members recognize the steps that are being taken for the
development of the country. " 3 8 That the attitude did not change greatly in the
ensuing years can be seen in the reply which one European unofficial made in
Council in 1928 when J. E. Casely Hayford suggested that Africans be allowed
even more unofficial representation than they already had.
I would • • • tell the Honourable Municipal Member for Sekondi [Casely
Hayford] that on the day on which an unofficial majority sits in the
Council that will be the day when British, I might say European, capital
will commence to leave this Colony • • • • [T]he Honourable Member for
Sekondi is, in my opinion, about one hundred years before his time i~ his
desire for self-government. 39
Whatever representative functions the African unofficials did enjoy,
moreover, were further jeopardized by the offhand way in which Legislative
Council meetings were run.

The unoffi'cials were rarely given agendas to read

before the meetings, and often were expected to make decisions on Bills which
they had never seen before.

Rules were almost always waived by the Attorney-

General so that the first, second, and third readings of a Bill could be held
at the same meeting, thus not allowing any time for consultation or discussion.

As one African argued" • • • if we were afforded the opportunity of longer time
[to consider Bills] probably we might have been in a position to go more deeply
and thoroughly into things after reading the papers. • , • " 40
there were very few meetings of the Legislative Council:

In any case

usually there were

about three a year averaging one-and-one-half days each in length.

And there

was no African representation on the Gold Coast Executive Council, where the
most important decisions which were independent of London were made.

3 8GCLegCo, 27 September 1904.
39

stateh~nt by Mr. Youngman, GCLegCo, 9 March 1928.

40 Statement by Nana Ayirebi Acquah III, GCLegCo, 20 February 1936.
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The types of complaints which African u:nofficials made against the
Legislative Council often bore marked similarities.to the complaints made by
the European u:nofficials.

For, despite the fact that the lines drawn were

usually racial, that is, African versus European, there was considerable conflict between the two European groups, the trading and the administrative, as
well.

The expatriate community in Ghana, white tight-knit, was by no means

monolithic.

The governing class was often motivated by an idealism, or e.t

least a sense of responsibility to the "natives," which the commercial community lacked.

After the First World War, once all of Ghana had been

con~uered

or "pacified, 11 a change took place in administrators, and former military men
were replaced by a group of people chosen for their "attitude of responsibili ty. u41

These new African colonial civil servants tended to come from the "new

poor" in Britain, the downwardly-mobile

former landed gentry, or to be the

younger sons of respectable families who often still maintained an attitude of
looking down on trade.

According to Robert Heussler, the laudatory historian

of the colonial civil service, their chief characteristics were their honesty,
gentlemanly conduct, and devotion to duty. 42

Whether such praise was warranted

or not, it was the case that the social origins and ideals of the administrative class differed to some extent from those of the trading class, and also
that, as training in administration, forestry, and agriculture became conEon
among the civil servants, their sense of responsibility to the colony as a

41 Heussler,

42 Ibid., p.

c

op. ait., p. 25.

43. Heussler's view, however, should be contrasted with that
of H. D. Perraton, "The Man on the Spot: British Officials in Late Nineteenth
Century Africa," in The Theo1y of Imperialism and the EuPopea:n PaPtition of
Af!'ica (Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1967),
pp. 146-147. Peeraton views the civil servants as social, fi.nancia1, professional and personal failures, often possesEed of a touch of sadism and a
desire to dominate.
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whole (or at least their capacity to see beyond the present and consider Gh&~a
as a resource to be preserved} was greater than that of the profi t-seeki:v.g
traders.
In 1908, the Chief Justice of the Gold Coast, Sir William Brandford
Griffith, gave a speech in the Legislative Council which was an impassioned
defense of the traders in the Colony.
He says that to the traders the whole Colony, Natives and Europeans,
a debt of gratitude; that it is thanks to the traders that we now
have this flourishing Colony; that when the Colony was struggling in its
infancy it was the traders who pulled it through • • • • [W]hat would the
Colony have been without the traders to dep8t and to ship its produce?
What would the Colony have done, what would the mines have done, without
the shipping companies? • • • [I]n view of all that has happened since
1900 it is perhaps a fortunate circumstance that the big traders and the
shipping companies did not quit their uatural grooves of business. ~he
merchants and shipping companies, however, are quite able to take care
of themselves; they are not here like the missions for benevolent purposes nor like the Government for the sake of civilization but for their
own interests. Still, their welfare, specially in the case of the
larger, one might almost say the historical firms, is largely bound ~p
with the welfare of the Colony in general and that they fully recognise
this has been shown both by the debates in this Council Chamber and ty
their endeavours to develop the resources of the Colony. 43
owe

Such praise of the traders was rare indeed from the mouth of an administrator,
for despite the fact that, to the African, the two groups appeared inseparable,
there were severe strains between them.

The issue of land ownership split

them; so also did the increasing oligopolization of Ghana's trade throughout
the twentieth century.

The Government also made a few attempts to protect

African cocoa farmers from the vagaries of the world market, attempts which
were not appreciated by the firms and which were usually stifled after complaints had been made to the appropriate officials at the Colonial Office.
In 1900, for example, the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce complained that
Government traders were interfering in the marketplace by buying cocoa.

c

43 GCLegCo,

26 October 1908.
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The Gov-ernor admitted that his Government had given, and still
proposed to give~ some a.ssistance to native planters, who had been
offered only nominal prices for their produce at the ports, rather th~~
allow their plantations to perish from neglect, owing to their alleged
unprofitableness. 4 4
The Governor was eventually obliged to agree, under Chamber pressure, that such
Government cocoa buying would be only a temporary measure.
In 1909, the Chambers again complained of Government attempts to help
African sellers, this time only by informing the cocoa producers of what the
prices for cocoa were in Europe.

" • • • the Government Officials in the Gold

Coast appeared to be habitually exhibiting to the natives at Coomassie, Accra,
and elsewhere, information respecting the prices obtained in the markets for
produce, and • • • such prices were exhibited to the disadvantage of the
European merchants. • • . "4 5

The Secretary of State for the Colonies assured

the Manchester Chamber, when it complained of this practice, that the Governor
would be warned to include information as to the dates of the prices, and the
costs of freight to Europe,

in these notices. 4 6

These incidents illustrate the types of conflicts which existed between
the two groups in the colony.

Both traders and administrators were directly

responsible to their principals at home and in fact had very little power on
their own.

~1ether

they liked it or not, those officials who wished to help

the Africans, in whatever ways they could devise, were aware that the Colonial
Office was in frequent consultation with the expatriate business community and
almost always put its needs and desires (which were so often congruent with the
needs and desires of "the Em:pire 11 ) ahead of those of the people whom it was

c

44 LivCC,

Fift-ieth Annual RepoT't (1900), ~· 181.

45ManCC,

3 May 1909.

46

Letter from the Earl of Crewe to ManCC, 27 May 1909, included in ManCC,

14 June 1909.
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supposed to be "civilizing."

The :fact o:f oligopolistic control, the fact that

the Government had to deal with a very small number of people who had a great
deal of power over the economy of Ghana (more so, no doubt, than the Colonial
Office itself); and the :fact that without constantly heeding the Chambers o:f
Commerce and doing their bidding the Colonial Office could have found its operations in Ghana disrupted, were very important.

Insofar as the Government was

concerned with other than business activities it still had to take the wishes
of the expatriate firms into consideration.

All Government decisions were cir-

cumscribed by the wishes of this sector.
Moreover, the view of the home Government was that business, trade, and
free enterprise were the key to the progress and wealth of the Empire.
by 1900 had lost her position as leader of the world system of

Britain

capitalis~;

at

most she was p:r>imus inte:t' paT'eB with Germany, the united States, and France.
The Empire was to provide resources to finance her industries at home, ru1d
markets for her products.

Companies such as Miller and Swanzy, and later the

UAC; banks such as the BBWA and shipping lines such as Elder Dempster were
what kept this vast profit-seeking Empire tvgether.

The :function of the colo-

nial Governments was to mediate between the :firms and the peoples of the
colonies, to ensure the smooth operations of the whole.

Under such circum-

stances, their primary function was to institute the types of structures which
would facilitate trade.

Two of the most urgent needs of the expatriate commercial class in Ghana
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were for infrastructure; a
means of exchange and a mode o:f transport.

The Government provided these fa·

cilities as a response to expatriate economic

-

2.

n~eds.

The Development of Currency in Ghana
In order that trade might progress profitably in Ghana it was necessary

c

for the British that a convenient, efficient currency be used all over the
Colony.

Early trade in Ghana was carried out by a variety of currencies, some

used merely as a form of barter and some used as an actual means of accounting
and of exchange.

The former included lengths of cloth and beads, while the

latter included currencies traditionally in use among the Africans themselves,
such as salt, cowrie shells, and gold dust and nuggets, as we 11 as currencies
introduced by the Europeans, such as iron bars.

Metal coins circulated freely

over the colony, and before the British took over political control complicated
systems of reckoning had been worked out anong the traders to accommodate coins
from America, Britain and Continental countries such as France, Germany and
Spain.

Notes were not used because no notes could survive the climate ru1d the

ants.

Nor, until the establishment of the BBWA in 1896, were there any facili-

ties either for storing notes or for estab:Lishing a system of exchange based on
cheques such as had developed in Europe over the preceding four centuries.
Facilities for exchange in Ghana prior to the political takeover were indeed
primitive.

While they inconvenienced many, however, some traders preferred

them as they were.

The barter trade offered opportunities for making extra

profits as "natives" could easily be cheated with shoddy goods. 47

While the

majority of the business community agreed with the Government that a need for
better currency was evident, a few argued for the old system.

But by the end

of the nineteenth century the Government i i;self wanted a more rational system,
to facilitate payments for tax and customs duties purposes.
One of the first tasks of the Government was to abolish all foreign
coins from the colony and confine currency strictly to British coins.

There

was no West African currency until 1912; the currency which circulated in Ghana

c

47Hopk'~ns,

11

The Creat~on
.
••• , 11 op.

't
a~.,

p. 131.
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was the same as that which circulated in Britain itself.
also circulated.

But many other coins

The demonetization of these foreign coins was a gradual

process; as parts of Ghana became more and more closely integrated into the
network of trade with Britain foreign coins were removed from the lists of
legal currency.

As early as 1889 the Legislative Council saw fit to demonetize

what was perhaps the only indigenous bullion, gold dust and nuggets, 48 which
the Africans for years had used as a means of exchange and as a measure of
value.

The Government's reasons for doing this were apparently twofold; to

protect the maximum amount of gold for export to Britain, and to force Ashanti
traders away from their traditional contacts with the northern Sahara trade
routes to the South, where they would have to acquire European coin and deal
with European traders.

Gold was the only convenient form of traditional

African currency (cowrie shells were too heavy and cumbersome for large transactions) and ~~thout it Africans became more dependent on the European mnrket.
Having eliminated gold, the British gradually demonetized other European currencies, either by banning them or by imposing ad valorem duties of ten per
cent or

per cent on their importation. 49

Nevertheless as late as 1930 both

French five-franc pieces, used in the cattle trade with French colonies, 50 and
German coppers, left over from the German rule in Togoland, 51 were circulating

4 8GCLegCo, 12 April 1889.
49 In

1909 there was a ten per cent ad valorem duty on all foreign silver
imported into the colony. The London Chamber of Commerce asked the Colonial
Office to remove this duty, arguing that it was in restraint of trade, but its
request was refused. LonCC, 9 December 1909.
50 In 1930 the five-franc piece was demonetized and a 12~ per cent duty
imposed upon it. GCLegCo 2 4 December 1930.

c

51 In

1930 it was decided to redeem 1,200,000 German coppers and replace
them with nickel 1/lOd. pieces. GCLegCo, 17 February 1930.
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in the colony and had to be declared illegal tender.
As well as ensuring that all coins were of British origin, the Government of Ghana was obliged, in order to facilitate trade and the acquisition of
British goods by the ordinary African, to provide coins of a sufficiently small
denomination for his use.

Imported European goods were often divided and sub-

divided into smaller and smaller quantities before they reached their ultimate
consumers.

The purchaser in a small village market, for example, might be

buying a few matches at a time, or one small can of sugar at a time.

Hence,

the Government periodically issued coins of ~' ~' or even as little as 1/10 pence
in value.
Unlike in Britain, however, where the populace had been used to dealing
with silver coins for centuries, the idea ••as new to some Africans.

With the

plethora of foreigners in the colony came a plethora of coins, and it was difficult to distinguish the real from the fa1se.
counterfeiting was easy.

In such a situation,

As late as 1930, for instance, the Basel Mission

found to its chagrin that cardboard coins which it had issued to schoolboys for
educative purposes at Koforidua were being sold as real coins. 52

Perhaps the

fact that the Basel Mission had issued these coins was a sufficient guarantee
of their value; or perhaps sufficient coins of low value were not available in
the marketplace and the cardboard coins filled the gap.
It may have been because instances of forgery or counterfeiting were
commonplace that Africans quickly became

Q~strustful

of any but new coin3.

By

the turn of the twentieth century it was commonplace among West African traders
that their customers would not accept old, used British coins.

The traders

assumed that the reason for this refusal was that Africans used the coins not

c

52

Reported in a docmnent signed by the Commissioner of Police, Central
Province, 13 July 1931. In GNA Adm.23/1/599, Cape Coast.
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only for exchange, but also for decoration.

Another possibility was that some

Africans could not distinguish between the intrinsic value and the exchange
value of worn currency; hence once a coin had lost weight through constant use
they thought that it would not be able to buy the same amount of goods.

But it

was also possible that Africans were wary of old coins because they could not
recognize them and worried that they might be receiving demonetized foreign
currency, or forged currency, instead of legal tender.

British coins could not

legally be recoined until they had lost nine per cent of their weight; but
Africans would not accept coins up to nine per cent worn. 53

New coin, there-

fore, had constantly to be shipped to Ghana from England.
Indeed this desire on the part of Africans for new coin was one of the
prime reasons why, by 1900, the idea of setting up a West African currency separate from British currency was being considered in Rome Government circles.
In that year a committee was set up to consider the question, but was unable to
reach a decision. 54 The question was therefore left in abeyance until 1912,
when a Committee under Lord Emmott 55 met and agreed to set up the West African
Currency Board, 56 which would issue and supervise a new West African cur1·ency.
The West African currency was designed to take away from the British Rome
Government the responsibility for supplying West Africa with coins.

The actual

expense of such supplying was prohibitive; without paper money, all currency
had to be shipped to Ghana in coin form and the weight alone was very great.

A

53 This point was made in ManCC, 19 January 1912.
54 "Departmental

c

Committee Appointed to Inquire into Matters Affecting the
Currency of the British West African Colonies anu Protectorates. Report, with
a Despatch from the Secretary of State." Cd.6426 (1912), hereafter referred to
as the Emmott Committee, p. 5.
55Ibid.
56 Rereafter

referred to as WACB.
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more important fear, however, was that the colony would not always be able to
absorb the large amounts of coin which were being shipped to it and that the
coin might have to be reabsorbed into the economy of the British Isles, causing
inflation.

While in 1886 West Africa as a whole had only about three per cent

as much coin as the British Isles, by 1910 it had almost lOO per cent as much.
Table 20.

Coin in West Africa and the British Isles 57

Average for the Period

West Africa
£ (i)

United Kingdom
£ (ii)

(i) as %
of (ii)

1886-1890
1891-1895
1896-1900
1901-1905
1906-1910

24,426
116,323
257,090
262,786
666,190

920,088
761,039
796,425
234,150
781,073

15.
32
112
85

3

This phenomenal increase in the supply of coin to West Africa over a
twenty-five year period frightened the administrators of the Government, many
of whom felt that Africans must be hoarding the cash and that if it were eventually released it would cause an inflationary disaster, a disaster which,
unless the flow of coin back to the home country could be controlled, would
spread direct to Britain.

The idea that perhaps the coin was being absorbed

into the local economy was not entertained, probably because the Europeans had
a very unrealistic picture of local West African conditions and assumed that
currency was used only in the import-export trade.

(Thus, if the large

European firms did not recover almost as much cash for imported goods as they
paid out for cocoa by the end of every cocoa season, the assumption was that
whatever cash was left over was being hoarded, never that it was being investeu

c

or used for local market transactions.)

57 Emmott Committee, op. ait., p. 6.
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In 1912 the Emmott Committee, after extensive investigation into the
currency situation, 58 established a West African currency.

This new currency

was not repatriable to Britain, and thus could not threaten the stability of
the currency there.

The WACB was under strict regulation as to the amount of

currency which it could issue; basically, it was obliged to have lOO per cent
reserves in sterling to back its currency {see Table 21) and therefore could
not increase the amount of coinage in circulation in the colonies at will.

The

object of the Board was not to provide for the internal needs of the colonies,
but rather to safeguard British currency.

Even when there were shortages of

currency in the colonies, the Board was not empowered to create more currency
or mi.nt more coins to overcome these shortages. 5 9
Table 22 presents figures of the amount of coin imported to and exported
from the Gold Coast from 1920 to 1938.

From this table it can be seen that the

amount of coin in the colony followed the cocoa crop fairly closely; when the
prices were good, much money flowed into the colony, and when prices were poor,
there was little currency available.

During the 1930s there was a net export

of currency, except during 1937 and 1938 which follow the bumper crop of 193637.

Table 23 presents figures for the amount of West African currency issued

and redeemed from 1912 to 1939.

Currency could be issued in West Africa only

against payment in London; that is, the WACB had to deposit pound for pound in

58 But

c

without hearing any testimony from Africans. The question of
African representation was discussed in evidence to the Emmott Committee.
"Q. It has been suggested that it vrould be of assistance to the Committee,
though it seems impracticable, if the Committee could hear evidence from one or
two of the natives themselves. Perhaps you can tell the Committee how very
difficult it is to
at the reason at the bottom of the black man 1 s mind?
A. (D. W, Paterson, Chief Inspector, BBWA) It is very difficult indeed; :,rou do
not know why. It simply just is so." Cd. 6427, "Minutes of Evidence," Q.lll4.
5 9Newlyn

and Rowan, op. ait., p. 51.
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Table 21.

Currency Liability Reserves of the West African
Currency Board, 1923-3960

Year

Currency Liability (i)
£MM

Reserve (ii)
£MM

(ii) as %

1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

10.60
11.00
13.00
12.81
14.74
15.23
14.86
13.66
9.46
9.07
9.57
8.13
9·95
12.54
19.27
18.06
11.76

10.30
10.90
12.80
12.84
14.82
15.88
15.52
14.15
10.10
10.20
10.94
9.61
11.96
14.21
20.11
19.79
12.74

97
99
99
100
101
104
104
104
107
113
114
118
120
113
104
110
108

Table 22.

Gold Coast: Imports and Exports
of Silver and Alloy Coin61
Alloy Coin

Silver Coin
Year

Imports
£

Exports
£

Balance
£

Imports
£

Exports
£

Balance
£

+ 522,400
nil
1920-21 147,293 185,815 - 38,522
522,400
+ 994,800
nil
1921-22 69,204 788,728 -719,524 994,800
1922-23 35,294 649,851 -614,557 1,789,200 200,000 +1,589,200
nil
nil
nil
1923-24 43,680 346,988 -303,308
,ooo
3,900 175,066 -171,166 1,626,000 100,000 +1,
1924-25
+ 538,423
274 145,200 -144,926
nil
1925-26
538,423
+2,585,165
nil
157 91,600 - 91,443 2,585,165
1926-27
886 56,500 - 55,614 1
1927-28
,058 16,600 +1,105,458
246,684
16 66,450 - 66,434
1928-29
33,850 + 212,834
41 85,000 - 84,959
1929-30
78,928 916,000- 837,072
147 154,775 -154,628
1930-31
9,825 917,300- 907,475
4,162 501,700- 497,538
188 163,850 -163,662
1931-32

c

60 source:
the author.

of (i)

Newlyn and Rowan, op. ait., p. 50.

61 source: WACB; Report, 30 June 1938.
figures for 1912-19.

Total Balance
£

+ 483,878
+ 275,276
+ 974,643
- 3)3,308
+1,354,834
+ 3;J3,497
+2,493,722
+1,049,844
+ 146,400
- 922,031
-1,062,103
- 661,200

Percentages recalculated by

author was unable to obtain
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Table 22 (cont 'd.)
Silver Coin
Year

1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936-37
1937-38

Imports

Exports

Balance

Imports

Exports

Balance

£

£

£

£

£

£

14
46
21
33

114,900
99,550
69,874
50,254
21,825
31,025

nil
nil

Table 23.

-144,886
28
9,708
- 99,504
- 69,853 12,488
- 50,221 16,970
- 21 '825 3,226 '200
- 31,025 1,874,611

1912-14
1914-15
1915-16
1916-17
1917-18
1918-19
1919-20
1920-21
1921-22
1922-23
1923-24
1924-25
1925-26
1926-27
1927-28
1928-29
1929-30
1930-31
1931-32
1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936-37
1937-38
62source:

1,173,980
112,871
1,223,750
951,743
1,389,475
3,949 '467
9,099,824
1,964,473
369,500
1,213,900
1,137,400
3,535,532
2,705,175
5,361,446
4,600,725
3,003,570
3,062,240
24,045
1,580,105
1,491,137
25
2,202,800
2,502,200
7,957,305
nil

38,000
16,200
32,300
534,500
6,200
470,000

Total Balance
£

37,972
6,492
19,812
- 517,530
+3,220,000
+1,404,611

-

182,858
105,996
89,665
567,751
+3,198,175
+1,313,586

Amount of West African Currency Issued
and Redeemed, 1912-193862

Currency Issued in
West Africa against
Payment in London
£ (i)

Year

c

Allo;y Coin

London Payments in
Balance of
Redemption of Currency Currency Issued for
Deposited in W. Africa Use in West Africa
(i)-(ii)
£ (ii)

130,000
530,000
100,000
nil
nil
nil

3,651,000
6,887,000
2,003,425
715,000
1,220,200
1,717,900
3,030,600
3,543,000
4,149,500
4,695,800
4,262,500
3,210,300
2,074,000
1,078,000
1,511,800
394,000
nil

729,200
3,240,000

WACB, Report, 30 June 1938.

+1,043,980
- 417,129
+1,123,750
+ 951,743
+1,389,475
+3,949,467
+5,448,824
-4,922,
-1,633,925
+ lf98,900
82,800
+1,817,632
- 325,425
+1,818,446
+ 451,225
-1,692,230
-1,200,260
-3,186,255
- 493,895
+ 413,137
-1,511,775
+1,808,800
+2,502,200
+7,228,105
-3,240,000
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London, one sterling pound for one West African
its resources in the colonies.

pound~

before it could expand

Merchants who returned West African currency to

the Board could similarly redeem their money in pounds sterling in England.
The amount of West African currency depended on the needs for colonial currency
of those who could afford to pay for it in

sterling~

not on the needs of the

local economy.
Despite the fact, however, that the WACB was originally set up to prevent massive repatriation of currency from West Africa, such an eventual:i.ty
never arose.

Rather, the opposite situation was to occur with alarming fre-

quency in Ghana, causing considerable inconvenience to African farmers and
traders.

Currency shortages were common and provided considerable opportuni-

ties for profit by those who could take advantage of them.
During World War

I~

for example, there was a chronic shortage of coins

on the Gold Coast, caused by the conversion of the Royal Mint to the production of arms and ammunition.

Because of the shortage, cocoa farmers were

forced to sell their crops at lower prices than they had expected; and some
firms, which did not have any cash on hand, had to step aside and watch the
larger firms which controlled cash buy out the crop at prices which they
practically dictated.

c

The Combined Firms, as they are locally called, viz. Messrs Swanzy,
Millers, the African Association and the Basel Mission--enjoy a great
advantage and will mainly derive any benefit from cash put back into
circulation through the purchase of the general merchandise, in which
they are large dealers. One or two of their competitors will share this
advantage, though to a smaller extent, and will be able to hold their own;
but produce buyers puP et simple, such e.g. as Messrs. Cadbury, who • • •
do not obtain any local income from a retail business, will have no
alternative but to shut down all operations, and to allow themselves to
be pushed out of the market unless some means can be found materially to
relieve the situation. The position of advantage and preponderance uhich,
in view of this restricted competition will be secured to the Combined
Firms will unquestionably be used by them as a means of fore ing dmm the
price of cocoa to as low a figure as the natives can be induced to
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accept . • • • 63
• • • the Combines • • • are likely to get for ~ of a million the
remainder of the crop which they apparently were prepared to take at
about 2 millions. • . . 64
In 1919 the situation with regard to silver was so bad that the Government decided to take drastic measures and introduced a Bill to make illegal the
melting down or hoarding of silver coin. 65 The Government introduced the Bill
because it attributed the currency shortage not to the fact that the local
economy absorbed large amounts of currency which were not automatically returned to the firms every year after the cocoa season was
uses of silver on the part of Ghanaians.

over~

but to irrational

Unofficial members of the Legislative

Council pointed out to the Government, however, that people hoarded precisely
because they found it difficult to obtain silver, and also because they did not
understand the European banking system.66

This particular Bill was therefore

withdrawn and replaced by a milder Bill " . • . to prohibit the refusal to sell
articles exposed for sale if payment is tendered in currency notes." 67
Here the Government had hit the crux of the matter; although paper money
might be considered useful and a logical solution to the currency shortage in
the eyes of Europeans it was not so in the eyes of Africans.

A report in the

Manchester Chamber of Commerce in 1919 summed up African objections to notes
and pointed out that their objections were reasonable enough.

63Report to Bonar Law, M.P., from Hugh Clifford, Governor, 4 December
1915, in GNA Adm.l2/5/151. "Issue of British Currency Notes."
64 Unsigned memo, 1915, in GNA Adm.l2/5/151.
65GCLegCo, 17 November 1919.

c

66 Evidence presented in Chapter IV also indicates that the banks discriminated against Africans, perhaps explaining their reluctance to use the banks
better than a simple "misunderstanding" might explain it.
67GCLegCo, 12 March 1920.
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• the natives had no proper means of storing the notes. If they
placed them in their dwellings there was great risk of fire; if they
buried them the white ants would probably destroy the notes; and there
was no means of carrying them on their persons . . • •
A case was cited of a European carrying notes in his sun helmet
throughout a journey, with the result that the notes were reduced to
pulp at the end of it.68
One author claims that with the necessity to use paper money, Africans
were pushed into using the banking services available in the Colony.6 9

But

this was not entirely the case, for aside from their justified suspicion of
banks, Africans had to contend with the scarcity of banking services.
were few branches in the colony and most Africans were never near them.

There
Farm-

ers and villagers had to go to money-changers to cash their notes; they could
not avail themselves of the services so readily accessible to the European
community.
Yery soon after the issue of notes in West Africa began, the practice
of

11

discounting" notes began as well.

ThiJJ was a practice whereby the money-

changer would pay, say 15s/6d. in coin for a £1 note.

The practice was

declared illegal in 1918 70 but it nevertheless spread rapidly and continued
throughout the colonial period, whenever and wherever there were shortages of
coin.

In 1919 the situation was so grave that farmers paid in silver were

getting less than seventy-five per cent of the price of cocoa in notes in some
parts of the colony.

"

serious differentiations fare] made in the valu-

ation of silver and of notes by the local Cocoa Buyers in the Colony.

. at

Nsawam 25/- in silver is paid for a load of cocoa while the current price is
34/6 as paid on the 30th May in notes • • • • " 71

That the practice of

68ManCC, 12 May 1919.

c

69 McPhee,

op. cit., p. 246.

70acLegCo, 31 December 1918.
71 speech by Nana Ofori Atta in GCLegGo, 30 June 1919.
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discounting continued until later dates is evinced by the fact that in 1932 the
London Chamber of Commerce expressed concern to the Colonial Office about a
rumour (later found to be untrue) that the French were going to introduce silver money into their colonies.

The Chamber was afraid that this would divert

trade away from British West African colonies where producers were paid in
notes. 72
On the whole, the introduction and organization of West African currency
benefitted the European community far more than it benefitted the African.
Ghana had become part of the world economy at a time when its own currency and
credit systems lagged behind its capacities for production and exchange.

It

was in the interests of all parties in Ghana to have a better, more efficient,
more mobile currency.

But within the framework of their common needs,

Europeans fared better under the system set up by the WACB than did Africans.
For Europeans, with access to banks, notes were more mobile and cunvenient than coin.
the man who has to sell the goods and buy produce • • • is
strongly in favour of the note issue with a view to relieving, or •
reducing the cost of transport of the Eilver into West Africa, which
remains not only very costly, but extremely slow. In parts of the Gold
Coast it is impossible to move silver about from one town to the other
without a police escort. When the produce season is at its height you
may have to wait three to five to seven days before your police escort
is provided, and when it is provided it becomes very costly. With these
notes, it will be possible to send up, you might say, half the amount in notes, and the
itself might be able to wait for two or three
days. 73
Moreover, while Africans had a hard time cashing notes into the coin they so
desperately needed, Europeans had an easy time converting their West African
notes to English notes.

c

72 LonCC,

The West African currency had no independent

18 February and 18 April 1932.

7 3'J'estimony

of 1>1r. Pickering of Pickering and Berthoud, Manchester, to
the Emmott Committee, Cd.6427, Q.1927.
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existence, nor was it based on a gold standard.
sterling and it was based on the pound sterling.
so also did the West African pound.

Its reserves were held in
When the pound rose or fell,

In 1951, W. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan

wrote of the Board that it was n. • • precluded from following an independent
monetary policy • • • • From a broad point of view, the Board is a moneychanging and accounting device. n74
Indeed, it was only on condition that West African currency would be so
easily exchangeable into British currency that the expatriate business community
had accepted independent West African currency in the first place.

It was much

easier for a European than for an African to change the notes, since the
European generally was based in Europe, often in London, while the African had
few outside contacts and could not easily bank his British notes, or indeed use
them, even if he presented currency for redemption in West Africa.

The pounds

sterling he received in exchange for West African notes were paid to him in
London, not in Ghana. 75

Lacking European contacts, he had no use for the pound.

In essence, he was limited to soft currency while his European competitors
moved easily between soft and hard currency.
The colonies did derive one very small benefit from the WACB, however,
in the form of profits for the seigniorage of the currency the Board produced.
Seigniorage profits were the difference between the cost to the Board of
minting the coins and, the price at which the coins were sold.

740p •

en.•t • ' p. 51.

75 n • • •

c

In the late

merchants are able to pay the coin in West Africa to the Currency Officer and receive its sterling value from the Board in London. • .• "
Ormsby-Gore Report, op. ait., p. 176. See als~ GCLegCo, 1 June 1912, summary
of recommendations of the Emmott Committee. "Holders of coin of the new currency and of the silver Imperial coinage will have the legal right to tender
them in British West Africa for conversion at a fixed rate of exchange into
sterling money issuable in London. 11
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nineteenth century, the Royal Mint. because of a sudden fall in the price of
silver, had been making very large seigniorage profits, and one of the reasons
for the investigation of a possible separate West African currency system in
1900 had been the Colonial Office's desire to get control of the seigniorage
profits on coin for West Africa made by the Imperial Treasury. 76

The idea of a

separate currency board had been rejected at that time because it was feared
that the Colonial Office might overissue coins, causing inflation in the colonies (and possibly therefore at home if the coins were repatriated) in order to
make profits.

Between 1901 and 1910 the Colonial Office calculated that the

Treasury had made two million pounds in seigniorage on West African coins; 77 it
therefore pressed all the more strongly for a separate Board in 1912.
While the Colonial Office eventually won its battle for the distribution
of seigniorage profits to the colonies, the actual returns were very small.
The Gold Coast Government received no income from the WACB until 1923; from
that date until 1939 it never received even as much as £200,000 a year from the
Board 1 s profits.
Table 24.

Ghana Government Revenue from Profits
of the West African Currency Board,
1923-1939 78

Year

Amount
£'OOOs

Year

Amount
£ 1 000s

1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928

112
110
107
119
140
156

1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934

194
151
72
115
199
105

76 Hop k.~ns,
77
78

11

-

Year
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

Amour1t
£ 1 000s
86
42
40

Th e Creat•wn ••• , " op. cnt.,
.
p. 125.

Newlyn and Rowan, op. ait., p. 36.

Sourc(~: Kay, op. ait., Table 24a, "Government Revenue by Source, 190060,11 pp. 350-51.
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One reason for the small amount which the Government earned from the WACB •,vas
that its profits had to be placed in reserve to cover possible future costs of
redemption of coinage. 79
issue as reserves.

The Board was required to keep 100 per cent of its

From 1926 to 1939, it held over 100 per cent as reserves,

reaching a high of 126 per cent in 1935 (see Table 21).

With such a conserve.-

tive reserve policy, the WACB was hardly an agent for investment and development
in the colonies which it ostensibly served.

The reserves, moreover, were not

invested in colonial Government securities but in Imperial Government securities; they therefore were used not for the benefit of the colonies but for the
benefit of the home country.

The Board held. only securities which could be

easily marketed in London. 80
Thus on the whole, while the introdu::!tion of a standard West African
currency and the regularization of the means of exchange facilitated trade and
commerce within the country, it benefi tted the European commercial class far
more than it benefi tted the Ghanaian peasant or trader.

Similarly, the con-

struction of the transportation infrastructure was to benefit the expatriate
community far more than the

3.

Afric~~.

The Development of Transportation
in Ghana
Even without pressure from European commercial concerns, no doubt the

Colonial Office in London would have regarded it as its business to build
railroa.ds and roads in Ghana.

The colony had to be self-supporting, and in

order to support itself it needed revenues trhich could only be generated by
trade.

But the contact which the British b11siness interests had with the Gov-

ernment in Ghana helped to generate transport policy, to determine the types of

c

79Emmott Committee, Cd.6426, p. 9.
80 Newlyn

and Rowan, op. ait., p. 1~9.
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transportation which were to be constructed and where they were to be cor-structed.
The earliest concern of the colonial Government was to build railways
which would facilitate the development of the mining industry by allowing the
importation of sophisticated technology.

As long as the only form of transpor-

tation inland to the mines was by head-loading, all machinery had to be broken
up into pieces weighing not more than sixty pounds.

During the first

11

gold

rush 11 of the 1890s, when hundreds of small companies were floated to exploit
the gold resources of Ashanti, then seen as vast, it became obvious that such a
form of transport was inefficient.

The Colonial Office began to experience a

great deal of pressure to develop railways. 81

The first railway line in Ghana

was built in the late 1890s and early 1900s, from the port of Sekondi to the
gold mining area of Prestea-Tarkwa, and thence to Obuasi, the centre of Ashanti
Goldfields. 82
According to Dumett
The chief aims of railway construction had been the promotion of
profitable mining ventures which, more than any other form of enterprise,
could be expected to stimulate the economy of the entire Colony through
the mobilization of a wage labour force [by releasing carriers for other
occupations], the attraction of British capital, and the provision of
increased revenue for other development projects. 8 3
Preferential rates were charged for mining equipment, which was seen as an

As early as 1891 the Live1~ool Chaffiber of Commerce was pressuring the
Colonial Office, on behalf of the Gie Appantoo Mining Company, to build railways. The Company presented the Chamber with a memorial 11 • • • on the subject
of improvements in the way of access to their properties, desired by the Gold
Mining Companies of the Gold Coast." LivCC, For·t;y-First Annual Report (1891),
p. 90.
81

82

c

Details as to the dates of construction of roads and railways in Ghana
can be found in Peter R. Gould, The Development of the Transportation Pattern
in Ghana (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1960).
83Dumett,

"British • • • ," op. cit., p. 276.
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investment conducive to development. 84

Railway construction was financed by

the Government from its own revenues, or through the floating of loans.

The

Government did not view Ghana as a good location for private investment in
railway construction, as the land was not properly surveyed, and there were
problems with climate, labour, and supplies which private investors could not
handle.

It discouraged the idea of private investment in railway construction

although it let out contracts for construction to private individuals (including Africans) 85 and allowed mines to construct their own railways when the
Government lines did not fulfil their needs.

Between 1902 and 1913, the

Government granted three loans totalling £3,163,000 to the Gold Coast

British

Government for railway and harbour construction. 86

Additional financing was

obtained by the floating of loans on the London market, as ". • • ordinary commercial investments."87
But private interests, although they acknowledged the difficulties of
building railways in a tropical country, were often dissatisfied with Government policies and argued that a system of private investment and construction
would be better.

They urged that the Government invite tenders for railways.

Petitions were constantly sent to the Colonial Office urging both private construction of railways and the taking over of already constructed railways by
private firms on the grounds that Government administration was inefficient. 88

84

Ibid.' p. 287.

85McPhee, op. ait., p. 113.
86 D. K. Greenstreet, "The Transport Department--the First Two Decades
(1901-20)," The Eaonomia Bulletin of Ghana, no •. 3, vol. 10 (1966}, p. 35.

c

87McPhee, op. ait., p. 114.
88 In 1911 the London Chamber suggested leasing the Nsawam-Accra railway to
a private concern on the grounds that it would be better run. LonCC, 12 January

1911.
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':'he Government did in fact :nGl:e several Yentures into the contract syst.ec:1 on

.!\

large scale; !'or example in 1909 it agreed to give a contract to "the firm of
. W. H. Murphy, in Dublin, to build the Accra-Mangoase line.B 9

On'the w·hole,

hm1ever, it found that the cont:ract system, al thoug.ll it might provide goocl
opportunities for profit (or graft) to private firms, vas not satisfactory.
The argument as to who was to construct railways, Governncmt er p.:ri:" te

enterprise, went on until 1923 when the
vate EnterpriHe Comrni ttee. 90

~ueation

the Pri-

was investigated

This Conrm:i ttee argued t!'lat the car:ty railii ~,ys

built by contract had been too costly because the Government lu;.d ha.d no co;rtJ·, ..L
over spending; complete constrtJction by Government was a better system. 91
• • • ,;e feel assured that at the present sta.ge of
wholly private company would be tempted to embark upon r:::.:'.l>ray
·::et::·:
without special inducements· in the form of la.."ld cor~cessicnu, l~~inf;:::et1
rights, or a guarantee of interest at a rate which vlOuld render cc:struction by the State itself a more economical alternative . • .
• • • it is not to be anticipated that private enter:: . se \Jil1 be
found wiLling to finance, construct and operate re.ilvays u.'lr,:L c.ed
Government in the present stage of development in Tr~pics~ Africa.. 2
By 1923, hovrever, the railway infrastructure necessary for in-.,·e2tors in
Ghanaian trade had already been created, so that the question of vJho ;;as t::;
finance it waa no longer a live issue.

Moreover, the Gove:n:.lliEmt

connecting to the Government railway lines when necessary, as

89 Reported

.E~s

in the JWAC, 1'7 February 1909.

90 "Report of the Co:mmi ttee appointed to consider and rer:Jrt i.'nsthcr,

011

if so what, measures c01.1~d be taken to encourage Private Enter1)rise in the
Development of the British Dependencies in East and West Trqdee.l A;.'rica~ 1-r:!."':h
special· Referemc-e to Existing ~::md Projected Schemes of Tran.sport:.tion. n Cn.ci.
2016 (1924).

c

92Ib·d
' 1- •

J

pp. 18 and 21.
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charged reasonable rates to the general public,9 3 To encourage such private
construction the Private Enterprise Railways Construction Bill was passed in

1907, stipulating that

11

•••

the provisions of the Public Lands Ordinance

shall apply to lands required for such a railway, and the Government are thereby empowered to acquire such lands on behalf of the licensee. " 94

This Bill

confirmed an earlier Bill passed in 1905 which retroactively gave the Prestea
Railway Limited the right to compulsory purchase of land on which it had alreaqy built its railway.
Owing to a mistake on the part of the engineer in charge, the line was
built before all the land on which it was constructed or through which it
passes, was formally acquired; and although most of such land has been
privately purchased, the object of the present Bill is to confer powers
of compulsory purchase in respect of those portions of land which the
Company has been unable to acquire privately. 9 5
African members of the Legislative Council -vrere of course against this Bill,
arguing that it was yet another infringement of indigenous property rights.
• • • some of the lands proposed to be compulsorily purchased by the
Company for this Railway are Stool property. If the Company is allowed
to purchase land absolutely, other Companies will come and ask for a
similar privilege and the precedent now laid down may be followed. The
result of this will be that in the course of time the Chiefs may be compelled to alienate all their ancestral property. 9G
Such opposition on the part of Africans to private railways was supported
by that section of the expatriate commercial community which was more concerned
with the import-export si de of the Ghana.i an econolllY than with the mining si de.
The merchants, cocoa-buyers and general traders felt that road-building
93 JWAC,

25 July 1906.

94 GCLegCo, 30 December 1907.
95Statement by ~~. Hunt, a. European Unnoficial Member, in GCLegCo, 23
November 1905.

c

96 statement by Mr. Brown, an African Unofficial Member, in GCLegCo, 23
November 1905.
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suffered at the expense of railway- (and, later, harbour-) construction.

They

saw the' gold-mining companies as having extra access to and pull with the
Colonial Office.

This view was especially reinforced in 1903, when it was dis-

covered by accident that in 1901 the Government had made an Agreement with
Ashanti Goldfields for the completion and working of the railway between
Sekondi and Kumasi so that it would go through the Ashanti Goldfields headquarters in Obuasi.
the Government "

In 1900, the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation had approached
• with an offer of a guarantee of interest upon the capital

which would be required if the Government U."'ldertook to extend the railway from
Tarquah to Coomassie

...

n97

The Agreement eventually settled upon included

the following terms:
That the Government have the right to convey troops and all stores
over the whole line at 'cost of conveyance'.
That if in any year the excess of gross receipts over working expenses
is less than £30,000, the Corporation shall pay to the Government a sum
equal to the difference, but not exceeding £30,000.
That while in the case of a deficit the Corporation are liable to the
extent of £30,000 per annum, on the other hand, if in any year the receipts shew an excess of over 4~~ on the outlay, the Corporation are to
receive a fifth of such net profits. 98
Both the traders and other miners, once they heard of this Agreement, protested
vigorously,

over a period of several years, against it.

Under the provisions

of the Agreement for low freight charges for Government, the traders felt that
they would be subsidizing the transport needs of Ashanti and the Northern Terri tories.

Further, they felt that "Ashanti Goldfields • • • would practically

·fix the rates" 99 so that high charges for imported manufactured goods and for

c

97Letter to the London Chamber of Commerce from R. L. Antrobus of the
Colonial Office, in LonCC, 21 March 1904.
98LonCC, 11 July 1904.
99Ibid.

0

cocoa, palm oil, and other exports would subsidize low charges for mining
equipment.

With all of its other

adv~~tages,

it was the last straw that Ashanti

Goldfields was entitled to a share of the railroad's profits in return for
accepting responsibility for a deficit which never, in fact, occurred •
• • • the liability of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation under the
Agreement to recoup any deficits on the Railway to the extent of
£30,000 per annum, ha(s] not come into operation owing mainly to the
high rates for traffic which the various Companies ha[ve] paid upon the
goods forwarded by them over the railway.lOO
The opposition from both the traders and rival mining firms to this Agreement
was so intense that the Government was eventually obliged to cancel it.

Nego-

tiations took place over a period of several months to settle upon a lump sum
which Ashanti Goldfields should pay the Government in return for having had the
railway built through Obuasi; eventually, however, the Agreement was cancelled
without any payment at all by the firm.

As soon as the Agreement was cancelled,

the Government revised the rates on the Sekondi-Tarkwa railway. 101
That such an Agreement as the one referred to above could have been made
in the first place was merely a reflection of the Government's overriding concern, in the early colonial period in Ghana, to facilitate the development of
mining and of railways, controlled by Government, which would provide it with
revenue.

Table 25 indicates the percentage of Government revenue which

from railways.

c~e

Between 1904, when the Sekondi-Kumasi line was completed, and

1927, when competition from road transport began to undercut railway carriage,102 railway revenue fell only once below twenty per cent of Government

100Report of a sUbcommittee of the London Chamber of Commerce on the
Ashanti Goldfields Agreement, LonCC, 15 November 1904.

c

101 statement by the Governor in GCLegCo, 6 February 1905.
102 competition between road and rail transport in Gh~~a is discussed
below.
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Table 25.
Year

Total Government Revenue
£000 IS ( i)

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

c

Government Revenue from Railways, 1900-1939 103

383
496
512
578
682
586
683
709
752
779
1,007
1,112
1,231
1,302
1,332
1,456
1,886
1,624
1,299
2,601
3,722
3,016
3,357
3,743
3,971
4,116
4,365
4,122
3,914
3,397
2,671
2,284
2,671
2,685
2,778
3,268
3,775
3,792
3,780
3,734

103 Source:

Revenue from Railways
r.ooors {ii)

65
147
130
172
168
150
182
249
295
329
357
381
446
506
494
453
664
736
796
892
1,012
1,073
1,106
1,156
134
134

(ii) as % of {i)

11
22
22
25
24
20
23
25
27
27
27
29
31
~7

30
35
26
20
26
27
27
27
27
26
3
3
.,..

23

1

raw figures from Kay, op. ait., Table 24a "Government Revenue
by Source, 1900-60, 11 pp. 348-55.
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revenue and was generally above twenty-five per cent.

By increasing or de-

creasing railway rates on various products the Government could control
development policy as well ·as increase or decrease its own income.
Given the Government concentration on
seemed like a neglected step-sister.

railways~

road construction often

A Department of Roads was created in

Ghana in 1894; in 1901 this became the Department of Transport.

But it would

seem that for the first two decades of its existence the Transport Department's
function was not to build roads so much as it was to find labourers to act as
Government carriers or to work on Government railways.l0 4 Such neglect of
actual construction occurred despite much pressure from the Manchester and
Liverpool business comnn.mities, who, because they were so involved in importexport trade, were anxious for roads to be built to the cocoa-farming areas of
the colony so that farmers could get their produce out and so that traders with
imported goods for sale could go deeper and deeper into the "bush. 11

Yet as

late as 1926 the policy as regards roadbuilding was still to give priority to
roads feeding the railways, then to roads serving other useful trade purposes,
and finally to roads built for administrative purposes. 105

The primary ~urpose

of roads was to act as feeders to railways even when railways were not conveniently located for trade purposes.
Until 1918, of course, the Government could argue that wide roads were
not a necessity, since the most predominant forms of road use were headcarriage and cask-rolling.

For either of these activities, narrow paths were

preferable to wide roads which could not provide adequate shade for the African
labourers engaged in carrying or rolling.

c

There was no transport by beasts of

104Greenstreet, op. ait.
l05statement by the Governor to GCLegCo, 22 February 1926.

268

c

burden, whose susceptibility to the tse-tse fly rendered them useless.

After

1918, however, European firms, and also the Government, began to import light
lorries in large numbers.
these imports.

The demand for roads increased concomitant with

Traders began to oppose other forms of investment in transport,

especially the Central Province railway which was constructed in 1923, on the
grounds that more roads should be built first.

11

•

•

•

in the Western Provinces

there [is] • • • a large area of available land suitable for the cultivation of
cocoa, where there [are] • • • neither adequate roads, or adequate transports.tion facilities • • • " 106
Much of the construction of roads which took place was not a result of
Government initiative, but rather of African initiative.

"So great was the en-

thusiasm for road-building that in Ashanti, for example, it was not unusual for
villagers to give road engineers a free hand to demolish houses or cut thelr
way through cocoa farms, provided the road passed through or near the vll-

lage."l07
Villages even went so far as to give contracts to European firms to
build roads for them. 1 0 8

The Government grew to rely on such African

106Thus the London Chamber of Commerce argued, futilely, against the construction of the Central Provinces Railway, LonCC, ll Ja...'1uar,y 1923.
107K. B. Dickson, "The Development
Ashanti since about 1850," T:Pansactions
5 (1961), p. 38. The Krobo people also
able to tap all their plantations. See
22 February 1926.

of Road Transport in Southern Ghana and

of the Historical Soaiety of C!hana, no.
built their own roads in order to be
speech by Nene Mate Kale in GCLegCo,

108see the statement of the Governor describing the employment of Italian
contractors in the Akwapim hills, GCLegCo, 23 October 1916. " ••• the natives
of some of the now flourishing towns situated on the summit of the JL~wapim
range of hills, recently employed an Italiun contractor, at their own charger:>,
to contruct a motor-road, 10 miles in length and costing £800 per mile, leading
down to and forming a junction with the PWD 1 s road from Adawso to Mangoase. 11
But the Governor went on to say "This work, it should be noted, was designed,
not to serve any immediate commercial purpose, but to enable the wealthy cocoafarmers of this division to spend as much time as possible with their families
in the hills."

0

enterprise for the upkeep of roads.

poJ.i~y

Early transport

was that all vil-

lages were to contribute compulsory quarterly labour on the roads in return for
a sma.ll payment; later the Government came to expect that villages would also
:finance road construction.

Indeed, whenever the issue of land concessions was

raised the Government argued that concessions rent!! obi!.adiJ.;ed by the various
tribes should be invested in roads, which no doubt wmwd benefit the Africans
concerned but which would also benefit the European
tive removed much of the burden of financing local

t~~ers.

African initia-

t~ailll.\Z:rJ)Urlation

routes from

the shoulders of the Government.
Maps 2 and 3 indicate that despite the fact t:halt Gtrvernment investment
policies concentrated more on railways than on

road's·~·

a.. c0nsiderable network of

roads was built up in Ghana during the colonial perl.o'dl..
maps indicate the north-south orientation of the

At the same time, the

t~spoTtation

roads and railways were geared for t.he export trade·,, a

tr~e

network.

Both

which was fa::::ili-

tated by the construction of the modern Tak:oradi lmrbow in the late 1920s.
The railways were built to promote the southerly fiow o.f goods a."ld the rates
charged reflected the directional flow; low rates cm
to the ports, and low rates on imported goods

~gricultural

co~ tro~

produce going

the ports.

The rail-

va;y network as it eventually vas established consi:s;te(il of a line from Kum::J.si to
Sekondi, a line from Kumasi to Accra via the cocoe,-prod'u.c:ing Eastern Region,
and a line along the coast from Accra to Sekondi am;d Ta.koradi.

Neither rail-

ways nor roads adequately criss-crossed the countrJ i::tt an east-west direction.
Table

26 presents figures for railway traf!'iie· !1!1 percentages for the

years 1900 to 1939.

This of course is not a completely accurate

refl~ction

of

trade patterns of the colony, since many goods were tJfalllsported by roads.

c

Nevertheless it does present some idea of the trade pa,tte.rns.

Except for the

years 1911 to 1922, the percentage of local traffic ea;rr:iied on the railways wa.s
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Table 26.

Local Goods
Year

,.,...
~

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

Tons
(OOO's)

%

(i)

n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
0.9
o.4
0.6
0.6
4.8
5.7
6.3
89.6
83.2
74.9
91.5
115.7
134.8
151.9
169.7
143.9
145.0
155.9
131.2
110.8
123.7
118.1
120.7
128.6
120.7
135.8
108.1
107.5
99.6
118.1
129.0
143.6
164.9
138.1
113.0
23.8
111 source:

41
1
1
1
10
10
8
49
42
32
35
43
45
45
54
41
39
44
30
19
18
15
15
16
15
15
14
20
25
18
18
16
17
13
14
3

Usea of the Railway by Different Sectors of
the Economy: Tonnages and Percentages (Main
Products Only), 1900-1939111
Cocoa

Tons
%
(OOO's} ( ii)
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
0.1 45
0.6 2
0.1 0
0.6 1
0.8 2
1.8 3
1.9 2
5.1 3
20.8 11
:37.4 16
41.1 16
60.3 22
57.4 19
79.7 24
73.8 23
111.9 32
95.5 26
109.1 31
143.1 33
164.3 28
156.1 22
150.3 19
149.2 19
131.2 17
165.6 20
139.5 15
132.5 17
123.5 23
122.0 31
125.9 19
122.4 17
130.6 14
140.1 15
134.6 12
207.8 25
115.5 12

Exported Goods Imported Goods
Tons
%
(OOO's) (iii)
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
1.3
7.0
5.7
12.6
9.0
3.2
4.0
7.6
24.9
47.3
48.9
61.4
63.1
113.5
100.8
149.3
145.2
123.8
235.3
364.7
442.5
534.5
552.8
520.3
542.2
657.1
537.3
335.9
200.7
466.9
496.3
611.2
597.7
718.3
484.0
590.4

59
22
12
25
19
6
5
4
13
20
19
23
21
34
32.
43
39
35
54
61
63
67
69
66
67
70
71
64
51
70
68
67
63
65
58
63

Tons
(OOO's)
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
24.8
41.1
37.9
32.4
46.6
72.1
85.0
89.3
108.8
118.2
92.1
99·9
69.7
45.9
54.7
81.2
77.9
72.6
120.2
136.4
144.3
131.7
141.0
145.9
139.3
113.5
82.9
n.d.
79.2
104.6
156.9
192.7
248.5
233.7
n.d.

%
(iv)

Total %
Imported and
Exported Goods
(iii + iv)

77
87
74
70
84
88
47
45
47
46
34
34
21
15
16
22
22
17
20
19
18
16
18
18
15
15
16

99
99
99
89
90

12
14
17
20
22
28

82
82
84
83
87
86

93
51
58
67
65
57
55
55
47
59
61
57
71
81
82
85
85
84
85
85
86
80

Based on raw figures from Kay, op. ait., Table 32a "Railway
freight traffic (excluding livestock), 1900-1960," pp. 388-89. N.B. n.d.=no
data.
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low; generally between ten and tw:enty per cent.

Much of this carriage consist-

ed of internal trade among different markets, and also of the supplying of food
to the mines.ll2

The falling off of local carriage in percentage terms after

about 1922 is also reflected in its slight decline in absolute terms; however
this decline may have been a reflection of a switch to carriage of goods by
road.
With the exception of the years 1911 and 1918 (in the latter year a
quota on cocoa exports was imposed by the Imperial Government in order to save
wartime shipping space) over fifty per cent of the railway carriage was of
imported or exported goods in all years.
built, the percentage was very high.
the 1920s and 1930s.

In the 1900s, before roads were

It dropped in the 1910s but rose again in

However, much of the export tonnage in the latter two

decades consisted of manganese from the mine at Nsuta.
for more than thirty per cent of the total tonnage.

Cocoa rarely accounted

Imported goods declined

as a per cent of railway carriage between 1900 and 1939 although the absolute
amount of imported goods carried rose fairly consistently.

In the 1900s, of

course, a large percentage of the imported goods would have been mining equipment; railway cars might have been bringing in mining equipment and leaving the
mining areas empty for lack 9f exportable goods, at least until a system of
feeder roads was developed.

Later on, the composition of the imported goods

was more varied; but at the same time lorry traffic began to compete with rail
traffic for the carriage of goods to marketplaces which might not be on main
railway lines, so that the total percentage of imported goods on the railways
fell.
The development of a fairly complete north-south system of roads, both

c

ll2aou ld , op.

•·
cn..-z;.,
p.

2.
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as feeders to the railways and as independent routes to the coast, provided
opportunities for the setting up of transport companies both by the large
European firms and by independent Africans.

"The pioneers in motor traction

were not the Government, but the merchants.

The motor-lorries belonged to

private mercantile firms, who used them for carrying their own goods, although
a passenger traffic vras springing up. nll3
ran their own fleets of lorries.

Large firms such as CFAO and the UAC

" • . . Ithe UAC] carries on extensive road

motor transport services, chiefly for its own use, for the carriage and distribution of merchandise and native produce between main centres and points not
served by sea, river, or railway. " 114

Elder Dempster also ran a road transport

company with garages and workshops at Nsawam.ll5
African transport firms could not, of course, compete with the European ·
firms either i.n size or in scope.

Often an African entrepreneur had just one

lorry which he ran on a shoestring budget, making the down payment on the lorry
to a European firm and having enough money for running expenses only.

The

Government argued that "shoestring competition" by Africans was unfair; that
the railways suffered because Africans offered poor quality services at low
prices.
in certain places, it is possible to obtain a 30 cwt. lorry on
first payment of probably £20. That £20 is the only capital the purchaser
possesses. We also ~now that there is a very large trade in one-gallon
tins of petrol. The reason is the lorry-owner is only able to produce,
when he starts the day's work, sufficient money to buy one gallon; he then
proceeds with that gallon in the hope that he will collect a few shillings
in fares to purchase a further supply; if he does not, he remains on the
road until his brothers come and help him. • • • no organised system of

l13McPhee, op. ait., p. 116.

c

114UAC Ranki.n file:

"Notes on the History of the United Africa Company,"

p. 3.
~he Elder Transport Company is mentioned in a speech by the Governor
in GCLegCo, 3 February 1925.
11
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transport, ~ether it be road or rail, can possibly compete successfully
with motor transport as it is run to-day in the Gold Coast • • • the
competition between road and rail is unfair.116
The "unfair" competition to the railways from African lorry drivers,
combined with the presumably slightly fairer competition from European firms,
was great enough to cause the Government considerable worry in the late 1920s
and 1930s.

The percentage of Government revenue supplied by the railways fell

from~twenty-six

per cent in 1926 to 3\ per cent in 1927; from 1928 to 1938 the

Government received no revenue at all from the railways.

While presumably at

least part of this drastic decline in resources was caused by the Depression of
the 1930s, evidently it was also caused by a drop in the percentage of goods,
specifically of cocoa, which was carried by the railway.

Table 27 presents

statistics on the percentage of the cocoa exports carried by rail and by other
forms of transport (after 1918 "other" was presumably almost exclusively by
lorry).

A decline in the percentage of cocoa carried by rail after 1930 eo-

incides with the decline in railway revenues from cocoa.
Because of declining railway revenues, the Government moved in the 1920s
and 1930s to take measures to guarantee traffic to the railways at the expense
of road traffic.

Its aim was to curb competition on roads competitive with

railways, such as the road between Nsawam and Accra.

In the early 1920s. the

Government tried reducing charges for various goods travelling on the railway;
however, since one of the goods for which rates were reduced was petrol, cornpetition continued as before.

In 1927, the Government changed its policy and

raised the duty on petrol by 100 per cent,ll7 in order to raise the costs of
lorry transport firms,

c

Parallel to this it decided to stop making repairs on

116 Speech by the Secretary for Native Affairs in GCLegCo, 8 March 1932.
l17Reported in LonCC, 20 September 1927.
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Table 27.

Cocoa Exported by Road and Rail,
1900-1939118

Total Cocoa Exports
Year

,-

'-"

000 tons
{i)

Rail Exports
000 tons
(ii)

n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
0.1
0.6
0.1
0.6
0.8
1.8

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919

0.5
1.0
2.4
2.3
5.2
5.1
9.1
9.5
12.9
20.5
23.0
40.3
39.2
51.3
52-9
77.3
72.2
91.0
66.3
176.2

1.9
5.1
20.8
37.4 .
41.1
60.3
57.4
79.7
73.8
111.9

1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

124.8
133.2
159.3
200.6
223.3
218.1
230.8
210.0
225.1
238.1

95·5
109.1
143.1
164.3
156.1
150.3
149.2
131.2
165.6
139.5

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

190.6
244.1
233.7
236.1
230.3
268.9
311.1
236.2
263.2
280.7

132.5
123.5
122.0
125.9
122.4
130.6
140.1
134.6
207.8
115.5

118 source:

%
(iii}

2
12
1
6
6
9
8
13
53
73
78
78
80
88

*

Other Exports (Roads)
000 tons
(iv)

%
(v)

5.1
4.5
9.0
8.9
12.1
18.7
21.1
35.2
18.4
13.9
11.8
11.0
14.8
11.3

98
88
99
94
94
91
92
87
47
27
22
22
21
12

*

*

64

64.3

36

77
82
90
82
70
69
65
6.2
74
59
70
51
52
53
53
49
45
57
79
41

29.3
24.1
16.2
36.3
67.2
67.8
81.6
78.8
59.5
98.6

23
18
10
18
30
31
35
38
26
41

58.1
120.6
111.7
110.2
107.9
138.3
171.0
101.6
55.4
165.2

30
49
48
47
47
51
55
43
21
59

Kay, op. eit. , Table 2lb, "Volume of Major Exports , 1900-1960,"
pp. 336-37 (col. i), and Table 32c "Railway freight traffic (excluding livestock) 1900-..1960, 11 pp. 388-89 (col. ii). N.B. n.d.=no data; *Shipping quota
imposed 1918-cocoa stored at port.
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certain major roads, so that lorries could no longer travel on them.
Government is at present incurring a large expenditure in establishing
motor transport routes in parts o~ the country where the railway does not
exist, and therefore it does not appear that it would be justifiable for
us to maintain alongside the railway a motor road for the convenience of
private interests strictly limited to a small area in the whole country. 119
At the same time, the Government instituted a

11

road-gap 11 policy, designed to

deliberately leave gaps in major roads to force exporters and importers to ship
by rail.

Diagram 1 indicates the gaps which existed in major roads.

The "road-gap" policy was ~ormally abandoned in 1929, 120 but in 1935-36
several of the gaps were still extant, for instance the gaps between Anyinam
and Wiresei on the Accra-Kumasi road, between Agona and Simpa on the Ta.koradiTarkwa road, and between Brofoyedru and Fomena on the Cape Coast-Kumasi
road.JZl

In that year, the Governor decided to definitely fill in the gaps,

but only on condition that a new policy

o~

"scheduled" roads be instituted.

On

31 July 1936 "An Ordinance to regulate the Carriage of Goods over certair.. roads
within the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti" was passed.122

This ordinance pro-

vided that on new roads, the Government could, if it wished, prohibit the
carriage of imported goods inland from the coast, and the carriage of exportable goods, especially cocoa, south to the coast.

The "scheduled-roads 11

policy, as it became known, was not rescinded until 1945 and resulted in considerable hardship not only
A~rican

~or

the independent lorry transporter, whether

~or

or European, but also

the cocoa farmer.

11 9Governor to GCLegCo,

22 February 1926.

120 Governor to GCLegCo,

26 September 1929.

121 Governor to GCLegCo,

19 March 1935 and.20 February 1936.

122

GCLegCo, 31 July 1936.
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IMPORTANT ROAD GAPS
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0
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Obuasi

Diagram 1.

Gaps in Ghana's Major Roadsl23

• • .. • take a man who has a large estate between Nkawkaw and Anyinelll.;
if he wants to go to Koforidua to replenish his stocks of say soap, rice
and other commodities, and sell his cocoa, he would have, according to
this Bill, to take his cocoa up north to a Railway Statior.: he cannot
bring it down to Anyinam; he must take it to Nkawkaw or the nearest
station up. On getting there, as the passenger train will not take his
cocoa, he has got to wait for the goods train, which may not travel that
day, to bring the cocoa down to Koforidua, and as he is not allowed to
travel on the goods train, he has to wait until the next passenger t~ain;
all this means delay. At Ko:foridua he sells his cocoa, makes his purchases of goods. These he cannot take by lorry, so he has to wait until
there is a goods train going, by which he will consign the goods, after
which he takes the passenger train himself, whereas by a lorry he could
accompany his products and do it all in one day • . • • And, at the same
time, although the lorry industry is principally not in the hands of the
Africans, yet those who do run these lorries pay licences and after all
is said and done, if they earn money it is not a loss to the cou~try,
because it is in the country,l24
The institution of the road-gap and scheduled-road policies indicates
clearly that in the matter of transportation, although on the whole the Government was concerned to build a transportation infrastructure which would
facilitate trade, yet in matters of detail it was more than willing to

c

123Gould, op. ait., p. 71.
12 4speech by Mr. Christian, an African Unofficial member, in ibid.
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sacrifice the needs of the expatriate commercial community and of indigenous
African entrepreneurs to its own needs.
Although, then, the business community had considerable powers of consultation with Government, acceptance of its views was not automatic.

Its

wishes could be superseded by the needs of the colony as a whole, as represented by Government policy.

Nevertheless, in the largest sense of policy,

Government and business were usually in accord and the mechanisms of consultation provided for the emergence of consensus, within certain bounds, as to the
directions colonial development, or lack of development, should take.

Once the

basic infrastructure for trade had been established, little else was done for
the economy of Ghana.

Chapter VI investigates investment policies and the

emergence of monocultural dependence in Ghena in the post-World War I period to
illustrate the stagnation into which the economy fell once the basic pattern of
trade had been established.

c

CHJ\PTER

0

VI

EUROPEAN BUSINESS-GOVEffiH.ffiNT CO-OPERATION IN GHANA:
THE PERi'?ETUATION OF MONOClJLTURAL STAGNATION

In Chapter III the basic import-export structure of the Ghanaian economy
during the whole of the colonial period was described.

The economy was charac-

terized by its peripheral nature; its dependence on exports of minerals and
arboricultural and agricultural goods, especially cocoa, and its imports of
manufactured goods of which a high percentage was for consumer use, not investment.

It was also seen that the structure of the economy became firmly

established by about 1915 and changed very :ittle after that date; as soon as
cocoa became a steady earner of income for both farmers and expatriate traders
other products were neglected.

Ghana fell into a pattern of monocultural de-

pendence from which she has not yet emerged.
Chapt~r

IV described the takeover of the economy's import-export sector

by Europeans, and the gradual squeezing out of both small European firms

~md

African entrepreneurs as the trading sector became more and more oligopolized.
In Chapter V, some of the mechanisms by whieh the Government established infrastructure suitable to European (and only to a lesser extent, African) needs,
were described.

The hypothesis was that once a structure which could facili-

tate import and export of the products which were such good income earners was
established, little more would be done by a Government which operated primarily
for the benefit of the "Empire, 11 and within that Empire, for the benefit of its
capitalist class.

And indeed, Ghana retained her peripheral status until World

War II, partly because of budgetary constraints on the Government and partly

c

because there were no significant pressures on the Government to change Ghana 1 s
role in the world economic system once she had been integrated into the
280
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international network.

The Imperial colonial policy was to stress self-

sufficiency for each colonial Government, so that there was little investment
by the Government in any projects beyond an essential minimum.

The interna-

tional firms invested little in the economy because its extractive nature
facilitated profits without investment.
The most significant attempts which were made to change Ghana's role in
the world economy were in the direction of diversification of her exports and
of upgrading her produce so that she would be less reliant on the world market.
Both attempts were constrained by budgetary problems and by the power of a
business community which was largely content with the economy the way it had
been set up by 1915.

This chapter will describe the financing of the colony

and the failure of Government attempts to reduce Ghana's almost completely
monocultural dependence by agricultural diversification programmes.

Chapter

VII will describe the attempts made by Africans, in the form of boycotts of the
cocoa firms, to remedy their dependence on the world market in the face of
Government reluctance and incapacity to act.
l.

Government Attempts at Diversification
and Quality Control
From 1915 on Governments in Ghana became increasingly aware of her mono-

cultural dependence and made attempts to rectify the situation.

As of 1916~

export duties were levied on goods leaving the colony, and they provided a
significant proportion of the Government's revenue.

As long as the Government

depended on cocoa export duties then it suffered whenever there was a drop in
the cocoa market.

To decrease its own reliance on cocoa revenue, if for no

other reason, the Government was interested in diversifying exports.

c

Under Governor Guggisberg (1919-1927), many projects for agricultural
diversification were begun.

The revenues of the colony were high in the buoy-

ant 1920s and the time for speculative investment seemed right.

In 1920, for

282
.example, Guggisberg started a. plan to cultivate sisal on the Accra plains, and
by March 1925 had 900 acres under cultivation. 1

His project was ambitious,

involving as it did tvo-to_;.three-year investments before the plants were ready
for cultivation, and projecting not only a factory in Accra to process the
sisal into hemp, but also a tramway from the plains to the factory. 2

The first

exports of sisal hemp were made in early 1925, and earned a profit of £22-23
per ton; 3 but this profit owed itself primarily to abnormally high prices
caused by "disturbed" conditions in Mexico.

By 1926 the price for sisal had

declined and Guggisberg was considering selling the plantation to a private
enterprise if a proper deal could be made with the chiefs holding the land on
which the plm1tation was located. 4

No such sale was ever made, however, and in

1930 the Government discontinued its experiment with sisal, at a total loss of
some n4 ,000; because it could not find the funds necessary for the expansion
which might guarantee profitability.s
The sisal plantation was only one of several experiments in agricultural
diversification, most of which failed.

Africans persisted in growing cocoa as

long as the price was good, and the Government found that it was fighting a
rear-guard action as long as it tried to persuade Africans to return to the
crops, such as palm oil and rubber, which

h~d

been popular in the 1890s.

Lack

of initiative and incentive to diversify had by the 1930s to cope further with

1 "Dispatch

of First Consignment of Sisal Hemp from Accra Sisal Plantation to Europe," Journal of the Gold Coast Ag:t'iouUu:ral and Commercial Sooiety,
no. 3, vol. 3 (April 1924 to March 1925), p. 204.
2 Ibid.

3Speech by the
Governor to GCLegCo,

c

3 February 1925.

4speech by the Governor in GCLegCo, 22 February
1926.
5Speech

by the Goven10r in GCLegCo, 17 :F'ebruary 1930.
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a lack of Government funds, once the Depression started.

0

In February 1930 a

coconut plantation started by the Government at Aburi was handed back to its
owners o6

Vague discussions '..-ere held throughout the 1930s to consider projects

such as a fishing industry, 7 but none of these projects was to prove successful.
More serious attempts were made, in conjunction with Elder Dempster and
its subsidiaries, to start exporting fresh fruit, and indeed by the end of the
1930s a banana export industry had been

pu~

into operation.

1ne history of

Ghana's banana export industry is of some interest inasmuch as it was first
proposed in the late 1920s (the exact date is not known) to the Government by
the firm of Elders and F,yffeso

Elders and Fyffes was a subsidiary of Elder

Dempster but since 1907 it had also been party to an agreement on the banana
trade with the United Fruit Company which, moreover, bought £550,000 worth of
shares in Elders and Fyffes in 1913. 8

In 1931 the Manchester Chamber of Cam-

merce, considering the possibility of establishing a banana industry on the
Coast, noted that
o •• a few years previously, Messrs. Elders and Fyffes Limited had
enquired into the possibility of establishing a banana industry in the
Gold Coast, but • • o as the Governor had not been prepared to give an
assurance that, on the industry being started, rival competition would
not receive Government support, negotiations had been broken off. 9
Elders and Fyffes therefore were interested in starting the industry only if
they were to be the sole recipients of Government aid.

vfuen the Government

tried to set up the banana industry on its own at a later date, and even went

6Noted in GCLegCo, 17 February 1930.

7GCLegCo, 19 March 1935.

c

8

P. N. Davies, "Sir lllfred Jones and the Development of West African
unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1964), p. 272.

Trade"~ (University of Liverpool:
9ManCC, 12 February 1931.
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so far as to consider canning and storage operations in the colony itself, 1 0
Elders and Fyffes argued that the industry would not be viable.ll

Eventually,

however, the Government was able to negotiate with Elder Dempster for special
carriage of bananas and the industry vras started in 1936.

"An agreement has

been entered into with Messrs. Elder Dempster Lines, Ltd., for the carriage to
England of

,000 bunches of fruit during the first year and 50,000 bunches

during the second year.

The Company's mail steamers have been fitted with

special cool chambers for the accommodation of the banana crop. "1 2
Various other exporting projects, including copra and coconut production, were tried by the Government in the 1920s and 1930s.

In addition, one

private expatriate entrepreneur at Abakramba, in the Cape Coast area, started
the export of lime juice and lime products.l3

But for the most part the at-

tempts were minor and did little to move Ghana from its basically monocultural
dependence on cocoa.

This of course was not surprising, for although the Gov-

ernment was concerned not to be too dependent on cocoa revenue, nevertheless
its first priority, as long as cocoa was its main export earner and the crop
with which the expatriate firms were most concerned, was to invest what IG.eager
funds it had for agricultural development in the cocoa crop.

In 1926, the

Governor pointed out " • • • the first point in Government's agricultural

policy--the protection, improvement, and development of our staple product-Cocoa!" 14

10 speech by Mr. Auchinleck, Director of Agriculture, to the GCLegCo, 8

March 1932.
11 ManCC, 29 July 1931.
12 Governor

c

to GCLegCo, 20 February 1936.
13 Governor to GCLegCo, 17 February 1930. "Rose's Lime Juice" is still
produced in Gl1ana for export to Europe and North America.
14 Governor to GCLegCo, 19 July 1926, italics in original.
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In

1935~

Nana Ofori Atta quoted a speech made by a late colonial secre-

tary in the Legislative Council, complairdng of the "distressing" attitude of
the speech, which again stressed Ghana's agricultural nature.

"A country's

wealth can be increased either by manufacture, that is to say, by converting
raw products into finished articles, or, alternately, by production and exporOf these two, the latter is, obviously, the Gold Coast's metier." 15

tat ion.

Thus Ghana was seen solely as a peripheral nation in the world economy.
The external orientation of the Gold Coast bureaucracy can readily be seen in
the operation of the

11

Gold Coast Intelligence Bureau, 11 a trade-promotion bureau

which was in existence from 1926 to 1930.

It first opened in 1926 with a win-

dow display of minerals, timber, and agricultural products obtainable in Ghana,
and" . . • an exhibit showing manufactured articles chiefly in demand in the
Gold Coast. ni6

There was no suggestion that Ghana might have the capacity to

process and manufacture finished products on her own, even when she could
supply her own raw materials.
Moreover there was little mention made in the many development plans
put forward by various Governors of Ghana of projects to diversify into light
industry or processing of raw materials.

This was considered the privilege of

the private traders in the colony, who were free to invest in light industry
if they saw fit.

Small industries such as the Dunkwa sawmill, which were con-

sidered necessary to Government's well being, were occasionally established
(although the Dunkwa sawmill itself eventually lo3t money and had to be sold to
a private buyer). 17
15 GCLegCo,

The Government's interest in this type of industrial

19 March 1935.

The author vms unable to identify the origina]_

speaker.

c

l6GCLegCo, 19 July 1926.
17 Speech by the Governor to the GCLegCo,

3 February 1925.
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diversification extended only so far as was necessary to ensure the adequate
functioning of its Public Works Department.

Otherwise it followed the poliry

set down in writing by Lord Lugard and reflective of administration in all of
the various British colonies.
Our present task . . . is to promote the commercial and industrial
progress of Africa, without too careful a scrutiny of the material gains
to ourselves, that we may not incur the accusation of having inflicted
upon Africa the grave economic wrong for which our commercial policy in
India is alleged to have been responsible in that country.
[But d]iscrimination . • . must be exercised in order to avoid
deflecting labour which would be more profitably employed in growing or
collecting raw materials for export than in competing ~o;ith the output of
organised industry and power-driven machinery in civilised countries. 18
The Government's reluctance to consider diversification into light industry was matched by a similar reluctance on .the part of the expatriate
investors in the colony.

Most of the companies' investments in Ghana were in

the form of buildings and transport equipment.

Buildings were necessary to

house their goods, to store their cocoa, and for the conduct of retail trade.
As well, the expatriate firms had to provide for the fairly extensive housing
requirements of their own European staff.

After World War I, there was also

significant investment in fleets of lorries to carry cocoa and other exported
and imported goods in

competitio~

with the state-owned railways which were

often not as able to reach far into the "bush" as were the light lorries.
In 1959, the United Africa Company argued that no investment in industrialization had taken place in West Africa under its aegis prior to World War
II because the time for such investment was not propitious.

c

In the early 1930s every ir-dustrial country in the ·world was concerned
with avoiding unemployment and not duplicating existing manufacturing
facilities, with the result that the time was not propitious for introducing industrialisation into tropical Africa. Indeed it is questionable
whether at that stage the local population would have had tbe necessary

18 F. D. Lugard, The Du a Z Mandate i.n BP1: tis h Tropical Africa (London:
William Blackwood and Sons, 1929), pp. 509, 513-14.

0

skills or whether government finances could have tolerated the consequent
loss in import duties.
A further important factor was that prior to 1939 African purchasing
power was so low that local markets vrere seldom large enough to susttdn
an economic manufacturing unit • . • . Criticism of the lack of industrialisation in the past has largely arisen from ignorance of such factors
as these. 1 9
It was, in the Company's own words, simply uneconomic to start factories in
West Africa when goods could be produced much more cheaply in Europe, where a
trained labour force used to factory work already existed.

The UAC saw itself

" • • • primarily as a merchant" 20 (as presumably also did its competitors, with
the exception of the chocolate manufacturing firms such as Cadbury) and therefore had no reason to expand into manufacture; indeed, during the 1930s it
divested itself of many of its textile manufacturing concerns in Europe in
order to be able to buy more freely and co~~etitively on the open market. 21
Moreover, it may well have been true that while the Government occasionally was willing to oppose expatriate business, for the benefit of Africans, in
such matters as cocoa price, when it came to questions of
Government was more conservative than the firms.
revenues was real.

industrializat~on

The fear of loss of import

As shown in Table 31 below, a very high proportion of Gov-

ernment revenue was derived from import duties.

Although this proportion

declined steadily from the inception of the colony until 1918; i t remained
high, varying from forty-five per cent to r;ixty per cent of the revenue, up to
World War II.

If indigenous industry were allowed to develop, imports and

import duties 'vould decrease.

The Government would be obliged to find an al-

ternative tax base, no easy task in a country which had steadfastly refused all

19 Uni ted Africa Company,

c
21

Ibid.

Your Corrrpany, op. c·it. , p. 23.
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forms of hut tax, head tax or income ta,x sL1ce 1852.

Merchants were constantly

obliged to urge Government to support the few private industries in which they
did invest.

In 1930, for exa.'nple, the bm merchant members of the Legislative

Council argued that Government should support the infant mineral water industry,
arguing that its linkage effects were such as to benefit the colony, and more
important, to provide GoverrLment revenue.
Now I want you to realise how important it is to foster this [mineral
water] industry; let us consider what it does for us. It employs local
labour, the manufacturer I have in mind employs British ex-servicemen
throughout. The ind1.lStry pays a good S'Jlll of money for the water it uses,
it pays an import duty on practically I
its ingredients and essences;
its label is the only article it obtain3 free of duty; it distributes its
manufactured article by railway and by road thus using petrol and paying
railway freight. In fact, it is an asset to the colony . . . 22
But GoverrLment, protective of its customs revenues, was unwilling to make concessions to encourage either the mineral water industry or the new brewery
which was started in Accra in 1932 by Overseas Breweries Limited and

whic~

was

to employ a good 100 to 120 Africans. 2 3 Ev~n though the brewery was one of the
few industries in Ghana, the Government expected it to pay the same duties and
contribute as much to

Gover1~ent

revenues as imported beer.

In 1933 an Ordi-

nance was passed imposing an excise tax of ls.6d. per gallon on beer, so that
Overseas Breweries Limited would not have a.1y price advantages over imported
beer and thus divert the beer market.24
Some independent attempts by firn1s to diversify out of the traditional
import-export trade did in fact take place, when it was thought that a substantial profit might be available.

In the light of recent (1974) Ghanaian

22 Speech by Mr. Youngman, a European unofficial representative, to
GCLegCo, 17 February 1930.

c

2 3Governor to GCLegCo, 1 March 1932.
2LtGCLegCo, 23 March 1933.
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attempts to discover oil off the Atlantic Coast, it is interesting to note that
oil explorations were carried out in the eolony in the early 1920s by the
Societe Fran<;aise de Pet:ro1e, which had a concession over about 185 square
miles of land in the Cape Coast area.

The Societe was taken over in 1926 by

Gold Coast Petroleum Ltd. (eventually to become part of the UAC empire), which
spent a total of £85,434 drilling for oil, without success, although there were
signs of oil all over the concession.

In 1929, when the Company joined UAC,

work on the concessions had stopped although rent, to the amount of £186 per
annum, was still being paid to chiefs for the land. 2 5
One attempt to revive palm oil exports and even to introduce palm oil
processing was made in 1912, when Lever Brothers tried to obtain a monopoly on
palm oil processing in Ghana.

In the early part of the twentieth century,

Lever Brothers, in its search for a constant, controllable supply of paln1 oil
for its factories, had asked the Colonial Office for permission to buy la.nd in
West Africa.

Consistent with its overall land policy, the Colonial Office re-

fused permission but did offer Lever a twenty-one year concession in Sierra
Leone, which was rejected.

Lever then proceeded to invest in the Belgiar, Congo

where terms were more profitable.26

But by 1912 Lever was anxious to begin

processing palm oil in Africa instead of Europe, because although freight
charges for processed oil were higher than for unprocessed palm nuts, and. although there was no market for palm nut cake (the residue from the oil, used as
cattle feed) either in Africa or in Britain, the quality of the oil processed
in Africa was much higher than the quality processed in Europe after a long
voyage on the high seas.

c

25 Report on the Gold Coast Petroleum Ltd., UAC Rankin file, report

2 6Digby Report, op. ait., p. 248.

36.
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Lever began negotiati::ms with the Colonial Office for the right to 3et
up a processing factory and obtain a mono_;_)oly, over an area within a
radius of its factory, of all :mechanical oil-palm processing.

ten-~nile

Africans within

that ten-mile radius could bring their palm nuts to the factory for processing
but they could not give their nuts to any other Europeans for processing nor
could they use any mechanical means of processing themselves. 27

To facilitate

the acquisition of such monopoly rights, in 1912 the Gold Coast Legislature
passed the Palm Oil Ordinance, which empowered the Government

11

•

•

•

to grant

to any person, within such area not exceeding a circle within a ten-mile radius
and for such period not exceeding twenty-one years • • • the exclusive right to
construct and work mills, to be operated by mechanical power, for expressing or
extracting oil from the pericarp of palm fruit." 2 8
This Ordinance, however, was passed with considerable opposition.

Some

members of the Government objected to it because they were suspicious of Lever's
possible influence in the Colony, and they were joined in their opposition both
by Lever's European competitors and by Africans.

The former argued that if

Lever were to have a monopoly of palm processing, it would be impinging on the
established nut export trade. 2 9

The latter objected because the Governor, not

the chiefs in charge of the land, would have sole authority to grant proc.:;ssing
monopolies, vri thout even consulting the native authorities. 3 0

The Ghanaian op-

position also viewed the monopoly as a threat to any future plans by Africans
to process their own palm fruit by mechanical means.

It so happened that in

p. 252.
28Ibid.

c

,

p. 245.

29 A statement to this effect was made by Mr. Grey, of the "Combine" firms,
in GCLegCo, 28 January 1913.
30 Digby Report.

op. oit., p. 250.
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1912, coincidentally just when the :rr.·ocessing monopoly Ordinance was being approved by the Government, one W.

Essu~an

Gwira, an

Afric~~

employee of the

Government Agricultural Service, invented a machine which was cheap, easily
manufactured, and easily operated, and which could have been used for smallscale palm processing by Africans.

The Aborigines' Rights Protection Society

pressured the Government to invest funds in perfecting this machine for African
use, and even went so far as to have its potential verified by an independent
expert in London.

The Government, however, not only refused to invest funds in

the machine, but it denied its inventor leave from his job to perfect it. 31

At

the same time the Government argued that concessions such as demanded by Lever,
and as provided for in the Ordinance, were necessary because the "natives" had
not yet reached the stage at which they could process oil themselves.
Opposition to the processing monopoly Ordinance was so intense that it
lay dormant for several years.

In 1917, the Digby Commission investigating land

law in West Africa recommended that the Ordinance be repealed. 32

The Ordinance

was not repealed, however, but remained law and was used in 1930 to grant a
palm oil processing monopoly in the Manya Krobo area to Lever's successor, the
UAC.

The Government in this instance not only granted UAC a monopoly of all

processing within a radius of ten miles of its factory, but also agreed that if
the projected supply of 3,000 tons of palm nuts per year could not be

obt~ined,

it would, once the supply fell to less than eighty per cent or 2,400 tons, pay
UAC £1.16s.

for every ton of fruit lacking. 33

failed for lack of supplies:

This monopoly project eventually

Africans simply did not bring in their palm nuts

31 Documents concerning this invention can be found in GNA Adm.ll/1/223.

c

3 2Digby

Report, op. ait., p. 270.

3 3statement

by the Governor to GCLegCo, 17 Ii'ebruary 1930.
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for processing but rather continued to sell them in their unprocessed form.
The Government on its part refused to pay the promised subsidy because it
argued that low world prices, not lack of supply, actually caused the eventual
closing of UAC's processing mills.3 4
Thus in general the Government was lax in its attempts to encourage
diversification in Ghana in order to reduce its dependence on the world cocoa
market.

Projects designed to promote new agricultural products depended both

on the whim of individual administrators ru1d on the overall economic situation
of Ghana.

When the economic situation was good and revenues (based mainly on

cocoa exports and the consequent ability to import more) were high, the Government would try to encourage diversification.

But in such periods of "boom,

the African farmers, content with cocoa prices, were not interested in changing crops.

In periods of depression, when they looked for new products to

relieve their overdependence on cocoa, the Government had no revenues for new
diversification schemes of any consequence.
While Government may have been lax, however, in its attempts to diversify the produce of Ghana, it did invest a considerable amount of energy in
endeavours to increase the world price of cocoa by improving its overall
quality.

The issue of adulteration of produce and poor quality produce was an

important one in Ghana.

From the earliest days of export of

prima~J

products

it was evident that poor methods of preparation, poor storage, and deliberate
adulteration were seriously affecting the quality of goods such as palm oil
and rubber.

As early as 1898 an !!Ordinance to provide for the prevention of

adulteration of palm kernels" was passed. 35

0

But palm cil and rubber were not

34 GCLegCo, 1 March 1932.
35 Reported in GCLegCo, Ordinance no. 15, 20 July 1898.
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subject to any such legislation, although by 1905 it was becoming evident that
at least the rubber trade vras seriously affected by poor quality.

Rubber was

being sold in a wet, sticky form instead of in the dry, "biscuit" form preferred by customers; palm oil was sometimes poorly prepared and dirty, and
sometimes (in order to increase its bulk) it had added to it adulterants such
as sand.

The merchants pressed the Government to remedy the situation by pro-

viding agricultural instruction; the Government replied that it was unwilling
to provide any instruction until and unless the merchants were willing to
offer higher prices for higher quality produce.

"It will be for the local

merchants to co-operate with the Government by offering improved

ces for

the better grades of rubber. 11 36
The adulteration issue, never

~ully

resolved with regard to rubber

(which declined drastically as an export after 1910) was to linger and to
plague the cocoa export trade up to World War II.

It was sometimes argued

that there was no need for control of quality of Ghana cocoa, since it was
used as a base in chocolate manufacture and there was no need for its quality
to be raised since whatever the quality, it. could not compete with the finer
grades of chocolate produced in Trinidad and Grenada. 37

Indeed, G. B. Kay

argues this position in his The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana.
On the issue of quality the department [of agriculture) was , ••
incorrect • • • (It] was wrong because it mistook Ghanaian cocoa for a
crop equivalent to West Indian cocoa, 'N"hereas the two are in fact quite

36 Letter from Mr. Antrobus, of the Colonial Office, to the JWAC, reported
in JWAC, 10 June 1909.

c

37According to A. W. Knapp, The Cocoa an,d Chocolate Industry (London:
Isaac Pi tman and Sons, 1930), Gold Coast C)COa was of the Calbacillo variety,
inferior to both the F'orastero and the Criollo. :Modern manufacturers, be
maintained, wanted an 11 • • • absolutely standard product in large quanti ties
for sale at a reasonable price--hence the tendency to use those not too expensive cacaos of which a large, reliable, and regular supply is available. 11
West African cocoa was regularly used as a fifty per cent backir.g in cocoa
production. P. 97.
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distinct and have separate uses in the confectionery industry . • •
[H]ad it understood more about the uses to which Ghanaian cocoa was put,
it might not have persisted with the groundless belief that improvements
in quality would have to lead to substantial increases in price ••
Both farmers and the European buying :firms knew that the return on
improved quality was often less thm1 the cost of grading • • • • 38
Kay is correct in arguing that Ghanaian cocoa could never reach the
quality of or, more correctly, could never become the same type as, West
Indian cocoa.
quality.

Nevertheless there were other reasons for being concerned with

Ghanaian cocoa was often of such poor quality that it simply could

not be sold on the New York cocoa market, as the United States' Government
maintained more stringent :food control measures than did the British and
Continental Governments. 39

Until the First World War, much of Ghana's poorer

quality cocoa was shipped to Germany, instead of to the American and British
markets, apparently because Germany had the resources and equipment to process
the poorer quality whereas the other two nations did not. 40

During the war,

Britain was obliged to take in all the imports of cocoa (exports to Germany
having of course been banned) without the facilities for dealing with th2m.
It may well have been that, as the merchants argued, there was no commercial
demand {at least until the Americans instituted their regulations) for different grades of cocoa.

But there was a great deal of dissatisfaction about

Gha<'1aian cocoa, which often did not reach even the lowest standard which the
merchants wished to buy.
As early as 1905 the Accra Chamber of Commerce complained of the poor
quality of cocoa to the Colonial Secretary, and asked for a system of produce

3 8Kay ,

c

op •

01.,'t • ,

p • 1 4.

39 In 1925-26 the United States rejected several shiploads of Gold Coast
cocoa because it contained mouldy and wor~y beans. de Graft-Johnson, op. ait.,
p.

56.
40LonCC, Twenty-8eaond Annua7. Report ( 1903), pp. 62-63.
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inspection.
It is an undisputed fact that the quality of Cocoa grown in this
Colony is naturally of m.ost excellent quality and that if proper
attention were given to its cultivation and preparation that it would
rank very high indeed in the markets of Europe and the United States
of America. 41
While the business community constantly argued with the Government that "
even the best Gold Coast cocoa could not be compared, so far as flavour was
concerned, with that from Sao Thome and Grenada in the manufacture of chocolate . • • n42 they acknowledged that Ghana cocoa suffered, within its

OWl?.

cZass, because of its impurities and especially because much of it, improperly
fermented and dried, was sold "wet."

Slate and weevils were two devils of the

cocoa industry, even before the cocoa blight became so prevalent in the 1930s.
It was known that Gold Coast cocoa often did not come up to the levels of
purity demanded even in the English markets.

Between 1928 and 1931, for in-

stance, Gold Coast shipments of cocoa averaged eighty-five to

eighty-eig~1t

per

cent purity, while the Liverpool market demanded no more than ten per cent
impurities. 4 3 The firms were concerned especially about wet cocoa.

In March

1936 the London Chamber of Commerce received a letter from the Hon. Mr.
Stockdale, Agricultural Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
inquiring hm-r the elimination of wet cocoa would affect the price to the producer.

The Chamber replied that
a) the world price would rise as more cocoa could be sold as "Gooi

Fermented Accra. . •. The improvement in the world market price would inevitably be reflected in the price paid to the producer. n44
41 Accra Chamber of Commerce to the Colonial Secretary,

29 June 1905.

Reported in .TWAC, 4 October 1905.
42 statement by Mr. Holloway, of J. S. Fry and Sons, in LonCC, 5 January

1931.

c

43 Speech by Mr. Auchinleck, Gold Coast Director of Agriculture, to
LonCC, 15 June 1931.
44 LonCC, 2 March 1936.
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b) Gold Coast cocoa 1vould be more ~ompetitive with cocoa from elsewhere.
c) With regard to \vet cocoa "

• • at present, when 'wet 1 cocoa is

bought a rough estimate is made of moisture content and a margin deducted from
the current price for dry cocoa, probably to the disadvantage of the producer
as few firms care to handle wet cocoa. 11 45
d) Most defects, such as mould a~d weevil, rise because cocoa is wet.
Dry cocoa would result in one commercially perfect grade.
d) There was no commercial demand for different grades of cocoa. 46
Despite, therefore, their public pronouncements as to the irrelevance
of cocoa grading, the firms were aware that a minimum standard of purity was
essential and that it was not always available in sufficient quantities.

The

Nowell Commission found that the firms did indeed distinguish, in their own
buying practices, between different grades of cocoa.
Sufficient proof that all cocoa is not 1 just cocoa' is provided by the
facts that some of the firms attach importance to their own private
grades and that differences in quality are recognized in the official
forms of contract in use in the world markets. The point was also admitted to us in effect by some of the firms' representatives who
complained that 25 per cent or more of the cocoa tendered in a normal
season is below Government Grade 1. 47
Moreover, despite Kay 1 s argument that farmers knew that returns on improved quality were often less than the cost of grading, it would seem that at
least a few Africans were concerned that the quality should be improved.
Konor Mate Kole of Manya Krobo, for instance, who consistently produced high
quality cocoa on his own farms and instituted quality control measure among

45 Ibid.

0

46Jbid.
47 Nowell Corr...mission, op. crit., p. 36.
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his people, just as consistently received higher prices for his cocoa than did
other Gold Coast farmers. 48

Konor Mate Kole, however, sold most of his cocoa

to Cadbury, which was known to encourage higher quality cocoa because it was
buying directly for its own chocolate factories.

Aware that other farmers who

tried to upgrade their quality were not so fortunate in their buyers, Konor
Mate Kale urged that the buyers should discriminate consistently between different grades Bnd that, if they did so, better cocoa would be produced.
If the merchants will instruct their agents to discriminate, when
buying, between the different qualities of cocoa, paying high prices
for cocoa of good quality and refusing all the bad product, they • • •
will be doing a good deal for the industry. As soon as the natives
realize that no cocoa, except of exceptionally good quality, is
accepted by the merchants they will take trouble to produce good cocoa.
The buyers for merchants are in the habit of following and urging the
farmers to sell all kinds of cocoa to them. They do not care for the
quality as for the quantity. 49
It would seem, then, that while the firms ackno-vrledged their need. for
good quality cocoa, they were nevertheless willing to accept any cocoa.
Partly this may have been a function of the high demand for cocoa on the world
level; no doubt it was also a function of the fact that some countries -were
willing to accept a lower quality than others and moreover that poor quality
cocoa could always be mixed with better quality to produce an acceptable grade
when necessazy.

But the crucial point here seems to be, not that better

quality cocoa could not have fetched a better price, but that the firms were
in a position to dictate what price would be paid to farmers no matter what

48Mr. Grey, Buropean unofficial member, to GCLegCo, 6 October 1913, "The
merchants differentiate between the price of well and badly prepared cocoa and
the native Unofficial Member Konor Mate Kale will bear me out that he has for
years realized from £1 to £3 per ton more for his cocoa, than the natives in
his district producing inferior qualities."
49 Speeches by Konor Nate Kole in GCLegCo, 1 December 1914 and 30 October

1915.
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the quality.

Konor Mate Kole was the exception, and part of the reason why he

was paid more may have been the very friendly terms on which he was with one
of the Cadbury brothers.

Most other farmers, whatever they produced, however

good their product, were obliged to accept the prices which the firms set; as
Chapter IV demonstrates, periods of competition among buyers in Ghana were
brief and normally only one price was offered by all firms.

As one firm 1 s

spokesman said "When the price is high anything sells; when it is low, the
good sells no better than the bad. '' 50

The expatriate firms bought Ghana 1 s

cocoa at prices they dictated, and sold it on the international market to
countries or manufacturers who needed bulk cocoa.

While they knew there was a

demand for better quality bulk cocoa than Ghana produced, it was not worth
their while to promote upgrading of exports when, with monopoly buying, they
could make good profits no matter how low a price Ghana's poor quality product
commanded on the international market.
The expatriate firms were unwilling to take any of the responsibility
of quality controls upon themselves.

'lbey were willing neither to offer price

differentials nor to accept penalties by the Government if they bought poor
quality cocoa.

They were, however, willing to accept quality controls which

they did not have to pay for, as they knew they could
higher quality cocoa on the world market.
of the
it.

Africe~s

better prices for

They constantly urged penalization

who sold poor quality cocoa, not of the Europeans who bought

In 1905 the JWAC complained to the Governor of the Gold Coast about the

poor quality of both cocoa and rubber.

"It has been said that the low quality

of that produce was the result of the attitude of the merchants.

The merchants

50 Edward J. Organ, 11 The Gold Coast Cocoa Industry and Its Recent Develop-·
ments (Bournville Works: Publicatlons Department ( Cadbury Limited), June
1921) ' p. 14.
11
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did what they could to buy the best produce possible but they could only buy
what was offered. " 5 1

The Governor replied that

• • • to a very great extent it was the fault of the merchants
themselves, because some of the very best of the planters complained
that having taken the trouble to grow their produce properly and to
send it down to Accra in good condition they had not received six pence
more than the hinterland n~::ti ves. 52
This type of debate, between the administrative and commercial classes in
I

Ghana, was to be a constant refrain for the next thirty years, as each tried
to place responsibility for what was considered a serious problem upon the
other's shoulders.

The firms were all in favour of fining Africans who tried

to sell poor quality produce; they even suggested that the merchants be appointed graders and be empow·ered to fine farmers on their own authority.

But

they were not willing to accept any fining system for themselves.
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the expatriate firms gradually
began to come round to accepting some sort of system of cocoa inspection and
grading as it became evident that too much poor quality cocoa was be:ing sold.
They favoured inspection up-country, so that the first producer or the African
cocoa broker would take the loss if the cocoa were rejected.

The Government

favoured inspection at ports of shipment, "rhich would place the burden of loss
upon the firms, who might have cocoa rejecoced after they had paid for it.

In

1923 the basic position was that the Government wanted inspection at ports,
the Farmers 1 Associations wanted inspection up-country (but presumably on the
assumption that inspection would be accompanied by grading and higher prices
for higher grades), and the merchants want~d no inspection at all.5 3

51

c

By 1930,

statement by Mr. J. H. Batty of MLLlers and Swanzy in JWAC, 4 October

1905.
52 Reply by Governor Rodger in

53 ManCC, 14 March 1923.

ibid.
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especially because of competition f1·om Nigeria where cocoa was inspected, the
Chambers of Commerce in England were in fav-our of a modified inspection system
but specified that it was " . . . essential that the inspection should be carried out before merchants actually bought the cocoa, in other words, it shotlid
take place up-country.54
By 1930, when the above statement was made, a system of voluntary inspection at the ports had already been in operation for three years.

In January

1927 voluntary inspection was initiated at five ports, and by 1928 all shipments were being inspected and given certificates of quality according to both
American and European standards.55

In 1930 a cocoa cess bill, which would have

imposed an extra export tax of lOs/ton on cocoa (seven shillings to go to a
cocoa publicity scheme in Europe and the other three to up-country inspection)
was defeated in the Legislative Council.

By 1934, however, the situation was

serious enough that Bills to provide for inspection and qua_l:ity control cf
cocoa and copra 1-1ere finally passed, although palm oil and kernels were still
not subject to any control. 56

In 1937, the Government introduced a scheme for

the presale inspection and postsale grading of all cocoa, with inspection to
take place up-country by inspectors trained by the Department of Agriculture 57
(thus refusing an earlier suggestion that the cocoa inspectors be the cocoa
buyers of the merchant firms). 58

But the cocoa boycott of 1937-38, follovred by

54 LonCC, 15 April 1930. One member argued that 11 • • • Gold Coast cocoa
had found it difficult to compete with Nigerian cocoa owing to the improvement
of the quality of the latter as a result of the system of inspection. • • . "
55 Governor to GCLegCo, 15 February 1929.
5 6GCLegCo, 19 March 1934.

c

57Governor to GCLegCo, 15 March 1937.
58 Suggestion made by Stockdale to JWAC, reported in LonCC, 7 April 1936.
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World War II and the introduction of the Cocoa Marketing Board, reduced all of
these many plans to a relic of the past.

In effect, during the entire period

of colonial rule to 1939, cocoa was being sold in an uninspected, ungraded
form.

As long as Ghana was the only country to supply Calbacillo cocoa in

large amounts, the firms could get away with supplying such poor quality; but
as soon as competition from Nigeria was evident, reforms had to be made.
It should be noted that even during the brief period when some sort of
inspection was taking place, there was no compulsion on the firms to get rid of
cocoa adjudged to be substandard.

"If examination by the Department yields

figures which do not agree with the grade marks, the exporter will not be required to change the marks.

The only action of the Department will be to

communicate with the exporter notifying him of. the differences. " 59

Thus it was

left to the discretion of the exporters as to whether or not to adhere to regulations.

No doubt this also explained the very common practice of watering

good cocoa with rejected cocoa, so that the final mix adhered to the lowest
standard. 60
Failing to control cocoa quality either by compulsion or by persuasion
of the producing and marketing communities, the Government turned to officiallysupervised but voluntarily-organized co-operatives as the solution to Ghana's
economic ills.

There was much pressure from educated Africans on the Govern-

ment to improve the quality of agricultural education and to provide the
facilities whereby Africans could remove themselves from the complete control
of the expatriate firms.

tion

c

The attempts made by the Aborigines' Rights Protection

59 JH: jacket no. 92, document dated 9 October 1936, concerning inspecKu.masi.

60 Interview with a former African buyer for W. Bart.holemew, Accra,
August 1974. The practice vas also noted in GCLegCo, 19 March 1935.
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Society to sta.rt an agricultural training programme early in the century 61 had
by 1937 still not yielded any concrete results.

Ghana, an agricultural country,

provided little by way of training for its farmers .
. . . Government, • • . knowing that this country is an agricultural
country • • . has failed to provide for us an Agricultural College
capable of affording the youths of this country such scientific knowledge of agriculture as will act as a bulwark against the disaster which
has been threatening us all the time and of which we have heard so
often. 6 2
The Government's reply to such complaints by Africans was that in fact it would
train Africans, if it could find farmers who were willing to learn and who were
responsible.

Farms were often worked by hired labour, or else they changed

hands so frequently that there was no point in training whoever was in possessi on.
So many farms are left more or less completely in charge of migrant
labourers, and so many are in the hands of receivers whose only interest
is to gather the crops, that there is nobody, in a large number of cases,
permanent enough to receive education or to apply it. Even where the
farmer himself occupies his farr11 the incentive to careful cultivation and
harvesting is frequently removed by his having pledged the usufruct as
security for a loan.63
While it might be easy for Government to ignore complaints about agricultural facilities made by the educated spokesmen of the Gold Coast through
official channels, it was less easy for it to ignore the attempts made by often
less educated, but far more active, Gold Coast farmers and entrepreneurs to
organize co-O]Jerative business ventures designed to step outside the traditional trading pattern of the colony and to deal direct with cocoa consumers,
especially in New York.

Crumerican buyers were anxious to make direct contact

61 see Chapter II.

c

62 Speech by

Mr. Korsah, Africar. unofficial member, to GCLegCo, 15 March

1937, PP· 94-95·
63 No'·Tell
<.

CO"!'""}.'
n~'t
-=· -~Sl'on Repo""t
~ ' op . '-'
'· . ' p. 2]. .
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with African producers to circlUllvent tbe British and Continental monopoly on
buying within Ghana.)

The Government v:i.ewe1 such organizations wit.h

assuming that the members >wnld not have the resources or the
deal direct with foreign markets.

By

to

there were already a few small

trading and thrift societies in the Gold Coast, for example the Aburi-Nsawam
Cacao Growers Association and the Abokobe Farmers Association.

The Government

argued that "To a friendly cri tic, their defects appear to be that the contributions of members are far too large, and that they have given too little
attention to standardising and improving the product in which they deal, and
laid too much stress on the purely commercial side." 64
It would seem that Government

with regard to indigenous self-help

associations, of whatever kind, was motivated by two factors; a genuine suspicion, with some backing in reality, tbat local farmers would be cheated or
would simply not be able to manage their own finances; and pressure from the
expatriate trading firms who insisted that African organizations should not
with the trading networks which they themselves so successfully
monopolized.

The Government turned to the idea of establishing a

movement as a means of providing agricultural education and self-help programmes (with the idea of eventually starting a co-operative bank) 65 without
interfering with existing trade relationships.

It also decided that the best

means of improving cocoa quality would be through co-operatives.66

Farmers

64 Report by G. G. Auchinleck, Deputy Director of Agriculture, on Co-oper-

ative Societies in the Gold Coast, in GNA Adm.ll/1436.

c

65 " •• , whatever be the final form assumed by the co-operative movement
locally, it is certain that a small peasant farmer, working three or four acres
and without valid title deeds, cannot be, as an individual, an acceptable customer to an-y t-ype of bank. His first step must be to join a society which may
later be able to borrow on the joint security of its members." Statement in
GCLegCo, 23 February 1931.
66 Governor to GGLegCo, 1 March

0

were to be taught business methods by honest, reliable, colonial officials,
not by persons such as one \Hn:i.fried Tete-Ansa, a Ghanaian entrepreneur, whose
unusual, if indigenous, methods of business practice were beyond the realm of
the acceptable.

In 1931 Tete-Ansa came up with a scheme to start district

co-operatives under paramount chiefs vrhich would eventually amalgamate and
engage in collective marketing.6 7
Schemes such as that proposed by Tete-Ansa were regarded with genuine
fear by the local expatriate firms, who wanted to be assured that all eooperatives, whether privately or publicly organized, would be kept clearly
away from the trading and marketing end of the cocoa industr.yin productioG.

~~en

&~d

engage only

the Gold Coast Co-operative Societies Bill was under dis-

cussion in 1930, the London Chamber of Commerce stated its position thus.
The Bill provided that any ten persons whose object was the promotion
of the economic interests of themselves in accordance with co-operative
principles could have the:rr..selves formed into a co-operative society. In
so far as co-operative societies -vrere formed for the purpose of improving
the production of cocoa, we should favour them, but under the Bill,
Societies could be formed for trading and other purposes and as they
were granted special protection, it would enable them to compete unfairly
against the merchants houses already established. 6 8
In fact, when it instituted the co-operative societies, the Government
assured that all cocoa would continue to be sold through the local firms.

The

idea •ras simply to improve the coco:::t quality in order to obtain a better price,
and the firms agreed to pay
sold.

a premium on the better quality cocoa which was

The actual co-operative movement was started in 1927, and by 1936 there

were some 4oo societies with 9,000 members, marketing about 4,000 tons of cocoa

67

West African 'l'imes, Accra, 16 July 1931. Clipping in GNA Adrn. 11/1436.
For more information on Tete-Ansa, see Cha.pter VII.

c

68LonCC, 2 June 1930.
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per annum (barely two per cent of the total cocoa crop). 69
ment could hardly have provided a serious

~hreat

Such a small move-

to the firms, yet there was

intense opposition to it. ·Some Europeans actively sought to subvert the eooperatives.

In 1932 a Government Assistant Inspector of Plants had to file a

complaint against one Mr. Hartland, a UAG agent, who refUsed to deal with eooperatives and asked to deal with individual farmers instead .
. he has no interest for the co-operative Societies' cacao as he
could get cacao at a cheap rate from the farmers direct. . • . He further
directed his attention to one Thomas Die, a Treasurer of the Anyinam
Go-operative Society, . . • [and claimed] that the Department of Agriculture is trading for itself; and is not assisting the farmers in any form,
and that the Department will do the farmer no good by instituting the
Co-operative movement) but that the C-o·.rernment is seeking the mea.11s to
know the output of each farmer and to impose taxation on each farmer hence
the Co-operative Societies are being instituted, therefore the Treasurer
should try to discontinue the Co-opera"~i ve movement over this area, and
therefore if any firm offers the highent tender the Society should not
just sell the cacao to the said firm, but that he Mr. J. A. Hartland
should be notified so as to offer more and clear the cacao. 70
Government

cy was to offer the cocoa produced by co-operatives for sale by

tender to the highest bidder.

This policy annoyed the firms who, although

they always pressured for better quality, were unwilling to pay for it.

Many

African farmers left the co-operatives because the price being paid for their
cocoa simply did not cover the extra expenses of producing the high quality
which Government agricultural officers had assured them would be rewarded.
The highest premium which the firms were Wllling to pay was 6d. per load, or
approximately the amount of brokers' connnission which they saved by buying
through the C~vernment (that is, they were not actually paying for higher

quality at all) , while the average extra e},:penses of co-operative cocoa 'l·rere
69 Shephard,

c

op. ait., p. 125.

70 Report included in GNA, Adm.29/1/91. 'lne prejudice of Government
officials is evident in a reply to this report dated 8 December 1932. "Conduct
of this_ sort we expect from certain African Brokers but not from Europeans
holding responsible commercial positions."
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11 3,i.d. per load. 71

Moreover the expatriates were in the habit of distributing

the buying of co-operative cocoa to each firm in turn; it was considered a
burden, not an advantage.
lowing terms.

The 1937 Cocoa Pool Agreement 72 included the fol-

"Co-operative Cocoa.

Local Committee to allocate and decide

which member should take it in turn; a fixed premi urn to be paid, not exceeding
6d. per load--maximum to be fixed by local committee ." 73

Some farmers alleged

that
• • • before buying Co-operative Society Cocoa the Merchants depress
the public purchasing price by 6d. and then buy the Co-operative Societies Cocoa at the true market price, and then immediately afterwards
depress the price again to give the im~ression that they are paying 6d.
more for Co-operative Societies Cocoa. 4
But in their defense the firms argued that in fact not all co-operative cocoa
was of high quality; some was definitely of poor quality and they suspected
that nonco-operative cocoa was being included in co-operative lots in order to
obtain the premium.
It was easy for the firms to make such accusations as the above, 9...r:td to
refuse to pay more than 6d. per load premi urn, since in order to placate them
the Government had agreed that only the principal European firms, not the
smaller firms or any African firms which might emerge, would be allowed to subrnit bids for co-operative cocoa.

Winifried Tete-Ansa complained of this

practice thus:
That section 29 of the Societies Ordinance precludes them from dealing
with any outside person or Firm without the consent of the Governor which

71 Nowell Commission Report,

op. ait., pp. 42-43.

72 See Chapter VII.

c

73 Cad:

288/12.

74 Report by the Corr.unissioner of the Eastern Province to the Colonial
Secretar.t, 5 July 1938. In GNA Adm. 29/6/14.
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directly introduces administrative interference in trade, and those restrictions become a fillip to the 'Pool' and gamblers in our Cocoa who
after speculating all the year round will be able to fix the local prices
for the cocoa, practically under the auspices of Government to the detriment of the Farmers.
The Societies do not introduce corr.petition which is very necessary in
any industry, but rather control agricultural products indirectly, there-fore controlling the lands yielding those cocoa crops for the benefit of_
the local merchants, meaning the Pool, with the huge capital behind it. 7 ~
Tete-Ansa's view, as an independent cocoa buyer, is perhaps somewhat biased,
but it is confirmed by J. C. de Graft-Johnson in his African Experiment.
When selling the cocoa of co-operators, they [the Government]
circularized all the principal merchants, secured tenders, and, without
consulting the peasant proprietors, decided which tender to accept.
Gold Coast Africans asserted that European firms 1-rere favoured in these
sales. However, although there was no deliberate discrimination against
African merchants, the fact that only the principal exporting merchru1ts
were circularized, and that these were all Europeans, resulted in the
virtual exclusion of all the smaller African exporters from the sale of
co-operative cocoa. 7 6
The firms, then, were able to subvert the growth of the co-operative
movement inasmuch as they both limited the movement's possibilities for expa.'1sion into new aspects of the cocoa industry, specifically

trade~

and refused

to pay adequate differential prices •..rhich would cover the higher costs of eooperative cocoa.

Their attitude to co-operatives was entirely consistent with

their general attitude to the problem of quality control.

For the large ex-

patriate firms, Ghana was primarily a supplier of low-cost, large quantities
of cocoa.

W11ile the firms acknowledged a need for better quality cocoa, they

were unwilling to pay for it.

Government attempts at diversification

a..Ylcl

quality control, such as they were, could not withstand the indifference and
sometimes hostility of the expatriate commercial sector.

c

The firms'

75 Quoted in the West Afncan Times, Accra, 18 July 1931.
GNA Adm.ll/1436.
76 op.

a-it., p. 69~ italics in original.

Clipping in
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unwillingness to invest in better quality cocoa was only one aspect of their
general unwillingness to invest in developlient in Ghana,
2.

Investment in Ghana
A Government, however benign, cannot operate without funds.

Colonial

Governments in the British Empire were constantly constrained by an Imperial
policy which decreed that colonies must be self-supporting, that they should
contribute to, but not take from, the
amo~~ts

Impe~ial

Treasury.

Without large

of administrative funds, the Ghana Government had to look for alterna-

tive sources of financing.
European investor,

But the colony as a whole had little to offer the
in the area of gold-mining.

The import-export trade

was a low-cost industry which required little in the way of flmding.

Rail-

ways, such as they were, were costly, and the few miles of track in Ghana were
not a priority investment for the coupon-clippers of the Western world.

Most

of the financing of the Gold Coast colony 'lvas, in the end, done by its African
inhabitants themselves through their (indi~ect) payment of import and export
duties.
As has already been pointed out in Chapter V, colonial Governments were
not entrusted with their own monetary policy.

They were not allowed to create

currency and thus to create credit; rather, the WACB was compelled to keep reserves of 100 per cent or more.

The budget had at all times to be balanced

and deficit financing was not allowed.

The Government was allowed to issue

bonds and to borrow on the London market, 1mt its highest priority in terms of
spending was its repayment of the public debt; development projects were curtailed if the public debt was not paid,
On the other hand, the Imperial Government, while limiting the amount

c

which it was willing to allow the colonial Government to spend, did not c-:>mpensate for these limits by gi v'ing that Government grants.

In Table 28 it can be
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Table 28.

Government Hevenue by Selected Sources
(Percentage Figures), 1900-1939 77

Grants from
Imperial
Goverm:tent

Year
1900
1901
1902
1903
19014
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

Rents of
Government Lands
and Buildings

0

0

5
4

0
1
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
1

4
5
2
1
1

0

0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

2
2
2
2
2

0

1
1
2

0
0
0
0
1
1
1
2
2
1

0
0
0

1920
1921
1922
1923
1924

9

0

5

0
0

2
1
1
1

4
3
3
3
1

2
0
0

1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

0

0
0
0

1
5
77source:

5

4

3
3
3
3
3

4
4

.
4

1
3
2
3

0
0
0
0
0
0

1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919

1930

Royalties

13

1926
1927
1928
1929

c

Interest on
Invest::nents
and Loans

,_0

1

1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

3
3
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
1

-·-

Based on Raw Figures from Kay, op. ait., Table 24a, "Government Revenue by Source ( 1900-1960), 11 pp. 348-55.
N.B. -=none, 0 = sQme but less than 0.5 :per cent.
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seen that the percentage of Ghana Government revenue which came from grants
from the Imperial Government was miniscule, except for 1900 (and the pre-1900
period),

The percentage steadily declined between 1901 and 1907, and from

1908 to 1929 nothing at all was given to the colony in the form of direct
grants.

The Depression-exerted needs of the colony after 1929, combined with

the new "development" policy of the home Government in the same period, as
exemplified in the Colonial Development Act, resulted in small grants during
the 1930s, actually reaching as high as five per cent of the colonial revenue
in 1939.

But on the whole, a most conservative policy was espoused by the

home Government.
The trustee was not to use his own money to make the ward's estate
more productive. The most he might do was to use his own credit to
guarantee a loan. Colonial revenues must be able to meet the service
of any loans they were permitted to raise, and the salaries of any
staff they were permitted to employ. 7 8
The "trustee" was of course the Imperial Government, while the ward was the
colony.

In fact the trustee hesitated to guarantee all but the safest of

loans, and would not guarantee loans of substantial sums of money to finance
development projects.

Development was to be financed out of colonial revenues;

since these revenues, as will be shown below (Table

) , consisted primarily

of import and export duties the capacity for development fluctuated with the
state of the import-export economy.
The Ghana development policy, according to Peter Sederburg, also depended very much on the individual Governor,

Aside from Guggisberg, most

Governors were conservative in their policy and preferred to have a balai'1ced
budget or a surplus.

c

78

Between 1901 and 1939, in Ghana, there were fifteen

Kenneth Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship: Aspects of Britiah
Colonial PolJoy bev.JJeen the ~lars (London: Oxford University Press, 1965),
p.

26.
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years of deficit and twenty-three of s.urplus..

''. • • the period as a whole ran

a surplus of approximately £2~439,000 despite a world war and two trade depressions." 7 9

The Gold Coast did raise several loans on the London market for

capital projects, but had to pay the high rate of interest of four to six per
cent.

Sederburg describes the general revenue and expenditure policy of the

Government in the following way.
The Gold Coast Government appeared to be most interested in its own
self-maintenance as an order-preserving framework 1-ri thin which the
foreign firms could operate fairly free from restrictions. These
operations were to be achieved at minimum cost to the British taxpayer.
• . . This general goal was manifested through the pursuit of intermediate ends indicated by the expenditure data. 'l'hus, state operations
were kept simple; the colonial regimes' role in social and economic
development was relatively circumscribed, as shown by a low rate of
capital expenditure. There was practically no state involvement in
directly productive activities, such as agriculture and industry. 80
Hhile the Government received little by way of income from its Imperial
trustee, equally little cruae its way as a result of its dealings with the expatriate commercial classes, either through rents or royalties.

In Chapter II

it was argued that African landmrners in Gh·ma lost a substantial amount of
their potential income because, until 1919, rents on urban land were paid to
the Government, not to the original owners of the properties.

Nevertheless,

the sum, while it may have been significant to an emerging African landowning
class, was of li ttJ e significance to the Government.

Rents on Government lands

and buildings never constituted more than one per cent of the colonial
revenue.

A few thousand pounds, never more than £30,000 a year, was all

that the rents amounted to in absolute terms..

Similarly royalties on mining

and timber concessions, pegged at five per cent of pretax profits, varied

79

c

Peter C. Sederberg, "The Gold Coast under Colonial Rule:
ture Analyq,il?./ .4f;ri;ean Studies Review., vol. 14 (1971} , p, 192.
01,...d • '

80 L~

p. 200 .
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between only one and four per cent of Goverrooent revenue.
The expatriate firms might have tried to argue that their contribution
to the colony as a whole,

not the actual Government, was far more signifi-

cant than appeared at first glance, since their entrepreneurial activity within
the territory had backward and forward linkages which stimulated growth.

In

fact, however, it seems that the expatriate firms were essentially parasitic.
Aside from providing a few opportunities for a brokerage class, and a group of
small shopkeepers and agents who sold the goods which the Europeans imported,
they did little to stimulate the economy.

No industrial production was needed

to facilitate trade, nor was any processing, either of goods to be exported or
of goods imported, engaged in.
Moreover, very little investment was required to maintain the European
retailing establishments necessary to induc::: the African to buy cheap manufactured goods.

The sole investments made by the trading firms (aside frorr.

investments by some of the firms in their o·..;rn transport businesses) were in
buying and selling stations ("mucky little stores"), 81 a few sheds for storage
of cocoa along the docks, and bungalows for their European staffs.

i-v'hile it is

difficult to obtain accurate figures of total investments, the following table
gives some indication of investments by some large European firms in Ghana just
prior to their amalgamation into the UAC,

The total investment in all of

Africa in 1928 by both Miller and Swanzy, t.:1e two oldest and largest European
firms in Ghana, was only £628,729.

Similarly, in 1937 Cadbury, J. S. Fry, and

Rowntree had a total investment in the Coas·;:, of only about £175,000, invested

"

in the provision of stores, offices, weighing apparatus, transport,

living quarters, and other necessary equipment." 82

c

81 These words were used by a former E'.lropean eocoA. buyer when describing

his companyls premises in an intervievr.
8 2cad: 288/74.

Accra, August 1974.
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Table 29.

Values of' Properties of Various Firms in Ghana
30 September 192883

.

======================~~=====~==·=-s~-==c=w==:=-=-~·~====·==-=-=============================

Company

Value of Property (£)

African and Eastern Trade Corp.
161,483
Ashanti-Obuasi Trading Co.
23,256
F. and A. Swanzy Ltd.
357,905 (all African properties)
Gold Coast Machinery and Trading Co. Ltd.
6,656
Millers Limited
270,824 (all African properties)
Tarquah Trading Co.
59,039

The only significant amounts of money invested in Ghana by expatriate
businessmen were to be found in the gold mines.

Even with regard to minE:s,

however, it must be kept in mind that large numbers of mines existed in name
only, or, even when their nominal capital seemed to be significant, their
actual subscribed capital was a very minor amount.

Between 1880 and 190h, for

example, some 476 companies ·..rere registered for mining and exploration ir. West
Africa, especially Ghana and the Ivory Coast.

Their nominal capital

some £43 million, but much of this capital was never subscribed.

tot~lled

Despite the

mining booms only thirteen compa..'1ies reported any production in 1904, anc. only
four of these had produced over £10,000 worth of gold. 84
was a substantial percentage of investment:

Nevertheless, mining

Frank.el estimates that of all the

non-Government capital issues in London for Africa as a whole between 1900 a.lld

1936, capital issues from mining and exploration companies constituted sixtysix per cent.85

8 3UAC Rank.in file: Reports. It is possible .that some of these properties were overvalued as the purpose of the valuation was to indicate the worth
of the African and Eastern Trade Corporation upon its amalgamation with the
Niger Company in 1929.

c

84Frankel, op. ai t., p. 162.

BSibid., p. 181.
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Frankel presents the following fignres for the total capital invested in

0

Ghana between 1870 and 1936, dates roughly corresponding with the dates of this
thesis.
Table 30.

Amount of Capital Invested
in Ghana, 1870-1936 86
=

Public Listed Capital
Private Listed Capital

£13,462,000
£20,160,000

Total Listed Capital

£33,622,000

Nonlisted Capital (estimate five per cent of
listed)
Total Capital

£ 1,681,000
£35,303,000

With the limited amount of capital which it was able to raise, the Goverr;.ment
was obliged to seek alternate sources of financing for its activities.

Taxa-

tion was the answer, although direct taxation was not possible, as both
Europeans and Africans opposed it.

The only experiment in direct taxation

which had ever been implemented in the Gold Coast took place in 1852, when the
Governor, aft.=r consulting with the various paramount chiefs along the coast,
imposed a head tax of one shilling on every man, woman, and child in the
Colony.

It was hoped that this tax would finance British expenditures, id th as

much as £20,000 per annum, but it aroused much indifference and some active
protest, so that the highest figQre ever raised was £7,567 in 1853, and the tax
was aba~ndoned by 1861. 87

The Sierra Leone hut tax rebellion of 1898 reinforced

the Governmen-c in its policy decision not to risk disruption by imposing any
more taxes.

A

86 Ibid.,
8 7 McPhee,

system of municipal taxation was introduced in the 1920s in the

p. 158.

op. cr~t., p. 210.
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major towns of Cape Coast, Sekondi and Accra, and direct taxation was introduced in the Northern Territories in 1937, 88 but the country as a whole never
suffered the burden of direct taxation. 89
Without direct taxation as a means of financing its activities, the
Government had to turn to indirect taxation; primarily, to import and export
duties.

Table 31 below presents total Government revenues, total import duties,

and total export duties for the years 1886 to 1939, stating import and export
duties as a percent age of Government revenue.

It can be seen that with the ex-

ception of the single year 1918, when wartime shipping losses restricted
imports and exports, these indirect taxes always constituted at least fifty per
cent of the Government revenue.

For the first ten years, import duties alone

constituted some eighty per cent or more of Government revenue; later the percentage declined gradually to little over fifty-five per cent until export
duties were introduced as well in 1916, after which point their joint contribution to the colonial revenue generally vmvered between the sixty and seventyfive per cent marks.

A substantial part of the Government's funds, then, came

from the import-export trade, and in this sense the colony was tr1liy selffinancing.
It should be noted that until 1916 there were no export duties in the
colony, although it would have seemed administratively easier to tax the few
large colonial exports than to tax the multi tu de of imports.

One cause of this

anomaly was that the British merchants repeatedly and insistently opposed any
attempt by the Government to impose an export tax.

They constantly reiterated

88Announcement made by Governor in GCLegCo, 15 March 1937.

c

89 Details of the taxation system t.aken from McPhee, op. ait., p. 207 ff,
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Table 31.

0
Year

1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1895
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922

c

Total Government
Revenue
( i)

Import and Export Duties as Per Cent
of Government Revenue, 1886-1939 90
Import
Duties

(ii) as %
of (i}

Export
Duties
(iv)

£000s

(ii)

£000s

.tOO Os

( iii)

123
122
98
111
156
186
183
202
218
230
237
238
304
423
383
496
512
578
682
586
683
709
752
779
1,007
1,112
1,231
1,302
1,332
1,456
1,886
1,624
1,299
2,601
3,722
3,016
3,357

103
105
80
95
133
166
162
178
191
198
205
200
225
279
281
351
382
370
384
334
386
414
490
459
611
663
736
780
769
828
1,150
683
489
1,253
1, 711
979
1,494

84
86
82
86
85
89
89
81
88
86

( iv) as %
of (i)
(v)

84
86
82
86
85
89
89
81
88
86
87
84
74
66

8'(

84
74
66
73
71
75
64
56
57
57
58
65
59
61
60
60
6o

58
57
61
42
38
48
46
32
45

Total %
(iii)+(v)

32
21.1
131
419
571
798
541

2
13
10
16
15
26
16

73
71
75
64
56
57
57
58
65
59
61
60
6o
60
58
57
63
55
48
64
61
58
61

1886-1899, Gold Coast, Bl-u.e Books; 1900-1939, Kay, op. cn~t. ~
Table 24a, "Government Revenue by Source, 1900-1960, 11 pp. 348-49.
90 Source:
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Table 31 (cont'd.)
=::::::

(iv) as %
of ( i)

( iii)

Export
Duties
(iv)
£000s

1,682
2,000
2,165
2,075
2,890
2,264
2,185

45
50
53
48
70
58
64

473
283
274
318
272
321
284

13
7
7
7
7
8
8

1,427
1,166
1,362
1,366
1,393
1,858
2,332
2,288
1,856
1,679

53
51
51
51
50
57
62
60
49
45

296
300
279
439
481
539
589
'463
810
911

11
13
10
16
17
16
16
12
21
24

Total GoYernment
Revenue
Year
( i)
£000s

Import
Duties
£000s

1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

3,743
3,971
4,116
4,365
4,122
3}914
3,397

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

2,671
2,284
2,671
2,685
2,778
3,268
3~775

3,792
3:780
3:734

nf

(ii) as
of (i)

{ii)

tO

that they were opposed "in principle" to export taxes.

Total %
(iii)+(v)

(v)
58
57
60
55
77
66
72
64
64
61
67
67
73
78
72
70
69

In fact, of course,

they opposed all taxes simultaneously with their desire for more development of
infrastructure in the colony and their pressures on the Government to spend
more money on transportation.

Retrenchment in other expenditure, not taxation,

was seen as the way to finance colonial development.
But given that they had to accept some form of taxation, the merchants
preferred impcrt duties.

Their logic for this argument was that" • • • import

duties, • • • affected more than one particular commodity, and the taxation was
not a direct burden on the native." 91

'l'he :merchants, in other words, saw the

taxes as a burden not on themselves so much as on "natives," i .e. , they admitted
that all taxes, except for import duties on mining equipment were passed on to

c

91ManCC, ll February 1930.
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the consumers, and they feared the consequences of imposing a high tax on the
cocoa producer, as againGt spreading taxes among all the consumers of the colony.

It would also seem that, given the very inexpensive cost of many imported

goods, a tax on these goods 1wuld still not raise the price beyond what the
average African could pay, whereas a tax on exported goods might reduce the
buying price below that at '1hich the average African was willing to sell.
Several attempts made by Government to introduce export duties fell
through because of the opposition of the merchants.

In 1911, for

Government was considering imposing an export tax of

l~d.

and 10/- per log on timber.9 2

exampl~,

the

per pound on rubber

The proposal created a furore in commercial cir-

cles, and eventually the Governor announced that it would be withdrawn because
there was so much opposition. 9 3
With the beginning of World War I, however, conditions changed, and even
the British Chambers of Commerce were willing to support the Government when it
introduced a cocoa export tax in 1916, albeit they insisted on it only aH a
wartime measure.
Resolved that the Colonial Office be informed that whilst the
[Liverpool] Committee still adhere to their previously expressed
opinion against the imposition of export duties for revenue purposes,
they recognize that the present circumstances are abnormal and do not
propose at the present time to oppose the imposition of this tax,
especially as it is understood that it is only a temporary measure. 91•
But a tax once
soon became

a

ed is difficult to remove, and in Ghana the export tax
permanent feature of the economy.

Moreover, after World War I

the revenue from the tax was necessary to replace revenue previously earned by
the import tax on trade spirits.

The tax on trade spirits had been the

92 Reported in Lance, 13 April 1911.
9 3speech

by Governor to GCLegCo,
May 1916.

6 November 1911.
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backbone of customs revenue prior to World War I, but whereas it constituted
sixty-four per cent of customs revenue in 1913, in 1920, after the signing of
an International Convention limiting the importation of trade spirits, it
comprised only six per cent of customs revenue. 9S

Even the commercial classes

realized that Government revenues had to be protected after this falling off
of import duties.

Leslie Couper of the BBWA (which was, of course, not itself

affected by customs duties) argued that "He thought it necessary for the Colonial Government to broaden the basis of taxation now that the Revenue from the
Trade Spirits had ceased. " 96

The Government was f1..llly aware of the relation-

ship between the two types of taxes.

"When the liquor revenue ceased to exist,

the Government had to look about for substitutes for it and they kept on export
duties, & in some cases had later to increase them, although they were originonly. " 97

ally imposed as a war

Occasional attempts were still made

after 1920 to have the export tax removed, but the Colonial Office refused to
entertain such notions and often the business community could not, in any case,
achieve unanimity among its various members.

In 1933, for instance, the

Liverpool Chamber of Commerce asked for the London Chamber's support in c, bid
to remove all export taxes in order to increase the African's purchasing power,
but the London Chamber refused its

support~

citing the current Depression as

precisely the reason why export taxes should be retained.9 8
Implicit, and sometimes explicit, in all the debates about whether taxes
should be imposed, removed, raised or lowered, ;vas the awareness that it vTas

95M cPhee,

op.

•
a~t.,

8
p. 22.

9 6LonCC, 24 May 1921.

c

97 "CoillEli ttee on Trade and Taxation in British West Africa,"
Minutes of Evidence, Q.l249, speech by the Chairman.
9 6LonCC, 4 December 1933.

ov. ait.,
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the African consumer or producer who bore the burden of the import and expert
duties; that it was the Africa..11s themselves, in fact, who financed what development of their coUntry occurred through the payment of indirect taxes.

If

import duties were raised, the cost of imported goods was raised corrnnensurately; while if export duties were imposed or raised, the price paid to the
African producer for his crops was lowered.

But the

convers~

was not always

the case; when import duties were removed prices did not go down, nor were
African farmers necessarily paid more when the export duties were lowereu (as
they were by the Governor in 1924

on condition that farmers' prices be

raised). 99
The Government, the educated AfricarJ. corrnnuni ty, and the expatriate business community all, at various times, indicated their awareness and
ackn~edgement

of the fact that in the end, it was the Africans who paid the

import and export duties of Ghfl-na.

As early as 1893, with regard to a petition

presented by the principal merchants of the Gold Coast against a ten per cent
import tax, the then Governor reported
• • . with regard to the • • • 'grievous tax upon trade' I have been
informed by a gentleman • • • that at one of the meetings convened by
Messrs. Swanzy with the object of obtaining signatures to the Complaint,
one of the persons present refused to sign it, stating that there was
not a merchant in the Colony who had not added more th&'l ten per cent to
his prices and was consequently making more money by it, and if anyoue
objected it should be the consumer.
[A 'native gentleman' said] •
if the ten per cent duty was taken
off it would not lessen the cost of goc,ds • • . to the consumers, but
would go into the pockets of the trading community just as the old four
per cent duty [abolished as of 1887] did when it was discontinued.lOO
99

0

Governor to GCLegCo, 26 March 1924. The Governor reduced the cocoa export tax to l/8d. from \d. per pound because at a conference at the Colonial
Office in 1923, Mr. Batty, head of the A&ETC, had promised that "any further
reduction of the duty on cocoa would at once go to the price paid to the
native."
100

Gold Coast, "Despatch from Govemor Griffith" (1893) (Xerox, Balme
Library, Legcn, Ghana), p. 49.
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Complaints by Africans that they dia not benefit from reductions of duties were
a constant refrain throughout the colonial period.

As lata as 1938, Nana Ofori

Atta argued" • • • I think I can say that certain commodities which were sold
at lesser prices have been increased in price with the removal of duty or sold
at the same price," 10 1

The business corr..munity, certainly, never denied that it

passed the full burden of the duties on to the Africans; its sole concern was
that if the burden became too high, Africans would stop buying or selling.

The

Sekondi Chamber of Commerce argued in 1921 that
. • • with the existing (export] tax, large quantities of Cocoa in the
country would never be brought to the market, as owing to the cost of
cartage, the amount the producer vrould get for his produce would not pay
him for the cost of labour. The repeal of the present tax would just
make the difference between a profitable and non-profitable industry. 102
Similarly Mr. Batty, head of the A&ETC, argued in 1921 before the Committee on
Trade and Taxation in West Africa that
If the Government are going to derive their revenue by direct taxation
on production, there is a great do.nger-··i t may not be before us today--but
there is a. very great danger that we may find ourselves in a position of
the native refusing to produce because we cannot pay him a price sufficient
to induce him to do so. , . , 1 0 3
This prediction foreshadowed the man:r small cocoa boycotts which w·ere to
take place within the next ten years, and which were to climax in the dramatic
and well-organized boycott of 1937-38 against a Pool of European firms which
refused to pay the African producers prices which they considered reasonable
for cocoa,

Yet, although both Government and business realized that the burden

of indirect taxation was born by the Africo.n, such a burden was considered
legitimate and there was no suggestion that someone else, perhaps the firms

101 Speech in GCLegCo, 15 September 1938.

c

102 Reported in LivCC,

6 June 1921.

103 Committee on TrE...de and Taxation, op. oit., Minutes of Evidence, Q.648.
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themselves, perhaps the European consUt'Ylers of the exported produce, should bear
the full or even partial weight of the tax.

A committee which investigated ana

accepted the proposal for export tax in 1916 justified the tax on the grounds
that the money made by Africans was clear profit.
The Comndttee fully realized that the direct effect of this tax would
be felt by the cocoa planter inasmuch as he would receive so much less per
[head] load (1/3) than he would otherwise receive, but it must be borne
in mind that in this Colony the cocoa industry is wholly in the hands of
natives.
have not such items as share-holders' dividends or the cost
of European supervision to bear, and, outside the actual cost of headload
transport from the farms to the raihray, the money they receive for their
crop is a clear profit.l04
Seemingly the costs of labour, organization, and enterprise (plus the cost of
waiting five years for the cocoa crop to mature) were legitimate costs only for
Europeans, not Africans, to claim.
Just as the African population of Ghana was ultimately held responsible
for such issues as crop improvement, so also it was ultimately responsibJe, to
a large extent, for the financing of the colony.

Outsiders contributed little

to the Ghana Government revenue in comparison to Africans.

It would seent that

in terms of production, Africans were certainly able to both organize themselves and to create sufficient surplus to fund development projects.
for the gold mines, in which Africans had little interest

Except

as a possible

source of employment, little significant investment was made in Ghana by
European entrepreneurs.

The cocoa boycotts which will be discussed in Chapter

VII, illustrate both the ability of the African farmers and independent entrepreneurs to organize in their own interests, and their awareness that the
rewards they were receiving for their endeavours were not commensurate i·ri th the
burdens of production, risk-taking, and tax-paying which they bore.

c

104Speech by the Treasurer in C~LegCo, 26 September 1916.

CHAPTER VII

AFRICAN RESISTANCE TO EXPATRIATE ENTREPRENEURS:
THE COCOA BOYCOTTS
The post-World War I period in Ghana witnessed a number of attempts by
African

farmers~

in conjunction with chiefs and aspiring African entrepreneurs,

to circumvent European control of the economy by engaging in economic boycotts
against the major European firms.

The objects of the boycotts were to increase

the price for cocoa paid to the actual producer, and to reduce monopoly control
of both buying and selling.

The boycotts also provided opportunities for cer-

tain Ghanaians (and a few Europeans not connected with the agreement firms) to
enter cocoa buying and shipping.

Although the boycotts failed in their con-

crete objectives, their impact upon colonial administration was considerable,
and they were a major cause of the reorganization of the cocoa export trade
under the Cocoa Marketing Board after the Second World War.
The following pages will describe the 1930-31 and the 1937-38 boycotts
with a view to discovering the limits to the potentialities for success of this
type of politicoeconomic action in a peripheral economy dependent for its
living on an agricultural crop sold on the world market.

It will be seen that

the structure and nature of the cocoa industry, combined with the development
of differing class interests among Ghanaians, constrained the boycotts and
limited their capacity for positive results.
1.

The Cocoa Market
In Chapter III the organization of production for the international

cocoa market was described, but little attention was paid to the actual mar-

c

keting of the cocoa;· that is, to the distributive network.

But an

understanding of that network is crucial to the analysis of Ghana's place in
323
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the international economic system.

The many intermediaries who handled the

cocoa between the producer and the ultimate manufacturer had each their role to
play and their profits to extract.
Chart 3 outlines the stages through which cocoa had to pass before finally being transformed into a finished product ready for the consumer market
in Europe or America.

In all the stages thus outlined cocoa was being bought

and sold in its raw form; other than fermentation, which was the responsibility
of the seller-farmer, no processing of cocoa was done inside Ghana.
There was very little contact between the producers of cocoa and the
Europeans who ultimately bought it, although in major centres such as Nsawam
farmers could bring their cocoa directly to the European store to be exchanged
for cash or European goods, rather than sell it to brokers.

As transportation

improved and roads and railways reached further into the "bush," more and more
farmers were able to circumvent the brokers.

Conversely, however, as the

cocoa-producing area expanded and the demand for cocoa rose, farmers further
and further away from the major routes began to produce cocoa, which was bought
by itinerant brokers who sought out farms and supplied cash advances to the

farmers until their crops could be harvested.
Some of those agents who operated combination buying stations and retail
stores in large centres such as Accra, Nsawam, Kumasi and Koforidua were
Europeans, but as the cost of keeping Europeans in the colony rose 1 the expatriate firms tried to hire Africans as much as possible to man these stores,
reserving Europeans only for advisory and supervisory positions.

Brokers,

however, that is the agents who travelled into the countryside to gather up the
1

c

1For each European position, two employees had to be hired, as all were
entitled to six months' leave a year. In addition, housi~g had to be provided,
school fees paid for children, etc.
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Producers (independent African peasant farmers)

Sub~brokers

(African)

I

Direct Selling to
Agents (African
or European)

Brokers (African)

all cocoa forwarded to

l
European Companies

I

Manufacturers

l

surplus cocoa stocks

Merchants

J

surplus cocoa stocks
Brokers at
.· _New York -and
Ion don
Exchanges

I

Home Company
for
Manufacturing

Manufacturing Firms

0

Chart 3.

Organization of Cocoa Sales
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cocoa for the firms, were Africans.

Two types of brokers existedt salaried em-

ployees and independent entrepreneurs who received commission from the
Europeans.
In 1938 the Nowell Commission 2 investigated the marketing structure of
cocoa in Ghana, and in doing so it discovered that the vast network of agents,
brokers and sub-brokers, each one in debt to the next, was extracting large
amounts of wealth from both the farmers and the expatriate firms for seemingly
unproductive reasons.

The Nowell Commission divided the brokers into the fol-

lowing categories.
1}

Scale-buyers.

These were salaried buyers who, with their scales,

went to the farms to buy cocoa for cash.

By 1939 their use was declining as

the brokers opposed their invol Yement in the trade; in any case they often
bought not from the actual producer but from the petty broker.
2)

Sub-brokers.

These were petty brokers, buying between 100 and 300

tons of cocoa a year, who were dependent for advances on larger brokers, yet
might themselves have even smaller suba.gents to work for them.

As the number

of roads increased fewer of these sub-brokers were evident, as larger brokers
could reach further into the bush.
3)

Brokers.

These were usually buyers engaged directly by European

firms on a commission basis.

Their pay consisted mainly of commissions, but

also, often, of retaining fees, bonuses regulated by a sliding scale according
to the quantity of cocoa they acquired, and various perquisites, such as free
bags or storage tarpaulins.

4)

Factors.

Brokers gave 1:1dva.nces to sub-brokers •

This special category, which the Nowell Commission includ-

ed, existed only late in the period, probably in the 1930s.

0
2

0p. cit.

They were Africans
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or Syrians (who became numerous in the colony in the 1930s) who not only bought
and delivered cocoa.but also performed fUnctions such as grading which would
normally be performed by the European buyer.

5)

Independent buyers.

Again, these were Africans or Syrians who

bought with their own capital, and of'ten had their own agents as well, and sold
the cocoa to the Europeans.

Some of these independent buyers were also in-

volved in small-scale independent shipping. 3
Quite possibly, therefore, a headload of cocoa could go through two or
three hands before it reached Accra or Takoradi for export.

At each stage a

profit was made in return for the functions of marketing; each link in the
chain took a bit of the price offerred to the seller so that the surplus was
eventually extracted directly from the producers.

Thus many viewed the brokers

as a parasitic class.
But it was not only inside Ghana that brokers handled cocoa, nor only
inside Ghana that parasitic profits could be made.

Very little of the cocoa

was bought at the port o:t: shipment by those who were actually going to use it
for production.

Cadbury and Fry (in conjunction also with Rowntree} and J. S.

Lyons were the only major European firms who bought directly for production.
The other firms bought for export and resale, either direct or through yet another broker, to those producers who did not buy direct, such as, for example,
the gigantic American corporation, Hershey.

In addition, any surplus stocks

which the manufacturing firms might possess were released through brokers in
Europe for resale.

The market was especially volatile because cocoa had a low

capacity for storage and all products had to be bought during the short October

to February cocoa season.

0
3

:tbid., pp. 27-29.
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Sale and resale of cocoa was regularized after 1925 with the establishment of the New York Cocoa Exchange and, shortly thereafter, .of the London
Commodity Exchange.

These exchanges were set up specifically to guard against

the ''boom-and-bust" nature of commodity markets •
Establishment of a cocoa futures market in 1925 by the cocoa industry
was a natural development that filled a vital need. Production and
consumption had been rapidly expanding since the turn of the century and
cocoa was becoming one of the important commodities of world commerce.
The problem of moving the crop from producing areas in the tropics to the
consuming countries involved continually greater financial risks on the
part of those engaged in cocoa marketing. • • • Mbst cocoa is produced in
four months of the year--October through January. For proper storage, it
was necessary to move the cocoa from the tropics to temperate zones
quickly. Thus, the intermediary merchants were forced to 'carry' the
crop until desired by the processors.
It was obvious to the trade--before the century was many years old--that
a futures market, for hedging purposes, such as already existed for wheat,
cotton, coffee, and sugar was needed. 4
Many Africans noted that the New York and London Exchanges often traded
in far more cocoa than actually existed.

In New York, for example, between two

and eight times the amount of cocoa consumed in the United States was traded on
the market between 1928 and 1937.
Table 32.

Year
(i)

1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937

0

Cocoa Traded on the New York Cocoa Exchange (in Tons) 5

Total World Estimated Total Quantities Bought and Sold Percentage
Production
U.S. Consumption on.New York Cocoa Exchange
of {iv) of (iv)
(000 Tons)
(000 Tons)
(000 Tons)
to
to
{ii)
{iii)
(iv)
(ii)
(iii)

511
530
479
550
564
555
590
676
702
657
4unaerstanding

152
185
175
185
178
192
215
265
290
232

514
632
364
375
466
658
732
552
1,039
1,808

the Coooa Market (New York:

tions Corp., 1971), pp. 6-7.
~owell Commission, op. oit., p. 125.

101
119
76
68
83
119
124
82
148
275

338
342
208
203
262
343
340
208
358
779

Commodity Research Publica-
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Similar figures were given for London.
Table 33.

Year
(i)

1934
1935
1936
1937

Cocoa Traded in the London Produce
Clearing House (in Tons)6

Total World Estimated Total
Production
U.K. Consumption
(000 Tons)
(000 Tons)
(ii)
{iii)

590
676
702
657

Quantities
Registered by Percentage of Percentage of
London Produce (iv) to {ii) {iv) to {iii)
Clearing House
(000 Tons)
(iv)

74
83
103
96

40
34
15
54

235
230
102
352

318
277
100
367

The profits from these paper transactions were going into tlie hands of the
brokers and members of the Exchange, but also into the hands of speculators who
had no inherent interest in the cocoa market peP se.

Cocoa sold for a forward

contract. at one price could yield a substantial profit if to fulfil the contract it was bought at a lower price at a later date.

It was the speculators'

business to deal in cocoa futures and many of the paper transactions which
occurred on 'the exchange were of this type.
va.:;Lues could be put upon cocoa.

But because of speculation, false

Commodity speculators, according to the New

York Cocoa Exchange,''. • • are concerned only with making a profit on their
transactions. " 7
The Nowell Commission found the cocoa speculators responsible for fluetuations in cocoa prices which affected the cocoa farmer, and, furthermore,
accused the merchant firms, who ostensibly were interested only in straight
buying and selling on forward contracts, of such speculation.

0

6Ibid., p.

129.

1fJndePstanding the Coooa MaPket, op. cit., p. 4.

". • • the buying
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policy of manufacturers has on cccasion appeared to be largely speculative, and
has even been described to us as perhaps the most important of the various
speculative elements which had together been responsible for excessive fluctuations in the value of cocoa. ne

The firms, in reply, argued that they were

simply victims of the manipulation of the markets by brokers, and had to engage
in buying and selling activities extraneous to their actual need to cover themselves.
This was the world market, then, with which the Ghanaian farmer had to
deal, and with which any indigenous protest movements and attempts to control
cocoa exports would have to come to terms.

Nothing similar existed in Ghana

itself, and in contrast to the relatively simple systems of advances on cocoa
from firm to broker to farmer, the system of hedging, forward contracts, and
speculation in New York and London seemed incredibly complex.
articulate of Gold Coast spokesmen,

I~ana

One of the most

Ofori Atta, complained of the system

in the Legislative Council in 1924, even before the Exchanges had been set up.
If

. ..I

was surprised to hear • • • that before the cocoa trees began to bear

fruit in this country all the cocoa had been sold already, and that there are a
number of persons who deal in cocoa trade, and sell cocoa in England without
ever seeing a bean. " 9

Similarly the GoJ.d Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation,

which in 1930 led the boycott against the firms, complained of "Secret Forward
Contracts." 1 0
The farmers, then, who by their actions such as boycotts were trying to

8Nowell Commission, op. cit., p. 126.
9Nana Ofori Atta, Speech in GCLegCo, 6 March 1924.

0

10 conference between the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation and

representatives of the European mercantile community, 16 December 1930, report
in GNA Adm.ll/1070.
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gain control of the marketplace, were faced with an extremely complicated
system of organization designed to assure maximum profits not only to the ultimate manufacturer of cocoa but also to the European middlemen.

Beside

the

profits of the European middlemen the profits of their African counterparts
seemed negligible.

Africans were well aware, also, that the producers received

only a fraction of the ultimate price paid for raw cocoa at the terminal
stages.

While in general, as can be seen from Table 34, the farmers received

the fairly substantial percentage of about two-thirds of the Liverpool cocoa
price, in both the boycott years of 1930-31 and

1937~38

the percentage they

received declined sharply from the year before, as also did the absolute amount
they received.

The absolute amount paid to the farmers dropped from £8,071,000

to £3,697,000 between the 1929-30 and 1930-31 seasons, and from £10,680,000 to

£2,663,000 between the boom 1936-37 season and the 1937-38 season.

No doubt

the worldwide Depression was responsible for much of these declines in the
cocoa price, but the farmers, even while acknowledging this, nevertheless laid
a substantial proportion of the blame on the expatriate firms.

In fact the

firms claimed, and the Nowell Commission, on the basis of their evidence, concurred with the claim, that they had been buying cocoa at uneconomic prices, 11
that competition was so strong in Ghana that in order to obtain the share of
the crop which they were committed to sell they were often obliged to buy at
prices above what was being paid in Europe.

Nevertheless, even when they were

obliged to pay more than the ruling price for cocoa, the European firms still
managed to show a heal thy income.

What was lost on cocoa was gained on prices

of manufactured goods sold to Africans; the UAC admitted that most of :i. ts
profits were in fact made on such sales. 12 Although it was a fledgling concern

0

11 Nowell Commission, op. cit., p. 101.
l2Ibid.
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Table 34.

0
Year

Cash to Farmers as Per Cent of Liverpool Price 13

Cash to
Value at
Value at
Tons
Cash to Agricultural Port When
Liverpool at
Marketed Farmers
Community Marketed Time of Export
(ooo•s) (£000 1 s)
(£000 1 s)
(£000 1 s)
(£OOO's)
(iii)
(i)
(v)
(ii)
(iv)

1926-27
1927-28
1928-29
1929-30
1930-31
1931-32
1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936-37
1937-38

238
207
242
232
223
212
256
220
276
285
300
232

10,877
9,688
8,233
8,071
3,697
3,398
3,929
2,411
3,654
4,392
10,680
2,663

11,350
10,020
8,570
7,420
3,960
3,650
4,240
2,670
3,960
4,700
10,980
2,970

12,066
10,620
9,202
7,886
4,388
4,055
4,724
3,070
4,427
5,162
11,460
3,267

(ii) as
per cent
of (v)

64
74
68
84
65
59
60
50
57
61
76
50

17,100
13,149
12,187
9,635
5,658
5,764
6,537
4,792
6,464
7,156
14,oo4
5,302

the dividends of the UAC rose consistently during the Depression years.
Table 35.
Year

The United Africa Company:

Dividend Rate (Per Cent)

1931-32
1932-33
1933-34

Year

Dividend Rates14
Dividend Rate (Per Cent)
8
10

1934-35
1935-36
1936-37

11

Although dividend rates are not a precise indicator of a company's profitabili ty, the :fact that the UAC was able to pay such rates during its infancy
suggests that it was not suffering overly much :from the Depression.

The

Africans' perceptions of that profitability, furthermore, were coloured by the
observed lifestyles and luxuries which the European employees of the

0

13 This table is taken from Baron Holmes, op. ait., p. 37.
Dept. of Agriculture Files: W. H. Beckett, Memo.2/12/37, GNA.
lltsource:

Stock Exch.ange Yearbook (1939).

His source is

See alto Table 13a.
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cocoa-buying firms enjoyed inside the colony •
It was assumed by many Africans that had the European business community
consisted indeed of men of goodwill, they could have used their position as
monopoly buyers in the internal cocoa market to manipulate the world market in
Ghana's favour.

But representatives of the expatriate business connnunity

denied that such control was possible.

"The Pool's Control of World Prices.

Mr. Harris explained that the Pool last year dealt with approximately only 24%
of the world's supply and was not in a position, therefore, to command the
world price. nlS

In fact, as Table 36 indicates, far more than twenty-four per

cent of the world supply of cocoa came from Ghana.

Between 1919 and 1939 Ghana

controlled, at the lowest ebb, thirty-four per cent of the world's supply; in
the season prior to the statement made above, forty per cent of the world's
cocoa came from Ghana.

Of this the UAC controlled, on its own, about fifty per

cent; with its colleagues in the various pools and combines which it formed,
the percentage rose to about ninety-eight. 1 6
The Nowell Commission was of the opinion that indeed the Gold Coast
firms did have a certain amount of leeway on the world market.

It argued that

the UAC might be able to influence the smaller London market, and even have
some slight effect on the large New York Exchange.

Controlling as it did about

half the Gold Coast and Lagos supply of cocoa, the UAC was bound to have some
effect especially if it oversold •
• • • while the market is in normal circumstances too wide, and the
influences upon it too complex, for any one firm to acquire a continuous
control over prices, there are none the less times when it [the market]

15 Conference between the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation ana rep-

0

resentatives of the European mercantile community, 16 December 1930, report in
GNA Adm.ll/1070.
1 6Nowell Commission,

op. cit., p. 8.
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is vulnerable and open to attack, and • • • in the absence of a good
consuming or speculative demand there would be nothing to prevent shippers
from forcing prices down by means of heavy sales. 18

0

Further, the Nowell Co:rmnission argued, without naming the firm, that
It appears to be the generally accepted view in the trade that the
market suffers, in the sense of being rendered unduly narrow, from a
certain shortage in the number of merchants and dealers vi th ca.pi tal
prepared to carry stocks and also from the concentration in the hands
of'a single shipper of an unduly large tonnage of the Gold Coast and
Nigerian crops.
Critics of the [United Africa] Company • • • maintain that its purchases
on the Coast are habitually used as the basis for a policy of unscrupulous
speculation carried out in the New York and London Markets and involving
numerous transactions in which the Company's identity is carefully concealed.19
Thus the general picture which emerges is of an export crop not only
dominated on the buying side by a tightly-knit monopoly of expatriate firms,
but also dominated on the marketing side by a complex and exclusive system of
international exchanges.

Those few Africans who managed to by-pass the UAC-

dominated buying Pool, and to ship cocoa direct to London or New York, would
find that they must sell through brokers and/or speculators dealing on the
cocoa exchanges.

While farmers worried about price, African entrepreneurs

worried about this manipulation of the buying at the European end.

They were,

thus, often as willing as the farmers to join in economic boycotts against the
Europeans.
2.

The Early Cocoa Boycotts
In the face of continued expatriate domination of their principal trad-

ing commodity, Ghanaians turned to organization within the colony to try to
overcome their relatively powerless position.

Boycotts, that is, the refusal

either to sell their products to or buy imported consumer goods from the

0

18Nowell Commission,

op. oit., p. 137.

19Jbid., pp. 128 and 132.
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principal expatriate firms, were the course of mass political action to which
they most frequently resorteC..

The use of boycotts (or "hold-ups," as they

were often called) against European businesses came into prominence in Ghana
after World War I.

Although the most organized and effective of these boycotts

were those of 1930-31 and 1937-38, several lesser boycotts also took place.
Prior to World War I it would seem that at least one boycott, on a very
small scale, had taken place.

In late 1915, the Governor mentioned such a

boycott in conjunction with current problems with low prices.

"It would be

within the recollection of Honourable Members that some time ago when the
natives could only obtain low prices for their Cocoa they were able to hold
back their stocks, with good results ultimately. " 2 0
prices, cocoa was again being held back.

In 1915, with similar low

In this case the low prices were

caused partly by a currency shortage entailed by the necessity to convert the
Royal ll..int in England to munitions manufacture.

The Governor apparently felt

that the merchants would exploit the shortage and offer low prices for cocoa,
and he therefore, with the previous boycott in mind, advised the farmers to
hold back their cocoa once again.

To this, of course, the business community

of the colony objected.
I was sorry to hear at the Public Meeting which was held at the High
Court Your Excellency advise the Farmers to hold back their cocoa for
good prices. That seems to me most dangerous advice. The natives have
no means of storing their cocoa in large quantities and the only way they
could follow Your Excellency's advice would be by leaving the cocoa on
the trees unplucked. It will be readily recognized that the result of
this would be disastrous to the industry. 21
After the war the price of cocoa was low because the amount of shipping
space had not yet caught up, after the war shortage, with the amount of cocoa

c

20 speech by the Governor to GCLegCo, 13 December 1915.
21 Reply

to the Governor by Mr. Parker, a European unofficial member, in
GCLegCo, 13 December 1915.
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available.

But the prices of imported goods were high and there was an attempt

in the Central Province to rectify the situation by a boycott.
I come now to the question of the increased cost of living due to the
daily mounting up of the prices of goods and other articles. I understand
that in some districts in the Central Province, the Chiefs there have been
beating gong-gong to the effect that their people should not sell cocoa
for less than £2 a load. They have been forced to take this action in
view of the fact that the Merchants are unduly inflating the prices of
goods, for example, the price of a piece of cloth is now, from £2.10 to
£3 which used to be from 9s to 13s6d.2 2
Shortly after this incident the cocoa price boomed to phenomenal heights during
the 1920-21 season.

But an abrupt crash followed the general world economic

decline in late 1921, so that, once again in 1922, the price of cocoa was very
low and farmers were resorting to boycotts.

Commenting on the 1922 boycott,

the Accra Chamber of Commerce blamed the Government for interference by informing the Africans of the price of cocoa in Europe.
The question of the Cocoa Farmers not bringing the Cocoa to the markets
for sale. The reason for the action of the Native Farmers appeared to be
that the Commissioners were advising the Farmers of the Home market prices.
The Accra Chamber decided to write to the Governor pointing out that it
was inadvisable to interfere in business transactions between the Merchants
and the Native farmers, as apart from the injury to trade interests, harm
is rendered to the Colonial revenue by the limitation of shipments. 23
Although in the 1915 incident the Governor had encouraged the hold-up, in 1922
the new Governor denied the charges by the Accra Chamber that he was assisting
in the hold-up.
A novelty as far as the Gold Coast is concerned, in the agricultural
year has been the refUsal of the Union of Farmers to sell their cocoa at
the low prices which have obtained. Government action in the matter was
limited to informing the farmers that they had a perfect right to hold up
their cocoa, but at the same time it was pointed out to them that such a

0

22Statement by Mr. Brown, an African unofficial member, to GCLegCo, 17
November 1919.
23

Extract from the Minutes of .the Accra Chamber of' Commerce, reported in
LivCC, 30 January 1922.
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procedure would be unwise unless they have the means for storing and safeguarding their crops. 2 4
The Union of Farmers referred to in the above quote was the Gold Coast Cocoa
Federation. 2 5 This Federation, started by John Kwame Ayew, a wealthy farmer,
in 1921, was to play a crucial role in all future boycotts, with Ayew at the
fore of all the farmers' struggles.

The original aims of this Federation were

not simply to hold up the cocoa in order to obtain a better price for it, but
also, more generally to improve the situation of cocoa in the world market.
The Federation advocated the rejection of all bad cocoa on the market, the
paying of a standard price throughout the cocoa season, immediate warning if
the international cocoa market entered a decline, and the deduction of the
cocoa export duty not from the price paid to the producer but from the price
paid to the merchant. 26

In general it was opposed to the "Combine" firms.

The

1922 boycott was, however, effective only in a few small strongholds such as
Asuboi, Mangoase, Adawso, and Tinkong, and was soon broken when a price of 14s.
per load was offerred. 27
After 1922 Ghana entered a period of prosperity, congruent with tha general situation of prosperity in the western world.

World sales of cocoa rose

from 366,000 long tons in 1920 to 535,000 long tons in 1929, and Ghana's share
of the total market rose from thirty-four to forty-four per cent. 28

There was

therefore no need for the type of boycott action which had been taking place in
order to improve the prices paid to the producer.

However, some of the more

24Address by the Governor to GCLegCo, 27 February 1922.
25Renamed the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation in 1930.
26 Ho1mes, op. cit., p. 86.

0

27Ib1-.d •,

P• 93.

2 8see Table 36 above.

339

0

prosperous farmers were aware of the disparity between prices paid in Ghana and
prices obtained in

Europe~

and they made at least one attempt to break out of

the European monopoly of shipping.

The attempt was made in 1924, when John

Kwame Ayew and the Gold Coast Cocoa Federation made an agreement with one Mr.
Strickler, an American, to ship cocoa through him to New York, paying him on a
commission basis •
• • • during the year 1924-25 one European named F. D. Strickler
arrived in the Colony from America and arranged with the farmers to ship
their cocoa to a firm named Willard Hawes and Company. Chief Farmer
John Kwame Ayew stood on behalf of all the farmers and collected the cocoa
for this F. D. Strickler for shipment with a promise of giving the farmers
a fair price in consequence of which this F. D. Strickler and the Company
made use of the cocoa amounting to £350,000 and action was taken against
them • • • • 29
A New York solicitor by the name of Slater was engaged to take action against
Strickler after he absconded with the Federation's funds, and judgment was
finally made in 1939; however, after deductions for lawyers 1 fees, very little
of their loss was ever recovered by the farmers.

For years thereafter, both

the Government and the established European firms used this case as justification for actively discouraging any contracts between Africans and "outside"
expatriate businessmen, as well as any organized attempts by farmers' associations to ship on their own.

The firms, who no doubt were threatened on the

initial appearance of Strickler and the seeming competition he offerred, were
relieved that he absconded with the money.

A report by the Cadbury historian

indicated the danger he had presented to them:
A determined attempt was made [to ship cocoa on their own] • • • in
1924 by the 'Gold Coast Farmers' Association', a group of merchants led by
an experienced farmer, named Ayew. The objects of this body were to obtain
control of a large tonnage of cocoa, hold it off the market and then to
negotiate its direct sale--preferably to the U.S.A.--at a considerably
enhanced price. Contact was made with an American named Strickler, who was

29

Police Report on a Farmers' meeting at Suhum, 10 October 1938, which
discussed the affair, with a view to further legal action. In GNA Adm.29/6/14.
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in the Gold Coast for much of the 1924/25 season. This gentleman apparently offered to take all the cocoa the Association could offer at a price
some lOs. per cwt. higher than the current world market price. Enthusiastic meetings of farmers were held in places like Nsawam, Mangoase, and
Koforidua. Strickler was the hero of the hour and ordinary buyers, including Cadbury-Fry, were lef't out in the cold. 30
During the two large boycotts of the 1930s, similar attempts, still led by
.Ayew, were to be made to initiate independent shipping schemes.

The memory of

Strickler was constantly evoked by the established firms in order to combat
these moves.
From the history of these early boycotts, several facts emerge.

The

first is of course their coincidence with downswings in the world market for
cocoa.

Boycotts occurred during the war, when little cocoa could be shipped

out of Ghana owing to shipping space regulations, and again after the recession
of the early 1920s.

The two major boycotts were to take place in 1930-31, just

after the Depression began, and in 1937-38, after the apparent resurgence of
gpod times with an extraordinary upswing in the price in 1936-37, followed by a
crash the next season.

The 1936-37 upswing had been caused by certain specula-

tive manoeuvres on the New York Cocoa Exchange.

A "bull" market had been

encouraged by the belief that the consumption in America that year would be
high while the Ghana crop would be small.

But "Later forecasts of a heavy

rather than a short crop in the Gold Coast, combined with the general business
setback and a decline in cocoa consumption, especially in the U.S., led to a
sharp fall in price after January, 1937:

by the end of June the whole of the

earlier advance had been lost." 31
Aside from the two large boycotts, a minor boycott also took place in
1934, with little success. 32

0

This boycott was a result of the continued decline

30Edwards, op. cit. , p. 24.
31 Nowell Commission, op. cit., p. 8.
32This boycott was reported in Cadbury's evidence to the Nowell

0

in prices since 1930. 33

The following table gives average price for Ghana

cocoa from 1925 to 1939; unfortunately, however, as the figures are given not
per season, but per calendar year, the full force of seasonal declines is
unapparen t.
Table 37.

Average Annual Prices (Cents Per Pound)
New York for Fair Fermented Main Crop
Ghana Cocoa Beans 3'+

Year

Price

Year

Price

Year

Price

Year

Price

1925
1926
1927
1928

9.5
11.5
15.8
12.8

1929
1930
1931
1932

10.4
8.2
5.2
4.4

1933
1934
1935
1936

4.4
5.2
5.0
6.9

1937
1938
1939

8.4
5.2
4.8

A second aspect of the history of the early boycotts is the role of the
Government.

In the 1910s and '20s, Government tried to maintain neutrality in

disputes between farmers and merchants, a neutrality which, at least according
to the merchants, sometimes bordered on outright inciting of the farmers to
boycott.

Such a position on the part of the Government was not to continue into

the 1930s, however; by the time of the 1930 hold-up business pressure on Government was sufficient to compel it to use leg6.1 means to discourage combination
among the African producers.
3.

The 1930-31 and 1937-38 Boycotts35
Both the 1930-31 boycott and the 1937-38 boycott, as previously noted,

were results partly of the downswing in cocoa prices which occurred shortly
Commission.

Cad:

288/78.

33Nowell Commission, op. ait., p. 8.

c

34

source: Gill and Duffus, op. ait., Table 14, "Cocoa Beans--Fair Fermented Main Crop Ghana, Average Annual and Monthly Spot Prices New York," p. 35.
35The following two sections are not intended to be a history of the two
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before their inception.

The first of the two boycotts, however, neither lasted

as long nor was as successfUl as the second.

Whereas the 1937-38 boycott

lasted through almost the entire season, that is from October of 1937 until an
agreement was negotiated with the expatriate firms, through the Nowell Commission, in late February 1938, the 1930 boycott petered out quickly; the entire
movement lasting only from 22 October 1930 to 6 January 1931. 36
Perhaps one of the most important reasons why the 1937-38 boycott lasted
longer, with more support from a wider variety of people, was that the European
firms were perceived much more clearly as a bloc which had to be defeated.
While in both cases a price-fixing Pool existed among the major buying firms,
in 1930 it was perceived as less nefarious, especially since in 1930 the manufacturing firms, Cadbury-Fry, Rowntree, and Lyons, were not part of the
price-setting agreements.

A buying agreement was implemented in October 1929

and continued until December of 1931, but Cadbury did not sign because the
agreement " • • • was accompanied by a selling agreement which obliged signatories to put their purchases of Cocoa into a common Pool which was to be sold
under the directions of a selling Connni ttee •

. . [ Cadbury]

formed the opinion

that the merchants' intention might be in the direction of raising world prices
to an uneconomic level. 11 37
Moreover the drop in cocoa prices in 1930 did not immediately coincide

0

boycotts but rather to bring out salient points for discussion. For an excellent analysis of the 1930-31 boycott, see Sam Rhodie, "The Gold Coast Cocoa
Hold-up of 1930-31," Transactions of the Historical .Society of Ghana, vol. 9
(1968). A detailed study of both boycotts and the actors therein can be found
in Baron Holmes, op. cit., and Southall, op. cit. Josephine Milburn 's nThe Gold
Coast Cocoa Crisis: British Business and the Colonial Office," African Historical Studies, no. 1, vol. 3 (1970), is a slightly apologetic account of the role
of business and the Cocoa_Agreement in the 1937-38 boycott.
36Holmes, op. cit., p. 143.
37 cad:

288/78.
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with the implementation of the oligopolistic agreement, as it did in 1937.
During the Main Crop season 1929/30 the approximate value of Gold
coast cocoa cif basis was 42/- per cwt., and the agreement operated
throughout that season without the slightest murmur on the part of the
Africans or any suggestion that it was operating to their disadvantage.
The existence on the Agreement was well known in the Gold Coast.
During the Spring and summer montns of 1930 there was a steady decline
in the value of Cocoa and at the opening of that season (say September
1930) the value was approximately 35/- and declined during December to
29/-. The first that was heard from the Africans regarding the operation
of the Agreement ~as in September/October of 1930 and on that occasion,
as in the recent happenings, the fall in the market was attributed to
the 'Pool' and a hold-up was engineered which lasted till the early days
of January. 38
Although the perceived exploitation of the farmers was less in 1930 than in
1937, there was nevertheless a clear perception of the effects of the Pool and
the boycott was organized specifically to counteract those effects.

At the

first meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation (revived from
1924), Mr. T. Hutton-Mills, a noted Gold Coast barrister, explained the position to the farmers.
Within four years from 1927 to 1930, among other things, I have visited
England about three times with regard to the marketing of our farmers 1
cocoa in this country. Now what I have found during my journey and my
activities amount to this; that the European firms out here have so
combined themselves in such a wa:y, both in England and America and everywhere, even including this country, that I can only say one thing,
namely, their object is to buy cocoa cheaper in this country and sell
dearer to manufacturers in Europe, and unless we help ourselves, we shall
only be mere slaves to the European merchants
39
He encouraged the farmers to hold up their cocoa, claiming that such a hold-up
alone would be powerful enough to stop the European "Speculators."
• • • the farmers need have no fear about the 'Speculators' with their
huge Capital continuing speculating with our Cocoa Crop on the American
and English markets, since the farmers have the absolute control of the
situation in that, if they continue now and always to hold their stocks
of cocoa, the Cocoa 'Speculators' in the paper [money] markets abroad

0

38JU.d.
39Minutes

of the First Meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation, held at Nsawam, 21 and 22 October, 1930. GNA Adm.ll/1070.
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and everywhere would . . • be defeated if no cocoa is sold to them at
their dictated low prices. Prices, therefore, are bound to improve if
we continue to hold cocoa at least for a while. 4 0
This statement by Hutton-Mills reflects the prevalent belief that the
Pool was responsible for the low prices, even in the face of the evidence that
low prices were not a problem in the previous season, when the Pool agreement
also existed. 41

The merchants time and again pointed out this fact, and also

pointed out the limited amount of the market which was controlled by Gold
Coast cocoa.

In reality,however, Ghana cocoa comprised over forty per cent

of the world supply in 1930, 42 a fact which could hardly escape the attention
of both farmers and merchants.

Moreover, there was clear evidence that the

merchants were actually fixing prices paid for cocoa to the farmers; that anyone who tried to pay above the agreed price was quickly disciplined.

Nana

Ofori Atta brought two pieces of evidence before the Legislative Council in
December 1930 to prove his charges of price-fixing.

The first was a reference

to a statement reported in West Af:ric:a by Major-General William Henry Grey, a
director, at the time the statement was made in 1925, of the A&ETC.

He

"· •• stated that they Ithe CombineJ fixed the buying price in Africa and the
selling price in Europe, and the companies followed the policy dictated by the
committee." 43

A more damning piece of evidence was brought to light when the

Cocoa Federation managed to get hold of a telegramme indicating not only that
prices were fixed, but that prices could have been higher had the firms been

40 Report of the General Committee Meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti
Cocoa Federation, held at the Palladium, Accra, 4 November 1930. GNA Adm.
11/1070.
41 For a list of price-fixing agreements in Ghana, see Chapter IV, Table

0

12.
42see Table 36 above.
~3GCLegCo,

4 December 1930.
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freely competing.
In the speech Mr.
was a telegram which
Legislative Council]
of the S.C.O.A. that

Ocansey submitted to the Federation at Nsawam • • •

Mr. Youngman Ia European unofficial member of the
is reported to have sent to a certain Mr. Nicodet
knocked the bottom out of the whole thing:-

'Nicodet

s.c.o.A.
Lome

Chauveur Saltpond increased his prices without consulting local
committee causing losses to other firms and strong protest by Cadbury
regret found it necessary to point out this serious breach of regulation
to London by Cable.
Youngman'
According to this we got to know that even if a European who may be in
the Group or otherwise to-day attempts to offer a price a little more
than agreed upon by the Pool, he is arraigned before his superiors, and
I do not know what would be his fate. That shows that the Group were in
a position to offer more than what they were offering at the time. I do
not think a man coming out here would be so foolish as to do something
deliberately which he knew would bring loss. I believe, he knew he
could offer a little higher price with profit to himself. It means there
is something which has been kept from the knowledge of the African
farmer.lf 4
Not only did this telegramme, "W:hich Mr. Youngman' s extreme anger when it was
read in the Legislative Council confirmed as genuine, reveal the absence of
free competition in the cocoa market, but it also indicated that Cadbury, although i.t had not signed the actual agreement, was co-operating in pricefixing activities.

If, as the firms claimed, price fixing was a method of

protecting the farmers, by shoring up prices in a declining market, it was no
doubt difficult

fo~

the Africans to understand why one ftrm should be disci-

plined for offering an even higher price.
Gold Coast Africans were unwilling to accept the view that it was the
international economic crisis which had, in the final analysis, facilitated
both the formation of a monopoly structure in the Gold Coast , and the decline

0

44Ibid.
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in the cocoa price.

Rather, w::tth such scraps of evidence as have been pre-

sented above, which witnessed that at least within a narrow range the Pool
could influence price, they concluded that the congruity in time of the Pool
and the price decline indicated that the former had at least partially caused
the latter.

Although prior to 1930 there had been a great many agreements

among the firms which limited competition, some Ghanaians viewed the past as
a time of unlimited competition with resultant economic prosperity in the
colony.
At the time when the merchants were buying individually and independently there was keen competition and trade was in a flourishing
condition. During those days we bought our goods from any firm who
offered us a good price but to-day it is not so but just the opposite-only one common price rules at the stores of the firms who are in the
Pool. We had Millers, Swanzys, MacLaren Brothers, African and Eastern
Trade Corporation etc., working independently with better results but
immediately these firms came together and were known as the Combine firms
cacao business prospects started to be very gloomy and trade also began
to decline. After the Combine we have now had the United Africa Company,
and the last but not the least is the Pool.45
The 1930 boycott, therefore, was a reaction against lowered cocoa
prices which seemed to be at least partially caused by the oligopolistic organizations of the major expatriate firms.

An attempt was therefore made to

hold up supplies of cocoa in the hope of forcing up the price.

At the same

time, at least a partial boycott of retail stores was instituted, to indicate
opposition to the practice of oligopolistic fixing of the prices of impcrted
goods.

At a meeting of the Cocoa Federation in Accra in November 1930, the

question of boycotting the retail shops was raised and it was agreed that such
action should be taken.

The Ga Manche of Accra agreed to "beat gong-gong" to

stop his people from buying from European stores after" ••• a farmer of
Koforidua ••• stated that since they come to Accra they witnessed that

0
45 Speech by Nana Ayirebi Acquah. of liinneba, an unofficial member, in
GCLegCo, 4 December 1930.
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people were buying from stores and women were seen hawking European goods.

He

asked that the Federation should see that this is stopped. "46
The 1930 boycott was, however, not successful, even within the context
of the limited range of influence which a political movement in Ghana could
have.

It had disintegrated by early January 1931, and although the Pool ar-

rangement was cancelled shortly thereafter, the cancellation was not a result
of the boycott.

Rather the Pool was found to be unable to cope with the

difficulties which the European firms were experiencing on the international
market, and other arrangements were tried to restore their profits.
The operation of the 11929] agreement dealing with the buying on the
Coast worked quite satisfactorily but owing to the inability of the
merchants to see eye to eye on the selling policies to be pursued the
whole agreement came to an end after two years.
Year by year during the period 1931/7 attempts were made between a
number of merchants to minimise their buying losses by undertaking to
maintain agreed prices, • • • but again owing to the absence of sanctions
all these attempts proved abortive.47
Thus from 1931 to 1937 there was no clear object of hostility or target at
which Ghanaians could aim the frustrations they felt at the low price of cocoa
on the international market, although it was assumed that the Pool still existed in some form, as the Combine firms had been known to exist in the preUAC period.

Protest during the mid-1930s

~entred

around more political

issues, namely those of municipal taxation and of freedom of the press.48
Nevertheless the issue of price fixing was dormant, not dead, as the minor
attempt at a boycott in 1934 indicated.

When the Cocoa Agreement of 1937 was

46 Report by Detective Sergeant S. A. Amable, Criminal Investigation Department, Accra, on a meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation,
29 November 1930. GNA Adm.ll/1640.
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47 Cad:

288/78.

48Agbodeka, op. cit., Chapter V.
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announced, an experienced group of Ghanaian leaders, who had learned their
lessons from the 1930 boycott, was ready to spring into action once again.
One reason for the success of the 1937 boycott, which actually resulted
in the appointment of an investigatory commission, was that the issue itself
was much more clear-cut and the Agreement made by the firms touched more
people than the 1930 agreement.

To begin with, Cadbury-Fry and Lyons joined

in the Pool, to the chagrin of many chiefs and farmers who had assumed that
Cadbury, with its strong Quaker background, was a firm more dedicated to the
welfare of the African than the others.

11

What the country mostly worries

about in this cocoa buying pool is that the two cocoa firms of Cadbury and Fry
and Lyon IhaYeJ joined themselves in the Pool. nl+9

In fact Cadbury had con-

sented to enter the Agreement only after enduring substantial pressure from
the other firms.

Cadbury argued that in reality the reason for the Agreement

was to corner the market for the UAC and to keep out any possible competition.
It is obvious that the UAC are losing ground with their cocoa purchases, to other competitors, amongst whom of recent years Lyons and
ourselves have made the largest increase. They are anxious to retain
their present position, and the only way they see of doing this is to
agree with other firms that no one shall increase their tonnage • • • •
They believe that an arrangement such as they outlined either by
entire pooling or by a pooling and tonnage agreement would keep the
Cocoa market in West Africa as 'a little corner' • • • so
In fact, according to Cadbury, it was not the intention of the UAC to raise
profits as to do so would attract more competitors to the Coast; rather it was
interested in making sure that it was guaranteed a certain percentage of the
market and that it could effect some savings in its buying price, hopefully
about one shilling per cwt. 51

Cadbury, when it entered the Agreement, did so

'+ 9Document (undated) entitled "The several reasons which have caused our

0

refusal to trade with the merchants who entered into the cocoa buying agreement • • • , 11 GNA Adm.23/l/798, Cape Coast.
50 cad:

51 Ibid.
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with the stipulation that it could leave after one year if it so desired, a
stipulation which backfired when the boycott began and Cadbury feared that if
word of this loophole got out the onus would be on it to cancel the Agreement. 52
The major provision of the Agreement itself, which was to run for four
years starting in 1937, was the division of the cocoa market.
patriate firms in Ghana joined in the Agreement.

All major ex-

Each firm was to buy no more

than its stated tonnage; should it buy more, it would be obliged to sell it at
an agreed-upon price, which might be less than it had paid, to any firm which
had less than its tonnage.

The division was as shown in Table 38.

Since the

UAC by this time had controlling interests in both G. B. Ollivant and the
Swiss African Trading Company, 5 3 it controlled in actual fact forty-nine per
cent of the main crop and seventy-four per cent of the intermediate crop.

In

toto, the thirteen firms controlled almost ninety-eight per cent of the Ghana
cocoa crop.

Many small firms had disappeared from the colony in the previous

few years, and it was argued

that the dividing up of the market into shares

would guarantee that no more firms would leave, thus eliminating competitiveness, while, somewhat contradictorily, it was also argued that no more
"wasteful" new f'irms would come in.

"Newcomers to the business have the ef'f'ect

of further intensifying competition and add indirectly to the cost of buying
by the introduction of capital for unnecessary duplication of existing handling
facilities."54

Along with their Buying Agreement the merchants had also, as

5 2Nowell Commission,

53see Chapter IV.

0

54 cad:

288/78.

op. ait., p. 60.
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Table 38.

Members and Shares in the Produce Agreement:
Gold Coast, 10 November 1937, Covering Cocoa
Purchased in the Gold Coast, Ashanti, and the
British Mandated Territory of Togoland.ss
Percentage of
Intermediate Crop

Members

Percentage of
Main Crop

W. Bartholemew and Co. Ltd.
Busi and Stephenson Ltd.

1.54
4.05

none
9.12

Cadbury Bros. Ltd.
}
J. S. Fry and Sons Ltd.

17.92

1.80

Cie Fran~aise de l'Afrique Occidentale
John Holt and Co. (Liverpool) Ltd.
J. Lyons and Co. Ltd.
G. B. Ollivant Ltd.
Paterson, Zochonis and Co. Ltd.
Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest Africaine
Swiss African Trading Co. Ltd.
Union Trading Co. Ltd.
The United Africa Company Ltd.

9.33
3.93
4.36
10.64
1.93
3.08
2.85
4.51
35.86

3-95
5.17
none
19.82
3.29
none
2.63

I

2.69
51.53

in 1930, instituted a Merchandise Selling Agreement, or, more accurately, they
had continued their policy of formulating agreements as to merchandise selling, and these agreements had become more obvious during the political
ferment preceding and during the boycott.

Data on merchandise selling agree-

ments in Ghana are even more difficult to obtain, on the whole, than data on
buying agreements, partly because there was no committee of investigation into
the subject and partly because arrangements for such agreements were made
locally, not in London, on a day-to-day or week-to-week basis.

The Nowell

Commission, however, confirmed that such a Merchandise Agreement did exist.
• • • the existence of a Merchandise Agreement only became generally
known in the Gold Coast as a result of Press articles when the campaign
against the Buying Agreement began, but • • • the idea has now taken
deep root. The Africans attribute to the Merchandise Agreement the
general rise which, they claim, took place in merchandise prices in
1936-37, and they have pointed out that in spite of losses that the

0
55source:

JH:

Jacket 536(ii}.
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firms claim to have made in cocoa in that season, the total profits from
West Africa trade were considerable. 56
(The latter claim is confirmed in part by UAC dividend rates listed in Table
35 above.)

The companies were worried that knowledge of the Merchandise

Agreement would become general, inciting even more hostility to the cocoabuying Pool, and also reducing the amount of support they could obtain from
the Government, which, while willing to accept the argument that price
stabilization on the international market was necessary for a primary c.ommodity such as cocoa, would be far less willing to accept the argument that price
fixing for imported goods on the local level was necessary.

"Witnesses before

the {Nowell] Commission report that they are being asked awkward questions,
indicating that the Commission have, so far, formed the conclusion that the
Merchandise Agreement is nothing but a link in the chain of policy which includes both agreements. " 57

And indeed the local Government officials were far

more hostile to import price fixing than they were to cocoa price fixing, if
only because they themselves were directly affected by the former policy.

The

Chief Commissioner for Ashanti, for instance, was very upset when in early
1938 he sent his "boy" to buy iron sheeting, and discovered that a bundle
which in 1937 had cost 37/6 now cost 65/-.

"His boy told him that the price

was the same at all stores and the reply to his query was--the price is fixed
by the UAC." 58
More seriously, a report filed by the Acting District Commissioner of
Saltpond in January of 1938 showed that there was a clear correlation between
the prices being paid for cocoa and the prices charged for imported goods in

0

56Nowell Commission, op. cit., p. 123.
57Letter from the Board of John Holt (Liverpool) to Rawlings, manager of
John Holt, Accra, 8 April 1938. JR: Jacket 536(ii).
58 Document dated 8 February 1938, GNA Adm.ll/1640.
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the

shop~.

A comparison between cocoa and store prices shows a connection.
Merchants admit that it is their practice to raise store prices when
cocoa prices rise. Merchants meet once or twice per month in Saltpond
and fix prices for their principal goods. An 'Approved Price List' is
produced, and merchants are expected to adhere to these prices.
The total trade of each district is divided amongst the merchants,
and a firm is allowed to sell a certain percentage only of the total
district sales of any of the principal goods.
eg. flour

UAC
GBO

60%
10%
me 10%
SCOA
5%
CFAO
5%
remainder 10%

If at the end of the trading year any firm's sales have exceeded this
fixed percentage, and other firms have not sold up to their percentage,
the former pay a penalty to the latter. This adjustment is made in
London. 59
This same District Commissioner later reported a case of price fixing by the
UAC, in which the Company tried to undercut a competitor, presumably an independent Syrian, who was selling sugar at less than the monopoly price.
Tate and Lyle Sugar:
UAC have been unable to get Tate and Lyle to agree to their terms for
sugar, and could not put pressure on a firm of such standing. Bikhazi
Brothers buy Tate and Lyle's sugar for cash and UAC are attempting to
stop this. Last month the case price for sugar in Saltpond was 21/6,
the price is the same this month in Accra, Nsawam, Swedru, etc. the case
price of UAC
sugar has been reduced to 16/6. The reason for this
drop in price is that Bikhazi Brothers are landing a few thousand cases
of sugar at Accra shortly and by forcing down the price UAC hopes to
leave this consignment on Bikhazi's hands.GO
Thus the evidence that price fixing was occurring on all sides was
quite clear during the 1937-38 boycott, and even some elements of the Government were opposed to such practices.

0

The situation was clearly aggravated by

59Handwritten memo dated 12 January 1938, GNA Adm.23/l/956, Cape Coast.
6 0Memo dated 15 January 1938, GNA Adm.23/l/956, Cape Coast.
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the £act that the expatriate firms, although they argued consistently that
there was nothing harmful to the African community as a whole in the buying
Agreement~

just as consistently refused to allow the Agreement into the hands

o£ those who could read and/or publicize it.

Originally, the firms had ad-

vised the Colonial Office of the Agreement's existence and requested that the
Colonial Office advise the Gold Coast Governor to publicize it and explain
that its provisions would not harm the colony.

This, however, the Governor

refused to do, especially as he himself did not see and never obtained a copy
o£ the document.

Josephine Milburn argues that "The primary agreement was

published in the Gold Coast simultaneously with a fall in the world price of
cocoa. n6J

In fact this is incorrect; the actual Agreement was never made

public until its inclusion in the Nowell Commission Report, and even then the
actual shares to be allotted to the firms were not included.
publish the Agreement was, of course, a

~ajor

This refusal to

bone of contention between rep-

resentatives of the Africans and the Europeans.
Throughout the course of the boycott and the several meetings which
were arranged between chiefs and the representatives of the European firms,
the subject of access to the Agreement was frequently brought up by the chiefs
and refused by the Europeans, on the grounds that should it be publicized, the
" • • • document would be submitted to lawyers Iand] find its way into scallywag press be quoted out of its context and distorted."6 2

The universal

reaction of the chiefs was that if the document could not be produced, then it
was obviously suspicious.

For example at a meeting in Kumasi it was argued

• • • you have drawn up an agreement and you refuse to produce a copy.
When you are asked to give explanation in regard to certain clauses. in
the agreement you say 'no'; then we think there is something dubious

0

6lap.

62 cad:

cit. , p. 61.
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about the agreement. {Asantehene] 63 You have made us to understand that
the agreement was drawn up in our interest; if so, why is it that you do
not want us to see a copy? {Kyidomhene]64
Milburn argues that
The failure of the Coast administration to publicize the Agreement
immediately, as anticipated by London, led to misunderstandings by the
farmers and the chiefs about the intentions of the Agreement and aided
in the developmei~ of suspicious attitudes about the firms . . • • The
hold-up might very well not have occurred had the farmers been better
informed, as was prevented by the lack of adequate communication between
the Colonial Office and the Coast administration .
6S
In arguing thus Milburn is accepting at face value the position of the companies involved in the Pool.

Cadbury, for instance, believed that it was the

duty of the Government to advertise the beneficial aspects of the Pool for
them.

" • • • nearly all the troubles and certainly any real hold-up could

have been avoided if the Government, and, of course, the Governor in particular, had been willing and ready to take the view of the Cocoa scheme • • •
H.E. and others on the Coast said it was not their job to advertise our Scheme
for us •

n66

In fact, however 1 the document could not be publicly sup-

parted because the actual provisions of the scheme did not coincide with what
the firms had been arguing were its provisions.

The provisions for sharing of

the market and price "stabilization" were rarely if ever mentioned in their
publicity.

Rather the firms stressed that their attention was focussed on

"abuses" in the trade caused by the overpayment of commissions and other
remunerations to the African brokers from whom they bought cocoa.

The firms

63From a discussion following an "Address Given to a Representativ-=
Meeting of Ashanti Chiefs and Farmers at Cadbury Hall Kumasi on December 7th,
1937, by Mr. Frank Samuel," GNA Adm.ll/1640.
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64 Ibid.
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66cad:
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argued that the overpayments to the brokers were a loss to the farmer; if,
through provisions to eliminate these abuses, there were fewer brokers, the
~armers

would suffer less.

Yet this particular aim of eliminating abuses was

not mentioned in the Agreement.

It seemed as if the expatriate firms hoped,

by stirring up resentment amongst the chiefs and farmers against the brokers,
who did indeed make fortunes at the expense of the producers, to divert attention away from the real provisions of the Agreement.

As one Cadbury

official confirmed, "Elmination of abuses the indirect benefit of which to
Farmers has been heavily stressed is not dealt with in [the] Agreement. " 67
Furthermore, the firms had also argued that the setting of prices
under their Agreement would be based only upon the taking of a "reasonable
profit"; that is, the farmer would be paid the full terminal price (New York
or London) minus only set expenses and an allowance for a "reasonable profit."
Again, the set expenses were never published, even in the copy of the Agreement appendaged to the Nowell Commission Report.

"Intention to pay full

market price is in preamble only and any interpretation we could give of words
reasonable profit could not possibly carry any weight."6 8
While Milburn, then, in her apologetic article takes the view of the
firms, that the Government was much to blame for the boycott because it never

publicized the Agreement and explained its provisions to the farmers, in fact
the firms should have been grateful that such action was never taken.

It was

not by accident that not a single copy of the Agreement was ever in the
colony. 69

The Nowell Commission agreed with the firms that in the end, it was

67 Cad:

0

288/57.

68 Ibid.

69 cad:
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better that the Agreement was not published as it would have hardened the attitudes of the Africans, thus encouraging political and economic strife.

In

mild tones, it argued
'

The Agreement was not in itself fully explanatory; it would be difficult to convince African critics, especially lawyers, that it was the
firms' intention to operate the Agreement in the manner in which they
had explained to the Colonial Office that they would; and even if the
letter of instructions were also published to explain the abuses which
the Agreement was intended to eliminate, critics would rightly reply
that the letter was not binding upon the parties.
The disclosure of the clause referring to Messrs. Cadbury Brothers'
right to withdraw on the 31st of May, 1938, would put the complete onus
of continuing the Agreement after that date on the shoulders of that
firm.
Publication was • • . more likely to harden opinion against the
firms. 7 0
Unwittingly, therefore, by refusing to publicize the Agreement at the firms'
request, the Government had probably done them a good turn.

In this particu-

lar instance, the good turn was an unintentional outcome of the Government's
annoyance with the rather strange request that it publicize an Agreement to
which it had never itself had access.

But on the whole, the Government was

far more willing to take the side of the expatriate firms than the side of
Ghanaian producers during the conflicts and boycotts over prices.

Indeed,

part of its function was to use legal means to suppress African organizations,
while allowing a free hand to European organizations.
During the 1930-31 boycott, the chief weapon which the Government used,
in aid of the firms, was a law passed defending the

11

Liberty of the Subject. 11

This was a law which denied to chiefs the right to pass laws prohibiting their
subjects from selling cocoa to the Europeans or from buying imported European
goods.

0

Under the Native Jurisdiction

Ordi~ance,

70 Nowell Commission, op. oit., p. 60.

which had been passed in
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1925, chiefs had been given the right, under the system of "indirect rule," to
pass local laws.

One method of passing a law was to swear a "chief's oath";

that is, an oath binding on all members of the community, the violation of
which could entail imprisonment.
hibiting a certain action.

Another method was to "beat gong-gong," pro-

In fact neither method was generally used unless

the chief was expressing the will of his people, as to go against their will
would engender the risk of destoolment.

But the Government argued that the

swearing of oaths or the beating of gong-gong was a usurpation of powers on
the part of the chiefs which violated the liberty of the subject to engage in
commercial transactions as he so pleased.

Now I wish to state clearly that for a Chief or State Council to
proclaim that people who sell their cacao below a certain price, or
people who buy certain imported goods, will be liable to be punished by
a tribunal purporting to exercise jurisdiction under the Native Administration Ordinance, is an interference with legitimate trade which
no Government in a British Colony can tolerate. 71
To ensure that this edict had force, the Government promised that "any person
using violence or threats in order to compel another to abstain from selling
cacao, which is a lawful act, is to be sent to prison. " 72

On their asking

about the coercion used by certain firms to ensure that other firms did not
outprice the Agreement, however, the chiefs were informed that such an oligopolistic situation with its economic san•::tions was permitted in Ghana.
To further its control over the boycott, the Government also instituted, in both 1930 and 1937, a policy of police supervision of all farmers'
meetings, as the many police reports of meetings in the Ghana National
Archives attest.

Such supervision was partly a response to business pressure

71 Governor's Message to GCLegCo,

Coast News, 9 December 1930.
72 Contained

4 December 1930, reported in the
GNA Adm.ll/1070.

GoZd

in a notice, dated 6 November 1930, signed by G. H. Gibbs,
District Commissioner, GNA Adm.ll/1070.
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on the Government.

The unofficial European members of the

Le~islative

Council

were vociferous in their demands for such surveillance. ·In tre Council on 4 December,l930, Nana Ofori Atta presented evidence of such pressure in the form of a
letter from Mr. Youngman, a European unofficial, to the acting Colonial Secretary, a letter which Youngman did not deny sending.
Sir:
May I call your attention to a meeting that is to be held on Tuesday
next • • • under the auspices of Mr. A.J. Ocansey.
You will observe
showing a desire to
Ocansey's intention
that you instruct a
and make a verbatim

that Mr. Ocansey makes reference to European Merchants
exploit and destroy the cocoa industry. If it is Mr.
to address the meeting on these lines may I suggest
political officer to attend the meeting in question
report of the speeches that are made. 7 3

And, indeed, at the first executive meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti
Cocoa Federation, on November 28, 1930, a police officer was present.
During the course of the meeting Mr. Ocansey stated that he was aware
that there Iwere] some people at the meeting who came to listen as spies
for the Chamber [of Commerce] and the Government. Upon this anyone who
was not well known was closely questioned. The Detective Constable who
accompanied me and who gained admission into the meeting was recognised •
• • • He was requested by Mr. T. Hutton Mills Jr. to get out as they did
not want detectives present, the detective constable replied that he had
resigned the force and that he was accompanying his uncle the Omanhene
of Effiderase to the meeting. He was allowed to remain. 7 4
During the 1937-38 boycott, similar methods of control were employed
by the Government.

One of the first acts it took when the boycott started

was to issue a long statement reaffirming the position on the liberty of the
subject taken in 1930. 75

That the Government political officers took this

position seriously is clear from the complaints which were made by various

7 3Quoted in GCLegCo, 4 December 1930.

0

74Report by Detective Sergeant S, A. Amable, 29 November 1930. GNA
Adm.ll/1640.
75The complete text of the Government's message to the people in 1937 is
published as an appendix to J. B. Danquah 1 s ''Liberty of the Subject: A Monograph on the Gold Coast Cocoa Hold-up and Boycott of Foreign Goods" (pamphlet:
1938).
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African leaders, that political officers were interfering with their rights
over their citizens.

In many of these cases, the political officers were ex-

ceeding their powers and contravening actions which the chief's, even under the
restricted powers granted them, had a perfect right to take.

Thus a meeting

of Omanhene at Adabraka, Accra, complained to the Government in January 1938
that the political officers were making extensive propaganda about the position
of the chiefs, criticizing paramount chiefs, and constantly bring.ing the
farmers together and haranguing them about the f'utili ty of the boycott •

One

Omanhene had beaten gong-gong to say that prices should be moderated on food
so that the people could live during the course of the boycott, and then a
political officer had had the gong-gong beaten to say that what the chief had
just said was untrue.

They also complained about a case in which the District

Commissioner had refused to convict a labourer who stole cocoa, on the grounds
that he had stolen the cocoa to obtain cash since his employer, participating
in the hold-up, had not been able to pay him.

Finally, they charged that the

Government was urging labourers to bring action against the farmers for nonpayment of wages, while the police were threatening brokers who did not
deliver cocoa to the expatriate firms. 76
The chiefs of' Ghana were, on the whole, inclined to feel that the Government was against them and an ally of the firms; expressions of the
neutrality of the Government and the disinterestedness of its spirited defence
of the liberty of the subject did not impress them, especially when the liberty of the firms who had entered the cocoa Agreements was never questioned.
Monopoly was permitted, while organization against monopoly was not.
The Omanhene [Nana Ofori Atta] asked whether monopolies were legal in
this country. He was informed that they were. The Chiefs were very

0
7 6omanhene to the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, 21 January 1938.

GNA Adm.23/l/798, Cape Coast.
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bitter against the Pool but more so against the UAC. They also were
not satisfied with what Government was doing and the Omanhene of Winneba
stated that the rumour was very strong that the UAC was a part of
Government. 77
Rumours were rife as to the power of the UAC, and its plans for eventual takeover of the entire economy.

One rumour had it that the Company would soon be

taking over all the farmland, although it was known that Europeans could not
buy land in Ghana.

At a cocoa meeting at Nsawam in April 1938 it was said by

one farmer that
The UAC had opened account for 'loan' against advance for the farmers
with an object in view that if farmers receives an advance from the firm
the firm during the season will drop the price of cocoa in such a manner
that a farmer would not be able to meet the advance. The firm would
auction the farm which the firm itself would arrange to buy. This would
continue until all the land would go into UAC and by the way the farmers
became labourers to the farms. As the UAC had already proclaimed to
their buyers in Europe that the Gold Coast cocoa is for them [sia].78
The situation, therefore, during both boycotts was the following.
Chiefs, farmers, and other members of the African community were aware not
only that the price paid for cocoa was limited by agreement among the Europeans, but also that retail prices were set in consultation among the various
firms.

They were also aware that despite its protestations of neutrality the

Government was partial, in its actions, to the European firms.

Finally, in

1937, the situation was aggravated by the outright refusal of the firms to
publicize the Agreement which they so often argued was ultimately of benefit
to the farming community.

Although they might not have been able to control

the international economy and its effect on the cocoa commodity market, the
farmers were well aware that they might, by political action, be able to

77Meeting of Chiefs with a Government Official, 20 December 1937.

Adm.ll/1640.
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78 Police Report of a cocoa meeting at Nsawam, 22 April 1938.
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remedy some of the abuses in the colony.

Their anger and militancy was sue-

cinctly displayed in a large pink poster, printed and distributed in Dunkwa,
entitled the
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

7·
8.
9.
10.

11

Farmers' 'D' Slogan of Cocoa Crisis."

Down with Pool Firms.
Drown Pool Firms in their Pool waters.
Dry pool waters with cocoa conflagration.
Doom cocoa buying agreement.
Drag away plutocrats.
Drill the unscrupulous capitalists.
Disband cocoa trade monopolies.
Do hold-up absolutely and persistently.
Dictate your price.
Dignify your position and that of posterity. 7 9

4. Participation in the 1930-31 and 1937-38 'Boycotts
The 1930-31 and 1937-38 boycotts were both characterized by two acts of
protest against the European firms; the hold-up of cocoa supplies and the refusal to buy imported European goods, except for essentials such as matches
and kerosene, from either European or African shops.

In addition, in 1937-38,

a small amount of cocoa was actually burnt during the later stages of the boycott as a symbolic protest.

The latter boycott was also the object of

sympathetic strikes by market mammies and lorry drivers.
On the whole the 1937-38 boycott was better organized and more success-

ful than its predecessor.

As analyzed above, part of the cause of this

success was that the issues were more clear-cut and the exploitation by the
European firms more obvious.

A second reason was that, although by the end of

the boycott some conflicts had occurred among the different sectors of the
African population, during the course of the action there was more cohesion
among the different groups and regions of Ghana than there had been in 1930-31.
Sam Rhodie, in his article on the earlier hold-up,80 has written an

79This poster can be found in GNA Adm.23/l/798, Cape Coast.
800p.
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excellent analysis of the conflicts a.m.ong the various groups who were originally engaged together in political action.

He argues in essence that "It was

the middle and wealthy farmers and chiefs who were behind the hold-up and even
they were far from united • • . • Their hold-up was a revolt of a nascent rural
bourgeoisie against a monopoly power which they regarded as a brake on their
own enterprise. us1

He maintains that in fact the small farmers were not as

eager as their richer compatriots to boycott the expatriate firms and were
therefore only too willing to listen to the British political officers who
informed them that, according to the laws on the liberty of the subject, they
were not obliged to obey their chiefs.

Further, the chiefs and rich farmers

were engaged in group selling projects which were designed to eliminate the
brokers, whom they regarded as a parasitic class.

Finally, Rhodie argues, the

cocoa labourers, who bad little to gain and much to lose from the boycott,
were eager to sell as much cocoa as they

c~uld

to the firms.

Rhodie's well-documented article needs little elaboration here:

un-

fortunately, however, a similar work, analyzing the class interests and
conflicts in the Ghanaian community, does not exist for the 1937-38 boycott.
This section will therefore be concerned with the different groups which
participated in the latter event , in an endeavour to show that there was more
support for the boycott as a whole and that conflicts were mitigated by a
greater over-all perception of exploitation.
The 1937-38 boycott was much more widespread than was its predecessor,
covering not only the Eastern Province, the original cocoa-producing area, but
also Ashanti and even the northern part of the Central Province.

In 1930, the

hold-up had been less successful in Ashanti because the Asantehene, who had

c

81 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
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returned from political exile in the Seychelles Islands only recently, was unwilling to take any action which might put him in the bad graces of the
colonial Government.

In fact, the Asantehene was known at that time only as

the Kumasihene, as by Government decree he had been stripped of the right to
rule the entire Ashanti nation.

But in 1936 the "Kumasihene" died and was

replaced by Nana Otumfoo Osei Agyeman Prempeh II, a man more willing, because
he had never himself been exiled, to assume the role of king of Ashanti and
thereupon to support the boycott.8 2

Along with Nana Ofori Atta of Akim

Abuakwa, he became one of the most articulate spokesmen of the Ghanaian cocoa
producers.

There was also some participation in the boycott in the cocoa-

growing areas of the British Mandated Territory (Togoland) but, as one business
agent wrote "We must remember that the British Mandated Territory native is,
in himself much less subversive than the Accra native. •

"8 3 The John Holt

papers indicate that the chiefs of this area, especially around Hohoe, were
quite willing to sell cocoa and only boycotted because of pressure from chiefs
from other regions.84
On the whole the chiefs were more willing to use their powers of sanetion to encourage the hold-up in the later boycott.

The Nowell Commission

reported that not only were they swearing oaths and beating gong-gong, but
also they were denying their people the traditional functions of the chiefs,
threatening to withdraw funeral rites

and refusing claims to adultery fees if

the people did not support the boycott.85

This situation contrasts with that

82Danquah,

op. ait., p. 11, considers the Asantehene's support a crucial
factor in the success of the boycott.
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83Hohoe Agent to District Agent, Accra, 24 March 1938.
(ii).
84Ibid.

85Nowell Commission, op. ait., p.

67.
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of 1930 when pressure had to be put on the chiefs to encourage them to support
the boycott. 8G
But chiefs were not only chiefs, they were also large farmers in their
own right, sometimes money-lenders or cocoa brokers on a large scale and,
also, entrepreneurs who were interested in buying up the stocks of cocoa which
accumulated during the boycott at cheap prices and selling and/or shipping
them at a profit.

The Europeans, failing often to recognize the multiple in-

terests of the chiefs, sometimes assumed that they were being coerced by
educated entrepreneurs from the Gold Coast Colony into taking positions of
support for the boycott.

At other times, however, recognizing the conflicting

aims, they managed to interfere with the chiefs' positions qua chief.

Nana

Ofori Atta, one of the most articulate spokesmen for the cocoa producers
during both boycotts, was a target for European bribes in his capacity as a
large cocoa farmer and would-be shipper.

It was in fact claimed by Cadbury

that the 1930-31 hold-up was broken when Nana Ofori Atta agreed to sell his
cocoa at a premium.
We are intending to ask UAC to-morrow if they would support our
offering a premium, say of 1/-:- per cwt. or so, for a certain limited
quantity of Cocoa or for a limited time, as a gesture of goodwill,
especially in view of the approach of Christmas. You may recall that in
the Farmers' Federation hold-up of 1930-31 it was a gesture of this kind
on our part which broke it up, Ofori Atta himself, while the Farmers'
Federation were deciding whether to sell, offering us a small parcel at
a premium of l/6d. per cwt. which we accepted at 1/-, and when this Cocoa
was seen moving by lorry it started off the renewal of selling,8 7
In 1938 similar accusations were made against Nana Ofori Atta, that he, as
well as other chiefs, was deliberately encouraging the boycott in order to

0

8 GThis type of pressure was put on the chiefs by John Kwame Ayew at the
21 October 1930 meeting of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Farmers' Association.
GNA Adm.ll/1070.
8 7Letter to J. Cadbury dated 1 December 1937.
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get "rake-offs" against the cocoa which was being held up.

In other words, it

was argued that the chiefs' role as entrepreneurs superseded their traditional
role.

One Government Officer reported

Had an interesting talk with a cocoa man from Somanyah. He is also a
lorry owner, and has come down here to get a contract on the road • • • •
I asked him what was the cocoa situation, and he told me that the reason
the cocoa was not being sold was because the chiefs headed by Ofori Atta
wanted a rake off from the farmers amounting to as much as six shillings
a load and because the farmers refused to let them have it the chiefs
had stopped the sales. He said further that the United Africa Company
were approaching Ofori Atta with a large bribe to let the cocoa sales
proceed. He said the chiefs wanted to appoint Agents through whom all
cocoa should pass to ensure the rake off and the farmers wouldn't agree.
This is probably all wrong but may be of interest.BS

An accusation such as the above is difficult to substantiate; it might easily
have been made by a jealous farmer.

In any case cocoa was not sold until the

end of February, despite any such bribes as may have been offered to Nana
Ofori Atta by the UAC.

But the accusation indicates a degree of suspicion of

the powerful chiefs of the colony, even of those who, like Nana Ofori Atta,
verbally supported the movement.

A great deal of debate took place among the

Europeans as to whether it was simply the chiefs, or the farmers themselves,
who were behind the boycott.

The UAC preferred to believe that it was simply

the chiefs who were the instigators of the boycott, but the Nowell Commission
found rather that the farmers were "throughout" in sympathy with it. 8 9

And

indeed it is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise, given the degree of suspicion of chiefs, who were recognized as also being concerned with
their profits as large farmers and possibly shippers in the event of a complete boycott •
For it was well-known during both boycotts that some leaders, including

0

88Extract from the Confidential Diary of the District Commissioner,
Keta, 16 January 1938. GNA Adm.29/6/14.
89

ap.
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John Kwame Ayew, A. J. Ocansey, T. Hutton-Mills, and various other officials
of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation, were engaged in attempts not
only to circumvent the monopolizing European buyers, but also to circumvent
the European shippers.

Many contacts were made with outside businessmen,

mostly Americans, who were willing to ship cocoa on contract for the striking
farmers.

The Government, invoking memories of the 1924 Strickler affair,90

cast doubts on the honesty of these contacts, but it would seem that at least
some were legitimate businessmen.

It would also seem, from what little evi-

dence is available, that the large American chocolate manufacturing concern,
'Hershey, was behind some of the independent attempts to ship cocoa.

One Mr.

Canalize, whose name often cropped up as an advisor to African entrepreneurs,
was reputed to be an agent for Hershey.

Try as they might, Government offi-

cials were unable to ascertain proof of this rumour, but it seems that certain
persons in America were definitely urging the Ghanaians to continue their
hold-up of cocoa in 1938.
several meetings (Accra) •

One official reported that there had been ". • .
about the monetary assistance offered by an

American firm on the condition that a certain amount of cocoa should be sent
to them to be kept in store pending the time when good price would be offered
n91

At one of these meetings, participants were

11

•

•

•

informed of pos-

sible agreement with persons in America to buy their cocoa and that these
persons ask the farmers to continue their Hold-Up until arrangements are completed. " 92

After the boycott was over, a buyer from Hershey arrived in Ghana,

9 0see above.
91 District

10 July 1938.

0

Commissioner, Dunkwa to District Commissioner, Cape Coast,
GNA Adm.23/l/798, Cape Coast.

92Report by the Superintendent of the Eastern Province Police, of a
meeting at Mampong, 3 February 1938. G!lA Adm.29/6/14.

367
apparently to purchase the cheap held-over cocoa.
I have the honour to inform you that an American by the name of Mr.
Schwarz arrived in Accra this morning and in Koforidua this afternoon.
He left America 10 days ago. 'He is a representative of Herchey [sic]
and Baker, the big cocoa merchants of New York. The purpose of his visit
is to ascertain the quality of Gold Coast cocoa awaiting purchase and
shipment. There are rumours in New York that most of the cocoa is of
bad quality owing to storage by Africans and the hold-up of sale of
cocoa.9 3
The purpose of the Hershey visit, as reported above, was seemingly innocuous.
But the possibility remains that Africans were encouraged through Hershey
representatives to try direct shipping schemes, thus giving them a false view
of their capacity to break out of the international monopoly.

For although

the aims of all the various organizations connected with the boycotts included
the desire to make direct shipments of cocoa, 9 ~ in fact no large shipments
ever came off.
were dealing.

The Africans were at the mercy of the Europeans with whom they
African entrepreneurs " . • • created a never-ceasing string of

limited liability companies to break into trade in a big way.

These schemes

were almost uniformly unsuccessful because of insufficient capital and
skills." 95
Anthony Hopkins has traced the career of one Ghanaian entrepreneur,
Winifried Tete-Ansa, who was prominently involved in many of the various shipping schemes put forward during the 1930s.

Tete-Ansa, having been trained in

business methods in England and America, put faith in limited liability companies as a means of mobilizing African savings on a group basis.

But in a

situation in which there was little capital in the first place, in which

93 Report by the Superintendent of the Gold Coast Police, Koforidua, 11

May 1938.
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9

GNA Adm.29/6/14.

~The Rules of the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation, 1930, included the aim of acting as a "Bureau" for the selling of cocoa. GNA Adm.ll/
1640.
9 5Holmes, op. eit., p. 72.
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entrepreneurs were not united, and in which, moreover, there were hints of
corruption about Tete-Ansa himself, 96 there was little hope that the Africans
could successfully compete with the Europeans.
The chiefs, then, along with certain rich farmers (or in their own
capacity as rich farmers) and the urban trading class which, according to
Rhodie, 97 was interested in entering the cocoa trade to replace the large brokers, had an interest in supporting the boycott in order to corner the
distributive network for their own gain.

Such an aim, however, was unattain-

able, except in the short run for very small amounts of cocoa.

The most that

could be achieved in the long run was in fact the sort of result which did
occur; that is, the investigation of some of the abuses of the immediate situation and the recommendation of a new mode of distribution.
Any new mode of distribution which might be set up would impinge upon
the brokers, however.

During the 1930-31 boycott, the brokers were not partic-

ipants because they regarded any attempt to by-pass the expatriate firms as also
an attempt to by-pass them.

Furthermore, many brokers were strangers , known

collectively as "Lagosians 11 because they tended to be from Nigeria, and therefor~

susceptible to resentment on ethnic grounds.

As strangers and as economic

middlemen, they did not wish to have attention called to themselves.

In 1934 a

chief of Akim Abuakwa tried to issue a proclamation prohibiting his people from
trading with Lagosians at all, on the grounds that the Lagosian brokers bought
poor quality cocoa.

He passed a "Village Cocoa Buying Prohibition Order" the

"Objects and Reasons" of which were the following.

96 A. G. Hopkins, "Economic Aspects of Political Movements in the Gold
Coast and Nigeria 1918-1939," Jou:m.aZ of Afriaan History, no. 1, vol. 7 (1966).
97ap • en"t • , p. 11 3 .

Gold Coast Cocoa in the World :Markets is given bad repute year by year,
attempts tending to improve the quality of the industry have been of no
avail, and this giving rise to the low price of the industry it is found
expedient to trace out the cause and provide a remedy.
It is known from recent experience that the source of the trouble is at
the Villages of the Farmers to which the petty cocoa buyers go for buying
competition, and failing to distinguish between good and bad qualities,
they buy and mix together :moulded, salt and damp cocoa. A tendency towards
the degradation of the quality of the industry. In aid of the restrictions
passed by the Government for the improvement of the industry in the interest of all concerned a prohibitory measure against village cocoa-buying is
the only safeguard. Buying at the Villages creates stealing habits and all
kinds of crime among the strangers who are petty cocoa-buyers, and caretakers of cocoa farms. 9 8
This chief, then, perceiving that the poor quality of Ghana cocoa was a cause
of its receiving a relatively low price on the international market, and unable
to influence the Europeans who willingly bought poor quality cocoa, thought to
attack the problem at its source, the stranger cocoa-buyers.
The 1937 cocoa-bey:ing Agreement, however, cont.a.fued such a clear threat to the
position of the brokers that for their own sake they were obliged to uphold the
boycott.

Although they were aware that certain chiefs and entrepreneurs were

trying to usurp their position, they were also aware that the primary aim of
the boycott was to attack the Agreement, an Agreement which was constantly
vaunted by the Europeans as a means of eliminating the "abuses" of the brokerage system and of therefore providing more payments to the farmers.

One of the

"abuses" most stringently objected to was the practice of dela¥ing declarations
of stocks.

The

~rice

of cocoa changed from day tc day on the international

markets, and as it changed, new prices to be paid for cocoa were wired out from
London to the firms' Accra agents, who then informed their various agents in
the other stations of Ghana.

Brokers were usually given a few days to bring in

9 8proclamation by the Omanhene of New Juaben, 20 October 1934.
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their cocoa at the old price as the agents were not able to inform them of the
new price immediately.

The brokers often took advantage of this practice; if

they heard that the price of cocoa had risen they would declare cocoa which
they had actually bought at the old, lower price at the new, higher price; if
they heard that the price had fallen they would buy at the new price and then
declare that they had bought at the old, higher price.

This practice was

ubiquitous and a source of rankle to all the European agents, yet to keep their
brokers the firms were required to put up with it. 99

A provision of the new

Agreement was to be that the brokers would have only forty-eight hours to declare their stocks, to cut out their chances for over- or under-declarations.
In order that their brokers could not leave the firms in a pique when denied
these opportunities, provision was also made that no firm would hire a broker
previously employed by another firm in the Agreement.lOO
The firms argued moreover that the prices they were paying for cocoa
were higher than they should be because of all the extra perquisites which they
were required to pay to the brokers in order to keep their contacts.

These

perquisities, or "abuses," as the firms insisted on calling them, included such
p~ents

as the following:

rent allowances to brokers or buyers for stores,

repair allowances, weighing machine and tarpaulin allowances, labour allowances
for clerks, watchmen, etc.; the loan of bags, free transportation, the payment
of an "over-riding c01mn.ission" on tonnage above a certain amount; and outright
gifts to brokers, the most well-known gift being a motorcycle.~Ol

99 The author was informed of this practice in several interviews with
former cocoa buyers, both African and European.
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100Nowell Commission, op. ait., p. 209.
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The firms tried to persuade the chiefs that the brokers' support of the
boycott was based entirely on their desire for the unwarranted profits obtainable through false declarations of stocks and through the various abuses listed
above.

They argued that the farmers would obtain more for their cocoa if only

they would join the firms in eliminating, or putting under control, the broker
class •
• • • constantly increasing abuses • • • have--inter alia--resulted in
the remuneration of brokers and middlement in the form of varying commissions and allowances, becoming far in excess of the value of the services
rendered by them.
To the extent that overpayments have taken the form of direct or indirect over-remuneration to brokers, the actual producer has not benefitted,
and it is the intention ••• that such overpayments to intermediaries
should be suppressed as soon as possible, thereby ensuring that out of the
fair price paid for Cocoa the full and proper proportion reaches the
pockets of the actual producer.102
The chiefs, however, were not taken in by this argument, partly because some of
them were themselves engaged in brokerage activities, and partly because they
were aware that brokerage was a risky business and that fortunes could be lost
as easily as they could be made.
the merchants have given evidence before the Cocoa Enquiry Commissions and accused the brokers for being the cause of low price of
cocoa therefore they entered into agreement so as to exclude them and
deal with the farmers direct. This being their defence for the formation
of the pool, the chiefs have got to support the brokers who are sons of
this country and keep fighting.l03
Indeed the firms were as aware as the farmers and chiefs that brokerage was a
precarious business; so aware that they argued to the Nowell Commission that the
chief reason for the opposition of the brokers to the Agreement was that the
brokers had overpaid advances for the 1937-38 season, thinking that the season

0

102Extract from the GOZd Coast News dated 14 December 1937.

GNA Adm.29/6/9.

1 03 statement by Nana Akua.moa Akyeampong {Omanhene of Kwahu State), at a
meeting in Winneba, 1 April 1938. GNA Adm.29/6/14.
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would be as prosperous as 1936-37.

The firms argued that the brokers were in

no position to buy the cocoa crop at the prices that they had promised; therefore they were encouraging·the boycott to

del~

payment of their debts •

• • • it can readily be seen that the brokers have a very good reason
for conducting a hold-up this year in the hopes of thereby creating a
shortage calculated to increase prices • • • the brokers are an active
factor in the present situation •
• many chiefs are directly interested in the cocoa trade. Many
are actual brokers, and many indulge in large-scale loans on the farmers'
crops. • • • The innumerable instances of disciplinary measures taken by
chiefs against those farmers wishing to sell their cocoa can only be
against those who have been independent of their finance. They have no
difficulty in controlling the others who have already lost to them their
interest in their cocoa.I04
Thus the firms professed interest in the welfare of the ordinary peasant who
was in debt to the brokers because of the notorious system of advances.

The

firms advocated, they claimed, a system of direct producer to shipper selling,
so that the producer might earn the maximum possible.

Their propaganda,

throughout the course of the boycott, was directed towards this contention and
was accepted as such by the Nowell Commission.
In the light of such professed concern, it is interesting to note that
one expatriate firm, when faced with the real possibility of eliminating the
broker from the distributive network, rejected the idea.

In a letter to the

John Holt headquarters in Liverpool, their Accra agent wrote that their system
of giving credit was in fact unnecessary.
To the general surprise it has been found recently, that, far from
having to continue advances for cocoa buying, we could all actually buy
cocoa on credit from the middlemen and farmers on the promise of payment
to them when the Banks replenished their stocks of currency.
I need not here reiterate the well known arguments against such a system
[of advances] which involves unsound credit for a crop which does not

c

°

1 4Anonymous memorandum on the reason for the Pool.
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really need financing, which is very easily transportable by adequate
existing transport facilities to a nearby buying post; and which is of
such a high value that, advances or no advances, it is bound to find its
way into the merchants' hands as soon as it is ready for marketing. In
fact, it could find its way into the merchants' hands very much quicker,
since it has been proved by our own and to everybody's experience that
cash advances merely provoke brokers and producer with means of gambling
with our money against us on a 'Heads I win, tails you lose' basis. 105
In reply to this letter advocating elimination of middlemen, John Holt wrote
that if they were eliminated, the European firms would no longer have control
over the cocoa market.

If they were not tied through credit to the Europeans,

the Africans would be able to ship cocoa on their own.
If the native cocoa dealers of the Gold Coast can in fact finance the
cocoa crop without credit facilities, how long do you think the exporting
houses can remain in business without forever paying a higher price on the
Gold Coast than the African shipper can get on the home market? A direct
shipper can hypothecate his cocoa shipments through the Bank.
In the long run does it not come down to this--that the exporting
houses have got to choose between paying more on the Gold Coast than the
average home market and relying for their profit on successful market
gambling [this would be if Ghanaians could sell direct] or alternatively
financing the market of the crop, in the hope of getting a substantial
proportion of tied customers, and being able to buy at a rather lower
price than they would have to pay if all the cocoa were free cocoa. In
the merchandise trade, I hold very strongly the view that it is the
function of Importing houses to finance its distribution. This is the
practice all over the world, and more particularly in primitive countries. • • • From time immemorial the West African trade has been
conducted on credit, and built up on credit. How can trade expand
otherwise? The im~ortant thing is to see that credit trade is sanely
conducted • • • • 10
By the same conduct of the credit trade, John Holt was referring to the conduct
of the trade in such a way as to keep the brokers, and through them the, producers, tied to the European firms at a minimum cost to those firms.

His fear

105Letter from the Accra District Agent to Holt and Company, dated 11
February 1937. JH: Jacket 92.
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106 Reply to Accra District Agent from John Holt, dated 17 March 1937.
Jacket 92, italics the author's.
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was that the producers might be able to finance themselves through the banks
and sell on their own.

It was imperative that whatever cash the banks brought

to Ghana. should be channelled through the firms, not given direct to producers
or to African brokers or traders.

No clearer statement could be made of the

absolute necessity of keeping all Africans, down to the lowliest producer,
firmly in the debt of the expatriate companies.
The lowliest producers, indeed, were well aware of the exploitation inherent in the cocoa distribution system, but they were constrained in their
ability to boycott by the hard necessities of life.

In debt as they already

were to cocoa brokers, who had advanced them money before the season began, few
farmers had capital to sustain them over the long period of the 1937-38 holdup.

Part of their hardship was relieved by their ability to grow some food-

stuffs, such as yams, along with their cocoa.

But they could no longer retreat

into the self-sufficiency of which they had been capable forty years earlier;
imported consumer goods were a necessity.
In fact, the leaders of the boycott realized that farmers could be selfsufficient only within certain limits; it was always clearly stated that
boycotts of European goods were not meant to include such basics as sugar,
kerosene, matches, or tobacco.

The market mammies who upheld the boycott were

thus able to make some income in the continued sale of these basic commodities.
At the same time, they supported the boycott not simply out of sympathy with
the farmers, but because it was in their own interests.

Mammies were tied to

the European firms through systems of credit similar to those which tied the
brokers; in order to finance themselves they borrowed from the European firms,
who in return had guaranteed customers for their supplies.

0

But those same

firms who sold goods to the mammies also competed with them, in their large
"department store" retail establishments in the coastal cities and regional
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centres, and in the lorry-loads of goods vhich they transported to the bush.
• • • you [the mammies] take certain articles so as to take them upcountry to retail at some little profit but before you get to the
up-country a lorry belonging to the same firms loaded full,· vi th the
same articles vould have gone ahead of you and disposed of them at the
same prices and sometimes a little cheaper. 1 0 7
Mammies vere especially urged to boycott the West African prints vhich
vere manufactured in England and then exported to Ghana, at prices inflated by
the acts of imperial protection vhich had denied Ghana cheap Japanese cottons
since 1934.

That the boycott of these cloths had no little effect is indicated

by the following report of the sufferings of the Lancashire cotton trade.
In conversation vith A. Jones yesterday he mentioned that Lancashire is
having a bad time vith cotton goods for West African trade.
A considerable number of firms in the cotton trade have shipped nothing
to West Africa for a long time and Lancashire people are blaming the price
of cocoa for it. He says that this comment is pretty widespread. It is
supposed too that the West African native is boycotting British goods,
particularly Lancashire cotton goods,l08
Many of the mammies vho boycotted the foreign firms were married to
lorry drivers who also participated in the boycott.

Again, it was not sheer

altruism in support of their farming brothers which induced the lorry drivers
to boycott; rather, they had specific grievances of their own.

They were

afraid that if the Europeans got control of the internal marketing of cocoa,
there would be less transport work available for them, and they were also
afraid that the Pool would result in a permanent reduction of cocoa prices,
affecting freight rates. 109

They vere moreover already suffering from the

107speech by Mr. Moore at a meeting in Cape Coast, 15 February 1938.
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policy of "scheduled roads" which diverted cocoa traffic from the roads to the
railway. 11

°

Finally, they were generally in debt to the expatriate firms for

the lorries themselves.

In fact, although they were militant in their stand in

support of the boycott, and although chief drivers made it their business to
ensure that all their men participated in the strike, the,lorry drivers were
not as able to hold out as other groups and were forced by early 1938 to renew
their licences for lorries and resume their work. 111

A similar sympathy strike

by the surf-boat men of Saltpond did.not last long.l 12

There was also a short

but unsuccessful strike by the workers who were engaged to supply palm fruit to
the UAC Palm Oil Mill at Sese, near Takoradi. 113
The general boycott and strike against Europeans from all sectors of the
community no doubt encouraged small far.mers who might otherwise have been
tempted to give in to the firms to hold out longer than they had intended.

For

indeed the boycott was a strain on such farmers, and it was they, along with
the hired labourers from the Northern Territories and French colonies who
worked on the richer farms, who were the first to let out small trickles of
cocoa in sales to the Europeans.

During the 1930-31 boycott, there had been

fairly frequent complaints against the richer farmers by the poorer ones, who
felt that the boycott was a plot to facilitate the acquisition of large stocks
of cocoa for shipment rather than a genuine attempt to alleviate the lot of all
the far.mers.

110See

Konor Mate Kole of Manya. Krobo, who had begun a co-operative

Chapter V.

111 Information

on the lorry drivers' strike is taken from GNA Adm.ll/1656

and GNA Adm.29/6/13 •
. 112 Doc~ent dated

November 1937. ' 1Whi.tfield of the Lighterage informed
me in the evening that the boat crews at Saltpond had agreed to return to
work." GNA Adm.ll/1640.
113Report

21

from Western Province, 13 December 1937.

GNA Adm.ll/1640.
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marketing scheme ostensibly for the benefit of all his people, was especially
singled out for such suspicion. 114 Although such claims were less frequent in
the later boycott, the suspicions still existed.

But the farmers were on the

whole more willing to take militant action, and indeed began, in February 1938,
to burn small lots of cocoa in support of their claims.

Although only an es-

timated total of about 400 tons was burned,llS the incidence of such protests
was sufficient to panic the Government administrators, who were instructed to
keep a close watch on all burnings, however small the lots destroyed.
It is more than likely that whatever small lots of cocoa were actually
sold during the 1937-38 boycott, as compared to the 1930-31 boycott, were sold
not by the small farmers but by the migrant farm labourers.

As in 1930, the

labourers were not convinced that they would profit from the boycott.

They

knew that the price of cocoa was low, but living as they did on a season-toseason basis, and required, as those from the French territories were, to

p~

yearly taxes, it was more important to them to acquire whatever cash they
could.

When they were not paid, they often "stole" cocoa (which was actually

theirs, since normal payment for a season's work was one-third of the produce)
and sold it to the Europeans. ll6

The leaders of the boycott tried to exhort

the farm labourers not to sell, but with limited success.

When John

Kwame Ayew

tried to persuade them to discontinue their selling at Asamankese in February

~eport from the District Commissioner, Akuse to the Commissioner for the
Eastern Province, 21 January 1932. See also Rhodie, op. cit., p. ll5.
11

11 5Nowell Commission, op. oit., p. 62.
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116on 29 January 1938 the Assistant District Commissioner of Cape Coast
wrote that he had had to try a labourer accused by a farmer of stealing his
produce. When it was discovered that he had stolen only his actual one-third
share the case was dismissed. The District Commissioner" • • • expressed the
hope that the farmers would see that their labourers did not suffer while they
held up their cocoa." GNA Adm.23/l/798, Cape Coast.
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belly trouble too much to wait

1938, he was shouted down with cries of" ••
any longer." 1 17

The labourers had no leaders to constrain them, as their

chiefs remained at home in the north and their Zongo headmen were as dependent
on cocoa revenue as they were •

Further, they came from tribes whi eh, if not

actually despised by the Ashanti and other southern peoples, were not regarded
as genuine members of the Gold Coast community.

Thus social pressure could

have little effect on them.
While southern farmers expressed concern for, and made arrangements for,
their fellow tribesmen who encountered difficulties, on the whole there was
little sympathy among them for the stranger labourers.
.in April 1938 the question of strangers was discussed.

At a meeting in Suhum
The Chief Farmer,

"Teacher Atta, 11 advised
It appears that some of the farmers who employed those Zabramas [a
stranger tribe] as labourers pay them by cash and some also by loads of
cocoa, and these led the labourers to possess cocoa, which may be those
that came to the market.
He then suggested to them that it will be better if a farmer who
employed any of these labourers will turn them out from his village.
This advice was taken by the farmers.

11 8

Despite such callous indifference to the plight of the migrants, on the
whole very little cocoa was actually sold to the firms during the boycott.

The

farming group, chiefs, and brokers managed to stick together enough to make the
effect of the boycott serious, as the following table indicates.

The boycott

was not successful in breaking down the collusion between the major European
firms, nor was it successful in raising the price of cocoa, a price which was
dependent on factors not completely within the firms' control.

But it was

. successful in ·eliminating the actual cocoa Agreement, and in obliging the

0
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dated 10 February 1938.

118Report dated 21 April 1938.
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Table 39.

Amount of Cocoa Bought by Members of the
Cocoa Agreement, 1937-38 Season 1 1 9
Tonnage

Dates
1 October-25 November
26 November-25 December
26 December-31 December
1 January-27 January
28 January-3 February
4 February-10 February
11 February-17 February

21,606
. 508
63
829
280
326
235

Government to reconsider the method of marketing the crop in Ghana.

The Nowell

Commission negotiated a truce between Africans and expatriates in February 1938.
With the outbreak of war in 1939, a Government marketing scheme was perforce
introduced, a scheme which was refined into the Cocoa Marketing Board established in the late 1940s.

5.

Limits to Economic Action in Ghana
Throughout the colonial period in Ghana, African resistance to colonial

political rule and expatriate economic rule concentrated on two crucial dimensions of the economic system; production and distribution.

In the struggle for

control of productive resources, Africans were by and large successful, in that
they maintained ownership of the land of the colony, although in doing so they
sacrificed their right and ability to evolve private ownership of land, and
with it capitalist forms of enterprise which could compete more successfully
with the Europeans.

In the second struggle, Ghanaians were not successful.

Neither in competition with Europeans nor as their adjuncts in the distributive
system could Ghanaians make an impact on the economic organization of their
country.

The cocoa boycotts, as attempts to remove the distributive network

0
119Report dated 26 February 1938.

GNA Adm.ll/1640.
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from foreign hands, failed,
The boycotts failed for two reasons.

First, the economy was too depen-

dent upon the world market for cocoa for an organization whose only weapon was
hold-up, boycott and strike to make any impact upon it.

While a significant

percentage of the world's production of cocoa came from Ghana, those who controlled its marketing were not willing to act in the ultimate interests of the
producer of cocoa.

Moreover, cocoa was not an essential commodity; as such,

the world's consumers were well able to withstand a short boycott of one season.

It was obvious to the colonial Government that something should be done

to control the violent fluctuations in cocoa prices, with their concomitant
risks of loss of revenues and,political upheaval in times of depression, but
action was only to be taken in conjunction with the expatriate firms.

Africans

possessed neither the political nor the economic power to force significant
changes.
Second, internal contradictions within the Ghanaian community acted to
impede a long-term boycott or indeed any long-term planning for economic
change.

Rich farmers were pitted against poor; all farmers were pitted against

the migrant labourers.

Brokers were sometimes also rich farmers or chiefs,

sometimes strangers making a petty existence by exploiting the farmers who
borrowed from them.

Chiefs had economic interests of their own which encour-

aged them to join the boycott, but they also were constrained by the necessity
to keep hold of their "traditional" power which depended ultimately on the
goodwill of the colonial Government.

African entrepreneurs acted ostensibly

in the interests of the farmers, but often their real motive was to become competitive on the international capitalist stage by using precisely the same

0

methods of exploitation as an expatriate capitalist would use.

As will be dis-

cussed in Chapter VIII, the develo:p:alent of class relations within Ghana
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coincided with the development of an international capitalist system geared to
keep Ghana in a peripheral producer's role, with the result that no significant
economic change could be realized.

0

CHAPTER VIII

0
CONCLUSION:

IMPERIALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT
IN GHANA:

1886-1939

In order to analyze the effects on Ghana of her integration into the
world capitalist-dominated economic system, effects which were compounded by
her position as a colony, a framework incorporating theories of development and
underdevelopment is best applicable.

The obvious import of the empirical data

presented in this thesis has been to provide evidence for the argument that
Ghana's "underdevelopment" during the period 1886-1939 was a function of both
the political and the economic imperialism which she underwent.

In the follow-

ing pages, this point of view will be elaborated.
It must be noted that when considering the concept of development in the
context of Ghana or in the context of the "Third World" as a whole, this author
is referring solely to the development of capitalism.
ture development i.s considered in a vacuum:

In much of the litera-

it is used as a descriptive term

implying some form of economic growth (sometimes concomitant with "political
modernization") which is independent of the form of economic organization and
the mode of production in existence.l

However, in many cases, what is actually

being considered is capitalist development, or the lack thereof.

In this the-

sis the term development is used specifically to refer to the growth of
capitalism.

Underdevelopment is defined as the process by which an economy's

realistic possibilities for capitalist ec9nomic growth are thwarted and distorted, usually by contact with a more developed economy. 2 The central

0

1For example W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Eaonomia Growth (Cambridge:
the University Press, 1960).

at

2These definitions follow the :practice of Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism
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argument of this chapter is that while Ghana might have developed, during the
colonial period, into a capitalist economy in her own right through her integration into the world trading economy, imposition of oligopolistic economic
control and foreign political domination prevented her from doing so.
It should by no means, therefore, be understood

tha~

Ghana became a

capitalist country in the same manner as European and North American countries
became capitalist.

Rather, Ghana in the colonial period was undergoing certain

changes in her economy which introduced in her the potential, which might or
might not be realized, for capitalist economic growth in the future.

She was

emerging out of a purely precapitalist economy, that is an economy".

where

landed property and agriculture form the basis of the economic order and consequently the economic object is the production of use values.

" 3 Much

of the research conducted on the development of capitalism in Europe indicates
that the European transition from the precapitalist economic formation of
feudalism to capitalism took a considerable period of time; some argue at least
three centuri.es. 4 Therefore, one cannot at any one time pinpoint an economy
and argue that it is precapitalist or capitalist, if it is still in such a
period of
change.
,

Most economies undergo long periods of transition from pre-

capitalism to capitalism, if they become capitalist at all.

Ghana was

following such a path in the colonial period, but her situation as an imperialized economy inhibited her capacity to develop from a precapitalist into a
capitalist system.

c

and UndePdevelopment in Latin AmePiaa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969),
and E. R. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa {London:
Heinemann, 1973) and others.
3Karl Marx, PPe-Capitalist Economic FoPmations (New York:
Publishers, 1965), p. 80.
4A leading proponent of this view is Dobb, op. ait.
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In order to analyze an economic system one must consider the mode of
production, that is the " • • . way in which people produce and exchange their
means of life, •
that is of "
product, •

" the ownership and control of the means of production,
• all those means which are necessary to produce the finished

" including land, labour, and capital, and finally, the relations

of production, that is the" ••• relations which people enter into with one
another in the actual production process itself • • • • " 5 In other words, in
order to determine the social classes which are likely to arise in a system of
capitalist production, one must consider how things are produced, who owns the
productive apparatus, and what the relations are between those who act upon the
productive apparatus and those who merely own it.

In the developed capitalist

West, the major social classes which have arisen have been the bourgeoisie and
the proletariat.

The bourgeoisie is the class which owns the means of produc-

tion and which organizes them on a mass scale with the eventual aim of
producing enough surplus value to make a profit which remains in private hands.
". • • the excess of the value of the product over the value of its constituent
elements, is equal to the expansion of the capital advanced or to the surplusvalue produced." 6 This surplus value is produced by the proletariat, the class
which does not itself own any of the means of production but which operates
upon the means of production for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, the owning
class •
• • • the labourer works under the control of the capitalist to whom
his labour belongs • • • the product is the property of the capitalist
and not that of the labourer, its immediate producer • • • • The

0

5Maurice Cornforth, Histor-iaaZ Materialism (New York:
Publishers, 1962}, pp. 35 and 37.
p.

212.

6Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I (New York:

International

International Publishers, 1967),
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labour-process is a process between things that the capitalist has
purchased • • • • 7
The basis of profit in a capitalist society is surplus value, that is the difference between the cost of production, especially the cost of labour power
(to which all other costs can be reduced), and the eventual exchange-value of
the goods produced.

That difference becomes the profit, which remains in the

hands of the bourgeoisie.
Not only the mode of production, but also the development of the two
classes, bourgeoisie and proletariat, is crucial in defining a capitalist
economy.

Ghana in the colonial period did not reach a stage in which her pro-

duction was based on the use of capital, or the acting on constant capital by
variable capital in order to produce a surplus, 8 nor, as a consequence of this,
did a bourgeois or proletariat class develop.

Ghana was integrated into a

world trading system which was dominated by the full-fledged capitalist powers
of the West, and in which she played a peripheral role. 9

That role was one of

producing primary products, all of which were either mineral or agricultural
and which were sold to the capitalist nations; and of buying manufactured consumer products from the capitalist nations.

Within Ghana herself, certain

social differentiations resulted from this role in the world trading system.
However, it is certainly clear that the two defining classes of capitalist
society, a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, did not develop.

No class arose

which owned and controlled all of the means of production; no class took into

1Jbid., pp. 184-185.

0

8Marx defines constant capital as "That part of capital • • • which
does not, in the process of production, undergo any quantitative alteration of value." Ibid., p. 209. Conversely variable capital, which is labour
power, creates more than its own value.
9rn using the expressions "core" and "periphery" I am adopting the
terminology of Wallerstein, op. cit.
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its own hands land, labour, and capital.

Primarily, what developed in Ghana

was a class of traders who bought up indigenously-produced primary products
and sold them to the capitalist traders from Europe; and, on the other hand, a
class of peasant producers who were not dispossessed of the means of production, who retained land in their own hands, but who were differentiated into a
wealthy "Kulak-" 10 group which accumulated land-use rights and employed hired
labour, and a group of poorer peasants who often became debt-ridden and sometimes lost their usufruct.
A group of expatriate financiers and miners imposed itself upon Ghana,
but even this group cannot be considered to be a capitalist class within the
framework of the Ghanaian economy, although it obviously represented the overseas European capitalist class which dominated Ghana's import-export trade
economy.

This group, like the African traders, did not actually obtain control

of the means of production or even organize production, although an attempt at
obtaining such control was made in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries when legislation was introduced, but not passed, which would have
given the Government the right to sell land to European buyers. 11

Had this

legislation been passed, a new form of production, agricultural capitalism,
might have arisen, in which multinational corporations, based especially in
Britain, would have organized production of primary goods, in particular cocoa,
and then sold them on the world market.

However, as land remained in indigenous

hands, what occurred instead was the retention of a "trade economy" in which
these international companies bought produce but did not organize production.

1 OAm·~n,

0

op.

~'t

., p. 11 6•

llsee Chapter II.
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••• the concept of 'economie de traite' [trade economy] • • .
describes analytically the exchange of agricultural commodities
provided by a peripheral society • • • against the products of a
central capitalist industry (imported or produced on the spot by
European enterprises). 12
International companies did, however, organize the production of gold, and
later of manganese and bauxite, and in this regard one might argue for the
presence of a foreign capitalist class in Ghana.

It would be more precise,

however, to regard this group as outposts of the British capitalist class in
the colony, rather than as a capitalist class indigenous to the Ghanaian
economy.
In general, then, Ghana, while integrated into an international trading
system dominated by capitalist economies, did not herself become capitalist.
While the potential for capitalist development existed, the reality had not yet
matured; Ghana, in fact, was underdeveloped.

In analyzing Ghana's economy

during the colonial period, the term "development" should be used to define
capitalist growth in the Western imperialist nations, and "underdevelopment" to
define the lack of capitalist growth in Ghana.

Underdevelopment is not a

stagnant concept; rather, it is a concept which implies a process which is a
result of a certain relationship between core and peripheral countries.

Walter

Rodney defines this relationship in terms of capitalist exploitation.
All of the countries named as 'underdeveloped' in the world are exploited by others; and the underdevelopment with which the world is now
pre-occupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist, and colonialist
exploitation. African and Asian societies were developing independently
until they were taken over directly or indirectly by the capitalist
powers. When that happened, exploitation increased and the expoPt of
surplus ensued, depriving the societies of the benefit of their natural
resources and labour.l3
·

c

12Ami n,

op.

~•t

., p. 115.

1 3Rodney. How EUPOpe

4

.

•.••

, op. cit., p. 22, italics in original.
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It is not, therefore, simply the case that certain economies are underdeveloped because their precapitalist modes of economic formation have not yet
evolved into capitalist modes of economic formation.
tween undeveloped and underdeveloped economies.

One must distinguish be-

Undeveloped economies, in the

capitalist sense, are simply economies which have not yet moved from precapitalist to capitalist modes of production.

Underdeveloped economies are

economies which have been thwarted in their capacity to achieve capitalist
development by their relationships with alreaqy capitalist and imperialist
nations, which have made incursions upon their indigenous development with foreign economic and political control.

That is to sa;y, that had Ghana been able

to somehow deal on equal terms with Europeans without being subject to their
political control or to monopolistic and oligopolistic control of trade, shipping and banking, then Ghanaian potential capitalism might have evolved much
further than it evidently had by 1939.
Table 40 below summarizes the major structural characteristics of the
Ghanaian economy between 1886 and 1939 and the effects of this structure vn
indigenous development.

Until the mid-nineteenth century, there had been a

relatively large group of entrepreneurs in Ghana who were eager and able to
compete on relatively equal terms with Europeans.

These entrepreneurs were

progressively pushed out of the international trading system as Europeans took
over complete control.

At the same time, Ghana's capacity to develop her pro-

ductive processes was restrained by an oligopolistic system which insisted that
she should produce only cheap agricultural goods which were necessary for the
international market.

The resulting dependence on the international commodity

market ensured that Ghanaians would be unable to resume their former trading

0

position; while the European firms could make large speculative profits on the
international cocoa exchanges, the African traders were unable to use the market

Table 40.

Effects of Foreign Control
on the Ghanaian Econo~

Structural Characteristics

Import-export

econo~

Results
dependence on world commodity markets
dependence on imported goods
middleman trading class develops

Retention of land in African hands

underdevelopment of private property in
land
nondevelopment of a bourgeois propertied
class

Extractive agriculture

cash-crop production
differentiation of the peasantry
small agricultural labouring class

Oligopolistic control of:
Trade

agreements on prices
undercutting of.African sellers
undeveloped trading class

Banking

lack of credit to Africans

Shipping

monopoly price-setting and route-setting

Mining

small migrant mining labouring class

Government-business co-operation

0

north-south export-oriented transport
routes
currency preference to Europeans
transferability of profits
lack of--quality control
--crop diversification
--industrial investment
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for their own advantage at all.

The underdevelopment of Ghana was a result,

therefore, of a dynamic process in which developed capitalist nations, through
the relations of international trade, undermined any possibilities for the
development of an indigenous capitalist class.
What is being contended, therefore, is that Ghana, although she was integrated completely into the capitalist-dominated world market, and although
she traded extensively with capitalist countries, was not herself capitalist.
The mode of production was not yet capitalist; although many Ghanaians had been
at least partially integrated into a money economy, others were largely outside
it; in any case, although they traded with capitalists, the products which they
traded were produced in precapitalist agricultural units which had not yet been
centralized into private hands.

Ownership of land was still communal, although

the profits from individual usufructs were not returned to the community.
Finally, the relations of production were not yet capitalist insofar as neither
a small, centralized owning class nor a free, landless labouring class had yet
developed.
The basis for. the development of capital ism in Ghana could have been
laid had it not been for foreign economic and political control.

As it was,

Ghana remained only a marginal participant in the international trade economy;
her status as a colony ensured her inability to compete on equal terms in this
trading system.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, colonial

profits resembled profits made in Europe during the era of mercantilism.

Prof-

its were not yet internal to the system of production; that is, they were not
yet a function of the surplus value which resulted from the opposition of a

c

small, centralized capitalist class to a large, free wage-labour class; rather
they were based on exploitative trading contacts.
For many centuries Europe had engaged in international trade.

But until
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the beginnings of the process which finally resUlted in the development of
capitalism, much of this trade was only in preciosities, that is in very expensive, low-weight goods which could be transported over long distances and
still be sold at a profit, such as spices, jewels, and silks.

"At this epoch,

the relationship of Europe and Asia might be summed up as the exchange of preciosities.

The bullion flowed east to decorate the temples, palaces and

clothing of Asian aristocratic classes and the jewels and spices flowed
west. " 14

A change occurred in Europe when low-value, mass-produced goods such

as salt, glass, metal-wares, textiles, and various foods and fuels began to be
traded. 15

Such trade had many more linkage effects, demanding new investments

in transportation, new productive techniques, and most important, new organizers of producers into large manufactories.

To facilitate the expansion of

such production the state began to organize to help the capitalist class eliminate feudal barriers to free trade such as internal tolls, and to encourage
the development of a landless, propertyless proletariat instead of a landed
peasantry bound to the soil by feudal obligations.

Mercantilism was a stage in

European history in which the capacity for full-fledged capitalist control and
organization of production was being established.

By about 1750, mercantilist

Europe gave way to capitalist Europe, and an economy based on profits through
trade gave way to an economy based on profits through the exploitation of the
labour power of free wage-labourers.
In Ghana, the trade economy was still in existence in 1939.

That is, no

landless, propertyless class, selling its labour for wages, with the potential

1

c

~allerstein, op. ait., p.

41.

15For a description of the production of these new goods, see John U.

Nef, The Conquest of the Material Wo:r>Zd (Chicago:

1964), Chapter 4.

University of Chicago Press,
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to become a proletariat, had yet emerged (except for the few migrant labourers,
who actually retained land in their own home areas but who worked part of the
year in the mines, for the Government transport department, or on cocoa farms).
Nor was the Government interested in facilitating the development of a capitalist class which would eventually own and control all the means of production.
The Government's role, as the representative of a foreign power, was to prevent
such a development as it would result in an African class which would compete
with the European traders.

As a trade economy, Ghana resembled European

economies passing through the mercantilist stage on the way to capitalism, but
with one essential difference; one of the most important means of primitive
capital accumulation for European mercantilism was the acquisition of colonies, 16 but Ghana, far from acquiring colonies, was a colony herself.
The trade in cheap bulk commodities in the international marketplace did
not in fact create capitalism in Ghana; it simply created the potentiaZ for
capitalist development, a potential which was not realized.

The cheap bulk

commodities were exchanged for more expensive manufactured consumer goods; the
more Ghana adopted a monocultural pattern of production, and the more she
bought from Europe, the more dependent she became.
In theoretical terms, the basis of the profit extracted from the trade
relationship between Ghana and Europe was u."lequal exchange .1 7 The idea of unequal exchange is that it is fundamentally a noncapitalistic way to make
profits.

Profits within pure capitalism are made by the creation of a surplus;

that is, by the creation of a system in which the labourer sells his use value

c

16For the theory that colonies were necessary to capitalism, see Marx,
Capital, Vol. I, op. ait., Chapter 33, and V. I. Lenin, ImperiaUsm, the Highest
Stage of CapitaZism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969).
17The following argument on unequal exchange is based on Arghiri Emmanuel,
Unequa'l &ahange (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), especially Chapter 3.
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to a capitalist in return for payment of exchange value.

The amount of ex-

change value which a capitalist pays a labourer for his use value is much less
than the amount of exchange value which the labourer produces.

The difference

between the two exchange values constitutes surplus value, which is appropriated by the capitalist as profit.

Goods using the same amount of labour power

are then exchanged at equal rates; each of the two exchanging capitalists
making his profit from the difference between the price of the exchange and
the price of the labour power.
However, while this type of profit is made within capitalist nations
such as Britain or America, much profit is also made between nations (not necessarily capitalist) through unequal exchange.

When unequal exchange takes

place, goods which are of equal value in terms of the labour power which enters
into them are not exchanged for equal prices.

Rather, one costs far less on

the market than the other; the labour power, which is of equal use value in
both situations, is remunerated unequally.

Where both sides of the trade are

controlled by the same capitalist class, as in Ghana's export-import trade,
extra profits are made through this unequal remuneration of the producing
class.

The cost in terms of labour power might be far moPe for one of the

goods exchanged than for the other, yet the price offerred could be Zess.
In general, when "Third World" countries produce commodities for export,
the cost of producing the commodity is much higher than the cost to the buying
country of producing the manufactured goods with which it pays.

In other

words, a Ghanaian might sell lOO loads of cocoa in return for twelve bolts of
cloth.

The amount of labour power which goes into the production of the hun-

dred loads of cocoa might be far more than the amount of labour power,
including the labour power necessary for the manufacture of the machinery involved, which went into the production of the twelve bolts of cloth.

0

However,

because of monopoly control of trade, pricing agreements, and the foreign
domination of Ghana, the price offerred for the hundred loads of cocoa equals
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the price which the Ghanaian must pay for the twelve bolts of cloth.
The disparity described above, then, is known as unequaJ. exchange and
is the primary means of profit-making between capitalist and noncapitalist
nations, and was indeed the most important basis of profit-making in colonial
Ghana.

The quotation in which one official of the colonial Government main-

tained that Ghanaians should not be paid too much for their cocoa because they
did not have to bear the cost of machinery, overhead and organization which a
European plantation would have to bear, 18 is indicative of the kind of profitmaking based on unequal exchange which occurred in Ghana.

The official

completely ignored the costs of labour in production when discussing the final
price which should be paid to Ghanaian farmers even though the cost of labour
is of the essence in determining what should be the real exchange value of a
product; that is, there should be some correlation between exchange value and
use value in pricing.

"The prices of all comm.odi ties tend • • • to coincide

with their values.nl9
Those countries which profit from unequal exchange are often referred to
as "core" countries; those which provide such profits are often referred to as
"peripheral" countries.

The terminology of core and periphery has often been

used in this thesis, especially in Chapter
alization" of the Ghanaian economy.

rrr,·

which discusses the "peripher-

This terminology provides a means of

analyzing the kind of situation which occurs between developed capitalist nations and underdeveloped, noncapitalist nations within an international

0

18see Chapter VI. The exact quotation is 11 • • • natives • • • have not
such items as shareholders' dividends or the cost of European supervision to
bear, and, outside the actual cost of headload transport from the farms to the
railway, the money they receive from their crop is a clear profit." GCLegCo,
26 September 1916.
19Emmanuel, op. ait., p. 106.
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trading community.

A peripheral nation is a country which produces for the

benefit of capitalist nations without at the same time necessarily being capitalist itself.

It may be capitalist, or it may be in a transitional stage

between precapi talism and capitalism, as was colonial Ghana.

In this respect a

peripheral nation can be differentiated from a nation which would be entirely
outside of the capitalist-dominated trading network.

In precolonial times, for

example, there were economies in existence which had not yet entered into trade
with Europe, or which were not producing in any organized way for the capitalist market.
Wallerstein introduces the concept of plunder, which he regards as a relationship between two economies in which one plunders the other for its goods
without regard to the effects on its internal production or social organization.
A country which is simply plundered by the capitalist nations can be considered
to be an "external arena."

"

• profit [ s] by trade in an external arena

~ •• when all is said and done, are those of plunder. " 20

The external arena,

postulates Wallerstein, is not yet integrated into the world capitalist economy
(or as this author contends, the capi talist-dcminated world economy).

Never-

theless, once a country starts to organize production for sale in the capitalist-dominated world trading system, and once it also becomes a customer for the
foreign capitalist nations, then it becomes a peripheral nation.

For example,

Wallerstein reasons that once the Spanish and Portuguese began to organize
plantation production in North and South America, their relationship to Europe
changed.

" • • • the Americas became the periphery of the European world-

economy in the sixteenth century while Asia remained an external arena. " 21

0

20Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 334-35.
2 1Jbid., p.

336, italics in original.

The
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function of the periphery is to produce cheap bulk commodity goods for the international trading system.
Wallerstein argues that the defining mode of production in a peripheral
economy is cash-crop production for the capitalist marketplace.

He contends

further that such cash-crop production indicates that the peripheral economy is
itself capitalist. 22

The debate on whether cash-crop trading economies are

capitalist or not has been of consuming interest in analyzing the so-called
"second serfdom" in Eastern Europe and the forms of labour control in the

hacienda of Latin America. 23

It is relevant in the context of Ghana because if

one postulates that the mode of production in Ghana was cash-crop production
for the marketplace, then one must make it quite clear that one does not necessarily therefore wish to imply that Ghana was capitalist.

This author argues

that an economy is not capitalist until the internal mode of production and
relations of production are capitalist, that is until two social classes, a
bourgeoisie and proletariat, develop.

Thus a peripheral nation can well be a

cash-crop-producing nation, that is a nation which produces agricultural crops
which are sold for cash in the international marketplace, without being capitalist.
The international marketplace itself, moreover, is not always necessarily capitalist; at certain times it is dominated by a capitalist economic

system, but at other times it may be dominated by a noncapitalist system.
Different types of economic systems may co-operate with one another in

22Ib'd
1- • ,

0

pp. 91- 92 •

23 For Eastern Europe, see Paul M. Sweezy, et at., The Transition fPom
Feudalism to Capitalism: A Symposium (New York: Science and Society, 1967).
For Latin America see the debate between Ernesto Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America," New Left Review, no. 67 (May-June 1971), and Frank, op.

cit.
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international trade.

The trading network itself does not have to be of one

system or another; all known economic systems with the exception of primitive
communal societies producing only for use value have been observed to engage in
international trade.

Therefore a peripheral nation which trades with a core

nation in the international capitalist-dominated marketplace is not necessarily
itself capitalist.

During the period under discussion in this thesis, Ghana

was· a peripheral country producing cash crops for the international marketplace,
but she did not herself have a capitalist economy.
The question may be asked; what is the point of discussing the kind of
economic formation which occurred in Ghana?

It must be seen that this question

is of the essence to understand the internal developments of Ghana during the
colonial period.

Ghana's underdevelopment reflected an international imperial-

ist system in which developed capitalist nations acquired colonies primarily in
order to further facilitate their ability to produce and to make capitalist
profits.

One of the first theories of the interrelationship between capitalism

and imperialism was that written by V. I. Lenin,

of CapitaZism. 24

Imperialism~

the Highest Stage

In this, Lenin posited several reasons for the acquisition of

colonies by capitalist nations, some of which apply to Ghana.
One of the most important of these, of course, was that colonies should
provide raw materials which could be used for production in the imperialist
economy.

Ghana provided such raw materials in the form of cocoa, palm oil,

palm kernels, timber, and other crops , and also in the form of minerals.

A

characteristic of this use of colonies for raw materials, Lenin r,easoned,
was the cartelization of raw materials buyers in the late nineteenth century.
These buyers tried to capture raw materials sources so that they could obtain a

0
24ap.

oit.
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dominant position over the manufacturers of capitalist Europe.
• • • the industries which process raw materials • • • not only secure
advantages from the cartel formation in the shape of high profits, to
the detriment of the finished goods industry, but secured also a
dominating position over the latter~ which did not exist under free
competition. 2 5
This is certainly a more than adequate description of the development of
Ghana's cocoa export trade during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Extreme cartelization of the buying of cocoa and attempts by these

cartelized buyers to obtain control over production by controlling the commodity markets in cities such as London and New York, were combined with attempts
to take over or bring into their cartelized system companies which had previously been solely concerned with

manufacture~

such as Cadbury.

Ghana's major

function was to be a source of raw materials for this type of international
cartelized trading group.
A second function of

colonies~

markets for the capitalist powers.
goods was typical of capitalism.

Lenin postulated, was to provide new

He argued that the export of manufactured
"England became a capitalist country before

any other, and by the middle of the nineteenth century, having adopted free
trade, claimed to be the 'workshop of the world', the purveyor of manufactured
goods to all countries, which in exchange were to keep her supplied with raw
materials." 26

There was an ever-growing need for a constantly-expanding market

because of the fact that there were not enough buyers within the capitalist
nations themselves to support capitalist production.

Overproduction of manu-

factured goods had as its counterpart the underconsumption of those same goods
as fewer workers were employed in the machine-dominated factories.

0

2 5Ib£d., p. 27, italics in original.
26

Ibid., P• 72.
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Underconsumptionism was a serious problem in late nineteenth and early twentieth century capitalist nations because the more that the organic composition of
capital (that is, the ratio of fixed to variable capital) increased, the fewer
workers were needed, the more unemployment grew in Europe, and therefore the
more need there was to find other people, in colonies, for example, to buy.
11

[T]he growing extent of the means of production • • • is an expression of the

growing productiveness of labour.

The increase of the latter appears, there-

fore, in the diminution of the mass of labour in proportion to the mass of
means of production moved by it ••

1127

By encouraging Ghanaians to produce crops such as cocoa, the Europeans
ensured that Ghana would enter the monetary economy and that Ghanaians would
have the cash and the desire to buy new goods.

Also, because they no longer

produced all of the goods which. they used, they would have to buy from the
capitalist producers (for example, Ghanaiar.s started to buy cloth, pots and
containers, salt and sugar, all of which they had previously produced on their
own).

Africans were encouraged to bring their produce into European stores and

then to immediately spend the money which they were paid on imported consumer
goods from those same shops.

Both Africans and Europeans were discouraged from

producing anything within the colony which might compete with the imported consumer goods.

Hence, for example, it was important that Ghanaians bought

imported cloth instead of making their own cloth:

it was also important that

the Government would not encourage diversification into any enterprise not
solely concerned with the production of raw materials.

Thus even such small

projects as the internal production of beer met with opposition.28
A third function which Lenin maintained the colonies fulfilled was that

c

27 Marx,

Capital., Vol. I, op. ait., p. 622.
28see Chapter VI.
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of providing

11

super-profits 11 for the capitalist world.

" ••• superprofits

• • • are obtained over and above the profits which the capitalists squeeze out
of the workers of their 'own' country. • • . "2 9 These supeP-profits could be
defined in two ways:

first, as profits from unequal exchange {which has al-

ready been considered); second, as the antidote to the constantly decreasing
rate of profit within the capitalist world.30

That is, while the absolute

amount of profit might be rising, the rate was decreasing, as a function of the
fact that less and less labour power was being exploited.

Since profit came

solely from surplus value, or from the difference between a labourer's cost of
use value and his capacity to produce exchange value, as fewer and fewer
labourers, proportionate to the expansion of capital, were employed in Europe
the rate of profit declined.
In the colonial countries, however, the rate of exploitation of labour
power was higher because the overall organic composition of capital was much
more weighted in favour of variable capital.

Therefore, Lenin argued, the rate

of profit was higher.in countries such as Ghana than in Europe.

However, this

particular function of providing colonial super-profits in Ghana was not very
essential because in fact production per se, organized by Europeans, was nonexistent except in the mines.

Therefore, Ghana's role with regard to super-

profits was to produce them as a function of unequal exchange between primary
commodity goods and imported manufactured goods, rather than as a function of
her participation in capitalist production.

29Lenin, op. cit., p. 9, italics in original.
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30Michael Barratt Brown, in The Economics of
Penguin Books, 1974), presents data which indicate
profit on industrial capital in the United Kingdom
from about sixteen per cent to twelve per cent, p.

Imperialism (Middlesex:
that the average rate of
from 1865 to 1913 declined

176.
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Finally, Lenin posits two more uses for colonies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which are of lesser importance when
analyzing Ghana.

The first of these was the provision of employment opportuni-

ties for the rapidly increasing mass of unemployed in the capitalist West, both
through emigration to colonies and through manufacture connected with processing of raw materials imported from the empire. 31

Few Europeans chose to

emigrate to Ghana, although she did perhaps take some of the unemployed overflow in the British military, and later the civil service, establishment.

She

did, nevertheless, provide employment for those working in the chocolate- and
palm-oil-processing factories of Europe.
Secondly, Lenin maintains that colonies were used as outlets for finance
capital:

that as the absolute amount of profit in the capitalist world rose,

it became more and more necessary for the capitalist investors to find new
outlets for their idle wealth.

An essentially parasitic class arose in Britain

which was only concerned with living off profits from passive portfolio investments.

"The export of capital, one of the most essential economic bases of

imperialism, • • • isolates the rentiers from production and sets the seal of
parasitism on the whole country that lives by exploiting the labour of several
" overseas countries and colonies.n 32

This argument is often made about North

America, specifically in the sense that the railways were built with the investment funds of this parasitic class which wanted an outlet for its profits.
It does not, however, seem the case that one of Ghana's functions in the imperial system was to act as an outlet for capital.

As shown in Chapter VI, the

amount of investment in trading establishments in Ghana was minimal.

c

31 Lenin,

op. oit., pp. 127 and 123.

32Ibid., p.

120.
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Furthermore, the amount of construction of railroads was minimal; this construction was usually done not by private entrepreneurs but by Government
contracts, and the financing of the Government indicates that very little
capital came from loans raised on the London market.

Most of its financing

came from import and export duties and other taxes paid within Ghana, although
it could be reasoned that the financing of the actual railways was done primarily through loans.

Nevertheless, as compared to other countries which might

have provided an outlet for surplus finance capital in Europe, Ghana's role was
minimal.

Michael Barratt Brown indicates in fact, in his consideration of

Lenin's thesis, that perhaps this aspect of finance capital has been overstressed as regards Britain's colonies.

His statistics indicate that most

surplus finance capital was invested not in colonies but in other capitalist
countries, or in highly-developed former colonies such as Canada and South
Africa. 33
Ghana's situation as a colony meant that on the whole her underdevelopment was even more pronounced than it would have been had she remained in a
neocolonial situation or in a situation in 'tvhich, although she was economically
dominated by Britain, she was not under her political control.

Andre Gunder

Frank, in his Capitatiem and Dnderdevetopment in Latin Ameriaa,34 provides an
interesting and comprehensive model of the type of underdevelopment which
occurs in peripheral economies which are not under the direct political control
of a foreign power.

Such independent peripheral economies have a greater

chance of developing on the road to capitalism, and of developing bourgeois and
proletarian classes, than do colonial economies.

0

33B rown , op. en.•t • , p • 190.
340p.

ait.

Indeed, a refinement of the
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term periphery to distinguish these differing internal developments might be
apposite; one might distinguish between precapitalist and capitalist peripheries, for example.
In his study, Frank considers the problems of "backward" agriculture,
poor production techniques, and the general situation of export-oriented production and foreign investment in and domination of industry.

However, his

model indicates that, unlike in Ghana, a fairly strong compradOr bourgeois
class was able to develop in Latin America.

That is, that to a certain extent

an indigenous class arose in Latin America which concentrated the means of
production in its own hands; which developed large plantations; which dispossessed large numbers of indigenous producers from the soil, forcing them to
evolve into a proletarian class,

working without land for wages on large

plantations or else in the cities; and which eventually began itself to invest
in capitalist mass production in the urban centres.

The rise of this class was

facilitated because Latin American states obtained their political independence
in the early nineteenth century, and because Latin America was a settled territory in which a white or mestizo group emerged which had extensive trading and
personal connections with Europe.

In other words, political independence meant

that primitive capital accumulation was more possible in Latin America than in
Africa.

Moreover, more credit was available to Latin American traders than was

ever available to Africans, whose skin colour and lack of established property
acted to their disadvantage in their relationships with British bankers.

The

Latin American trading class had the resources to organize production on its
own, although it was always dominated by core country industrialists and traders, first from Britain (as the inheritor of Spain and Portugal) and later from

0

the United States.

Such domination permeated the African traders much more

completely than the Latin Americans.

4o4

c

A colonial economy such as Ghana could not develop an indigenous

oomprador bourgeoisie to the same extent that it could be developed in Latin
America.

First, Ghana moved very rapidly from a precapitalist economy into a

cash-crop economy in which she was·still not capitalist but in which, on the
other hand, she had lost some of her precapitalist roots.
developed than Latin America.
political control.

She was more un-

Secondly, Ghana was under direct foreign

This direct political control implied a much closer co-

operation between the governing elite and the foreign economic elite.

In Latin

America, governments swayed between co-operation with the outside economic
elite and encouraging of indigenous

growth~

but in all cases there was a dis-

tinction between the Government of the Latin American country and the
Government of the country of origin of the external economic elite.
In Ghana, there were two external elites, one political and one economic, which co-operated very closely.

The colonial Government of Ghana was not

always in complete accord with the wishes of the external British-dominated
economic elite.

Several instances have been recorded of discord between the

two groups, especially when the civil servants who directed the Government
considered it their duty to assume the "White Man's Burden" and, to some extent
at least, to protect the "native" from exploitation by the cartelized European
fir.ms.

However~

in any case of severe conflict the desires of the economic

elite took precedence, and the external political elite was obliged to give in.
Projects for capitalist development initiated by the external political
elite were usually thwarted by opposition from the external economic elite,
which had extensive ties with the home Government, especially with the Colonial
Office, the final arbiter in any case of conflict.

0

The Colonial Office, while

it also was not completely dominated by economic interests, nevertheless perceived its function as that of preservation of the Empire as an economic unit
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which would maintain England at the top of the competitive international capitalist system.

It therefore encouraged the external economic elite and

discouraged any competitive outgrowths in colonies such as Ghana, whose
primary function was to provide raw materials for the capitalist Government and
not to compete in any way with existing industry in Britain.
It was for this reason that the colonial Government did not, on the
whole, discourage the growth of oligopolistic control of Ghana's trade.

The

Government's objection to the cocoa Agreement of 1937-38 was not that it exploited Africans but that it held up the system of production and the system of
importing essential goods into England.

Up until the boycott, the Government,

although well aware of the growth of oligopolistic trading practices and
oligopolistic control of shipping and banking, investigated these practices
only when complaints were instituted by other Europeans, especially by other
British traders, against the British firms who controlled these cartelized
organizations.

The Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, 3 5 for instance, was

primarily interested in investigating complaints which had been made against
the two large shipping companies by small British trading firms.

It was not

investigating the effects of this kind of cartelization on African shippers.
Similarly, in 1930, when there was a boycott of the cocoa buyers, the Government did not hesitate to impose legal constraints on African organization while
encouraging European organization in restraint of trade.

The boycott of

1930-31 was not successful enough to warrant Government concern with the issue
of oligopolistic buying.
Monopoly per se was not considered, within Britain, to be an illegitimate means of organizing trade in the best interests of the Empire.

c

35 0p.

ait.
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conflicts between manufacturers in Manchester, shippers in Liverpool, and financiers in London might result in Government investigations, but only in order
to keep capitalist competition on a fairly peaceful footing within Britain itself.

Monopoly control of the economies of Britain's colonies was considered

natural, inevitable and valuable within the context of the overall goals of the
Empire.
Because of this monopoly control, however, circumstances arose in Ghana
under which it was almost impossible for the kind of comprador bourgeoisie
which developed in Latin America to evolve.

The monopolists who controlled

trade made sure that the African role was confined to that of middleman.
African entrepreneurs bought cocoa from indigenous producers and sold it to
European firms, or they bought it on a commission basis on behalf of those
firms.

They also bought goods which were imported by Europeans and then sold

them to other Africans.

Thus an extensive parasitic trading group arose in

Ghana, a group with many gradations, each of which took its tiny share of
trading profits.

This group mediated between the Ghanaian producer and consumer

and the European exporter and importer.

It was not, however, given the chance

to realize its own economic potential.

The middleman role did not include, as

it did in Latin America, the actual organization of production.

Nor did it

include direct contacts with the ultimate European buyers who would process
exported commodity goods.

There were no linkages which might result in the

development of an internal market to offset reliance on the export-import
economy.

The traders were strictly confined to their middleman role, and their

earnings from this role were most uneven because of the subjection of Ghana's
trade to the fluctuations of the international commodity markets.

0

But it must not therefore be assumed that this group of Ghanaians was
not possessed of the potential to develop, had the situation been more

favourable.
skills.

It was not a question of Ghanaians' lacking entrepreneurial

The most prominent organizers of the two cocoa boycotts of 1930-31 and

1937-38 were Ghanaians who wished to break out of their middleman role and become exporters and importers in their own right, with their own connections
with the European and American markets, to avoid the European middleman role
between the ultimate European consumer and the original African producer.
Africans demonstrated considerable entrepreneurial ability, in the face of all
odds, throughout the colonial period.

However, because they could not obtain

access to banking and shipping facilities, and because they were not privy to
agreements in restraint of trade which set prices on both produced goods and
imported goods, they could not compete on equal terms.

The development of

their entrepreneurial skills took place within the constraint of the parasitic
economic role which they played as middlemen.

Thus their capacity to develop

from traders into capitalist organizers of production, a development which took
place over the space of 300 years in early capitalist Europe, was thwarted.
Without this kind of capitalist class, underdevelopment as a whole continued in
Ghana.
It is in this context that the argument made in Chapter II, that the
necessity to defend traditional rights to·property against the incursions of
the Europeans in the long run inhibited the growth of capitalism, is crucial.
There are some indications that property in land among Africans was growing in
the late nineteenth century, and that Africans were acquiring private plots for
productive use in the emerging cash-crop economy.

Where urban areas were es-

tablished, Ghanaians who controlled land developed an interest in acquiring
outright property rights so that they could rent it or sell it at its new in-

0

flated value.

Had the British Government not tried to take over land, the

African elite might not have adopted the position that above all it wished to

408
preserve communal ownership.
Had communal ownership not been preserved, had instead Africans been
able to acquire land in their own right, then the result might have been the
development of a proletariat class similar to that in England.

In England the

development of the proletariat was primarily facilitated by the enclosures of
farmland for wool, which resulted in the throwing off of peasants from land
which they had formerly cultivated in perpetuity, and in the consequent creation of a landless wage-earning class.

Such a landless wage-earning class in

Ghana would have constituted the basis of a proletariat which could have been
used for capitalist agriculture.

When the African capitalist agricultural

class had developed enough to have large profits, it could then have invested
in capitalist manufacturing production using the landless agricultural class as
its basis for industrial labour.

Development of indigenous capitalist produc-

tion might therefore have occurred in Ghana, very similar to the process which
occurred two centuries previously in Europe.

But without either a bourgeois

or a proletariat class, Ghana did not enter capitalist production and could not
be considered a capitalist nation.

The chance for primitive capital accumula-

tion which could have resulted in advanced capitalism based on production of a
surplus by a proletariat, a surplus which could then be appropriated by the
bourgeoisie, was denied this potential Ghanaian entrepreneurial class.
One must conclude, therefore, that Ghana's colonial status was directly
responsible for her inability to compete on equal terms in the world capitalist
marketplace.

Implicit in this conclusion there is the assumption that the

kinds of monopolistic mechanisms of control imposed on Ghana from the outside
resulted in her underdevelopment.

0

In a processual, dynamic manner, Ghana's

potential for development was checked.

Ghana was denied the opportunity to be-

come a capitalist nation in her own right, and her economy therefore could not

progress as it might otherwise have done.

The consistent denial to African

entrepreneurs and traders of opportunities to compete with Europeans on an
equal basis meant the denial of opportunities to make profits which might eventually have resulted in their formation as a bourgeois class.

Because they

could not form as a bourgeois class, similarly no proletariat class could
develop.
The imposition of expatriate control on Ghana and the types of resistance which this imposition incurred, resulted in underdevelopment.
resistance did achieve the preservation of African land rights.

African

This, al-

though partly also a result of British Government policy, meant that foreign
capitalists could not establish an expatriate agricultural capitalist class
within Ghana's own boundaries.

At the same time, however, an indigenous

capitalist class, based on private ownership of the means of production, especially land, did not develop.

African resistance to trade, while often

well-organize(l, was in the end fUtile, because Ghana could not break out of the
international capitalist-dominated trading system.

Therefore, on the whole,

resistance, while evident within the period of capitalist incursion, failed.
Similarly, the attempts of Ghanaians to compete in the international trading
system and therefore to develop, within their country, the capacity for capitalist growth, failed.
Ultimately, both the economy and the indigenous farmers and traders were
subject to the: control of an external elite and an expatriate capitalist class
which preferred to maintain Ghana in a peripheral role within the world
capitalist-dominated economic system.

0
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APPENDIX A
West African Firms Incorporated into the United
Africa Co:n.Pany .(to 1938) 1
1.

Companies Acguired or Formed by the
African and ~a?tern Trade Corporation
Limited (1919-1928)
Angola Land Company Limited ( 1922)
African Mahogany Association Limited (1919}
African Traders Company Limited ( 1919)
Ambas Bay Trading Company Limited (1920)
African and Eastern (Spain) Limited (1923)
Bai Rubber and Cocoa Estates Limited (1920)
British Nigeria Company Limited (1919)
Crombie Steedman and Company Limited ( 1920)
Egwanga Limited ( 1920)
Gold Coast Machinery and Trading Company Limited (1920)
Gold Coast Petroleum Limited (1926)
Hatton and Cookson Limited {1919)
Kingsway Chemists Limited (1928)
Lagos Stores Limited (1919)
Ma.'la Company Limited (1920)
Millers Nigerian Estates Limited (1920)
McNeill Scott and Company Limited (1920)
McLaren Brothers (Manchester) Limited (1926)
Nigerian Products Limited (1920)
Nigerian Motors Limited (1920)
Pesquerias de San Cristobal S.A. (1926)
Standard Mahogany Company Limited ( 1919)
Takoradi Coaling and Lighterage Company Limited (1926)
Tarquah Trading Company Limited (1920}
West African Publicity Limited (1928)
W. D. Woodin and Company Limited (1919)

2.

Companies Acguired or Formed by the
C.ompan;y Limited (1899-1919)

Ni~er

African Products Development Company Limited (1918)
Company of African Merchants Limited (1917)
Compagnie du Niger Fran~ais S.A. (1913)
G. W. Christian and Company Limited (1919)
R. Hassan and Company Limited ( 1916)

c

1Source: UAC Rankin file. Dates are dates of acquisition of companies,
or dates of formation in the case of new companies.
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3.

Companies Acquired by Lever Brothers
Limited (1900-1921)
Bathu.rst Trading Company Limited (1918)
Cavalla River Company Limited (1912)
Compagnie Proprietaire du Kouilou Niari, S.A. (1911)
R. and W. King Limited (1918)
W. B. Mciver and Company Limited (1921)
Palm Oil Estates Managers Limited (1919)
P. Ratcliffe and Company Limited (1912)
Sedec, S.A. (1912)
John Walkden and Company Limited (1917)

4.

African Oil Nuts Company Limited (1920)
African Timber Company Limited {192 5)
Compagnie Fran~aise de la C5te d'Ivoire, S.A. (1926)
Gambia Trading Company Limited (1922)
Lever Stores (later Opobo Stores) Limited (1922)
Niger l.fineral Development Company Limited (1922)
Pickering and Berthoud Limited (1926)
Societe Mini~re du Niger Fran~ais, S.A. (1926)
Thomas Brothers (Liverpool) Limited (1922)
Trading Association of Nigeria Limited (1922)
T. Welsh and Company Limited {1929)
Weeks Transport and Engineering Company Limited (1927)
West African Motors Limited (1926)
Voltaland Limited (1923)

5. Companies Acguired or Formed by the United
Africa Company (1222-1938)

c.

The Aleppo Company Limited (1932)
Anglo-Guinea Produce Company Limited (1930}
Anglo-African Aerated Waters Limited (1929)
The Beyrout Trading Company Limited {1931)
The Gold Coast Machinery and Trading Company Limited (1931)
Jurgens Colonial Products Limited (1932)
Kingsway Chemists Limited (1931)
The Lebanon Trading Company Limited (1932)
Millers Swanzy Limited ( 1929)
N. R. Caterers Limited (1929)
Nigerian Motors Limited (1931)
Nouvelle Societe Commerciale Africaine, S.A. (1932)
The Ologbo Timber Company Limited (1935)
Palmine Limited (1932}
Schweizerisch Afrikanische Handelsgesellschaft (1935)
Societe de l'Exploitation des Acajous Bassam, S.A. (1935)
Societe Forestiere de Niari, S.A. (1936)
Societe Forestiere de Tabou et du Cavally, S.A. (1935)
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Takoradi Coaling and Lighterage Company Limited (1931)
United Agencies, S.A. (1937)
West African Motors Limited (1931)
Anchor Limited (1937)
Commercial Development Company Limited (1937)
Elmina Limited (1937)
Gold Coast Properties Company Limited (1934)
Nigerian Properties Company Limited (1933)
Pamol Limited (1936)
Sherbro Limited {1937)

APPENDIX B
Interlocking Directorships in the West Africa Trade:
Selected Examples 1885-1935 1

2.

Director

Directorships

Elder, Alexander

British and African Steam Navigation Company
Limited*
Pacific Steam Navigation Company

Godfrey, Joseph S.

African Steam Ship Company*
East Indian Railway Company
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Company

Mirrlees, J. B.

British and African Steam Navigation Company
Limited*
Clydesdale Bank Limited

Watson, William R.

British and African Steam Navigation Company
Limited*
Glasgow and South Western Railway Company

1895
Director

Directorships

Cookson, Edward H.

African Association Limited*
Maritime Insurance Company Limited

Mi~ls,

Hon. Charles W.

Rogerson, Thomas Stanley

Royal Niger Company Limited*
Anglo-Austrian Bank
Imperial Ottoman Bank
North British and Mercantile Insurance Company
Railway Passenger's Assurance Company
African Association Limited*
Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Company
Limited

1This list i3 selected from 380 directors of major British firms in
Ghana, from 1885 to 1935. It is designed to demonstrate the ty~es of interlocks which existed between West African companies and outside companies,
including mines, resource development firms, insurance companies, banks, transport firms, and others. The list is by no means complete. Source: Direatory

of Direators (1885,1895,1905,1915,1925,1935).
*Indicates firms involved in the West Africa trade.
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1905
Director

Directorships

Byas, Edward Hegley

Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Limited*
A. and F. Pears Limited

Coke, Henry

Bank of British West Africa*
Imperial Bank of Persia

Duncannon, Viscount

Ashanti Goldfields Corporation Limited*
Bovril Limited
London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway
Company

Hillingdon, Lord

Niger Company Limited*
Egyptian Government Irrigation Trust Certificates

Ingram, Sir Herbert

West African Mahogany, Petroleum, and Gold
Company Limited*
Angle-French Quicksilver and Mining Concession
of China Limited

4. 1915
Director

Directorships

Beazley, Eidwin A.

African Association Limited*
Great Central Railway Company

Bessborough, the Earl of

Ashanti Goldfields Corporation*
Bank of Roumania Limited

Catling, Charles E.

West African Mahogany, Petroleum, and Gold
Company Limited*
Societe Fran~aise de Petrole Limited

Cotterell, Harry

Association Limited*
Bai Rubber and Cocoa Estates Limited
Forum River (Nigeria) Tin Company Limited

Hughes, Thomas Rowland

African Association Limited*
Canadian Dominion Development Limited
Canadian Resources Development Limited

Milner, Viscount

Bank of British West Africa*
London Joint Stock Bank Limited
Rio Tinto Company Limited

Nicholl, Lt.-Col. William

African Association Limited*
Congo Exploration Company Limited

Afric~~
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0

Pirrie, Lord

Eastern Telegraph Company Limited
Elder, Dempster and Company Limited*
London and South-West Railway Company
London and Glasgow Engineering and Iron
Shipbuilding Company Limited
London City and Midland Bank Limited
Scottish Widow's Fund Life Assurance Society

Director

Directorships

Bell, E. Hyslop

Niger Company*
Deptford Dry Docks Company Limited
Tyne Dock Engineering Company Limited

Bicker-Caarten, E.

Compagnie Belge Maritime du Congo
Elder, Dempster and Company Limited*

Cadbury, Edward

British Cocoa and Chocolate Company Limited*
Daily News Limited

Campbell, Colin Algernon

Colonial Bank*
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporatic,n
London Assurance
Westminster Bank Limited

Carisbrooke, Marquess of

Lever Brothers Limited*
Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam
Navigation Company Limited

Cassels, George Cyril

Bank of Montreal (France)
Colonial Bank*

Dickinson, Robert Edmund

Bank of British West Africa*
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited

Du

0

Buis son, Thomas

Colonial Bank*
Antigua Sugar Factory Limited
St. Kitt's (Basse Terre) Sugar Factory Limited

Fox, Sir Gilbert Wheaton

Colonial Bank*
Guardian Assurance Company Limited

Greenhalgh, Harold Robert

Lever Brothers Limited*
Planters Foods Limited

Rambling, Sir Herbert

Colonial Bank*
Imperial AirH"ays Limited

Harris, Sir Austin Edward

Bank of British West Africa*
Itabira Iron Ore Company Limited
Lloyds Bank Limited
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c

Henriques, David Q.

Bank of British West Africa*
London and Foreign Banking Corporation Limited
Rubber Estates of Ceylon Limited

Nicholl, Lt.-Col. William

African and Eastern Trade Corporation Limited*
African Mahogany Association Limited*
Angola Land Company Limited

Pollard, George Arthur

J. Iqons and Company Limited*
Jersey Tomato and Fruit Preserves Limited

Sanders, Sir Edgar
Christian

Lafon River Tin Areas (Nigeria) Limited
MacFisheries Limited
Niger Company Limited*

Selbourne, Earl of

Bank of British West Africa*
Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company
Limited

Sharp, La-urence Mort on

Elder, Dempster and Company Limited*
Yselhaven Wharf(Rotterdam) Limited

Tatlow, Charles Ed.mund

Lever Brothers Limited*
New Transvaal Chemical Company Limited

Wargrave, the Rt.-Hon. Lord Colonial Bank*
Rolls-Royce Limited

6.

c

1935
Director

Directorships

Beatty, Alfred Chester

American Metal Company Limited
Consolidated African Selection Trust Limited*
Consolidated Diamond l~nes of South West
Africa Limited
Rhodesian Selection Trust Limited
Sierre Leone Selection Trust Limited

Cadbury,

Bristol Gas Company
British Cocoa and Chocolate Company Limited*
J. S. Fry and Sons Limited*

F.~gbert

Cripps, Hon. H. L.

China Mutual Steam Navigation Company Limited
Elder, Dempster Lines Limited*

Eley, Sir Frederick

Bank of British West Africa Limited*
Cross and Blac~well Limited
Waldorf Hotel Company Limited

Foa, Raoul Hector

Barclays Bank Dominion Colonial and Overseas*
British Bank of South America Limited
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Greenha.lgh, Harold Robert

United Africa Company Limited*
Southern WhaJ..ing and Sealing Company Limited

Hoare, 0. V. G.

Barclays Bank Dominion Colonial and Overseas*
Gold Coast Selection Trust Limited*
Suchi Timber Company Limited

Hol t, Sir Richard Durning

Mersey Docks and Harbour Board
Elder, Dempster Lines Limited*
Martins Bank Limited

Jones, David

Port of London Authority
Atlantic Coaling Company
Elder Line Limited*

Oppenheimer, Sir Ernest

Barclays Bank Dominion Colonial and Overseas*
Companhia de Diamantes d'Angola
de Beers Consolidated Mines Limited
Gold Coast Exploration Limited*
Rhodesian Anglo-American Limited

Oppenheimer, Louis

Consolidated African Selection Trust Limited*
Northern Rhodesia Power Company Limited
Rand Selection Corporation Limited

Pearson, John Westall

British Extracting Company Limited
British Oil a~d Cake Mills Limited
Lever Brothers Limited*

Pusch, Emile

Lazard Brothers and Company
Barclays Bank Dominion Colonial and Overseas*

Tennant, Robert Hugh

Bank of British West Africa*
Brampton Brewer~ Company Limited
Westminster Bank Limited

Wilson, Sir Roderick Roy

Bank of British West Africa*
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited
Waldorf Hotel Company Limited
West African Currency Board (member)

